

**SECURITIZATION OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE IN RWANDA
IN 1990-1994**

**LA SÉCURISATION DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE AU RWANDA
ENTRE 1990-1994**

A Thesis submitted to the Division of Graduate Studies
of the Royal Military College of Canada
by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of
Security and Defence Management and Policy

April 2016

Acknowledgements

I would firstly like to thank Dr. David Last for taking me on as a student and for his incredible support and feedback throughout this process. I am very grateful for his advice, insight and guidance. Dr. Last continued to be encouraging even when I was not sure I would ever get this thesis done.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Esther de Vos, Kim Mah, and Jessica Ellison, all former supervisors. I am fortunate enough to have worked for three brilliant women in my short career as a public servant, who have given me encouragement and time off work (when necessary) to complete this thesis. Kim Mah's enthusiasm for my ability to complete this thesis and for my career in general is a true reflection of what I have learned from her.

I would obviously like to thank my family for their love and support during this very long process. My Mum, Cathy Benson-Jestin, has been my biggest supporter and is perhaps the only person who really understood my grief in leaving Rwanda the first time. She has reminded me of my abilities, worried about me, listened to me, and pushed me to do better my entire life. She is truly the spine of this thesis. My Dad, Ryan Jestin, who has inspired me, encouraged me, and supported me, all while making me laugh. My sisters, Shayley and Shelby, who are my most favorite people and who have always taken an interest and have let me vent throughout this process. To my friends: Chantal, Celeste, Sheri, Ana – you keep me sane and your excitement for me has meant the world. In particular, Celeste, thank you for talking through this with me a million times. Ryerson, you're right – I'm obsessed with you. Thank you for your support and encouragement and for listening to me when I complain. Thank you for believing in me. I love you.

Finally, I am grateful to my friends in Rwanda who have welcomed me into their homes, who have shared their stories with me, and who have shown me their beautiful country. I am in awe of your strength and my heart continues to live in Rwanda.

Abstract

Prior to and during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the French government financially and militarily supported the extremist regime, turning a blind eye to the ethnic cleansing that took place. Why? This study examines the French intervention in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide through the lens of the securitization theory. Linguistic and semiotic analysis of documents from the French presidency and foreign ministry are used, then discourse analysis of press statements and newspaper editorials to demonstrate that the securitization of the French language in the Great Lakes region of Africa drove French policy. The concept of securitization, and the use of semiotic and discourse analysis are shown to be useful tools to understand the motivations for, and justification of, external intervention in an internal conflict. These tools can be used to gain perspective on actions taken, and can be used as a lens to frame the issue and to think about extraordinary measures. Notwithstanding, the analysis also demonstrates that a successful securitization is a snapshot in time. For a brief moment, the French Government managed to convince the French public that intervention on behalf of the French language in Africa was a good idea. However, hindsight allows us to observe that, since the expiry of the mandate of Opération Turquoise, further questions have been raised and France is often accused of being complicit and/or of aiding in the genocide.

Résumé

Avant et pendant le génocide au Rwanda en 1994, le gouvernement français a soutenu financièrement et militairement le régime extrémiste, fermant les yeux à la purification ethnique qui a eu lieu. Pourquoi? Cette étude examine l'intervention française au Rwanda pendant le génocide de 1994 à travers le prisme de la théorie de la sécurisation. J'utilise l'analyse linguistique et sémiotique des documents de la présidence française et ministère des Affaires étrangères, puis l'analyse du discours des communiqués de presse et éditoriaux de journaux pour démontrer que la sécurisation de la langue française dans la région des Grands Lacs en Afrique a conduit la politique française. Le concept de la sécurisation, et l'utilisation de l'analyse sémiotique et du discours se révèlent comme étant des outils utiles pour comprendre les motivations et la justification de l'intervention extérieure dans un conflit interne. Ces outils peuvent être utilisés pour prendre du recul sur les mesures prises, et peuvent être utilisés comme une lentille pour encadrer la question et de réfléchir à des mesures extraordinaires. Cependant, l'analyse démontre également que la sécurisation réussite est un photo d'un instant. Pour un bref instant, le gouvernement français a réussi à convaincre le public français que l'intervention au nom de la langue française en Afrique était une bonne idée. Cependant, le recul nous permet d'observer que, depuis l'expiration du mandat de l'opération Turquoise, d'autres questions ont été soulevées et la France est souvent accusé d'être complice et / ou d'avoir aidé dans le génocide.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction:

Over a 100 day period between April and July 1994, up to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed in Rwanda by Hutu extremists. Prior to and during the genocide, the French government financially and militarily supported the extremist regime, while subsequently turning a blind eye to the ethnic cleansing that was taking place. Some describe France's actions as being a direct result of the Fashoda Syndrome and an urge to resist Anglophone encroachment in an historically French-speaking country, while others point to the French President's long-standing friendship with the Rwandan President. However, there is no concrete theory to explain why the French Government would risk its reputation to assist a failing government located 9,000 km away in eastern Africa. Securitization theory and critical discourse analysis may be one tool to help analyze France's decision to intervene on behalf of the génocidaires.

The genocide:

The Rwandan genocide was centuries in the making and can be traced as far back as 1892 when the first Europeans set foot in Rwanda. Prior to this, the difference between Tutsis and Hutus was solely class-based. Oral history portrays this time as feudal with Tutsis (cattle farmers) occupying a superior status within the Kingdom and Hutus (peasant farmers) serving as serfs or clients of a Tutsi chief. It was the German arrival in 1892 that first advanced the theory that the Hutu and Tutsi populations were racially different. Surprised by the structure of the unified nation-state in Rwanda, the Germans attributed this to John Hanning Speke's Hamitic hypothesis, which suggests that well-organized societies are the result of a Hamitic civilization that had imposed itself in the area. It was supposed that the Tutsi were the "descendants of a relatively recent invasion from Abyssinia and, before that, from the ancient Middle East." (Chretien, 72) It was noted that Tutsi chiefs and nobles were tall and "well-made" (Mecklenburg, 1907) and were "intelligent, shrewd, proud, reserved, arrogant, and powerful, among other characteristics, and definitely born to rule over the short (with wide nose and dark skin), noisy, subservient, and fearful Hutu." (Twagilimana, xlv) The Hamitic hypothesis therefore, "sealed the idea of Tutsi superiority and justified the German and Belgian colonial administrations and the Catholic Church in their choices of the Tutsi as their ideal collaborators in the spread of European civilization." (Twagilimana, 76)

In 1935, after the Belgians gained control of Rwanda-Burundi, they embarked on a census to identify all Rwandans, based on their physical characteristics, as either Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa and subsequently issued every person an identification card on which these "ethnic groups" were recorded. These cards were still in use in 1994. Under the Belgians, Hutus and Twa were not given the same educational opportunities as the Tutsi and compulsory labour was still harshly enforced. The Belgians began introducing elections at the local and administrative levels and a Tutsi generally won.

Beginning in 1950, the Hutu voice grew stronger as Hutus became more educated and were helped by missionaries and the Catholic Church. Encouraged by the Catholic Church, political parties were created to champion the Hutu majority's interests. After years of supporting Tutsi power throughout colonisation, Belgium switched its allegiance to the Hutu majority during independence.

Once Rwanda gained its independence and the Hutu majority was in government, “quotas” were introduced. Since the Tutsi minority accounted for about 9 per cent of the population in Rwanda, Tutsis were allocated only 9 per cent of school seats, 9 per cent of jobs, etc. Tutsi exiles made commando-style raids into Rwanda sporadically, and Hutus responded severely. By 1963, between 8,000 and 12,000 Tutsis had been killed.

Over the next several decades, tensions rose between the two factions, culminating in invasions by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda in 1990. The RPF was a political party established by Rwandan refugees in Uganda in 1979. The RPF continued its guerrilla raids and, by the end of 1992 had expanded to a force of almost 12,000. Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana took the RPF threat seriously and enlarged the Rwandan army from about 5,000 in 1990 to about 24,000 in 1991 and 35,000 in 1993. The Rwandan army also began training and arming civilians (known as the Interahamwe). In the face of international pressure, Habyarimana committed to a number of reforms under the Arusha Agreement in August 1993, including the “establishment of the rule of law, political power-sharing, the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, and the integration of the armed forces to include the RPF.” (Brandt, 18)

On October 21, the Hutu president of Burundi was killed in a military coup, which further exacerbated tensions in Rwanda. The United Nations sent UNAMIR forces to the country and vulnerable and well-informed Rwandans began evacuating the country. In January 1994, the hate-radio RTLM began openly calling for the extermination of Tutsis and anyone who supported them. (Twagilimana, xxxiii) On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Habyarimana and Burundi’s new president was shot down by rocket fire by an unknown assailant near Kigali. Both men died.

The assassination of President Habyarimana was the catalyst for something that had clearly been in the works for a while. Roadblocks were immediately erected and the Rwandan army and interahamwe began targeting Tutsis and moderate Hutus in a campaign of “death, torture, looting and destruction.” (Brandt, 19) On April 8th, the RPF launched an offensive, advancing from Uganda through the country and liberated Tutsis in hiding.

Between April and July 1994, up to one million people were killed in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces did not intervene, as this would breach their mandate to ‘monitor’. After 10 Belgian soldiers were killed, the force, previously 2,500 members strong, was reduced to 250. On April 30th, the UN Security Council spent the entire day discussing the crisis without ever once using the word ‘genocide’, despite reports from UNAMIR staff that genocide was indeed taking place. Had they acknowledged that it was, in fact, genocide, the UN would have been legally obligated to “prevent and punish” the perpetrators. In May, the UN agreed to send 6,800 troops to police and defend civilians, but implementation was delayed by arguments over who would cover costs and provide equipment. In June, France announced its own operation called Operation Turquoise and deployed 2,500 troops.

On July 4, the RPF captured Kigali and set up an interim government. The remnants of the Hutu government fled to Zaire (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo). In addition to the tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees that had already fled Rwanda, the refugee camps created another humanitarian crisis due to overcrowding, violence, and a cholera outbreak that killed tens of thousands of people. On July 18th, the RPF declared a ceasefire and announced that the war had been won.

French- Rwandan relations:

France and Rwanda entertained excellent relations between 1973 and 1994. Even though not a former colony of France, Rwanda “as a French-speaking country was tied to France through the French language and received considerable aid from France.” (Twagilimana, 58) At the Franco-African summit at La Baule in June 1990 to which Rwanda was also in attendance, Mitterrand simultaneously advocated for the creation of multi-party democracies in Africa and linked French economic assistance to progress toward democratization, while also indicating that France would not “organize domestic political changes by plot or conspiracy.” (Mitterrand, 1990) Instead of reducing aid to Rwanda, French military and economic assistance not only continued but increased. This included arms transfers, technological transfers, and military-industrial cooperation. It also provided training by the French military of Rwandan troops. (Krosiak, 69) According to the book *Mitterrand: A Study in Ambiguity*, an American diplomat commented on the French-Rwandan relationship by saying that Habyarimana “could do anything he likes, militarily and politically... France would stick behind him no matter what.” (Short, 538)

When the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990, France, along with Zaire and Belgium, sent troops to support the sovereign Habyarimana government and to drive the rebel RPF back. The Zairian and Belgian troops withdrew after a few weeks, but France kept their troops in the country and provided financial and military guarantees to the Rwandan government (Melvern 15) until the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement. French military advisers remained long after the signing to assist Habyarimana and his troops.

After Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, during the first few days of the genocide, France launched a first mission involving 190 paratroopers to evacuate expatriates from Rwanda. French troops also evacuated Habyarimana’s wife and several high profile members of his government. In late June 1994, France launched Operation Turquoise, a UN-mandated mission to create safe humanitarian areas. By the end of July, the UN Security Council had reached a agreement about sending an international force to Rwanda. By the end of August, Operation Turquoise was terminated and UN forces replaced the French.

Research questions:

This thesis will approach the question of French intervention in Rwanda through the lens of securitization theory, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. Securitization theory articulates the way in which a “securitizing actor” can politicize a specific issue into a threat. (Buzan *et al.* 1998) According to Buzan *et al.* (1998), the goal of securitization theory is to identify ways in which a threat to a referent object can be positioned as a threat requiring extraordinary measures “beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan *et al.*, 5) or “outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” (Buzan *et al.*, 23)

In the book *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan *et al.* (1998) propose a framework (hereafter referred to as the Framework) for analyzing specific actions of securitizing actors. While proposing a specific three step methodology, they do not indicate how the analysis should be conducted. Since the process of securitization is a speech act and is socially constructed, critical discourse analysis will be used to assist in the analysis. In this context, French intervention in Rwanda is an appealing case study because there is no clear indication of why the French government chose to intervene on behalf of the génocidaires. Therefore, an analysis using securitization theory and critical discourse analysis has the potential to add to the growing body of knowledge about state decision-making.

This thesis will test the bounds of securitization theory as a tool for analysis using the Framework put forth by Buzan et al. (1998) through the case study of French intervention in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. To this end, the analysis of the case study of French intervention in Rwanda will explore the following issues:

1. Can the Framework by Buzan et al. (1998) be applied to the securitization of the French language in the Great Lakes region of Africa?
2. Are the concepts of securitization and discourse analysis useful tools in the context of external intervention in internal conflicts?
3. What lessons can be learned from the case study about the theory of securitization?

Thesis overview:

The results of the case study analysis found that the concept of securitization and discourse analysis may be useful tools for analysis of external interventions in internal conflicts. It can be used to gain perspective on actions taken, and can be used as a lens to frame the issue and to think about extraordinary measures. Notwithstanding, the analysis also showed that a successful securitization is a snapshot in time. For a brief moment, the French Government managed to convince the French public that intervention on behalf of the French language in Africa was a good idea. However, hindsight allows us to observe that, since the expiry of the mandate of Opération Turquoise, further questions have been raised and France is often accused of being complicit and/or of aiding in the genocide.

This thesis will be organized into five chapters. The first chapter has briefly introduced the thesis topic and presented the research question that this thesis will be examining. Chapter 2 will review the literature on approaches to French foreign policy in Rwanda. It will shed light on terms and conceptual knowledge that will be used in the context of French involvement in Rwanda and to identify the gaps in the literature to date. Then, chapter 3 will present the methodology that will be employed to answer the research questions presented in chapter 1. Chapter 4 will present the results of the case study analysis of French intervention in Rwanda during the genocide. Finally, chapter 5 will present the key finding of the case study analysis and will discuss possible future avenues of research.

Positionality:

All researchers are positioned, wherein our identities and biases can shape the research process (Bourke, 1). This can include given attributes such as, “race, nationality, and gender which are fixed or culturally ascribed” (Chiseri-Strater, 116) and “subjective-contextual factors, such as personal life history and experiences” (Chiseri-Strater, 116). Therefore, before undertaking this study, it is important for me to position myself within my research and explore my values and biases.

I am a Canadian woman with no ancestral ties to either Africa or France. While I do speak French, I do not speak Kinyarwanda and have not spent any significant amount of time in either location. I grew up on various Canadian army bases, as my father was in the military for most of my formative years. I consider military means to be one of many political tools, although I confess that it is the one I am most interested in. I completed my undergraduate degree in International Studies and have worked as a Policy Analyst for the department of Justice within the Government of Alberta. I am currently employed as a Senior Policy Advisor for the

department of Treasury Board and Finance within the Government of Alberta. I therefore have worked and continue to work in an environment that places value on relaying information in such a way that makes it palatable to the appropriate audience.

I would never claim to fully understand the situation in France or Rwanda pre- or post-genocide, nor would I be willing to impose my ideas on others. However, by applying a new analysis framework to the case study of French intervention in Rwanda in 1994, this research can offer alternative perspectives on the situation and can contribute to the greater body of literature regarding the analysis of French intervention in this conflict.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction:

This chapter addresses approaches to French foreign policy in Rwanda. The purpose is to shed light on terms and conceptual knowledge that will be used in the context of French involvement in Rwanda and to identify the gaps in the literature to date. It is ultimately argued that the French government used the concept of La Francophonie to successfully securitize the potential loss of Rwanda to an English power, thereby resulting in French intervention on behalf of the génocidaires.

Because this thesis is analyzing French foreign policy with a particular emphasis as to how it relates to the French language, an effort was made to review works in both English and French. The sources mentioned below are pretty evenly split in terms of language. It is also worth noting that, in relation to the works that were written on France's involvement in Rwanda after the genocide, both languages are equally critical of French action.

French foreign policy:

During the years leading up to the conflict in Rwanda, scholars argue that French foreign policy could be characterized as "Gaullist". The seminal literature on this matter is Philip H. Gordon's *A Certain Idea of France*, which argues that French security policy in the 1990s under President François Mitterrand was assuredly created by Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s and remained a cornerstone of France's political culture. Mitterrand asserted "supreme or even exclusive control over foreign policy and defence" (Gordon, 113) and enshrined this control in articles 14 and 52 of the Constitution (Krosiak, 57). Further, under article 15 of the Constitution, the President was named Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, meaning that he was the only one with the power to dispatch troops overseas "without reference to parliament or ministers" (McNulty, 6).

According to Gordon, the way in which Mitterrand most emulated Charles de Gaulle was in his idea of French grandeur on the global stage and his concept of the nation-state. The concept of French grandeur was not a new one when de Gaulle made an issue of it, but it does form the basis for Mitterrand's actions in Rwanda. Likely rooted in colonialism, de Gaulle believed that France was destined for a role on the international stage and that that role "was in the interest of all humanity" (Gordon, 15). Thus, the French, according to Gordon, has a tendency to view "their national interests in general or systemic terms. French rights are thus 'human rights (as the revolutionaries put it), and France's rebirth as a great power is to take the form of a 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' (as de Gaulle used to say)" (Gordon, 16). Norman Bowen, a scholar specializing in French foreign policy, as well as the United Nations, argues that France's inclusion at the Security Council table of the United Nations under de Gaulle has "served to magnify France's otherwise modest place in the world" (Bowen, 95), as well as allows it to "pursue national interests in France's historic spheres of influence" (Bowen, 95).

In terms of de Gaulle's concept of the nation-state, "As de Gaulle himself put it, 'nothing is more important than the legitimacy, the institutions, and the functioning of the State'" (Gordon, 9). That is, that France has a special role and interests that require it to be completely independent. This concept was a particularly difficult one in an increasingly interdependent Europe, whereby France was claiming the uninhibited right to decide for itself, while belonging to the European Community, which was based on compromise and consensus. This concept of

nation-state was justified in terms of legitimacy and efficacy. “The nation-state was morally fundamental, because it was the only entity that legitimately represented the people who felt attached to it, and it was practically fundamental because it was the only political community that could effectively serve a society’s interest” (Gordon, 10). Any other concept would leave the country vulnerable to the domination of an outside power – which, in a bipolar world, meant to the USSR or to the United States. De Gaulle therefore advanced the notion of multipolarity in the foreign policy discourse, which would “preserve a sphere for French initiative within regional organizations” (Bowen, 95) by allowing for a distribution of power between multiple states. Under Francois Mitterrand, these themes remained. Thus, it is argued that French foreign policy “invokes principles of preeminent multilateralism, autonomous regional groupings and unapologetic nationalism” (Bowen, 95).

Gordon’s work on France’s Gaullist design is used extensively by other scholars to illustrate French behavior in the post-Cold War world. It is now understood that the “real force behind the “Gaullist legacy” lay in the way it had become rooted in a symbolic national political consensus that overcame certain traditional policy cleavages and created a sense of France’s national mission being fundamentally different from the others” (Cerny).

According to Dominique Moisi in *Foreign Affairs* in 1981, while Mitterrand did maintain continuity with de Gaulle’s concept of French grandeur, he instead chose to emulate his more immediate predecessors’ (Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) concept of internationalism. “Mitterrand’s idealism and internationalism have replaced de Gaulle’s nationalism and Machiavellianism in structuring France’s international mission” (Moisi, 1981). In this sense, rather than being openly hostile to the United States and Great Britain as de Gaulle had been, Mitterrand instead cultivated good relations with both, while maintaining a critical distance from the United States. In the 1990s, according to the Richard Kuisel in *The French Way: How France Embraced and Rejected American Values and Power*, the French government began to perceive “U.S. policies and unilateralist tendencies bec[oming] the principal obstacle to French and European independence” (Kuisel, 148) and chose to maintain a critical distance. It is argued that, “for the most part, Mitterrand’s transatlantic policies enjoyed wide domestic support – more so after he turned away from his early Atlanticism” (Kuisel, 148). This theoretical underpinning is of particular importance to this thesis, as it forms a basis for Mitterrand’s actions in Rwanda and Africa more broadly.

La Francophonie as foreign policy:

Scholars of La Francophonie argue that the concept of French grandeur expressed itself culturally under the mantle of La Francophonie. According to many, “La France, c’est la langue française”, which, according to some scholars, is a “conviction shared amongst the highest echelons of the French ruling class” (Kroslak, 61). That being said, at the time, only 15 per cent of the populations included in La Francophonie actually spoke French (Adebajo, 148). According to Daniela Kroslak in *French Betrayal of Rwanda*, this indicates “the francophone idea is very much an elite-driven agenda with little realization at the grass-roots level. While the ‘big men’ of Francophone Africa identify strongly with a certain French heritage, it is doubtful whether the ordinary citizen shares this identity” (Kroslak, 62). In this case, the dissemination of French culture and the fear of Anglophone encroachment are two sides of the same coin.

A number of scholars attribute France’s use of La Francophonie as a foreign policy tool throughout the twentieth century to the “Fashoda Syndrome”, a term coined by Gérard Prunier in 1995 to “draw a historical analogy between the Franco-American rivalry in East-Central Africa in the 1990s and the Anglo-French rivalry in Sudan in the 1890s” (Mwakikagile, 382). According to

Jean-Pierre Chrétien in *L'Afrique des grands lacs: deux mille ans d'histoire*, Rwanda "était le nouveau Fachoda" (Chrétien, 321). In *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, Prunier argues that the French demonize Anglo-Saxons to an absurd point: "The Anglo-Saxons want our death – that is, our cultural death. They threaten our language and our way of life, and they plan our ultimate anglo-saxonisation" (Prunier, 105). He coins the term "Fashoda Syndrome" and argues that it is still very much a part of French political thinking today (1995) and "is the main reason – and practically the only one – why Paris intervened so quickly and so deeply in the growing Rwandese crisis" (Prunier, 105). According to historian Martin Meredith, the French have since been "vigilant in guarding against Anglophone encroachment in what they consider to be their own backyard.(...) The 'Fashoda syndrome', as it was known, formed a basic component of France's Africa policy" (Meredith, 493). This discussion on the Fashoda Syndrome is of particular interest to this thesis, as it demonstrates that scholars attribute French involvement in Rwanda to the potential loss of the French language in the region. This thesis seeks to demonstrate how France successfully securitized the issue.

French policy in Africa:

A number of works have been written on French foreign policy in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. So much so, in fact, that the term "Mitterrand l'Africain" is used throughout almost all literature on the subject to illustrate how important the African continent was to the French president. Most of this literature focuses on Mitterrand's reasoning behind his passion for the continent. In most of these works, the term "Fashoda syndrome" (discussed in detail above) is also used to illustrate the potential origin of French foreign policy in the region.

Philippe Marchesin, a political science professor at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, edited *Mitterrand et l'Afrique*, a collection of articles on French foreign policy in Africa under François Mitterrand. Marchesin also wrote the first article in the book titled "Mitterrand l'Africain". He argues that, unlike in Fashoda in 1898, the French were not concerned about Great Britain prior to the conflict in Rwanda, as much as they were about the United States. At the time, the U.S. "s'intéressent au pétrole africaine, notamment au Congo et au Gabon ; prêtent l'oreille aux opposants de certains régimes francophones (...) affichent leur sympathie pour l'Ouganda anglophone, base de départ du FPR rwandais actuellement au pouvoir à Kigali" (Marchesin, 10). Accordingly, the attitude of rivalry towards the United States was considered a constant in the African vision of Mitterrand (Marchesin, 11). This perception on American involvement in Africa was echoed as early as 1981, when Dominique Moisi argued that France's "Third-Worldism" contains three distinct strains in varying degrees. The first strain is the product of *raison d'état* (mentioned above) wherein there is a belief that France has to play an important role in Africa for political as well as economic reasons. The second strain focuses on the moral imperative to aid the world's poorest. Finally, "a third element is less idealistic and is directly linked to a latent anti-Americanism, ready to criticize American imperialism in the Third World" (Moisi, 1981).

Aside from anti-Americanism, a number of works argue that France's guiding principles in relation to Africa were primarily to widen French presence beyond francophone Africa, and to "de-emphasize military aid while stressing the more "pure" economic and cultural aspects" (Moisi, 1981). These perspectives of French foreign policy in Africa provide context for French intervention and involvement in Rwanda leading up to and during the genocide.

French policy in Rwanda:

One of the most balanced approaches to the question of French foreign policy as it relates to Rwanda can be found in Olivier Lanotte's *La France au Rwanda (1990-1994): Entre*

abstention impossible et engagement ambivalent. Unlike other works that argue whether or not France failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, Lanotte instead focuses on the French decision-making process. Lanotte's is an historical account that documents French military and diplomatic choices in Rwanda using official records, published narratives and testimonies, as well as interviews with officials and witnesses. In Rwanda, the foreign policy was completely in line with French foreign policy in Africa in general. Although Rwanda was not a former French colony, its past as a Belgian colony piqued the interest of the Quai d'Orsay in 1962, since it was a francophone country and would expand the state's influence in Africa (Lanotte, 133). It is argued that France supported an undemocratic regime because of its own internal interests, which included extending this "air of radiance, of which La Francophonie was its gold standard, promoting its methods, its men. In short, its influence"(Lanotte, 134). As an historical narrative, Lanotte details the bilateral agreements and informal security commitments from the French government to the Habyarimana regime as a rationale for French involvement in Rwanda on behalf of the genocidal regime. During the genocide, Lanotte uses narratives and testimonies to illustrate profound divisions within the French government that resulted in Operation Turquoise. The resulting conclusion is that Operation Turquoise was a public relation operation meant to satisfy considerations for international credibility, as well as considerations not to abandon its allies in Rwanda. Like nearly all works on this matter, there remains a lack of evidence, which means that Lanotte reaches this conclusion with little concrete evidence.

Lanotte uses all previously discussed arguments to conclude that French decision-makers miscalculated the risks they were taking in Rwanda. These arguments include the Fashoda syndrome and the way French foreign policy was conducted under President Mitterrand.

One of the sources used by Lanotte is Jean-Christoph Ferney's "La France au Rwanda: raison du prince, dé-raison d'État." Ferney argues that that France's opposition and aggression to the RPF was partly due to the fact that the RPF was based out of Uganda. Kampala maintained friendly relations with London, and the United States was interested in the country. The RPF, therefore, could arguably be considered "l'agent d'un expansionnisme anglophone désireux de saper une Communauté économique des pays des grands lacs trop francophone" (Ferney, 172).

French intervention in Rwanda:

The primary literature on this matter, written in English, is Daniela Krosiak's *The French Betrayal of Rwanda*. Most of the literature used in Krosiak's research is secondary sources, but also includes French presidency documents and French Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents, in addition to press releases. Krosiak also uses first hand anonymous accounts. Krosiak argues that the French government was close to the Habyarimana regime and knew about the increase in violence against the Tutsis prior to the genocide, but did little to stop it and, in fact, continued to support the regime during the genocide. Krosiak examines French involvement in Rwanda by reviewing three main criteria: knowledge, involvement, and capacity. That is, did the French government know what was happening on the ground in Rwanda both prior and during the genocide; did the French government work with the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the Interhamwe, and the Habyarimana government, and; was France able to intervene? Although circumstantial in nature, the evidence Krosiak presents ultimately argues that the French government could have prevented the genocide, but instead continued to provide support to the Rwandan government during the genocide because of long-standing ties between the two countries. Although Krosiak presents a compelling argument that France, while not the perpetrator of the genocide, was complicit in the genocide, she does not delve too deeply into the why of the matter. This thesis seeks to fill that void.

Conclusion:

The literature mentioned above proved to be invaluable to the researcher's understanding of France's role in Rwanda during the genocide. Firstly, this review provided a context for French involvement in Rwanda by looking at the theoretical underpinnings of French foreign policy, with a particular emphasis on French foreign policy as it related to Africa. Second, the literature review demonstrated the gap in the literature, which this thesis will seek to fill. Of the literature reviewed, no author relies on critical discourse analysis as a tool to explain French involvement in Rwanda. Finally, this review provided echoes of securitization in relation to France's attitude towards the United States. This suggests using the securitization theory to analyze French involvement in the region is plausible. In the next chapter, the gaps identified above will be combined with the opportunities provided in relation to the echoes of securitization to create a methodology for analysis.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Introduction:

The goal of this study is to examine the securitization of the French language (la Francophonie) using the case study of France's involvement in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994. Chapter 3 will review the methodology that will be employed to answer the research questions presented in chapter 1.

This paper will use the securitization theory as the guiding theoretical framework and critical discourse analysis as the methodology to analyze French intervention in the conflict in Rwanda. Through this exercise, this thesis hopes to determine if the Framework can be applied to France's involvement in Rwanda and if critical discourse analysis is a useful tool in security analysis. This will help establish that France's involvement in Rwanda constituted extraordinary measures and that the audience (in this case, the French public) accepted the claim.

This chapter will begin by reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of securitization and briefly review some of the key elements required to securitize an issue. Next, it will discuss the use of securitization as a tool for analysis. Then, it will review the idea of critical discourse analysis within the context of qualitative research. It will then discuss the research methods that will be employed to analyze the case study of France's involvement in Rwanda during the genocide. Finally, it will outline the documentation and data sources that will be analyzed in the next chapter.

Theoretical underpinnings of securitization:

In order to understand the ethical and political stance of the concept of securitization, it is important to understand the theoretical underpinnings. The concept of securitization in international relations was developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and their collaborators into a body of work that is now known as the Copenhagen School. The origins of securitization are in political realism (Williams, 512); it has also been heavily influenced by social constructivism (Williams, 512), which has created a foundation for applying securitization to the subject matter at hand.

Political realism theory focuses on power as the primary end of political action; that is, that "might is right" and that a state's primary concern is survival. According to Michael C. Williams in the article "Words, Images, Enemies, Securitization and International Politics", the roots of securitization can be traced back to German political theorist Carl Schmitt, a powerful influencer in postwar realism. Schmitt argues that the political entity is always the decisive entity "and is sovereign in the sense that the decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always necessarily reside there" (Schmitt, 38). This act of decision is of particular relevance to the theory of securitization, as it is the "primary reality" (Waever, 55) of securitization; to secure a threatened object with potential mortal combat, as deemed by the political entity (Williams, 518), which in this case, is the French government.

Social constructivism theory, on the other hand, focuses on identity by working to demonstrate how shared ideas and norms, rather than nature, shape state behaviour (Wendt, 1998). According to Alexander Wendt in *Social Theory of International Politics*, states will make political decisions based on "social relationships rather than material realities" (Ikenberry, 1999). Shared knowledge will help determine the significance of power and interests in states' decisions to "opt for balancing, cooperation, or war" (Ikenberry, 1999). This shared knowledge is of particular importance to the theory of securitization, as the security claims that are likely to be

effective are considered to follow specific forms of social construction, and securitization “as a particular kind of social accomplishment” (Williams, 514). Indeed, the Copenhagen School has explicitly indicated that their understanding of security is rooted in social constructivism (Buzan and Waever, 245, Buzan et al., 19).

It is this theoretical foundation in both political realism and social constructivism that allows the securitization approach to bridge the gap between the social and linguistic tradition in order to make “securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis” (Williams, 514).

Securitization theory:

The theory of securitization will be the primary framework for this thesis. The idea of securitization was first put forward by Barry Buzan in 1983 in *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* and was formalized by Ole Waever in 1995 in “Securitization and Desecuritization” in *On Security*. The concept was further developed in the primary book on the matter, developed by the Copenhagen School in 1998 in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. This is widely considered to be the seminal and most systematic treatment of the theory to date.

Securitization is a theory to articulate the way in which a “securitizing actor” can politicize a specific issue into a threat. Thus, it is the ways in which a threat to a referent object can be positioned as a threat requiring extraordinary measures “beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan et al., 5) or “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 23). The concept of security, therefore, is a “self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al., 24).

It is not, however, enough that the threat is articulated as existential in order to justify extraordinary measures. In order for an issue to be securitized, the audience must accept it as such. “The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures to other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity” (Buzan et al., 25).

Thus the process of securitization is a speech act and is socially constructed. The idea is not whether a threat is objectively real or perceived. Rather, it is a matter of the “senses of threat, vulnerability, and insecurity are socially constructed” (Buzan et al., 57). By pointing at an object and arguing that its survival requires otherwise illegitimate actions, the securitizing actor must make reference to an object that is part of “a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm” (Buzan et al., 31). Further, a successful speech act includes both internal and external contexts. The internal requires that the act follow the security form and the grammar of security, that constructs “a plot that includes existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al., 33). Externally, the securitizing actor must hold a position from which the speech act can be made (generally a person in a position of authority) and there must be a threat to point to. Thus, a security issue is made when the actor securitizes an issue and the audience accepts the claim. Therefore, to apply this approach to French involvement in Rwanda, it must first be demonstrated that this involvement constituted “extraordinary measures” and that the audience accepted the action.

To do this, definitions of “extraordinary measures” and “audience acceptance” presented by Buzan et al. (1998) will be used, complimented with commentary from Balzacq (2005). Since the publication of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* in 1998, securitization theory has been interpreted and used in many ways by scholars and practitioners from around the world. The article “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” appearing in the *European Journal of International Relations* (2005) emerged to argue that the Copenhagen School does not focus enough attention on the role of the audience. Thus, since audience acceptance is critical to the process, this perspective will be included.

The Copenhagen School puts forward a definition of security complexes as being, “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al., 12). Security complex theory is therefore posited to be opened beyond the traditional military and political sectors to actors other than states by analyzing either homogenous complexes or heterogeneous complexes. The former argues that “security complexes are concentrated within specific sectors and are therefore composed of specific forms of interaction among similar types of units” (Buzan et al., 16). The study of heterogeneous complexes argues that “regional logic can integrate different types of actors interacting across two or more sectors” (Buzan et al., 16). In this case, it is argued that France’s relationship with La Francophonie, within the general idea of language politics is just as important to the French state as border security. Heterogeneous complexes will therefore be the focal point of study of this paper.

Buzan et al. argue that the securitization approach includes five sectors of analysis. Although there are ongoing discussions even within the Copenhagen School as to whether to expand these sectors to remove law from the political sector or religion from the societal sector (Lausten and Waeber, 2000), for the purpose of this paper, we will assume that there are only five formalized sectors:

- 1) Military sector, which is about relationships of forceful coercion and argues that the referent object is the state;
- 2) Political sector, which is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition and argues that the referent object is the “constituting principle – sovereignty but sometimes also ideology of the state” (Buzan et al., 22);
- 3) Economic sector, which is about relationships of trade, production, and finance;
- 4) Societal sector, which is about relationships of collective identity and argues that the referent object is “large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state” (Buzan et al., 22); and
- 5) Environmental sector, which is about the relationship between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan et al., 7).

Sectors are used as analytical devices by disaggregating the whole with the intent that they “remain inseparable from the complex wholes” (Buzan et al., 8). Since France was involved in the conflict in Rwanda, as well as in Rwandan politics prior to the genocide because of a shared language, this study will focus primarily on the societal and political sector with the understanding that these are partial views of the whole. By focusing on these sectors in this study, this in no way implies that that these sectors are most important within the social world they observe. Rather, by focusing on the two sectors that are entirely dependent on the social world, this feeds into the structuring process in observing and analysing. Both sectors will be discussed in further detail below.

Societal sector:

A focus on the societal sector will be provided in this analysis because of the shared language between Rwanda and France. A societal sector analysis first defines society as being about identity, where “ideas and practices identify individuals as members of a social group” (Buzan et al., 119). Social groups are any identity or combinations of identities where individuals identify themselves as a member of a community, i.e. the self-conception of communities. That is, a national identity could include a language or a religion, “but it nevertheless remains a political and personal choice to identify with some community by emphasizing some trait in contrast to other available historical or contemporary ties” (Buzan et al., 120).

Like threats in other sectors, societal threats are identified by the community as any development or potentiality that can be seen as threatening the survival of the community (Buzan et al., 119). That is, anything that is threatening the “we”, with the “we” being the referent object. “Different societies have different vulnerabilities depending upon how their identity is constructed” (Buzan et al., 124). These vulnerabilities are also determined by the community, meaning that all aspects of securitizing an issue within the societal sector are determined by the community. “Whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon whether the holder of the collective identity takes a relatively close-minded or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained” (Buzan et al., 23). In the case of this paper, the community, or the “we”, is La Francophonie, which means that France identified Rwanda as belonging to a community with a shared language. The threat, therefore, was from the global expansion of the English language.

A threatened community can expect to react to threats to its survival in two ways: the first “through activities carried out by the community itself” (Buzan et al., 122), and the second by “trying to move the issue to the political (and potentially military) sector by having the threat placed on the state agenda” (Buzan et al., 122). In this case, the French government placed the issue of French survival as being tied to the survival of *Françafrique*, thereby requiring defence in order to maintain the “we”.

Although the concept of the nation is often used interchangeably with the concept of the state, that will not be the case here. The concept of nation, in this case, is closely tied to a shared language and culture between France and Rwanda. Luckily, since this identity is closely aligned with both countries’ concept of the state, the securitizing actor in both cases will often be state leaders, who can be expected to use “state” and “nation” interchangeably, with the defence of “state” and “sovereignty” being a stronger impetus to act and more likely to be accepted by the audience. That is, since the French language is so closely tied to the sense of “we” as a state, any threat to this community would be considered a threat to the sovereignty of the state. Thus, the threatened community will have done very little to move the issue to the political sector, as it will have already been on the agenda.

It is generally argued a potential threat that is in closer proximity is more pressing than a potential threat that is some distance away. Since language and culture are central to national identity in France, the “global victory of English, combined with an increasing interpenetration of societies, will be problematic” (Buzan et al., 124) to the national identity of France, which may result in the state being more concerned about a threat that is geographically distant from France, since it is more vulnerable to that kind of threat (Buzan et al., 125).

Political sector:

The heart of the political sector is threats to state sovereignty, with political security being about “the organizational stability of social order(s)” (Buzan et al., 141). Internally to the state, in and of itself, the political sector constitutes threats to the legitimacy or recognition of the governments, institutions, structures or processes. That is, to the internal legitimacy of the political unit, or to the external legitimacy and recognition of the state (Buzan et al., 144). The political sector can also include threats to international security or to international regimes to which a state belongs. These threats can include “situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute those regimes” (Buzan et al., 22). In the case of France’s involvement in the conflict in Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was supported by English-speaking Uganda and was therefore a threat to *Françafrique*, which was a threat to the entire regime of *La Francophonie*.

The referent object in the political sector is generally the state, although it can also include stateless society groups such as minorities, as well as “transnational movements that are able to mobilize supreme allegiance from adherents” (Buzan et al., 145). The state generally consists of three components: ideas, physical base, and institutions. The ideas that constitute a state typically include nationalism and political ideology (Buzan et al., 150). Thus, the securitizing actor will generally be state leaders.

These referent objects and securitizing actors can sometimes be in conflict. As observed by Buzan et al., since the end of the Cold War, international society has been marked by a “high degree of homogeneity organized as concentric circles around a dominant Western centre” (Buzan et al., 153). This trend has resulted in states being considered “insiders” and “outsiders”. In order to be considered an insider, states are required to open themselves up both politically and economically and to interpret sovereignty more so as relationships among insiders and between insiders and outsiders. If a state resists this process, they are considered an outsider, operating in the more traditional way of sovereignty and non-intervention. Outsiders are more likely to securitize issues and the described threats to the state (Buzan et al., 154).

In order to justify extraordinary measures taken by international society, including legitimizing intervention, the “intervening actor will have to make a strong and extraordinary appeal, which often means that claim will have to take a security form” (Buzan et al., 151). This is because, during intervention, a dual securitization is in play; both from the state being intervened whose sovereignty is being violated, as well as from international society who is acting in “reference to some principle that has allegedly been violated” (Buzan et al., 151). In the case of this thesis, it is argued that *La Francophonie* is a subset of international society.

Hence, a state may wish for territorial and ideological sovereignty, while transnational movements - to which they may or may not belong - may require that they self-open and practice intervention or risk being intervened upon. This can also result in some confusion due to the distinction between intentional threats and “threats caused inadvertently by the constellation of organizing and legitimizing principles of different units” (Buzan et al., 155). Thus, belonging to a transnational movement can also result in political or societal threats to a state just by virtue of belonging to the organization. In this case, France also belonged to the United Nations who, although reluctant to classify the conflict in Rwanda as a genocide, was sending in intervening agents from English-speaking countries to support the RPF. France was therefore required to initiate its own UN-backed operation to ensure the threat to *Françafrique* was neutralized as best they could.

Securitization as a tool for analysis:

In order to analyze a specific instance of securitization, Buzan et al. have proposed a three-step method of analysis (hereafter referred to as the Framework) that is laid out in the book *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*. The Framework allows for the analysis of a specific instance in order to determine whether a specific issue was successfully securitized and to determine the methods that were employed.

The Framework has three steps. The first two are used to analyze the specific actors and speech act within the security act while the third utilizes this information for analyzing the security complex as a whole.

Step 1 of the Framework involves an in-depth analysis of the securitization act “as a distinct type of practice” (Buzan et al., 169). Step 2 of the Framework involves analyzing the security units – that is, the “legitimate referent objects for security action and those that are able to securitize – the securitizing actors” (Buzan et al., 169). The likelihood of recurring themes in the documents is high and it is expected that these themes will clearly indicate the security units that should be analyzed.

In step 3, the information gathered in step 1 and the context provided for in step 2 are combined to determine patterns of mutual reference among the various units- that is, to analyze the security complex as a whole (Buzan et al., 169). The outputs from step 3 can help decision-makers determine the components necessary for a successful securitization act.

Since the process of securitization is a speech act and is socially constructed, this thesis will use Critical Discourse Analysis to assist in the analysis.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA):

In the *SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research* (2nd ed.), Ryan and Bernard (2000) create a typology of qualitative research that divides qualitative data into three main forms: texts, images, and sounds (Ryan and Bernard, 2000, 771). As a qualitative data, text is further subdivided into text as a proxy for experience and text as the object of analysis (Ryan and Bernard, 2013, 3). The first can be considered the “sociological ethnomethodology” (Ryan and Bernard, 2000, 769), and the second as the “linguistic ethnomethodology” (Ryan and Bernard, 2000, 769). According to Tesch (1990), ethnomethodology is language-oriented and focuses on “common social interactions” (Tesch, 22) in an attempt to determine how sense is made of language interactions. Sociological ethnomethodologists attempt to determine how “people talk about and make sense of behavioural episodes” (Tesch, 22), while linguistic ethnomethodologists use a number of interdisciplinary methods to analyse talk and text within their “cognitive, social and cultural context” (Tesch, 23). The latter is the root of modern discourse analysis, which is the primary focus of this thesis.

Discourse analysis is a general term for a number of approaches, including critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA has a particular focus on language as a form of social practice (Fairclough, 1989, 41) and “aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)” (Meyer, 2). “The central notion of CDA is that of social power. That is, that the groups who “control most influential discourse also have more chances to control the minds and actions of others.” (Van Dijk, 2001, 355) CDA, therefore, looks at empirical materials within their sociopolitical context. This means, therefore, that documents are viewed with an understanding of their source. In the case of this thesis, this means that information that comes from the government in power is more likely to be accepted by the audience, since the government is generally the one controlling the influential discourse.

CDA has no guiding theoretical viewpoint that is used consistently (Meyer, 18). Instead, CDA can look at all the levels of sociological and socio-psychological theory from “grand theories” (Meyer, 19) at social structure level (macro level) down to linguistic theories such as grammar use and rhetoric at the micro level. As suggested by Teun A. Van Dijk in *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (2001), CDA can bridge this gap by engaging in four methods of analysis: by looking at members-groups, actions-processes, context-social structure, and personal and social cognition. (Van Dijk, 2001, 355) CDA therefore analyzes discourse in the following way:

“(a) examine the context of the discourse, (b) analyse which groups and power relations are involved, (c) look for positive and negative opinions about Us versus Them, (d) spell out the presupposed and the implied, and (e) examine all formal structures that (de)emphasize polarized group opinions” (Van Dijk, 1998, 41).

One of the ways in which this analysis can be accomplished is guided by the theory of securitization, which is the main focus of this thesis.

Critical Discourse Analysis as a tool for analysis:

CDA analyzes the discourse as a subject in its own right – not as an indicator of something else. CDA theorists also argue that it goes beyond the mere structural aspect of discourse – that it is, in fact, poststructural in that CDA looks for the ‘meaning’ and ‘doing’ in order to link it to the context (Richardson, 22). The ‘critical’ portion of CDA is of greater interest in relation to securitization. By its very definition, CDA is not neutral in its approach to analysis – it means to “explain the relationship between language, ideology and power by analysing discourse in its material form” (Janks, 195). CDA therefore sees language as socially constituted and constitutive. (Fairclough, 55).

In order to analyze discourse, Norman Fairclough (1989) has proposed a three-tiered structure (hereafter referred to as the Structure) that is first laid out in the book *Language and Power* and further developed in subsequent work. This Structure is used by most CDA theorists as a useful starting point for textual analysis.




Figure 1: The Structure

This Structure laid out by Fairclough (1995) has three tiers designed to provide a methodology for textual analysis.

The Structure has three tiers (Fairclough, 25) designed to provide a methodology for textual analysis (see Figure 1). At the centre of the Structure lies the core aspect of the analysis – the text. At this tier, the analyst would apply linguistic and semiotic analysis describe the text, the argument that is being made, to whom, and by whom, in order to determine patterns. Linguistic analysis is the study of the words and the way they are used, while semiotic analysis is the study of signs within the text; of meaning making. It is also important to note here that analysts should focus both on what is present in the text, as well as what (or who) has been omitted. Patterns are discerned by looking at the structure of sentences and the words being used “to establish hypotheses about discourses at work in society”(Janks, 331). Fairclough has borrowed three ‘categories of function’ from systemic functional linguists that operate in texts in order to help determine patterns. These are the “ideational, interpersonal, and textual”, although Fairclough prefers to refer to them as “action, representation, and identification” (Fairclough, 2003, 26). ‘Representation’ and ‘ideational’ are one and the same and refer to representations of society or ideology present in the text. ‘Action’ is closest to ‘interpersonal’ in terms of the way the text interacts in social events, while ‘identification is also closest to ‘interpersonal’ in terms of the representation of the writer and reader. Although ‘textual’ traditionally refers to the style or genre of the text, Fairclough incorporates this within ‘action’. This tier, therefore, is the actual textual analysis.

The second tier is that of discourse analysis. This is done by looking at the production and consumption implicit in the text – that is, looking at the possible discourses at play in the text from the perspective of both the writer (or the source of the text) as well as from the consumer of the text. This tier is the interpretation of the text analysis done in the first tier.

The third and final tier is the sociocultural practice – looking at the larger social context of the text. This tier is meant to explain the text by looking at its relationship with the larger socio-political factors that will contextualize the text. Thus, this tier is the explanation. This is not a three-step process, with one step following the other. Instead, it is important to deconstruct in both directions. Although this process can be subjective, Fairclough (2003) contends that it is a valuable exercise and can help increase understanding of a case study.

Research method:

Critical discourse analysis and security theory are two distinct models of analysis that, when combined and applied to the case of French intervention in Rwanda in 1994, will work to reveal the interests, ideologies, context and histories of political texts. These two models are theoretically similar, in that they share a conception of discourse as an instrument of control and power, but their fundamental differences lies in the methodologies. By combining both methods of analysis, critical discourse analysis will provide an implicit and explicit basis for the wider security analysis. According to Buzan et al., “the defining criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse” (Buzan et al.,176) Therefore, a securitization and CDA approach seems to be the most pragmatic framework for analyzing France’s decision to securitize the conflict in Rwanda in 1994.

Since step 1 of the Framework involves an in-depth analysis of the securitization act, the primary documents will be analyzed using tier 1 of CDA to determine the context of French involvement in Rwanda. Step 2 of the Framework involves analyzing the security units, which will be done by utilizing the second tier of the critical discourse analysis Structure, which allows for the implicit production and consumption of the text – that is, who created the text and for what audience.

In step 3 of the Framework, the information gathered in step 1 and the context provided for in step 2 are combined to determine patterns of mutual reference among the various units. This step therefore includes the third and final tier of the critical discourse analysis Structure, which is to analyze the socio-political context of the text.

Documentation and data sources:

Presidential Archive:

132 recently declassified documents were studied. 21 documents were transcripts of Council of Ministers’ meetings. Of these, 14 were of restricted Ministerial Council meetings that only included the President, the Prime Minister, and select Ministers and advisors. These transcripts are of particular interest, as they include remarks made off the cuff and help to identify areas of concern for the securitizing actors. In addition to transcripts of Council of Ministers’ meetings, 82 documents are briefing notes to the President and 11 are situational reports on the region around Rwanda. Although briefing notes are generally advisory in nature, they tend to indicate governmental (or, in this case, Presidential) priorities. That is, by reviewing these documents and looking for the key words mentioned below, one can determine if Anglophone encroachment within a francophone country was of concern to this French government.

Print Media:

It is assumed that newspapers are a reflection of their readers since newspapers generally report on what is important and of interest to the general population. It is further assumed that by analyzing newspapers, it can be determined if the audience understood the French government’s rationale for intervention and whether or not it accepted the claim that the French language was a referent object under an existential threat that is worthy of extraordinary measures.

In terms of print media, only French publications were analyzed for the purpose of this study. Further, in order to narrow the focus, only articles from *Le Monde* will be discussed.¹ Wider analysis of less mainstream media would likely have given a more nuanced picture of the domestic debate being held in France, but this would not likely change the conclusion reached by analyzing articles from *Le Monde* only. *Le Monde* is circulated daily and nationally and has a circulation of over 300,000 people. It should also be noted that *Le Monde* has a political alignment of centre-left.

There were 907 articles published in *Le Monde* that included the key word “Rwanda” written between 12 March 1990 and 21 August 1994. It is further worth noting that, prior to these dates, only 569 articles with the key word “Rwanda” were written since the newspapers’ first edition on 19 December 1944. That is an average of one article that included the term “Rwanda” per month in the 46 years that preceded the beginnings of the Rwandan Civil War. In the 53 months being analyzed, *Le Monde* published an average of 17 articles with the key word “Rwanda” per month.

As 907 articles is an onerous number of articles to go through, a search was conducted using the key words mentioned above to help determine if Anglophone encroachment in a francophone nation was a concern to the print media in France and therefore to the French people. By searching by keyword, this will also enable us to see if potential government concern of Anglophone encroachment was communicated to the French people via print media. This is of particular importance because, for an issue to be securitized, the audience must accept the securitizing actors’ claim that the action required extraordinary measures due to the threat to the referent object. That is, the French general public must agree that French intervention was required in Rwanda because of the threat to francophone Africa. Therefore, of the 907 articles, 63 were selected for analysis based on the key words mentioned below. Of the 63, four were interviews with politicians, nine were commentaries on interviews conducted by other media outlets with politicians, eight were editorials, five were international media round-ups, and 37 were proper articles.

Interviews, speeches and press conferences:

This section will detail the information that was publically discussed by the securitizing actors mentioned above. To find the primary source for these files was a rather more onerous task. It is important to find either transcripts or videos to ensure an unbiased representation of what was said for the purpose of this study. Although these interviews, speeches, and press conferences were often discussed and dissected in the media, using these documents as primary sources would give us another set of data. By analyzing videos or transcripts, what was conveyed to the French people can be determined. By analyzing media reports of these interviews, how the French people received the words spoken can also be determined. The latter provides valuable information for the purpose of this study, but it is important to also understand the opposite side for the discourse analysis portion of this paper. That being said, it is recognized that interviews

¹ The author would have also liked to have included an analysis of *Le Figaro* in this thesis. *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* are comparable newspapers, in that they are both circulated daily and nationally. Both also currently have a circulation of over 300,000 people. The only difference is that *Le Monde* has a political alignment of centre-left and *Le Figaro* has a political alignment of right. Further, Patrick de Saint-Exupery, one of the most-cited critics of French involvement in Rwanda, wrote for *Le Figaro* from 1989 until 2008. However, *Le Figaro*’s archives are only available from 1826 until 1942 and from 1997 until present. Wider analysis of less mainstream media would likely have given a more nuanced picture of the domestic debate being held in France, but this would not likely change the conclusion reached in analysing articles from *Le Monde*.

can be condensed and words can be taken out of context. Therefore, when analyzing interviews, only the specific words that were spoken by the securitizing actor will be analyzed to ensure an unbiased perspective.

Four videos, four newspaper interviews and one speech transcript were found and were analyzed for the purpose of this study. All documents were issued by securitizing actors – that is, the information given was from the “horse’s mouth”, so-to-speak.

Conclusion:

This chapter introduced the concept of the theory of securitization, which will be analyzed using critical discourse analysis. The frameworks presented by both theories will be combined and used as the methodology of this thesis. It also presented the documentation and data sources that will be analyzed in the next chapter to answer the research question presented in chapter 1.

Chapter 4: Analysis

Introduction:

This chapter will present the analysis of the case study of France's involvement in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994 using the methods outlined in chapter 3. First, it will demonstrate through linguistic and semiotic analysis the context of French involvement in Rwanda. Secondly, discourse analysis will be used to analyze the security units at play to demonstrate that France's involvement in Rwanda constituted extraordinary measures and that the audience accepted the claim, thereby securitizing the issue. As mentioned in chapter 3 of this thesis, critical discourse analysis and securitization are not three step processes, with one step following the other. Therefore, there might be a significant amount of overlap from one section to the next in order to appropriately deconstruct the texts to demonstrate that the issue was securitized.

This thesis will predominantly focus on French press conferences, interviews, newspaper articles and declassified presidential archive documents related to the issue from 12 March 1990 until 21 August 1994, when the mandate of Operation Turquoise expired. All documents serve a purpose to this thesis. Declassified documents, although not made public until early 2015, will help to provide insight from the securitizing actors as to the rationale behind French involvement in Rwanda. Press conferences and interviews from securitizing actors will serve to demonstrate what was disclosed and how the involvement was explained to the French people. Finally, newspaper articles during the time will help to demonstrate that the audience accepted the claim.

For the purposes of this thesis, and for ease of reference, the main securitizing actors in this case are the members of the French government and includes: François Mitterrand, President of the French Republic from 1981 until 1995; Roland Dumas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1988 until 1993; Michel Rocard, the Prime Minister from 1988 until 1991; Général Maurice Schmitt, the Chief of Defence Staff from 1987 until 1991; Édouard Balladur, the Prime Minister from 1993 until 1995; François Leotard, Minister of Defence from 1993 until 1995; Alain Juppé, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1993 until 1995; Général Christian Quesnot, Chief Military Advisor to the President from 1991 until 1995.

Linguistic and semiotic analysis:

According to step 1 of the securitization Framework, an analysis of the securitization act must occur. This is done by using tier 1 of the CDA Structure, which analyses the text using linguistic and semiotic analysis. Therefore, what is sought in this first section is confirmation, through linguistic and semiotic analysis, that the Mitterrand government viewed the French language and la francophonie in general, as a referent object worthy of French intervention. The declassified presidential archive documents will be heavily relied upon for this section. One of the challenges of this step is that all documents being analyzed are in French, while this thesis is written in English. Several key words were identified to help narrow the focus. These were: Rwanda, francophone, Anglophone, security (sécurité), United States (États-Unis), American (américain), Mitterrand. For example, when searching through the print media articles, doing a keyword search for Rwanda would pull up all 907 articles written in the appropriate timeframe. Doing a further keyword search for "Anglophone" resulted in a June 24, 1994 article quoting a *Times* article that reads, "La politique française en Afrique est fortement motivée par son obsession de préserver l'étendue de la francophonie. Dans le passé, les officiels français ont justifié leur soutien au président Habyarimana en termes d'aide à la 'famille franco-africaine' contre l'empêchement anglophone" (*Le Monde*, 24 Jun.1994).

Concern for Ugandan encroachment:

Of the 114 briefing notes, Council of Ministers' meetings, and situational reports, 28 documents from October 17, 1990 until November 21, 1994 indicated concern of Anglophone encroachment in Rwanda. Initially, these documents indicate a concern of Ugandan encroachment that is best expressed in May 1993, when Mitterrand indicated to his Council of Ministers that, although the "quarrel" in Rwanda at that point was merely ethnic, the President of Uganda was getting involved. This was of concern because, "[il] appartient à l'ethnie Tutsie et représente l'Afrique anglophone, pas mécontente d'enfoncer un coin dans la Francophonie" (Presidential archives, 3 May 1993). This concern can be traced back as early as 1991, when Mitterrand indicates in a Council of Ministers' meeting that French presence in Rwanda cannot be limited, since the Anglophone presence in Uganda is of concern and "il ne faut pas que l'Ouganda se permette tout et n'importe quoi" (Presidential archives, 23 Jan. 1991). A Ugandan advance is mentioned again in 1993 by Mitterrand, when contemplating disengagement from Rwanda: "Il faut faire la soudure, retarder l'avancée des Ougandais" (Presidential archives, 3 Mar. 1993). This concern is also expressed explicitly in the briefing notes, using strong language: "Cette situation est désastreuse: elle offre un boulevard au FPR qui, avec le soutien militaire de l'Ouganda, la sympathie belge pour les Tutsis, un excellent système de propagande qui s'appuie sur les exactions malheureuses commises par les extrémistes hutus, la complicité bienveillante du monde anglo-saxon, ne cesse de marquer des points sur le plan militaire" (Presidential archives, 15 Feb. 1993). As the war progressed in 1994, a briefing note argues that, despite concerns from the Belgians² and Americans, the President of Zaire (present-day Democratic Republic of Congo) Mobutu Sese Seko, should be involved in regional discussions. "Pas question de laisser les initiatives de règlement entre les mains des seuls Anglophones (Ouganda et Tanzanie) sans y associer le principal voisin francophone, à savoir le Zaire" (Presidential archives, 28 Apr. 1994).

All of this illustrates that, although the conflict in Rwanda was deemed an ethnic one (potentially even a civil war, in which France would not normally get involved), the very fact of Uganda's potential support or involvement resulted in the French government's need to defend its language and the Francophone community it had created in Africa.

Concern of losing French influence after the war:

As early as May 1994, briefing notes began to discuss the implication of a RPF victory on French influence in the region. "Tous ces efforts resteront vains si le FPR remporte une victoire militaire sur le terrain et veut imposer la loi minoritaire du clan tutsi, ce qui aurait, par ailleurs, des répercussions sérieuses au Burundi" (Presidential archives, 3 May 1994). Three days later, the French concern of anglophone encroachment in the region was made even more explicit, when a briefing note to Mitterrand argues that, if the RPF wins the war in Rwanda, President Museveni of Uganda and his allies "auront ainsi constitué un 'Tutsiland' avec l'aide anglo-saxonne" (Presidential archives, 6 May 1994).

² It is important to note here that, although French is one of the official languages of Belgium, according to Emmanuelle Labeau in *Language and Society*, French-speaking Belgians have shown a defensive attitude towards a policy of French-language promotion. Further, the French language in Belgium shows a higher degree of tolerance towards the English language on "lexical and phonetic levels." (Labeau, 289) As a result, it could reasonably be argued that, concerns about Belgian expansion in Africa are one and the same as concerns about Anglophone encroachment since Belgium does not have the same protectionist attitude towards the French language in relation to Anglophone expansion as the French do. Losing Rwanda to Belgium would be effectively ceding the French language and therefore French influence in the region.

Near the end of the war, the briefing notes began to concern themselves with retaining French influence in the region. For example, “[La volonté de Général Kagame] est de vider le Rwanda de toute présence étrangère qu’elle soit française, ‘onusienne’ ou autre (...) Dans cette perspective, il n’acceptera ni la présence d’un bataillon africain francophone ni les renforts de la MINUAR qui restent à ce stade hypothétiques. Nous sommes donc placés devant une alternative, dont les conséquences sur notre politique africaine et notre image internationale devront être soigneusement pesées” (Presidential archives, 15 Jul. 1994). A situational report written by Christian Quesnot, Chief Military Advisor to the President, argues that American troops were now in Kigali, which would have the effect of putting political pressure on the RPF, but would also result in “le progrès de l’anglophonie: ‘Voyez comme nous sommes exemplaires, les autres n’ont rien fait’” (Presidential archives, 27 Jul. 1994). Quesnot argues that, while the RPF do not want French troops involved in UNAMIR at all, perhaps Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General of the United Nations, could be convinced to accept a francophone battalion from a friendly (to France) country. An August 3rd situational report indicates that this proposal was accepted. When France removed 300 soldiers from Rwanda, it was compensated by the arrival of 300 francophone African soldiers.

Despite this, France remained concerned about the encroaching American influence in the region. The United States was now in both Entebbe and Kigali and British soldiers were now also helping out with communications in the American zones, which was not seen by the French as an innocent, humanitarian manoeuvre. That being said, France remained committed to Zaire, which would have the pleasant side effect of bothering the “anglo-americans”, since there are a lot of natural resources in Zaire. This was also identified by the print media. A June 1994 article in *Le Monde* indicates that “ayant fait le choix de ne prendre parti ni pour l’un ni pour l’autre des belligérants, la France dispose d’une marge de manœuvre très limitée, son seul moyen de pression étant de l’autre côté de la frontière, au Zaire, par où transitent les armes à destination des Forces armées rwandaises, de même qu’Américains et Britanniques essaient de faire pression sur l’Ouganda, par où arrivent les armes du FPR” (*Le Monde*, 7 Jun. 1994).

An August 1994 briefing note to the President detailed the number of francophone troops (both French and African), as well as the number of American and British troops in Rwanda at the time. The briefing asks if the French government has “un intérêt quelconque à établir des relations suivies et particulières avec ce nouveau régime dont même les plus chauds partisans commencent à découvrir le vrai visage?” (Presidential archives, 2 Aug. 1994). This briefing note follows this up with short, medium, and long-term implications of a new regime in Rwanda. It supposes that, short term, the French government has nothing to ask of the new government. Medium to long-term, it supposes that, if the regime is primarily Tutsi, the zone of influence from Uganda to Burundi would result in instability in the great Lakes region for years to come. Therefore, the French government might want to consider working with the new government in Rwanda.

Although it is outside the set dates, it is also interesting to note that, a briefing note written on October 24, 1994, concerned whether or not to invite the new President of Rwanda to the Francophonie summit in Biarritz. It noted that, “il faut tourner la page et ne pas donner l’impression que la France ‘boude’ après ‘la victoire’ du FPR” (Presidential archives, 24 Oct. 1994). That being said, the note also acknowledges that the RPF and the Rwandan government remains hostile towards France “et peu pressés de nouer les relations avec l’Afrique francophone” (Presidential archives, 24 Oct. 1994). It was also of concern, however, that Kagame “cherche des ouvertures du côté des Belges, des Israéliens, des Libyens et des anglo-saxons” (Presidential archives, 24 Oct. 1994). It was decided not to invite Rwanda to the summit.

Concern of the perception of other African countries:

In May 1993 Mitterrand argued in a Council of Ministers' meeting that, if France retires from Rwanda, each African country that relies on French military and economic aid, would feel threatened. This sentiment was re-emphasized a month later by Juppé, who stated that "il y a des risques de massacres si nous partons et un risque de défiance africaine vis-à-vis de la France" (Presidential archives, 2 Apr. 1993). In October of 1993, a briefing note explicitly states that "les pays africains qui, dans l'ensemble, ont condamné ce coup d'état, observant avec le plus grande attention notre attitude" (Presidential archives, 25 Oct. 1993). Two days later, when discussing the crisis in Burundi, Mitterrand suggested French troops remain in both Burundi and Rwanda to support the governments and indicates that he can get the approval of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) because "les africains y seront sensibles et il ne faut pas entamer la solidarité" (Presidential archives, 26 Oct. 1993).

A May 1994 situational report states that French involvement in the region is of paramount importance because the idea of accepting that an opposition, armed by a neighbouring country, could take a country by force cannot be tolerated; "Sinon, on fout en l'air toute l'Afrique!" (Presidential archives, 5 May 1994). This sentiment is further stated a day later in a briefing note to the President: "À travers le drame du Rwanda et l'abandon de fait d'années de coopération franco-rwandaise, sera-t-il possible de garantir à d'autres pays amis africains que des situations analogues ne nous conduiront pas à une réaction identique de repli?" (Presidential archives, 6 May 1994). In June 1994, in response to a question of how best to intervene and with whom, Mitterrand responds that France must intervene alone with the Africans, "et puis, les Hutus sont favorables à la France et les Tutsis aux Belges." He notes that not including nations outside of Africa will result in a less efficient intervention, but the action has an urgent and limited character. Finally, and most importantly, he concludes, "c'est l'honneur de la France qui est en cause" (Presidential archives, 15 Jun. 1994).

An August 1994 briefing note to the President detailed the Prime Minister's visit to three African countries, wherein he emphasized that "contrairement aux critiques, [son gouvernement] 'n'abandonnait pas l'Afrique, bien au contraire.'" (Presidential archives, 1 Aug. 1994) This was further echoed by Alain Juppé in an interview with *Le Monde*, wherein he states that the success of Opération Turquoise "est bon pour l'image de la France en Afrique et démontre, s'il en était besoin, que la France n'a pas lâché ce continent" (*Le Monde*, 6 Sep. 1994).

Summary:

This section attempted to illustrate through linguistic and semiotic analysis, that the Mitterrand government viewed the French language and la Francophonie in general, as a referent object that was being threatened. Because of this, the Government of France chose to intervene in what was essentially an ethnic conflict in order to ensure it retained its interest in the Great Lakes region. What was found was that of the 114 briefing notes, Council of Ministers' meetings, and situational reports, 28 documents from October 17, 1990 until November 21, 1994 indicated concern of Anglophone encroachment in Rwanda from a number of different avenues.

These concerns can best be expressed by grouping them into three categories. Firstly, the French government was concerned about the RPF winning the civil war within Rwanda, as they were perceived to be supported by the English-speaking, American-backed Uganda. This would decrease French influence in the region, particularly if neighbouring Burundi followed suit. Secondly, as the war progressed and it became obvious to the French government that the RFP

would win and would form a government in Rwanda, the French government became concerned that, since French efforts were primarily focused on helping the losing party, the French government would still lose influence in the region. Finally, the French government was also concerned about the message it would send to its other Francophone African countries if it abandoned the Rwandan government in its time of need. It is of note that the briefing notes also go to great lengths to describe the work done by French efforts in relation to the work done by the Americans, British, and Belgian troops, which could arguably be an indication of the French desire to retain its influence in the region by ensuring that its efforts were the greatest and therefore the most likely to get recognized both by the incoming government, as well as by other African countries. The following section will attempt to identify if these concerns were clearly expressed to the French people and if they accepted the claim.

Discourse analysis:

In order for an issue to be securitized, the second step outlined in the securitization Framework is that the text should be issued by a securitizing actor and accepted by the audience. To do this, the following section will look at the implicit production and consumption of the documents, as per tier 2 of the CDA Structure. That is, who created the text and for what audience. This section seeks confirmation that the concerns expressed in the previous section were expressed clearly by the Mitterrand government to the French people and were subsequently accepted. The declassified presidential archive documents will be of very little use to this section, except to help illustrate the rationale behind certain external messaging. The documents that will be primarily used in this section are the interviews, speeches and press conferences and newspaper articles. It is hoped that the interviews, speeches, and press conferences will demonstrate that the Mitterrand government publically expressed its concerns about Anglophone encroachment (document production), and that the newspaper articles understood and accepted this claim (document consumption). Production and consumption of documents in the public discourse will be discussed, as well as three key themes evident from the discourse.

Document production:

It is often argued that the French government (and, in particular, the Mitterrand government) “conceptualizes international relations as the pursuit of national interests within a world of competitive nation-states and regional alliances” (Bowen, 95). Therefore, under Mitterrand, the focus of French foreign policy was firmly on Africa. Mitterrand expressed his thoughts on the importance of French Africa as early as 1953, when he was a Minister of State. He published a book called *Aux frontières de l’Union française*, in which he argues that Paris is the necessary capital of the French Union and, as such, French Africa has to balance itself around Paris since it has no center of gravity within its own borders. Mitterrand argues that France must do all that it can to ensure that the links between itself and Africa are not broken, “La France reste celle qui conduit, celle dont on a besoin, celle à laquelle on se rattache” (Mitterrand, 85). In his first speech after becoming President of France in 1981, Mitterrand stated, “Il est des domaines non négligeables, un pré carré dont je revendique, lorsqu’il est empiété, qu’il soit reconquis et rendu à la France. Dans ce pré carré, je distingue en premier notre langue, notre industrie, et notre sécurité, qui sont autant des fronts où garder nos défenses sans les quitter des yeux. Que l’une cède et la citadelle tombera” (Marchesin, 10).

The La Baule Speech of June 20, 1990 is often identified as the foundation of political renewal in French-speaking Africa and, although primarily directed at African heads of state, it provides a further context for French involvement in Rwanda. In this speech, Mitterrand re-emphasized France’s intent to protect French-speaking African countries when faced with

external intervention, while simultaneously, employing a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of “friendly African nations.” Mitterrand states that France “n’entend pas abandonner quelque pays d’Afrique que ce soit” and concludes with the following emphasis: “Je répète le principe qui s’impose à la politique française chaque fois qu’une menace extérieure poudra, qui pourrait attenter à votre indépendance, la France sera présente à vos côtés. Elle l’a déjà démontré plusieurs fois et parfois dans des circonstances très difficiles” (La Baule, 20 Jun.1990). Mitterrand’s book and the above-mentioned speeches provide a context for French involvement in the region and set the stage for future intervention in Rwanda. As externally-facing documents, they also indicate the policies and priorities of the Mitterrand government in relation to French Africa to the French public.

In 1994, Mitterrand indicates why France is involved in Rwanda by explicitly stating in a May 10 television interview on France 2, “[Le Rwanda] s’agit d’une ancienne colonie belge. La Belgique a fait d’excellentes choses (...) et a gardé une sorte de tutelle. Mais la France, comme c’est un pays francophone, a dû constamment appeler au secours. Nous avons envoyé des soldats à la fois pour aider à sauvegarder nos compatriotes qui vivent au Rwanda et pour sauvegarder en même temps, ce que nous avons fait là” (France 2, 10 May 1994).

In a June 1994 interview with France 2M, Édouard Balladur, Prime Minister of France, stated, in relation to a question on French intervention in Rwanda that, “La France se veut une puissance mondiale, c’est son ambition et c’est son honneur, et je souhaite qu’elle conserve cette ambition. Et le premier champ de son intervention, c’est l’Afrique où, de par une tradition séculaire, elle a un rôle éminent à jouer, spécialement en Afrique francophone” (*Le Monde*, 29 Jun.1994).

Document consumption:

The second step of discourse analysis calls for identifying the discourses at play from the perspective of the consumer of the text. The importance of this step cannot be overlooked. Up to this point, we have solely looked at the actions and discourse of the securitizing actors, but for an issue to be properly securitized, the issue must be understood and accepted by the audience. In this case, the audience is the French people. As mentioned in chapter 3, it is assumed that newspapers are a reflection of their readers and that by analyzing them, it can be determined if the audience understood the French government’s rationale for intervention and whether or not it accepted the claim that the French language was a referent object under an existential threat that is worthy of extraordinary measures. This section will attempt to demonstrate, through discourse analysis, that the concerns expressed in the previous section were expressed clearly by the Mitterrand government to the French people and were subsequently accepted. It is the mark of a free and democratic society that its people can question the actions of the government. While a number of articles and editorials questioned French involvement in Rwanda, this is not indicative of the audience not accepting the claim. This thesis supposed that the majority rules and, for most of France’s involvement in Rwanda leading up to the genocide, the audience accepted the claim that France should be there.

Acceptance of French-African policy

Prior to the beginnings of the genocide, while France was still involved in helping the Rwandan government contain the threat from the RPF, newspaper articles began discussing French policy as it pertained to Africa. An article in *Le Monde* argued that “l’affection historique nourrie par l’idéologie du ‘pré carré’ et de la chasse gardée a fait de la France une puissance éminemment interventionniste depuis Valéry Giscard d’Estaing jusqu’à François Mitterrand. Ainsi, la figure du légionnaire français est devenue bien familière dans plusieurs pays africains

francophones” (*Le Monde*, 21 Mar.1993). This editorial demonstrates that the French foreign policy of involving itself in French Africa was understood and approved. The terms ”pré carré” and ”chasse gardée” in relation to Africa were terms frequently used by Mitterrand to explain the special relationship between France and French Africa and this editorial demonstrates that the French public understood the priorities of the Mitterrand government – certainly enough to be able to throw around commonly-used terms.

Another article from as early as 1992 discussed the possibilities of extending its influence on the African continent that France had in the 1970s and 80s, had it had a plan to ”seduce the orphans of Belgian and Portuguese colonies” without instantly ”céd[er] à tout moment au chantage diplomatique de leurs clients traditionnels” (*Le Monde*, 05 Mar.1992). In this case, the ”clients traditionnels” are the former French colonies who might have objected to France aligning itself with the former colonies of other colonizing countries. The article further argues that the chance was lost and that today (1992) France must ”ramasse[r] sa politique africaine autour de quelques points d’appui et à lui faire épouser le dynamisme démographique, économique et historique des rares pôles de croissance potentielle de la zone” (*Le Monde*, 05 Mar. 1992). This demonstrates that the French public also would have liked to see France’s zone of influence in Africa expand, while also having a good grasp on the challenges facing France’s African policy with its relatively small zone of influence.

In relation to Rwanda itself, a number of articles published in *Le Monde* reported on French involvement in Rwanda in the years leading up to the genocide, including reporting on the number of French soldiers sent to support the Rwandan government against the ”rebels.” Beginning in February 1993, articles began appearing in *Le Monde* questioning previous information related to tribal killings in Rwanda. French support for the Habyarimana government was quickly explained ”Évoquant le maintien, depuis plus de deux ans, de quelque cent cinquante soldats français au Rwanda, le Quai d’Orsay avait expliqué, vendredi dernier, que c’était là ‘la meilleure façon d’éviter que des combats sanglants n’opposent la majorité hutue et la minorité tutsie’” (*Le Monde*, 05 Feb.1993). The next article published in *Le Monde* on the subject pertained to the announcement of a further five hundred French soldiers being sent to Rwanda that was explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as being for no other objective than to ”assurer la sécurité de nos ressortissants.” This claim was questioned by the newspaper by pointing out that French foreigners in Rwanda numbered approximately four hundred and that three hundred French soldiers were already present in Rwanda (*Le Monde*, 05 Feb. 1993). Six days later, *Le Monde* published an article titled, ”RWANDA: Selon les services de renseignement français les rebelles bénéficieraient du soutien de l’armée ougandaise” (*Le Monde*, 17 Feb. 1993). that reported that the Services de renseignement français were convinced that the RPF was being supported by the Ugandan military. The article made no comment on the claim and reported instead on the number of French soldiers in the region, the training given to Habyarimana’s soldiers, as well as munitions sent to support the Habyarimana government, including ”de[s] canons anciens HM-2” (*Le Monde*, 17 Feb. 1993). Further articles in *Le Monde* simply reported, every few days, on military movements and United Nations declarations.

An editorial from *Le Monde* in July 1994, acknowledged that the concern of Ugandan encroachment in French-speaking Africa was always vocalized as the main argument for French intervention in Rwanda. ”A l’Elysée, via l’état-major particulier de la présidence de la République, mais aussi au Quai d’Orsay, puis à la Mission militaire de coopération au ministère de la coopération, l’explication le plus souvent avancée fut longtemps toujours la même, c’est-à-dire plus que sommaire, et elle valait ce qu’elle valait : le Rwanda (francophone) est victime d’un conflit alimenté essentiellement par un Ouganda (anglophone) voisin, qui a trouvé des complices

minoritaires – le FPR – pour imposer sa loi à une majorité d’une autre ethnie” (*Le Monde*, 07 Jul. 1994).

Although the general public’s interest in Rwanda was minimal prior to the genocide, the above demonstrates that the French people had a good grasp on the French involvement in the region, understood the necessity of Rwanda as part of France’s African policy in order to retain influence in the region and, for the most part, approved of its policy of intervention. The lack of discussion on French intervention prior to the start of the genocide could be seen in terms of numbers, as well. In the 49 months between March 1990 and the beginning of the genocide on April 7, 1994, only 356 articles containing the word “Rwanda” were published in *Le Monde*, compared to the 551 published in the same newspaper in the four months between the start of the genocide and the expiry of Operation Turquoise’s mandate – an average of seven articles a month prior to the genocide, compared to 4.5 articles a day during the genocide. This lack of fulsome discussion and argument in relation to French involvement could reasonably be seen as acquiescence to its policy of intervention. This sentiment is further echoed in an article published in *Le Monde* from June 7, 1994: ”Il aura fallu des centaines de milliers de morts pour que dans l’opinion publique française on s’émeuve du rôle de la France au Rwanda. La présence de militaires français aux côtés de l’armée gouvernementale rwandaise, d’octobre 1990 à décembre 1993, n’avait suscité qu’indifférence” (*Le Monde*, 07 Jun. 1994).

Public questioning of French involvement

For two months, beginning at the end April 1994, the Quai D’Orsay began to notice that the French people were perhaps not quite onside with the French intervention in Rwanda. In a briefing note to the President on April 28th, 1994, it is noted that, “après deux semaines de silence, l’opinion publique internationale et nationale commence à se réveiller. Mais de façon générale elle le fait en appuyant les thèses des ‘libérateurs du FPR’ et en fustigeant les ‘extrémistes’ du gouvernement rwandais. Les Nations Unies sont mises en cause pour leur impuissance et la France continue d’être accusée d’avoir soutenu le ‘dictateur Habyarimana”” (Presidential archives, 28 Apr. 1994). In May 1994, in a situational report on Rwanda to the President of the Republic, it is suggested that a debate, initiated by non-governmental organizations (such as Médecins sans frontières) and perpetuated by indulgent media groups, was brewing as to France’s role in Rwanda. The concern is shrugged off as accusations “sans fondement évidemment, sont puisées dans la propagande du FPR” (Presidential archives, 17 May 1994). Throughout May of 1994, briefing notes began to discuss public perception of the RPF as liberators and contemplated its impact on French foreign policy. Without wondering if France was perhaps supporting the wrong side, the briefing notes instead dismissed public perception as being “largement propagée par les Belges et les Anglo-Saxons” (Presidential archives, 2 May 1994).

On June 2nd, 1994, it is noted in a briefing note that, the President of Médecins du Monde was extremely critical of French foreign policy as it relates to Rwanda from 1990 to 1994. It was observed that, “avec lui, come avec d’autres et notamment les journalistes, le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) a su jouer de l’émotion ressentie devant l’horreur pour se présenter come une armée de libération, malgré les centaines de millier de personnes (plus d’un million selon le Croix Rouge) qui les fuient” (Presidential archives, 2 Jun. 1994). In addition, during a limited Ministerial Council meeting, Mitterrand observed that, “Il y a huit jours tout le monde voulait qu’on intervienne tout de suit. Maintenant, c’est l’inverse. La propagande du F.P.R. à Bruxelles est très efficace et la naïveté des diplomates et des journalistes est déconcertante” (Presidential archives, 22 Jun. 1994).

On May 20th, 1994, the editorial board of *Le Monde* published an editorial arguing that the dwindling public support for French intervention in Rwanda was heartwarming because, “le chaos qui règne au Rwanda est aussi la défaite de la politique française ; l’échec flagrant, pitoyable, de la politique méditerranéenne. Politique consistant trop souvent en Afrique à imposer une démocratie inadaptée aux réalités locales et par ailleurs à mettre en place des systèmes commercialo-affairistes de tous ordres” (*Le Monde*, 7 Jun. 1994). That being said, the editorial also acknowledges that, although it is often convenient to argue that France should not and cannot be the “gendarme” of Africa, it must also be noted that, “l’exploitation, l’utilisation sans vergogne de ce domaine réservé que fut, que reste, une grande partie de l’Afrique francophone, obligeait, oblige, à certaines responsabilités à certains engagements que nous ne pouvons fuir sans être accusés de mépris et de lâcheté” (*Le Monde*, 20 May 1994). This therefore furthers the argument that, protection of other francophone nations is seen and accepted as a referent object requiring extraordinary measure, even if the editorial board of *Le Monde* isn’t necessarily confident that it should be.

Because of the previously-discussed disinterest in what was happening in Rwanda prior to 1994, a June 2, 1994 article argues France has therefore had no other choice than to support neither side in the conflict and has therefore been placed in the frustrating position of having limited manoeuvres. “Marquée par son récent passé “pro-Hutus”, handicapée par le recul pris à l’égard du Zaïre, la France semble aujourd’hui peu à même d’exercer une quelconque influence dans la région. Sans doute est-ce la raison pour laquelle elle se targue de faire le maximum en matière humanitaire” (*Le Monde*, 02 Jun. 1994).

Praise for French intervention

Less than a month later, on June 27th, 1994, another briefing note to the President observes that, “sur le plan diplomatique, l’action de la France semble mieux comprise et suscite moins de réserve” (Presidential archives, 27 Jun. 1994). More so than just understanding French action in Rwanda, the Quai D’Orsay began to observe that, “l’attitude de la presse nationale et internationale est plus positive à notre égard. Certains journalistes commencent à découvrir la ‘face cachée’ du FPR dont la progression vide le pays et s’accompagne de massacres sélectifs” (Presidential archives, 11 Jul. 1994). Even further still, “l’opinion publique internationale, relayée par la presse, s’inquiète aujourd’hui des conséquences éventuelles de notre départ” (Presidential archives, 26 Jul. 1994). In a press conference, Mitterrand indicated that he had observed, “avec satisfaction que l’opinion française comprend de mieux en mieux l’objectif de l’Opération turquoise” (Press conference, 23 Jul. 1994). This reversal of public opinion is firmly stated in a situational report dated August 3, 1994, “l’action de la France reçoit maintenant un soutien total et clair partout” (Presidential archives, 3 Aug. 1994).

On August 21, 1994, an article in *Le Monde* titled “Les critiques contre l’Opération ‘Turquoise’ se sont tues” indicates that less than two months prior, non-governmental organizations cried about neo-colonialism and the foreign press (with particular emphasis on British and American) were discussing the bad intentions of France in Africa. However, “il n’a pas fallu deux mois pour que tout change. (...) Les doutes ont été noyés par l’actualité, les critiques se sont tues et, comme s’ils faisaient amende honorable, leurs auteurs se gardent aujourd’hui de tout commentaire sur la non-prolongation de l’opération “Turquoise” alors que la question se posait encore, il y a quelques jours : les militaires français ne pourraient-ils pas rester un peu plus long que prévu?” (*Le Monde*, 21 Aug. 1994). This was further confirmed on August 24th, 1994, in a situational report issued after the departure of French troops that indicates, “la presse anglo-saxonne, française, les organisations, Médecins sans frontières etc., reconnaissant

que l'action française a été bénéfique et qu'elle s'est bien passée" (Presidential archives, 24 Aug. 1994).

In September 1994, *Le Monde* published another editorial discussing the perception of Opération Turquoise and the future of African politics in France. It argues that the operation was a humanitarian one because "la France n'avait pas le choix : son intervention ne pouvait qu'être neutre" (*Le Monde*, 07 Sep. 1994). It argues that an evolution to the French foreign policy in France is natural because, for the first time, "une intervention de l'armée française sur le continent noir n'a pas eu pour but ou effet de maintenir en place un régime ami" (*Le Monde*, 07 Sep. 1994). (It is assumed here that the editorial board is referring only to the French military intervention of Opération Turquoise and not to the French military's previous interventions in the region that were put in place strictly to assist a friendly regime.) It concludes by asking, "à des rares exceptions près, qui parle encore du soutien apporté par Paris à l'ancien régime?" (*Le Monde*, 07 Sep. 1994) This argument was further echoed by Alain Juppé in an interview with *Le Monde*, where he stated that "l'intervention a été de bout en bout strictement humanitaire. Il n'y a eu aucune espèce de dérapage" (*Le Monde*, 06 Sep. 1994).

Conclusion:

It is recognized that Anglophone encroachment in the Great Lakes region of Africa was not the only concern of the French government in their involvement in Rwanda. This paper argues that it was a motivating factor for initial French involvement and remained a motivating concern even after the end of the genocide. This chapter demonstrated that the Mitterrand government saw the encroachment of Anglophone influence in the Great Lakes region as a threat worthy of extraordinary action in Rwanda. Through linguistic and semiotic analysis, it was demonstrated that concerns related to this issue were expressed inside the presidency. By using discourse analysis, this chapter was able to demonstrate that the French government relayed these concerns to the French people through speeches, interviews, and press conferences and that these concerns were absorbed by the general public through print media. Finally, by analyzing print media, this chapter demonstrates, through anecdotal evidence that, overall, the French people accepted the claim of the French language being worthy of extraordinary measures in this case. All of this, therefore, indicates that the French government successfully securitized the issue of French involvement in Rwanda.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Introduction:

The goal of this study was to explore the securitization of the French language (la Francophonie) using the case study of France's involvement in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994. As stated in chapter 1, this thesis tested the bounds of securitization theory as a tool for analysis using the Framework put forth by Buzan et al. (1998) through the case study of French intervention in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. Specifically,

1. Can the Framework by Buzan et al. (1998) be applied to the securitization of the French language in the Great Lakes region of Africa?
2. Is the concept of securitization and discourse analysis a useful tool in the context of external intervention in internal conflicts?
3. What lessons can be learned from the case study about the theory of securitization?

This chapter will summarize the key findings of the case study analysis and relate these findings to the original research question presented in chapter 1. Next, it will explore possible venues for future research. Finally, it will conclude with a brief discussion on the current state of the relationship between Rwanda and France.

Key Findings:

The results of the case study analysis found that the securitization framework developed by Buzan et al. (1998) is useful as a tool for analysis when looking at French intervention in Rwanda in 1994. The Framework was useful to help identify critical variables, to determine patterns of mutual reference, and to relate these to actions taken. The case study analysis also reinforced the importance of language as a referent object. However, completing the steps of the Framework does not necessarily result in ongoing agreement on the necessity of extraordinary action on behalf of a language. It is likely that using the Framework to analyse documents written today by current policy makers on past actions could show that the perception on the necessity of extraordinary action has evolved. That is, if a person were to use the Framework to analyze documents by current French policy makers on the necessity of intervention in Rwanda in 1994, they might be hard pressed to find acceptance of intervention on behalf of the French language.

Securitization theory requires that the referent object proposed by a securitizing actor must be accepted by the audience in order to close the loop from proposition to perception and action. This study demonstrated a clear link between the thinking in the French government (based on declassified presidential archive documents) and pronouncements of the government (based on statements and press conferences). It showed a clear link between government statements and media acceptance demonstrated by newspaper articles and editorials published in one major newspaper (le Monde). Limitations of time and access made it impossible to close the loop from media relaying the information to the French public understanding and reacting to the claim, thereby influencing governmental discourse. A more extensive study might do this by broadening the survey of mass media (e.g. le Figaro), using public opinion polls to track acceptance, and finally by reviewing electoral results to link mass behaviour back to continuity or change of the securitizing government. However, even a much more extensive study would have difficulty making this connection unequivocal, because mass opinion is based on many factors, and no electoral outcome depends on a single issue.

The case study analysis also revealed the subjectivity of the Framework depending on the interpretation of terms, the documents chosen for analysis and how the steps are completed. Users of the Framework in the future should be certain to carefully identify all possible sources of documentation and to be as transparent as possible throughout all of the steps of the Framework. By continuing to apply the Framework to various actions, it will help to determine the most useful guidelines for completing the process. In turn, this will make using the Framework, as well as critical discourse analysis, a more practical tool and will increase the use of securitization theory as a tool for analysis.

The case study analysis showed that the concept of securitization and discourse analysis may be useful tools for analysis of external interventions in internal conflicts. It can be used to gain perspective on actions taken, and can be used as a lens to frame the issue and to think about extraordinary measures. Notwithstanding, the analysis also showed that a successful securitization is a snapshot in time. For a brief moment, the French government managed to convince the French public that intervention on behalf of the French language in Africa was a good idea. However, hindsight allows us to observe that, since the expiry of the mandate of Opération Turquoise, further questions have been raised and France is often accused of being complicit and/or of aiding in the genocide.

Future Research:

The case study analysis of French intervention in Rwanda illustrates several worthwhile venues for future research in French intervention in Rwanda and for securitization theory and critical discourse analysis in general.

To build on this case study analysis of French intervention in Rwanda, it would be useful to complete a further review of external actions and perceptions by taking a systems-thinking approach. This exercise could reasonably discern the sociocultural impact to security strategy and policy, which would require a new cycle of analysis. Further, by proving that the French language and culture was securitized in the Great Lakes region of Africa, the common definition of security complexes is put into question. By successfully securitizing the French language, an inherently socio-cultural object, France has demonstrated that security complexes are not necessarily geographically contiguous.

Researchers should continue to apply the securitization theory to different scenarios to help create guidelines and protocols for completing the steps of the Framework. It would be interesting to complete further case studies on current and ongoing conflicts to analyze document production and consumption as it happens. This exercise could increase understanding of the discourse cycle when a state chooses to take extraordinary measures and could help gain more perspective on additional methods used to securitize an issue.

Researchers should also consider the pragmatic utility of critical discourse analysis in the following settings:

1. Discourse on conflict is often couched in assumptions (e.g. realism, neo-realism, security dilemmas, etc.). Semiotic and linguistic analyses help reveal perceptions and justifications that allow us to understand conflict as it is emerging, rather than in hindsight.
2. The Framework forces researchers to take into account some interactions that are not always considered in foreign policy.

3. Conflict analysis of third party intervention relies on accurate perception, as well as description of the perception of the parties and interveners (Levinger, 2013).

Current French-Rwandan relationship:

As a result of France's alleged complicity in the genocide, Rwanda cut diplomatic relations with France until 2009. In 2006, Rwanda replaced the French language with English as the official second language to be learned in school. The Government of Rwanda also shut down all French institutions in Rwanda, including schools and cultural organizations. Further, in 2009, Rwanda joined the Commonwealth – a group made up almost entirely of former British colonies. After years of acrimony, during a 2010 visit to Kigali, French President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that France made “serious errors of judgment” during the genocide, without offering a full apology.

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