

SOLDIERING ON

The Long-Term Effects of the Dieppe Raid on the 2nd Canadian Division

PERSÉVÉRANCE

Les effets persistants du raid de Dieppe à la 2^{ème} division canadienne

A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Graduate Studies
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by

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Abstract

On 19 August 1942, the 2nd Canadian Division was nearly destroyed in Operation “Jubilee,” the failed Dieppe raid. The division’s next operations occurred two years later in the Normandy campaign (16 June - 21 August 1944). Like Dieppe, the Normandy campaign had its share of failures, and the Canadian effort there has long been seen as one of the worst performances among the Allied armies in the war. Until now, no historian has asked whether the 2nd Canadian Division suffered lingering effects from Operation “Jubilee” that affected its performance in the Normandy campaign. Using primary source documents to examine the morale and training of 2nd Canadian Division and compare the “combat effectiveness” of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in the Normandy campaign, this study shows that morale remained steady during the rebuilding period after Dieppe. However, 2nd Canadian Division underperformed during the Normandy campaign and suffered proportionally higher casualties than 3rd Canadian Division. Moreover, the division experienced problems with leadership and training, and suffered two notable breakdowns in unit cohesion that can be traced to the high number of junior leaders lost in the Dieppe raid.

Resumé

Le 19 Août 1942, la 2e division canadienne a été presque détruit lors du raid de Dieppe, l'opération «Jubilee». Deux ans plus tard, la division a prit part à la campagne de Normandie (16 Juin - 21 Août 1944). Comme Dieppe, la campagne de Normandie a eu sa part d'échecs, et l'effort canadien été longtemps considérée comme l'une des pires performances parmi les armées alliées dans la deuxième guerre mondiale. Jusqu'à présent, aucun historien n'a demandé si la 2e division canadienne a subi les effets persistants de l'opération «Jubilee», qui a affecté sa performance dans la campagne de Normandie. Par utilisation de documents de source primaire pour examiner le moral et la formation de 2e division canadienne, et de comparer l' «efficacité de combat» de la 2e et 3e divisions canadiennes à la campagne de Normandie, cette étude trouve que le moral est resté stable au cours de la période de reconstruction après Dieppe. Cependant, la 2e division canadienne a sous-performé au cours de la campagne de Normandie et a subi des pertes proportionnellement plus élevées que la 3eme division canadienne. En outre, la division a connu des problèmes avec le leadership et la formation, et a subi deux pannes notables dans la cohésion de l'unité qui peut être tracée au nombre élevé de chefs subalternes perdu dans le raid de Dieppe.

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List of Abbreviations

21 AG: 21 st Army Group	GSO 1: General Staff Officer, 1 st Class
2i/c: Second in Command	
A.A.: Army Act	HQ: Headquarters
AAG: Assistant Adjutant-General	Inf: Infantry
AJAG: Assistant Judge Advocate General	Int: Intelligence
APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier	
Armd: Armoured	JAG: Judge Advocate General
AT: Anti-tank	
AWL: Absent Without Leave	LAA: Light Anti-Aircraft
	L/Cpl: Lance-Corporal
Bde: Brigade	
BEF: British Expeditionary Force	MG: Machine Gun
CAOS: Canadian Army Overseas	NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer
CASF: Canadian Active Service Force	
Cdn: Canadian	Offr: Officer
CEF: Canadian Expeditionary Force	Op: Operation
CGS: Chief of the General Staff	OR: Operational Research
C-in-C: Commander in Chief	OR: Other Ranks
CIGS: Chief of the Imperial General Staff	
CIRU: Canadian Infantry Reinforcement Unit	Pte: Private
CMHQ: Canadian Military Headquarters	PW: Prisoner of War
CO: Commanding Officer	
COHQ: Combined Operations Headquarters	QJMA: Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis
Comd: Command(er)	
Cpl: Corporal	
C Pro C: Canadian Provost Corps	RCA: Royal Canadian Artillery
Coy: Company	RCAMC: Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
	RCASC: Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
DS: Directing Staff	RCE: Royal Canadian Engineers
	RCOC: Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
Ech: Echelon	Recce: Reconnaissance
Ex: Exercise	
	Sec: Section
FGCsM : Field General Courts Martial	SOS: Struck Off Strength
FMR: Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal	
	TEWT: Tactical Exercise Without Troops
GCsM: General Courts Martial	Tk: Tank
GHQ: General Headquarters	TOS: Taken on Strength
GOC: General Officer Commanding	Trg: Training
GOC-in-C: General Officer Commanding-in-Chief	
GS: General Staff	UK: United Kingdom
	US: United States

Introduction

Launched on 19 August 1942, Operation “Jubilee” was the Canadian Army’s single costliest day of operations in the Second World War. In a massive frontal assault that German propaganda later described as “mock[ing] all rules of military logic and strategy,”¹ the troops of the 2nd Canadian Division were quickly pinned down on the beaches of Dieppe below heavily defended cliffs. An artillery officer who landed in the first wave with the Royal Regiment of Canada described the situation shortly after landing at Puys Beach:

The beach was ... plainly visible to the Germans, whose own fire positions were well-concealed from our view. The ROYALS were shot down in heaps on the beach without knowing where the fire was coming from... [I]n five minutes time they were changed from an assaulting Battalion on the offensive to something less than two Co[mpan]ys on the defensive being hammered by fire which they could not locate.²

Succeeding waves fared no better. In all, over 67 percent of nearly 6,000 Allied troops involved in the raid were killed, wounded, or captured in under nine hours. In addition to its human cost, the operation failed to achieve any of its objectives, leaving commanders and staffs few consolations except the extraction of hard lessons about amphibious landings. Although the value of the raid has been debated ever since, the immediate result was clear. The 2nd Canadian Division had been broken. Of the 4,963 Canadians who embarked for Dieppe, most had come from the division, and a staggering 3,367 became casualties or prisoners of war.³

¹ Quoted in Brian Loring Villa, *Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3.

² Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group 24 (RG 24), vol, 6918, “The Landing at BLUE BEACH, by Capt. G.A. Browne, RCA – FOO att’d R.Regt C. - Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Historical Officers report No. 89,” 4.

³ C.P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Vol. I: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1955), 389.

In the weeks following the raid, 2nd Canadian Division began to rebuild. Longstanding units like the Royal Regiment of Canada had “virtually ceased to exist.”⁴ Out of an embarking force of 554 all ranks, only 65 returned to England, most of them wounded.⁵ Reinforcements arrived quickly, but unit training had to begin from scratch while units also went about the grim tasks of preparing casualty reports and conducting courts of inquiry to determine whether each of the missing had been captured or killed. The official history by Colonel C.P. Stacey says very little about the process of rebuilding the division, only that “[m]onths of hard work were required before the 2nd Division became again the fine fighting force that had assaulted the beaches.”⁶ The regimental histories also gloss over the process, stressing instead the continuity and resilience of the battalions, but the speed at which the division rebuilt was actually quite startling. The regimental history of the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada is typical for units who participated in the raid. By late September, the Camerons had been fully reinforced and, according to the regimental history, the “shock had now worn off and the normal military round was resumed.”⁷ Within twenty-four hours of the failed raid, the Royal Regiment had received 183 reinforcements, while the Fusiliers Mont-Royal took on 253.⁸ Within two months, the division was again at full-strength.

But had the division really recovered? Nearly two years after Dieppe, in mid-July 1944, 2nd Canadian Division joined II Canadian Corps in France and experienced its first combat since Dieppe as part of Operation “Overlord,” the Allied invasion of Normandy. Alongside the 3rd

⁴ D.J. Goodspeed, *Battle Royal: A History of the Royal Regiment of Canada, 1862-1962* (Toronto: Charters Publishing Company, 1962), 402.

⁵ Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) Kardex File 594.065(D3), “Stats – Dieppe Raid, 1942: Chart Showing Embarkation and Disembarkation Strengths, Nature of Casualties, etc, by Units,” Revised 5 Jul 1954.

⁶ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 387.

⁷ R.W. Queen-Hughes, *Whatever Men Dare: A History of the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, 1935-1960* (Winnipeg: Bulman Brothers Ltd., 1960), 84.

⁸ Goodspeed, *Battle Royal*, 403; Canada, *Cent Ans d’Histoire d’un Régiment Canadien-Français: Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 1869-1969* (Montréal: Éditions du jour, 1971), 157.

Canadian Division, which had been fighting since D-Day, 2nd Canadian Division began operations between Caen and Falaise. In all, the division fought four major operations in Normandy including the bloody struggles for Caen and Verrières Ridge, plus two set-piece assaults to close the Falaise Pocket. In its first two operations in Normandy, Op “Atlantic” (18-21 July) and Op “Spring” (25-27 July), 2nd Canadian Division tried to take Verrières Ridge and suffered over 3,100 casualties, 948 of them fatal.⁹ With German armour waiting on the reverse slope of the ridge, the division experienced the second worst day for Canadian Army casualties in the Second World War on 25 July, the worst being Dieppe.¹⁰ By the end of August, 2nd Canadian Division had suffered 7,150 casualties, an average of 115 per day since the beginning of Operation “Atlantic.”¹¹ Although one would reasonably expect both Canadian divisions of II Canadian Corps to perform more-or-less equally, 3rd Canadian Division, despite having been in combat 42 days longer, suffered a lower daily average of casualties-- 93 per day.¹²

There were other signs of trouble. According to historian Douglas Delaney, during the rebuilding period between August 1942 and July 1944, the division felt “resentment and anger against the chain of command that had sent them into an inferno,” which manifested itself as “lethargy” among the non-commissioned officers (NCOs).¹³ Furthermore, in July 1943, the division’s General Officer Commanding (GOC), Major-General E.L.M. Burns, noted failings among the junior officers of the division for a lack of tactical ability during training exercises,

⁹ Figures taken from LAC, RG 24, vol. 10517, “Casualties by Formation, stats re- Jun/Dec 44.”

¹⁰ Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 193.

¹¹ LAC, RG 24, vol. 10517, “Casualties by Formation, stats re- Jun/Dec 44.”

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Douglas E. Delaney, *Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45* (Vancouver:UBC Press, 2011), 77.

something its previous GOC, Major-General J.H. Roberts had noticed seven months before.¹⁴ These failings were apparent in the division's poor showing during the multi-army exercise "Spartan," in March 1943. The division showed further signs of trouble during the fighting in Normandy. In addition to its high casualties during the campaign, two units of the division retreated in disorder during July and August, indicating a failing of junior leadership.

To understand if there was a connection between the Dieppe raid and the performance of 2nd Canadian Division in the Normandy campaign, this study aims to answer two questions: Did 2nd Division perform poorly in Normandy? And, if so, were the lingering effects of the Dieppe raid responsible? To find answers, this study uses primary source evidence from the Library and Archives Canada (LAC) on the morale and training of 2nd Canadian Division during its rebuilding period. It also looks at "combat effectiveness" to compare the performance of 2nd and 3rd Canadian Division in the Normandy campaign. The findings are sometimes surprising. Contrary to expectations, the records show that morale in the division remained steady after Dieppe. However, evidence from the war diaries and official history indicates that the division experienced problems with leadership and training during this period that can be traced to the raid. Furthermore, 2nd Canadian Division underperformed during the Normandy campaign compared to 3rd Canadian Division. Not only did 2nd Canadian Division fail more often in the assault and suffer proportionally higher casualties than 3rd Canadian Division, there were two notable breakdowns in unit cohesion in its constituent battalions.

In answering the two research questions, this thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, I examine the historiography of the Dieppe raid and the Normandy campaign, with

¹⁴ LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13749, reel T-7609, War Diary (WD) 2nd Canadian Division General Staff (GS), "Trg of Officers," 20 July 1943. And; reel T-7608, WD 2nd Canadian Division GS, "Letter to Commanding Officers," 2 January 1943.

a particular focus on the official histories of Colonel Stacey. Dieppe was a debacle, and many of those involved tried to distance themselves from it, or tie a strategic outcome to it-- after the fact. Similarly, the Canadian performance in Normandy has long been hampered by a low historical opinion of Allied fighting capabilities compared to those of the German forces. Because of these larger trends in the literature, the story of 2nd Canadian Division's rebuilding has been handled as an afterthought in the Dieppe literature and its performance in Normandy subsumed by the larger story of Allied and Canadian performance. Chapter Two presents the methodology and primary source material that this study uses to gauge the long-term effects of the Dieppe raid on 2nd Canadian Division. It also discusses morale and "combat effectiveness," both disputed but central concepts for this thesis. Moreover, the origins of primary source records, their purpose, and their limitations must be considered before using them as a major resource for this study.

The third and fourth chapters provide the central analysis of the thesis by comparing 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions during the rebuilding period as well as the Normandy campaign. Not only will they discuss the well-known scale of destruction the division suffered in the Dieppe raid, it will also look at what remained as the scaffolding of a reconstituted formation. To understand the long-term implications of the division's near-destruction in "Jubilee," Chapter Three also considers the Dieppe survivors who returned to their units after the raid and the roles they played in rebuilding the division. Many historians note that the division reverted to individual and sub-unit training after Dieppe. However, none link this fact to its poor performance seven months later in the multi-army exercise "Spartan." This study examines the training regimen that 2nd Canadian Division followed during the rebuilding period and shows that the division had enough time to prepare for "Spartan," but its training stagnated at the sub-unit level for too long after "Jubilee." Examination of the war diaries also shows that junior

leadership problems were of particular concern to two of the division's commanders after Dieppe. The third chapter also tracks three morale indicators -- field censor reports, desertion rates, and court martial statistics-- during the rebuilding period. These records show that the average soldier's morale did not suffer significantly as a result of the Dieppe raid. In the fourth chapter, I compare the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in Normandy, with particular emphasis on their combat effectiveness. Not only did 2nd Canadian Division underperform compared to 3rd Canadian Division, it suffered breaks in unit cohesion that again point to problems of junior leadership. The division also suffered a high rate of casualties compared to 3rd Canadian Division during the campaign. Despite its troubles, 2nd Canadian Division's rates of "combat exhaustion" and self-inflicted wounds during the campaign were similar to those in the 3rd Canadian Division.

My final chapter discusses the major findings of this study and suggests further lines of inquiry. For most of the past seventy years, historians have been highly critical of the Canadian performance in Normandy, mainly citing poor training or command failures as the root causes. This thesis contributes to the discussion by examining the rebuilding of 2nd Canadian Division and showing that, although its morale bounced back after Dieppe, its collective levels of discipline and combat proficiency did not. These findings support earlier conclusions that Canadian infantrymen performed as well as could have been expected, and provides evidence that problems originated above the level of individual soldiers. Although it does not rule out earlier conclusions about problems of higher command, this study shows that some of 2nd Canadian Division's troubles in Normandy can be traced directly to the Dieppe raid.

Chapter One - 2nd Canadian Division: Dieppe, Normandy, and the Literature

Operation “Jubilee” has been written about hundreds of times in the past seven decades. The literature tends to focus on three major issues: the raid’s value to the later war effort; placing blame for its mistakes; and the motives for launching Operation “Jubilee” in the first place. The fact that these issues have been repeatedly fought over for seventy years gives a sense of the trauma that such a defeat can have on soldiers, units, formations, or a nation’s psyche. In contrast to the Dieppe literature, no historian has looked specifically at the performance of 2nd Canadian Division in Normandy as a formation. Instead, the division’s performance is usually wrapped up in a negative view of Canadian battlefield performance. This view fits in with larger trends of the time that were critical of the Allied war effort and saw Germans as the superior soldiers of the Second World War. Although such criticism began to fade in the 1990s, Canadian historiography did not take a fresh look at the country’s performance in the Normandy campaign until the mid-2000s. Still, a connection between the virtual destruction of the 2nd Canadian Division at Dieppe and its later performance has never been made.

The Dieppe raid, in its immediate aftermath, fuelled wartime propaganda for both sides. The Germans portrayed “Jubilee” as a foolishly-conceived attempt to appease Stalin, and the German Home Service claimed it had been the first wave of an abortive attempt to open a second front.¹⁵ Outside Canada and Great Britain, the Allied response was enthusiastic. Russia saw “Jubilee” as proof that an invasion of “Fortress Europe” was possible, and many Americans now believed that the Allies were actively preparing the long-awaited second front.¹⁶ Canadian and British coverage of the raid was decidedly different, with blame-shifting and post-operational

¹⁵ LAC, RG 24, vol. 10582, “First Canadian Army Intelligence Report,” 22 Sep 42, 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

rationalization beginning almost immediately. In the month following the raid, newspapers received few details until Canada's Minister of National Defence (MND), J.L. Ralston, read an official statement to parliament.¹⁷ The original "white paper" was drafted by then-Major C.P. Stacey. This first official statement about the raid placed blame for the defeat primarily on a chance encounter between the Canadian force and a German tanker ship which gave the Dieppe garrison advanced warning and delayed the landing until after daybreak.¹⁸ The report, first and foremost a political document, also stressed the courage of Canadian troops whose "determination [was] beyond all praise."¹⁹ But Stacey ended on his most enduring note, that although the raid had failed in its immediate objectives, its lessons would "assist ... in the future prosecution of operations in Western Europe or elsewhere."²⁰

Stacey, who wrote the official history of the Dieppe raid as part of his volume, *Six Years of War*, was a thorough historian who sought a complete picture of events. Over the next three years, he collected personal narratives from the trickle of returning Dieppe prisoners of war.²¹ When the first volume of his official history was published in 1953, he provided a remarkably clear chapter that remains the most authoritative account of the Dieppe raid to date. For the first time, Stacey explained the primarily political reasons for launching the raid; it was an attempt to appease both Russian and American impatience regarding the establishment of a second front.²² Stacey's official history also amends his preliminary report in many important ways. Most notably, he debunked the theory that the chance naval encounter was the primary cause of

¹⁷ Ronald Atkin, *Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster* (London: MacMillan, 1980), 255.

¹⁸ C.P. Stacey, "Preliminary Report on Operation 'JUBILEE,'" Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Report No. 83, DHH, 19 Sep 42, 4.

¹⁹ Stacey, "Preliminary Report on Operation 'JUBILEE,'" 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

²¹ For a valuable study of Stacey's methodology and opinion of oral narrative, see Tavis Harris, "C.P. Stacey and the Use of Oral Testimony in the Dieppe Narratives," *Canadian Military History*, 21, No. 4 (Autumn 2012): 67-78.

²² Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 325.

failure, writing “[a]ll in all ... the convoy encounter did *not* result in a general loss of the element of surprise.”²³ Stacey now blamed the costly mistakes of the raid on “Jubilee’s” planners in Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), asserting that “from the beginning [they] underrated the influence of topography and of the enemy’s strong defences in the Dieppe area.”²⁴ He also strongly criticised COHQ’s decision to forego heavy air and naval support.²⁵ Finally, Stacey’s most lasting conclusion about the Dieppe raid mirrored his prediction of September 1942. The raid, he claimed, was vital to the successful invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944. Some of these “lessons learned” included the requirement for heavy air and naval support, the necessity of improving assault vehicles, and the need for prefabricated harbours.²⁶ Overall, Stacey’s conclusions have stood the test of time, and to those who question what it was all for, his is the standard answer: “The casualties sustained in the Dieppe raid were part of the price paid for the knowledge that enabled the great enterprise of 1944 to be carried out at a cost in blood smaller than its planners ventured to hope for.”²⁷ As noted, Stacey did not describe the rebuilding of the 2nd Canadian Division after Dieppe, taking for granted that its reinforcement and retraining were complete by July 1944. Most of Stacey’s contemporaries agreed with his findings and followed his lead, either focusing on the value of the raid to the later war effort, placing blame for its mistakes, or deciphering reasons why it was launched in the first place. Like Stacey, none have looked closely at the long-term impact of the raid on the units involved.

Although he set the tone of the debate, a few notable figures have questioned Stacey’s conclusions about the lessons of Dieppe. One of the more important dissenting opinions was that of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. In his memoirs, published in 1958, Montgomery

²³ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 359. Italics in original.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 398.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 398.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 403-4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 404.

mentions “Jubilee” only briefly, but he states unequivocally that its planners in COHQ should have known better.²⁸ And, though he agrees that many lessons were learned from the raid, he asserts that “we could have got the information and experience we needed without losing so many magnificent Canadian soldiers.”²⁹ Eric Maguire’s 1963 study, *Dieppe, August 19*, goes even further, disagreeing with the long-standing conclusion that the raid paid strategic dividends. First, he denies the political value of the raid, which did little to satisfy Stalin’s demands for a second front.³⁰ He also claims most of the innovative weapons and vehicles used in Normandy were the result of experience gained in later amphibious attacks.³¹ In addition, Maguire asserts that no “sane commander” would have planned an invasion on the scale of D-Day without air and naval bombardment, and none would have staked its success on the element of surprise.³² Such “lessons” were already known. In his final assessment, Maguire states the Dieppe raid was of “very little” value to the later war effort.³³ This sentiment was shared by Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns who commanded the 2nd Canadian Division from June 1943 to January 1944. According to Burns, the supposed lessons of Dieppe had already been learned during the First World War. In his memoirs, published in 1970, Burns states the case:

The landings and withdrawals in Gallipoli, in face of an enemy position, were similar enough to what was planned for Dieppe that the planners should have known the heavy price that would have been paid for a withdrawal in daylight of such a considerable force.³⁴

²⁸ Bernard L. Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.* (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 75.

²⁹ Montgomery, *Memoirs*, 77.

³⁰ Eric Maguire, *Dieppe, August 19* (London : Jonathan Cape, 1963), 183.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 185.

³² *Ibid.*, 184; 186.

³³ *Ibid.*, 188.

³⁴ E.L.M. Burns, *General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars* (Toronto: Clark Unwin, 1970). 115.

Burns finds it “surprising” that the “Jubilee” planners and the Canadian commanders involved, all of whom had fought in the First World War, would have expected the raid to succeed.³⁵

In addition to sifting lessons, many historians have sought a final judgement on who to blame for the failures of the Dieppe raid. Terence Robertson’s 1962 study, *The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe*, accuses nearly all the senior commanders involved in “Jubilee” for errors in its planning and execution. Among the British commanders, the head of Combined Operations, Vice-Admiral Louis Mountbatten, was the first to suggest a large-scale raid of the continent.³⁶ As a naval officer, Mountbatten deferred to Montgomery’s rejection of the original “flanks only” plan for a frontal assault.³⁷ Then, after its July cancellation, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir Alan Brooke, gave British Prime Minister Winston Churchill the decisive advice to remount the assault.³⁸ Robertson also gives the Canadian commanders a share of the blame. He points out that General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the First Canadian Army, General A.G.L. McNaughton and GOC I Canadian Corps, then-Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, held ultimate authority for the raid, but made no attempt to alter the plan.³⁹ Instead, they acted as a “restraining influence” on any doubt Major-General J.H. Roberts, GOC 2nd Canadian Division and the ground force commander, might have expressed.⁴⁰ More recently, Brian Loring Villa’s 1989 study, *Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid*, takes aim squarely at the Chief of Combined Operations, claiming Mountbatten was not only ultimately responsible, but also launched the revised raid without authorization from Churchill or the Chiefs of Staff. Shortly after the publication of *Unauthorized Action*, Denis and

³⁵ Burns, *General Mud*, 116.

³⁶ Terence Robertson, *The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1962), 34.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 145.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 144.

Shelagh Whitaker published a rebuttal in *Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph*. The Whitakers' study is of interest because Denis Whitaker was a captain during the raid who went on to command the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) in Northwest Europe. In their response to Villa, the Whitakers double down on Stacey's earlier diffusion of blame. Furthermore, they conclude that the tactics used in "Jubilee" conformed to prevailing British military theories of the time about the importance of surprise, mobility, and the use of tanks.⁴¹

In addition to the lessons of the raid and seeking blame for its mistakes, the historiography has continually sought motives for why the raid was launched in the first place. Like Montgomery, Winston Churchill also included a very short entry on "Jubilee" in his wartime memoirs. Published in 1951, Churchill accepted ultimate responsibility for remounting the operation after its cancellation in July. Churchill "thought it important that a large-scale operation should take place [that] summer, and military opinion seemed unanimous that until an operation on that scale was undertaken no responsible general would take responsibility of planning for the main invasion."⁴² Despite Churchill's assertion, most historians agreed with Stacey's reasoning about the clamour for a second front. Even Maguire suggests the raid was a necessary gamble to "fulfill our promise" to Russia.⁴³ The Whitakers claim, uniquely, that most of the pressure for a second front came not from Stalin but from Britain and America, spurred on by Anglo-Canadian media.⁴⁴ The Whitakers are also highly critical of Canadian Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King, who bowed to public pressure and encouraged McNaughton and Crerar

⁴¹ Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, *Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992), 166.

⁴² Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate* (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1951), 457-8.

⁴³ Maguire, *Dieppe*, 165.

⁴⁴ Whitaker and Whitaker, *Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph*, 22-35.

to seek action.⁴⁵ Recently, the long search for explanations has taken a decidedly different turn. In the most recent Dieppe narrative to gain widespread attention, David O’Keefe’s *One Day in August* claims that the true purpose of “Jubilee” was to retrieve a new model of enigma machine, with the massive raid serving as both cover and diversion for a clandestine mission by none other than Ian Fleming. O’Keefe’s complex narrative and its enthusiastic reception demonstrate the continuing appetite for explanations of Operation “Jubilee.” Over seventy years later, Canadians continue to seek a satisfactory justification for the tragedy.

Since the earliest interpretations of the Dieppe raid, the primary questions have remained: What went wrong? Who is to blame? And what was it all for? In the multitude of published works, few historians have looked beyond the fateful day except to describe the ensuing scramble by senior commanders to assign blame. And while regimental histories describe the fortitude of Dieppe veterans and the resilience of broken units, no historian has looked closely at the recovery of 2nd Canadian Division. Even Burns, for all his criticism of the motives and “lessons” of Dieppe, asserted that when he took over command of the division in June 1943 “much leeway had been made up, and [the 4th and 6th Canadian Brigades] were ready to take part in the programme of more advanced training.”⁴⁶ For Canadian historians, the Dieppe raid suggests a number of disquieting possibilities: that our soldiers were colonial pawns, were poorly led, or were insufficient to the task. Careful to avoid any sign of disrespect, few would suggest that the great sacrifice was for nothing. In early statements and in the official history, Stacey performed a delicate balancing act that laid most of these concerns to rest. Since then, historians have followed his lead. They have examined the events leading up to the raid, dissected the unfolding disaster, and extrapolated the long-term impact of the raid on the war effort. But the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁴⁶ Burns, *General Mud*, 114.

long-term impact of Operation “Jubilee” on the units and formations involved has been largely overlooked.

Literature on Allied and Canadian Performance in Normandy

As with Dieppe, the narrative of Canada’s role in Normandy begins with Stacey’s official history. Published in 1960, the third volume, *The Victory Campaign*, includes a chapter entitled, “Normandy: The Balance Sheet,” which, like Stacey’s earlier chapter on Dieppe, set the tone for later historians. In this chapter, Stacey attributed the Allied victory in Normandy to numerical and material superiority. However, he also gives credit to Allied generals, especially Montgomery, claiming they were better than their German counterparts in Normandy. In particular, he notes that German generals mistakenly expected a thrust on the eastern flank throughout the campaign, leading them to concentrate their forces around Caen, where 21st Army Group faced strong opposition throughout June and July.⁴⁷ Stacey notes that Canadians suffered proportionally greater losses among the Allies, theorizing that they were inexperienced and would not achieve battle-hardened efficiency until the end of the campaign. In a frequently quoted passage, Stacey claims that “we had probably not gotten as much out of our long training as we might have.”⁴⁸ As with his Dieppe narrative, Stacey performs a delicate balancing act. He praises Allied and Canadian generalship and the “initiative, high courage and steadily increasing skill” of the average Canadian soldier, but he vaguely identifies the weak link in the chain as “that proportion of officers who were not fully competent for their appointments.”⁴⁹ He names no one in particular, but cites the high turnover rate for brigade and battalion commanders,

⁴⁷ Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 272.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 275.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

strongly implying that the problem existed at the unit level.⁵⁰ Stacey lists their major failures in Normandy:

In particular, the capture of Falaise was long delayed, and it was necessary to mount not one but two set-piece operations for the purpose at a time when an early closing of the Falaise Gap would have inflicted most grievous harm upon the enemy and might even, conceivably, have enabled us to end the war some months sooner than actually was the case.⁵¹

He also singles out the 2nd Canadian Division for its high casualty rate in Operations “Atlantic” and “Spring” with a statement by its GOC, Major-General Charles Foulkes, that “at Falaise and Caen we found that when we bumped into battle-experienced German troops we were no match for them.”⁵² This is another quote that turns up frequently in later studies. Finally, Stacey notes that some of the German divisions in the area were also “green,” but still managed to fight well. The reason, he suspects, is that “the German formations were on the defensive while ours were attacking, a more difficult role.”⁵³ Overall, Stacey is hard to please. In his assessment, even though the Canadians were in the tougher role, attacking against a dug-in enemy, the Germans were simply better at fighting. Despite the importance of the Normandy campaign in securing ultimate victory, Stacey focused instead on the “better” victory that never materialized.

A New Canadian Authority on the Normandy Campaign

In 1991, John A. English’s *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, became the new standard account of the Canadian effort in Normandy.⁵⁴ English begins from Stacey’s conclusions, and points to the Caen and Falaise operations as the nadir of Canadian arms.

Although he does not question Stacey, English provides a long-overdue re-examination of the

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 276.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 277.

⁵⁴ Copp, *Fields of Fire*, 6.

Normandy Campaign, seeking a better explanation as to *why* the Canadians performed so poorly. English notes in his preface that the accepted rationalizations for Canadian ineffectiveness in Normandy, “German fanaticism, inferior tanks, or the greenness of Canadian troops and the inadequacies of their regimental officers, ... border on [the] simplistic.”⁵⁵ To better understand the Canadian failure, English relies heavily on archival sources and brings his background as a staff college Directing Staff (DS) to the task.⁵⁶

Instead of Stacey’s vague speculations, English assigns blame directly to the army’s high command for Canadian difficulties in Normandy, especially McNaughton who failed to prepare officers for higher command during his long term as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in the interwar period.⁵⁷ Where Stacey sees trouble with lackluster regimental officers commanding brigades and battalions, English places blame for every failure at the feet of commanders and staffs at division and higher. Even in Operation “Atlantic,” when the Essex Scottish Regiment infamously withdrew in disorder, English lays the blame on GOC II Canadian Corps, Guy Simonds and GOC 2nd Canadian Division, Charles Foulkes, for putting troops in a “tactically untenable position” without proper armoured support.⁵⁸ Later, he blames Foulkes again for “the rather complicated and disconnected tactical plan of the 2nd Division” in Operation “Spring,” while Crerar and Simonds are held responsible for the troubled efforts to close the Falaise Gap in Operation “Totalize” and “Tractable.”⁵⁹ Although he gives a thorough retelling of Canadian efforts in Normandy and refutes lazy explanations such as “German fanaticism” or the inexperience of Canadian troops, English nevertheless reinforced and popularized the idea that

⁵⁵ John A. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command* (New York: Praeger, 1991), xiv.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 331.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 263.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 249.

the Canadians “had been an especially ineffective part of the Allied forces.”⁶⁰ As with the overall historiography, English looked at the role of 2nd Canadian Division within the larger story, and the possibility of a connection between Dieppe and its efforts in Normandy remained unexamined.

Canadian Reassessment - Since 2003

The first major work by a Canadian historian to reclaim the reputation of the Canadians in Normandy was Terry Copp’s *Fields of Fire* in 2003. Beginning with a thorough examination of the historiography, Copp states his purpose in no uncertain terms:

The argument of this study is that the evidence demonstrates that the achievement of the Allies and especially the Canadian armies in Normandy has been greatly underrated while the effectiveness of the German Army has been greatly exaggerated. The defeat and near destruction of two German armies in just seventy-six days was one of the more remarkable military victories of the Second World War... The Canadians played a role in this victory all out of proportion to the number of troops engaged. Their performance at both the tactical and operational level was far from perfect but it compares favourably with that of any other army in Normandy.⁶¹

Using a balance of secondary and archival sources, Copp retells the story of the campaign, challenging the prevailing judgment against the Canadian effort at every turn. More than any other earlier account, Copp takes aim at Stacey’s official history, and concludes his study with “Normandy: A New Balance Sheet.” In Copp’s estimation, Canadian victories have long been overlooked in the search for an easy narrative. For example, the 2nd Canadian Division’s return to combat in Operation “Atlantic” and “Spring” are often seen as a total loss, but Copp points out that those operations “included both victories and defeats.”⁶² That those victories typically have to be counted at the unit level suggests to Copp that the most costly errors were those of the

⁶⁰ Terry Copp, *Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 6.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 261.

formation commanders, such as Foulkes who, in his first week of action, simply passed along orders to his brigade commanders without moving forward to understand their positions.⁶³ Copp takes issue with many of Stacey's conclusions. Regarding those regimental officers whom Stacey maintained were not qualified for their appointments, Copp notes that, during the campaign, only one brigade commander and five battalion COs out of twenty-six lost their jobs.⁶⁴ Finally, to explain the high casualty rate of the Canadians in 21st Army Group, Copp's research shows that they spent more days in close combat with the enemy than soldiers from other Allied formations.⁶⁵ Not surprisingly, few readers are on the fence about Copp's revisionist history. Although it has drawn fire of its own from historians who see his intent as more patriotic than scholarly, a decade of Canadian military scholarship has increasingly followed his lead.⁶⁶

Until the close of the twentieth century, the historiography of Canadian efforts in Normandy relied primarily on Stacey's interpretation. Often repeated, his official judgements sufficed for non-Canadian historians to dismiss out of hand Canada's role in the Allied war effort. Whether it was true or simply a feedback loop, the assumption that Canadians performed poorly in Normandy was not seriously questioned for over fifty years. Of course, even unexamined, the interpretation may have been correct. Things had gone wrong, and no reinterpretation could ignore the high casualties, the long struggle for the D-Day objective at Caen, or the delayed closure of the Falaise Gap. Still, a look at the historiography reveals a tendency to ignore the ultimate success of operations there, focusing instead on some better victory that never materialized. In the aftermath of the war, Stacey's official history highlighted many shortcomings of the Canadian effort in Normandy. By the 1990s, English's study began

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 266.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 267.; see also Terry Copp, "To the Last Canadian?: Casualties in 21st Army Group," *Canadian Military History* 18, 1 (Winter 2009), 3-6.

⁶⁶ See Donald Graves's review in *the Canadian Military Journal*, 4, 3 (Autumn 2003).

from this premise and sought to complete the picture by asking why the First Canadian Army had performed so dismally. Terry Copp's re-evaluation and the growing body of work that supports it significantly alters the old narrative and opens a new debate about the First Canadian Army's combat ability. In these grand historiographic trends, it is perhaps no surprise that 2nd Canadian Division's role in the Normandy campaign has been subsumed in the larger story. As with the Dieppe literature, Stacey laid the path of inquiry and even those historians who disagree have focused on the issues he raised in the official histories.

Chapter Two - Methodology and Sources

Despite the large number of books written about the Canadian Army during the Second World War, historians have not established a connection between the annihilation of the Dieppe raid and 2nd Canadian Division's long-unquestioned failure in the Normandy campaign. However, military archives can help fill this gap. Most Canadian army units collected huge numbers of documents during the war. In addition to war diaries, orders, and personnel files, various units kept track of their own statistics and produced regular reports, like the Canadian Provost Corps' (C Pro C) monthly court martial summaries. Because no single indicator can "prove" that 2nd Canadian Division still suffered lingering effects from "Jubilee," this study will examine "morale indicators" during the rebuilding period, August 1942 - July 1944, and also compare the division's combat effectiveness in Normandy to that of the 3rd Canadian Division. For the rebuilding period, the state of morale can be inferred from three sources: field censor reports, court martial statistics, and desertion lists. Taken together, these sources suggest that, rather than suffering as a result of the Dieppe raid, morale in 2nd Canadian Division remained steady in comparison to 3rd Canadian Division during the rebuilding period. To understand 2nd Canadian Division's performance during the Normandy campaign, this study will compare its combat effectiveness and casualty statistics with those of the 3rd Canadian Division, as well as examine the problems it faced on operations. Finally, a cursory look at the number of self-inflicted wounds (SIW) and "battle exhaustion" cases during and after the Normandy campaign provide further points of comparison between the two divisions. Taken together, these indicators suggest that, despite its apparently high morale during the rebuilding period, 2nd Canadian Division did not perform as well as it could have done in Normandy. Furthermore, evidence from the war diaries of the rebuilding period and the specific troubles suffered by 2nd Canadian

Division in Normandy suggests that, despite steady morale among the individual soldiers, there were problems at the junior leadership levels, all of which first became apparent in the aftermath of the Dieppe raid.

Morale

Morale is an important consideration for military units, but it poses difficulties for anyone wishing to measure it with certainty. Because it is subjective, commanders often rely on their intuition to assess unit morale. Similarly, historians typically depend on anecdotal evidence to understand the state of morale during a given time. In common parlance, morale simply refers to collective happiness. Even the US Army adhered to this oversimplification in its 1983 *Field Manual on Leadership*, defining morale as “the mental, emotional, and spiritual state of the individual. It is how he feels - happy, hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, sad, unrecognized, or depressed.”⁶⁷ However, most military thinkers include elements of unit cohesion and a willingness to fight in their definitions of morale. For example, psychologist Frederick J. Manning states: “Morale is the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group.”⁶⁸ In a military context, this describes the soldiers’ willingness to engage the enemy. Major-General E.L.M. Burns similarly defined high morale as “a feeling in the mind of the soldier that, on even terms, he can trounce his enemy.”⁶⁹ For this reason, morale is tied implicitly with unit cohesion and combat motivation. However, psychologist Ben Shalit notes that morale is not always measurable out of combat. Noting that “fighting potential is often taken to be directly related to the degree of discipline,” he nonetheless describes “good soldiers” who readily followed orders and kept out of trouble, but

⁶⁷ Quoted in Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps,” in *Handbook of Military Psychology*, Reuven Gal & A. David Mangelsdorff, eds. (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), 454.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 455.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 68.

“did not prove to be the best in battle.”⁷⁰ Despite the attendant difficulties and ambiguities, this study will look at morale both in and out of combat, recognizing that they are not always the same. As the GOC II Canadian Corps in Normandy, Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds noted, “[m]orale is hinged to discipline.”⁷¹ So, although combat effectiveness is the best indication of 2nd Canadian Division’s morale in Normandy, discipline is its best indication during the rebuilding period. To find the state of morale in 2nd Canadian Division during the rebuilding period, this study will use three main indicators-- the qualitative assessments of the field censor reports; and two quantitative indicators-- desertion rates, and court martial statistics. This study will also compare compares the combat effectiveness, casualty statistics, and their rates of “battle exhaustion,” and self-inflicted wounds for the two divisions.

The Field Censor Reports⁷²

During the war, British field censors read thousands of soldiers’ letters home to track morale in the Canadian Army. In August 1941, twenty-five “Postal Censorship examiners” attached to the British War Office censorship liaison (M.I. 12) began to collect and read a percentage of all “free” mail posted by Canadian soldiers in England.⁷³ The scale of this effort was enormous, requiring censors to examine about 15,000 letters in each reporting period (five to six percent of the total mail).⁷⁴ From this, field censors produced bi-weekly reports outlining censorship and security breaches as well as the general state of morale in the Canadian Army.

⁷⁰ Ben Shalit, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 135; 136.

⁷¹ Guy Simonds and Terry Copp, “General Simonds Speaks: Canadian Battle Doctrine in Normandy,” *Canadian Military History*, 2, No. 8 (1999), 74.

⁷² Filed as “CENSORSHIP REPORTS,” each report is titled “Notes on Mail examined during Period...” They can be found at LAC, RG 24, vol 10705. Hereafter referred to as “Field Censor Reports.”

⁷³ Stacey, “Censorship of Mail, Canadian Army Overseas,” 4.

⁷⁴ During one particularly busy reporting period, censors examined 18,682 letters, representing six percent of the total mail; Field Censor Report, 4 - 20 December 1942, LAC RG 24, vol. 10705.

Each field censor report begins with a summary page listing topics under seven main headings: morale, welfare, health, complaints, security, censorship, and miscellaneous. For each topic, censors calculated the approximate percentage of letters containing it and the percentage change since the last report. For example, during the reporting period 20 October - 3 November 1942, approximately 8.4 percent of letters mentioned boredom. Of those, 1.6 percent complained of being bored and 6.8 percent wrote that they were content. The comparison shows that, in the previous report, 9 percent had mentioned boredom, with 1.7 percent complaining and 7.3 percent content.⁷⁵ Despite these attempts to quantify their findings, the reports primarily consisted of illustrative quotations from the letters framed by censors' commentary. For example, the report for 20 August - 3 September 1942 includes the following entry:

1. Morale - continued.

(h) Pay and Allowances. - There is a decrease in references to this subject, and the comparatively few comments made mainly refer to the difference in the pay of the Canadians and the U.S. soldiers. Some writers grumble at the high price of everything, and consider their pay inadequate to meet their needs.

Typical:-

- (i) "The cost of everything here is away out of reach of us, and we are all praying that the Cdn. Govt. will raise our pay to equal the American Army."⁷⁶

Because they read thousands of letters, field censors acquired a good overall sense of morale, which they tried to communicate in the reports by including representative passages as well as their own general impressions. In the example above, the censor added a number of qualifiers, ("comparatively few," "mainly refer," "some writers grumble"), at pains to provide a representative complaint without overstating its urgency.

⁷⁵ Field Censor Reports, 20 October - 3 November 1942.

⁷⁶ Field Censor Report, 20 August - 3 September 1942, 5.

The value of the field censor reports as historical record has long been recognized. In a historical report, dated 31 October 1941, then-Major C.P. Stacey said of them: “[t]hese notes appear to have a very definite interest as source material for the Official Historian. It is doubtful whether he will have at his disposal any material which comes closer to affording a genuine cross-section of the thinking of the man in the ranks of the Canadian Army.”⁷⁷ Although they give an idea what was on the army’s “mind” and are a valuable resource for tracking morale throughout the army, Stacey adds a number of caveats that are worth considering. First, the historian must consider the writer’s mood, which could lead him to paint “an unduly bleak picture.”⁷⁸ Stacey also points out that the random cross-section of letters may not be representative of the whole.⁷⁹ Despite their drawbacks, the censors’ experience and systematic approach to measuring morale makes them a fairly reliable indicator. For this reason, the reports of the period 4 August to 20 December 1942 give a good indication of the effect the Dieppe raid had on overall army morale. Of even greater interest, the field censors produced a special report on 28 August 1942 that focused solely on the Dieppe raid and paid special attention to writers who had actually been involved in the raid. Surprisingly, the report suggests Canadian Army morale *increased* after the raid and that the returned participants of “Jubilee” showed renewed determination rather than lowered spirits. After twenty months of training in England, the censors noted that “the raid has had a stimulating effect on the Canadians in spite of the losses.”⁸⁰ Despite the inherently imprecise nature of such qualitative conclusions, the field censor reports provide a valuable insight into army morale that is further supported by the archival record.

⁷⁷ Stacey, “Censorship of Mail, Canadian Army Overseas,” 5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ “Comments on the Dieppe Raid,” Field Censor Report, 22 Aug - 28 Aug 42, 2.

Desertion Rates

In addition to the field censor reports, desertion lists are another important archival source for understanding morale in 2nd Canadian Division. One major strength of the desertion lists as a measure of morale is that desertion is a direct indication of a soldier's state of mind. Because morale is directly related to a "willingness to fight," and desertion is a clear indication that individuals refuse to do so, any "spikes" in the overall desertion rate of the 2nd Canadian Division would indicate a drop in morale.⁸¹ Furthermore, a higher desertion rate compared to 3rd Canadian Division could suggest a correlation to the Dieppe raid.

Even so, as with all archival sources, the desertion records should be considered carefully. Beginning in May 1941, the Canadian Section, General Headquarters, 2nd Echelon, (Cdn Sec GHQ, 2nd Ech) produced weekly summaries of absentees and deserters.⁸² These summaries list the new cases reported to 2nd Ech during the week and allow patterns to be easily identified. By consulting nearly all of the 2nd Echelon lists for the period April 1942 to December 1943 (eighty-seven out of ninety-two), this study will look for patterns or spikes that might indicate lowered morale. Furthermore, the lists allow direct comparison between the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions.

Court Martial Statistics

In addition to field censor reports and desertion statistics, the state of morale in 2nd Canadian Division can also be reflected in the number of courts martial against its personnel.

⁸¹ Shalit, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat*, 135.

⁸² According to Stacey, the Cdn Sec GHQ, 2nd Ech was, "in effect, a Record Office for the immediate purposes of the army in the field." Although it was originally responsible for the collection of War Diaries, by March 1941 it contained the following records sections: Part II Orders, Reinforcement, Casualties and Effects, Discipline and Pay, and Statistics.; "Brief Sketch of the History of the Canadian 2nd Echelon," CMHQ Report No. 16, DHH, 17 March 1941.

Based on the assumption that poor morale could cause increased disciplinary issues, a higher volume of courts martial could indicate lowered morale. Each month, the Judge Advocate General's Branch (JAG) at CMHQ produced summaries of all Canadian courts martial held in the UK. Using information provided by the Canadian Provost Corps, the reports included summaries of General Courts Martial (CGsM) conducted against officers and Field General Courts Martial (FGCsM) against other ranks. The monthly JAG summaries list offences by formation- division or independent brigade. They list the crime, sentence and the number of days the accused spent awaiting trial, but no identifying information such as names or regimental numbers. As with desertion statistics, the monthly court martial summaries also allow comparison between the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions.

Although the number of courts martial is an important morale indicator, the records should be considered carefully and in the proper context. While they may reflect actual crime rates, court martial rates can also indicate the chain of command's attitude toward indiscipline. In his PhD dissertation on Canadian infantry motivation, Robert Engen notes that the number of offenses in 2nd Canadian Division plummeted to almost nothing once it arrived in Normandy. However, he concludes that the drop was likely a reflection of both improved discipline in theater and "a diminishment on the part of provosts and COs to enforce the disciplinary code."⁸³ It is also worth remembering that most behavioural "corrections" were dealt with summarily and did not result in a court martial.⁸⁴ Still, the court martial statistics provide a general indication of the state of discipline. Although the records are incomplete, this study uses the monthly reports for nearly every month between May 1942 and July 1944 to determine if there are "dips" or "spikes" that would indicate a change in morale.

⁸³ Engen, "The Canadian Soldier," 262.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 140.

War Diaries and Re-training

Although the field censor reports, desertion rates, and casualty statistics of the rebuilding period suggest that morale remained steady, the divisional war diaries provide an important link between the Dieppe raid and the Normandy campaign. Not only do the war diaries provide a record of the divisional training schedule during this period, they also include letters and memoranda from the divisional GOCs, highlighting any problems they perceived. Despite the apparent fitness of the individual soldiers in 2nd Canadian Division, the divisional training schedule after Dieppe reflects serious deficiencies. To illustrate the problem, this study will compare the training schedule of the rebuilding period to an earlier schedule designed to work the 1st Canadian Division up from individual to formation level exercises during 1939-40. Although it is understandable that the 2nd Canadian Division returned to individual and sub-unit training after the near-annihilation of two of its brigades, the comparison demonstrates that training after Dieppe did not progress at anywhere near the rate it should have done. In addition to its training deficiencies, the war diaries provide further evidence of trouble in the division during the rebuilding period. In memoranda written by two of its GOCs, Major-General Roberts and Major-General Burns, both noted deficiencies at the junior leadership levels- the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and junior officers. Although Burns repeatedly addressed his concerns, his successor, Major-General Charles Foulkes seemed unaware of the problem, suggesting that the problems had either been solved or ignored in the final months before the Normandy campaign. Together, the problems with training and junior leadership may explain why 2nd Canadian Division performed worst of all the Canadian divisions in Exercise "Spartan" in March 1943. Furthermore, the fact that these problems began after Dieppe suggests that,

although the morale of individual soldiers remained steady, junior leadership in the division suffered as a result of the raid.

Combat Effectiveness in Normandy

This study will also compare the combat effectiveness of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in the Normandy campaign. Like morale, “combat effectiveness” is an abstract concept that few military scholars can agree upon. Throughout history there has been a tendency to describe combat in romantic terms, such as Revolutionary France’s “Miracle” at Valmy, or the “Protestant Wind” that saved England from the Spanish Armada. However, since the Second World War, military thinkers have increasingly sought empirical explanations for military outcomes. The combat effectiveness of a military formation is a measure of its ability to achieve victory. Although it seems simple at first glance, a closer examination of the concept reveals significant complexity. First, history provides many examples of underdog armies defeating powerful adversaries who, reasonably, seem to have had higher “combat effectiveness.” Demonstrable factors, such as terrain, weather, technology or tactics can explain such upsets. But the effectiveness of a unit or formation also encompasses intangible concepts like unit cohesion, temperament, and morale. And, while any of these factors can arguably be the deciding factor in combat, few can be defined in a reliable or measurable way. So while strategists and historians talk about “combat effectiveness,” there is no general agreement on the factors it includes or which are key.

Early post-war definitions of combat effectiveness came from the field of Operational Research (OR). In an attempt to keep up with rapidly changing technology and weapons during the Second World War, thousands of Allied OR scientists collected and analyzed combat data to

make recommendations about the conduct of the war.⁸⁵ In the mid-1960s, American OR scientist, Philip Hayward defined combat effectiveness as a unit's *probability* of success $P(S)$ compared to an opposing unit.⁸⁶ To find the probability, Hayward weighed three main variables: capabilities, environments, and missions, all of which he sub-divided even further. As an OR scientist, Hayward was astutely aware of the many factors at play in battle. Of less value to historians was his subsequent attempt to reduce this complexity to a single number. Trevor N. Dupuy's "Quantified Judgment Model" followed Hayward's earlier definition of combat effectiveness very closely and built upon it. Although Hayward notes that "even the most thoroughgoing analysis will leave a rather large number of independent variables, [whose] influence... on combat effectiveness remains to be assessed," Dupuy eagerly accepted the challenge, producing dozens of minutely detailed charts comparing such things as "operational lethality indices" of weapons from javelins to nuclear bombs.⁸⁷ Together, Hayward and Dupuy's models show the reductive methods used to measure combat effectiveness during the early post-war period. These methods are not useful to this study because they require exhaustive calculations of minutiae whose impact on combat effectiveness, ultimately, remain matters of conjecture.

A later approach by historians Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray defined combat effectiveness- military effectiveness in their parlance- as "the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power."⁸⁸ In their opinion, military effectiveness is measured at four levels: political, strategic, operational and tactical. Their conclusions are much more nuanced than numerical judgements, highlighting strengths and weaknesses, and the impact of all

⁸⁵ See Erik P. Rau, "Combat Science: The Emergence of Operational Research in World War II," *Endeavour* 29, 4 (December 2005).

⁸⁶ Hayward, "The Measurement of Combat Effectiveness," 316.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 322.; Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions & War*, 29.

⁸⁸ Millett et al., "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," 37.

four levels on combat effectiveness. Millett and Murray's definition of "military effectiveness" restored historical analysis of combat to the humanities by encouraging balanced analysis rather than absolute pronouncements. Despite its advantages, their method is less useful for understanding the combat effectiveness of the Canadians in Normandy. Because this study compares the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in a single campaign, it is principally concerned with the tactical and operational levels of war. Furthermore, because the model is meant to examine whole states and their total military forces (e.g., Germany versus France in 1870), the two Canadian divisions would be similar in all but the smallest details.

Although Millett and Murray assert that "victory is an outcome of battle" rather than something a military formation *does*, victory is nevertheless an important factor in measuring combat effectiveness.⁸⁹ British historian Peter Simkins articulated a simple but useful method for comparing similar formations that reflects this understanding. According to Simkins, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of the First World War has been unjustly denigrated in the historical record despite its success on the battlefield. To set the record straight, he demonstrates the combat effectiveness of the BEF during the Hundred Days campaign using a single variable: victory. Comparing many levels of assaults, from "strong offensive patrols" up to major set-piece battles, Simkins calculates the percentage of victories by divisions in opposed attacks.⁹⁰ With this method, Simkins finds an overall success rate of 68.8 percent for dominion divisions. For the British divisions, he calculates an overall success rate of 58.81 percent.⁹¹ To understand the discrepancy, Simkins surveys the number of battles each division took part in and the number of days spent in battle. Overall, he finds a great deal of variation. But, on average, he shows that

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁹⁰ Peter Simkins, "Co-Stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions in the 'Hundred Days', 1918," in *British Fighting Methods in the Great War*, ed. Paddy Griffith (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996), 53.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 56.

most British divisions performed as well as their dominion counterparts.⁹² Simkins' method is useful to this study because, unlike earlier "calculation" models, his does not require exhaustive surveys of battle minutiae or factors whose influence on the final outcome is arguable. As many historians note, ultimately "the effectiveness of a given military force can best be judged by its performance on the battlefield."⁹³ With this in mind, his focus on ultimate performance is a useful way to determine combat effectiveness. Furthermore, unlike the grand strategic considerations of Millett and Murray, Simkins focuses on the operational results of similar formations conducting attacks. To find the relative combat effectiveness of the Canadian divisions, this study counts every assault undertaken by a battalion or greater from the infantry divisions. Simkins notes that he does not count every British assault, but only those mentioned in the official history, which he calls "sufficiently thorough and extensive to offer some reasonably accurate conclusions about performance."⁹⁴ Following his lead, this study counts only actions mentioned by Stacey in *The Victory Campaign*, counting only those assaults that reached all of their objectives as *complete* successes. Any assault that met some intermediate objectives without being thrown back by a counterattack was counted as a *partial* success.

Battle Exhaustion

"Battle exhaustion" is another important consideration for understanding soldiers' responses to combat. While the specific causes of "battle exhaustion" varied, defeats could understandably shake soldiers' morale, and strains could add up over time, especially in regular contact with the enemy. In most instances, nervous reactions to combat were temporary,

⁹² *Ibid.*, 57.

⁹³ Engen, *Canadians Under Fire*, 4.

⁹⁴ Simkins, "Co-Stars or Supporting Cast?," 56.

requiring only two to three days of sedation and rest before soldiers returned to their units.⁹⁵ According to data gathered by Canadian Army psychiatrists on exhaustion casualties from June to November 1944, 11 percent of all infantry casualties were exhaustion cases.⁹⁶ Of these, half recovered immediately.⁹⁷ A further 28 percent returned to service and 22 percent were “not recovered,” meaning they either returned to service in another capacity or remained in hospital.⁹⁸ Despite the majority of exhaustion cases returning to their units, psychiatrists of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (RCAMC) faced a “battle exhaustion crisis” during the Normandy campaign.⁹⁹ Although previous experience had led psychiatrists to expect a low exhaustion rate, the battles of July caused the rate to balloon suddenly from 10 percent of casualties to about 25 percent. In heavily-engaged units the rate could even reach 35 percent.¹⁰⁰

To compare the exhaustion rates of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions, this study uses records compiled by the First Canadian Army Statistical Section for the period July 1944 to November 1945. However, like all primary sources, “battle exhaustion” statistics must be considered with care. The exhaustion crisis in Normandy forced doctors to “improvise new approaches to forward psychiatry,” such as battalion aid stations and divisional rest centres.¹⁰¹ Because treatment for “battle exhaustion” was *ad hoc* during the Normandy campaign, the records can only be considered approximate. Despite these difficulties the statistics consulted for this study can serve as a general morale indicator.

⁹⁵ Terry Copp & William J. McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 95.

⁹⁶ A chart drawn up by Army Stats shows 23,450 total casualties by battalion since D-Day, with 2,530 of them listed as “battle exhaustion” cases.; LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, “Battle Exhaustion & Battle Casualties (Infantry),” Stats 2nd Ech, 6 June - 30 November 1944.

⁹⁷ LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, “Disposal of Exhaustion Cases,” Stats 2nd Ech, 18 December 1944.

⁹⁸ LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, “Exhaustion Cases not Recovered,” Stats 2nd Ech, 18 December 1944.

⁹⁹ Copp & McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, 109.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 112; 114; 126.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 126.

Self-Inflicted Wounds

At the extreme end of “battle exhaustion,” a self-inflicted wound (SIW) is surely one of the most desperate acts a soldier can do to escape the horrors of war. Mention of SIWs occurred from time to time in the field censor reports during the long training period. One soldier from the RCASC, for example, wrote, “Quite a few of the lads are shooting themselves in the foot, etc. so as to get back home.”¹⁰² Although such assertions may have been exaggerated, the Canadian Army investigated all “wounds, injuries, sickness or death” that did not result from combat.¹⁰³ For all suspected cases of SIW, units conducted courts of inquiry and, if the suspicion was confirmed, tried the offending soldier by court martial.¹⁰⁴ The number of SIWs in the Normandy campaign is difficult to determine with certainty. A few sources cite a September 1944 report issued by I Canadian Exhaustion Unit, which claims there were 95 *suspected* SIWs during the Normandy campaign.¹⁰⁵ However, a memo by the Assistant Adjutant-General for discharges (AAG (dis)), states that in 21st Army Group, there had been “somewhere in the neighbourhood of 200 cases,” most of which occurred in Normandy.¹⁰⁶ Most suspected SIWs did not result in convictions, but were categorized as “accidental” injuries.¹⁰⁷ To compare the numbers of SIWs in the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions during the Normandy campaign, this study uses records kept by First Canadian Army Statistics over the period August 1944 to January 1945.

Conclusion

¹⁰² Field Censor Report, 22 Aug - 20 October - 3 November 1942, 2.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*; LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Report on Wounds, Injuries, Sickness or Death,” CMHQ Form M.F.B. 271.

¹⁰⁴ LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Injuries and Deaths not Caused by Enemy Action - Reports and Courts of Inquiry,” 17 April 1942.

¹⁰⁵ Engen, “The Canadian Soldier,” 263; Copp & McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, 135.

¹⁰⁶ LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Memorandum to File,” 11 November 1944, AAG(dis).

¹⁰⁷ Copp & McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, 95.

Although no single measure can determine whether 2nd Canadian Division suffered long-term effects from the Dieppe raid, the sources used in this study provide a fairly good indication. Although the many factors that make up morale are difficult for scholars to agree upon, this study uses a number of sources-- field censor reports, desertion rates and court martial statistics-- to understand its state in 2nd Canadian Division during the rebuilding period. Similarly, “battle exhaustion” and self-inflicted wound statistics can be used to understand the state of morale once the division returned to combat. The combat effectiveness of 2nd Canadian Division can be inferred by comparing its performance to 3rd Canadian Division and by comparing the two divisions’ casualty statistics during the Normandy campaign. Finally, a look at specific problems the division faced during its re-training and on operations can be used to establish whether links exist between the Dieppe raid and the division’s later performance. Taken together, the indicators used in this study provide strong evidence about whether 2nd Canadian Division performed below expectations in Normandy, and any connection its later troubles may have had to the Dieppe raid.

Chapter Three - The Rebuilding Period, August 1942- July 1944

In his 1948 summary of the wartime Canadian Army, Stacey wrote that, although it was composed of citizen-soldiers, “[t]he Canadian Army of 1939-45, by the time it went into action, was better trained than any peacetime regular troops have ever been.”¹⁰⁸ But it took long months of work to make citizens into soldiers, and organize them in units and formations:

Armies are not made overnight, however excellent the raw material (and the Canadian raw material was the best possible); they are formed, as Kipling once remarked, by the expenditure of time, money and blood. The increasingly scientific nature of war has only lengthened the time required. A Canadian general officer recently expressed the personal view, founded on very wide experience in the field in 1939-45, that “the modern infantry soldier requires at least twelve months’ intensive training”.¹⁰⁹

This chapter examines the rebuilding of the 2nd Canadian Division during the period between the Dieppe raid and the Normandy campaign. First, by looking at the casualty cost of the raid and, perhaps more importantly, what remained of the broken brigades, we can get a sense of the basic manpower challenges that had to be overcome. Next, a look at the divisional war diary during this period gives an idea of how the “raw material” once again became a fighting formation. Command of the division changed twice during the rebuilding period, and the issues addressed by each GOC further suggest the difficulties the recovering division faced. Finally, an analysis of data from field censor reports, desertion lists, and court martial summaries provides insight into 2nd Canadian Division’s morale throughout this period. Although the division was physically “broken” in Operation “Jubilee,” morale remained high once it had been reinforced. However, problems identified by two of its GOCs and obvious shortcomings in training indicate that Dieppe left a lasting mark on the junior leadership and the combat readiness of the division.

¹⁰⁸ C.P. Stacey, *The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: A Historical Summary* (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948), 326.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

The Aftermath of the Dieppe Raid

By the time of the Dieppe raid, the Canadian Army had already built three infantry divisions from the ground. In theory, it should have been no greater challenge to do it again for 2nd Canadian Division. **Figure 1** shows the organization of the 2nd Canadian Division in 1944. During the war, all three Canadian infantry divisions were organized along the same lines, with three infantry brigades of three battalions each, plus divisional support elements. In 2nd Canadian Division, each battalion was from a separate regiment of the non-permanent active militia. A tenth infantry regiment - the Toronto Scottish - filled the role of machine gun (MG) battalion. In addition to infantry, each division included three field regiments of the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) as well as one anti-tank (AT) regiment and one light anti-aircraft (LAA) regiment. An integral armoured reconnaissance battalion served as the division's eyes and ears, and could operate under divisional command or with elements detached to brigades.¹¹⁰ Infantry divisions also contained various support units such as engineers, signals, and provosts (military police). A full-strength Canadian division of the Second World War was just over 18,000 strong. The total war establishment in the infantry battalions of 2nd Canadian Division was 333 officers and 7,323 other ranks.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ United Kingdom War Office, *Military Training Pamphlet No. 23. 1941, Part X: The Infantry Division in the Advance* (Canada: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1941), 20-21.

¹¹¹ LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, "Chart by 21 AG Stats showing War Establishment, Strengths and Deficits by Unit, 5 Aug - 7 Oct 44," 18 October, 1944.

Figure 1

2nd Canadian Infantry Division		1944
<p>Canadian Infantry Corps</p> <p>4th Canadian Infantry Brigade</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Royal Regiment of Canada</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Essex Scottish Regiment</p> <p>5th Canadian Infantry Brigade</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Le Régiment de Maisonneuve</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Calgary Highlanders</p> <p>6th Canadian Infantry Brigade</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The Queen`s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">The South Saskatchewan Regiment</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">The Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.)</p>	<p>Canadian Armoured Corps</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">8th Reconnaissance Regiment (14th Canadian Hussars)</p> <p>Royal Canadian Artillery</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">4th Field Regiment</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">5th Field Regiment</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">6th Field Regiment</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">2nd Anti-Tank Regiment</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment</p> <p>Royal Canadian Engineers</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">1st Field Park Company</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">2nd Field Company</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">7th Field Company</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">11th Field Company</p> <p>Royal Canadian Corps of Signals</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">2nd Canadian Divisional Signals</p> <p>Royal Canadian Army Service Corps</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">2nd Infantry Divisional Troops Company</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">4th Infantry Brigade Company</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">5th Infantry Brigade Company</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">6th Infantry Brigade Company</p> <p>Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">No. 10 Field Ambulance</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">No. 11 Field Ambulance</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">No. 18 Field Ambulance</p> <p>Support Detachments of:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Canadian Dental Corps</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Canadian Provost Corps</p>	

Adapted from: English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, 224.

In the aftermath of Operation “Jubilee,” 2nd Canadian Division began the laborious process of rebuilding and re-training. Reinforcements began to arrive within days. Units also recalled dispersed members from staff positions, schools, and courses.¹¹² Thanks to these measures, most battalions were at full strength by mid-October.¹¹³ Despite the speed of reinforcement, the casualty statistics from the Dieppe raid tell a devastating story. **Table A-1** of **Appendix A** provides a breakdown of the “Jubilee” Force by unit, showing the total embarked and the number of casualties. Nearly all of the information shown in **Table A-1** has already been published by Stacey in *The Victory Campaign*. However, to allow a better understanding of the raid’s aftermath, **Table A-1** includes a count of personnel who returned uninjured to their units, information Stacey left out. Some 4,961 Canadians embarked for Dieppe, but only 2,210 returned and about 600 more were immediately struck off their unit strength as casualties, leaving only 1,596 able-bodied Dieppe veterans in the Canadian Army.¹¹⁴ Further examination of the Dieppe casualty statistics in **Table A-2** reveals the devastation the raid dealt to the battalions of the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades. Although the brigades made up only 44 percent of the division, infantrymen accounted for 2,818, or 84 percent of the 3,367 Canadian casualties from the raid.¹¹⁵ All but eighty-six of these infantrymen were from the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades.

What Remained of the 2nd Canadian Division after Dieppe

As devastating as the losses were to the division, a more important consideration might be to ask who was left. By comparing the Dieppe casualty statistics in each unit to their war establishment, **Table 1** shows the total strength remaining in each unit after the raid. For

¹¹² Goodspeed, *Battle Royal*, 403.

¹¹³ Canada, *Cent Ans d’Histoire d’un Régiment Canadien-Français*, 162. ; GreenHous et al. *Semper Paratus*, 221.

¹¹⁴ LAC, RG 24, vol 12699, “Part II Orders, Jubilee Operation - France,” 31 August 1942, Cdn Sec, GHQ, 2nd Ech.

¹¹⁵ DHH 594.063(D3), “Stats - Dieppe Raid, 1942,” 5 July 1954, CMHQ.; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 428.

example, the Essex Scottish Regiment conducted the main frontal assault along with the RHLI. Out of 553 Essex Scots who embarked, only 52 returned to the UK afterward, and of those, 29 were injured.¹¹⁶ Subtracting their casualties from their war establishment strength of 37 officers and 817 other ranks shows the Dieppe raid left the Essex Scots with only 7 officers and 317 other ranks, or 37.9 percent of its war establishment.¹¹⁷ Although these calculations are based on the unit war establishment for 1944, the numbers did not change significantly during the war for infantry battalions.

Table 1
Remaining Strength in 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades after “Jubilee”

	<u>Battalion</u>	Standard Strength	Number Embarked	Number Returned to UK	Total Remaining in Bn	Percent of Original Strength
4 Brigade	Royal Regt of Canada	848	554	30	324	38.2%
	Royal Hamilton Light Infantry	848	582	102	368	43.4%
	Essex Scottish Regiment	854	553	23	324	37.9%
	4 Bde Total Infantry	2550	1689	155	1016	39.8%
6 Brigade	Fusiliers Mont-Royal	848	584	71	335	39.5%
	Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada	854	503	157	508	59.5%
	South Saskatchewan Regt	848	523	184	509	60.0%
	6 Bde Total Infantry	2550	1610	412	1352	53.0%

Standard Strength taken from: LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, “Chart by 21 AG Stats Showing War Establishment, Strengths and Deficits by Unit, 5 Aug – 7 Oct 44,” 18 October 1944.

Similar devastation occurred in all six battalions of the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades. The Essex Scots and the Royal Regiment of Canada both finished the raid with only 38 percent of their war establishment. The FMR had a similar bloodletting, being reduced to only 39 percent of their establishment strength. The hardest hit brigade was the 4th, reduced to 1,016 all ranks or only 40 percent of its war establishment. The 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade was gutted by a half, with 1,352 all ranks remaining, leaving it with only 53 percent of its established strength. Out of

¹¹⁶ DHH 594.063(D3), “Stats - Dieppe Raid, 1942,” 5 July 1954, CMHQ.; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 428.

¹¹⁷ Engen, *The Canadian Soldier*, 383.

the nearly 1,600 uninjured Dieppe veterans left in the army, only 567 of those remained in the infantry battalions of the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades.

Although one might think of the rebuilt 2nd Canadian Division as a veteran formation, the number of Dieppe veterans was actually quite small. An important clue to the continuity of Dieppe veterans in 2nd Canadian Division comes from the Part II Orders issued by 2nd Echelon shortly after the raid.¹¹⁸ The Part II Orders list not only the dead and missing, but also every returning veteran who was subsequently struck off strength (SOS) to hospital. In all, the orders list 621 injured personnel. By comparing any names that show up in later war diaries with the “Jubilee” Part II Orders, we can see that some of these soldiers eventually returned to their units. For example, the Part II Orders show that Acting-Corporal J.J. Hartnett of the RHLI received a wound in Dieppe, was SOS to No. 7 Canadian General Hospital, and subsequently reverted to his substantive rank of private.¹¹⁹ However, by 5 June 1943, Hartnett had recovered, been promoted to corporal and received further training at a divisional Intelligence school.¹²⁰ To get a sense of their place in the division afterward, **Table 2** shows the Dieppe participants who remained in 2nd Canadian Division as a percentage of its war establishment.

Table 2
Dieppe Veterans as a Percentage of War Establishment

Brigade	Total Returned	Returned Uninjured	Dieppe Veterans as Percentage of War Establishment		
			low	avg.	high
4 Canadian Infantry Brigade	334	155	6.1%	9.6%	13.1%
5 Canadian Infantry Brigade	66	60	2.4%	2.5%	2.6%
6 Canadian Infantry Brigade	746	412	16.2%	22.7%	29.3%
Total - 2nd Canadian Division	2210	1596	8.9%	10.6%	12.3%

¹¹⁸ Part II Orders are the official records of personnel strength in the army. When someone was posted out, he would be “struck off strength” (SOS) from one unit and “taken on strength” (TOS) at another.

¹¹⁹ LAC, RG 24, vol. 12699, “Part II Orders, Jubilee Operation - France,” 31 August 1942, Cdn Sec, GHQ, 2nd Ech.

¹²⁰ WD - 2nd Canadian Division, GS, “2 Cdn Div Bn Int School Nominal Roll,” 5 June 1943.

The calculations are based on the total number of participants who returned from the raid as well as the numbers who were SOS to hospital. Together, these figures give a high and low range of veterans remaining in the division. The high range represents the most possible veterans that could have been part of the division at any time after the raid, and the low range represents the least possible number of veterans in the division after the raid. For example, if none of the injured personnel returned to 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, its uninjured Dieppe veterans would represent the low average, 6.1 percent, of the reinforced brigade. If all of the injured personnel eventually returned, the Dieppe veterans would have represented 13.1 percent of the reinforced brigade. However, most of the injured required long-term hospitalization, so the chart also gives an average calculation for each brigade and the total division.¹²¹ The averages show that, reasonably speaking, about 10 percent of the reinforced 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade were veterans of the raid, and fewer than a quarter of those remaining in 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade had participated. For the reinforced division as a whole, about 10 percent were veterans of the Dieppe raid. Although we can only be certain of the percentages for the immediate aftermath of the raid, it is unlikely that many of the veterans were posted out of the infantry brigades, so they can be taken as reliable for the rebuilding period.

Did Dieppe veterans provide much-needed combat experience to the units they returned to, or were they a liability, the “broken” part of the division? The regimental history of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal notes that the experience of Dieppe veterans was “of great help during this reconstruction period.”¹²² But, without a complete nominal roll of the “Jubilee” Force and exhaustive tracking of their wartime careers, it is difficult to assess their importance to the

¹²¹ First Canadian Army Stats noted that “[o]f the personnel hospitalized.. approximately 24% were fit for discharge to duty within 11 days of admission to the medical installation.”; LAC, RG 24, vol. 12699, "Statistics - Dieppe Operation," HQ Canadian Army, 21 October 1942, 4.

¹²² A rough translation; Canada, *Cent Ans d'Histoire d'un Régiment Canadien-Français*, 168.

building of a “new” 2nd Canadian Division. However, we do have a few clues. Along with decorations for their actions in Dieppe, many veterans also received promotions in the weeks that followed. Regimental histories frequently name officers, such as the RHLI’s Denis Whitaker, who received his majority in September 1942.¹²³ But it is much harder to track private soldiers or NCOs (lance-corporals, corporals, and sergeants) such as the thirty unnamed privates of the Royal Regiment of Canada who received their lance-corporals shortly after the raid.¹²⁴ Still, it is safe to say that some of these were veterans of the raid and that similar promotions occurred in all of the infantry battalions of 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades as new recruits filled the ranks behind them. As with the RHLI’s corporal Hartnett, the historical record shows that other units also gave advanced training to their Dieppe veterans.¹²⁵ Further evidence comes from the proceedings of courts of inquiry after the Dieppe raid. Although most court of inquiry records list only the dead and missing, the records of proceedings for the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Fusiliers Mont-Royal include complete lists of personnel who embarked for Dieppe. By comparing these lists to the consolidated casualty lists for Normandy and Northwest Europe, we can make a reasonable assumption about the numbers of Dieppe personnel who remained in the battalions over the next two years. For example, of the sixty-five members of the Royal Regiment of Canada who returned from “Jubilee,” ten later became casualties.¹²⁶ Similarly, twenty-one Dieppe veterans of the 125 who returned to the FMR later became casualties.¹²⁷ In both cases, the Dieppe veterans injured in the later campaigns represents about 16 percent of the total who returned. Because 2nd Canadian Division suffered a casualty rate well in excess of 100 percent during the later campaigns, these findings suggests that only a handful of Dieppe

¹²³ GreenHous et al. *Semper Paratus*, 220.

¹²⁴ Goodspeed, *Battle Royal*, 404

¹²⁵ Canada, *Cent Ans d’Histoire d’un Régiment Canadien-Français*, 168.

¹²⁶ LAC, RG 24, vol. 10875, “Op Jubilee – Courts of Inquiry,” August 1942.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

veterans were still serving in battalion combat positions during the Normandy and Northwest Europe campaigns.¹²⁸ With this small percentage of personnel now representing the bulk of combat experience in the division, it is reasonable to assume that many of the Dieppe veterans received promotions and formed a small cadre of NCOs in the 2nd Canadian Division. So, while this study cannot say for certain the roles Dieppe veterans played in 2nd Canadian Division afterward, evidence suggests they advanced in their wartime careers and had an influence, for better or worse, on the formation and the newly-arrived reinforcements.

Leadership Vacuum Following the Dieppe Raid

Regardless of the role played by Dieppe veterans in the rebuilt formation, 2nd Canadian Division faced a sudden and persistent junior leadership deficit. According to records compiled by First Canadian Army Statistics in October 1942, 544 NCOs and 94 junior officers of “Jubilee” force failed to return from the operation, with the lowest ranks (lance-corporals, corporals and lieutenants) representing the vast majority.¹²⁹ Again, about 80 percent of the dead and missing came from the infantry battalions. This sudden gap in junior leadership created difficulties that simple reinforcement could not remedy. In a 2 January 1943 letter to his battalion COs, Major-General Roberts called NCOs and warrant officers “the backbone of any military organization.”¹³⁰ As section commanders and platoon 2i/cs (seconds-in-command), NCOs occupied vital junior leadership positions. They had much more day-to-day contact with troops than officers did, and NCOs were trained to take charge if the commissioned officer became a casualty. In the above-mentioned letter, Roberts expressed concern about the division’s NCOs

¹²⁸ From June 1944 to April 1945, cumulative infantry battalion casualties in 2nd Canadian Division were 255 percent for officers and 175 percent for other ranks.; Engen, “The Canadian Soldier,” 390-91.

¹²⁹ LAC, RG 24, vol. 12699, “Statistics - Dieppe Operation,” HQ Canadian Army, 21 October 1942.

¹³⁰ WD - 2nd Canadian Division, GS, “Letter to Commanding Officers,” 2 January 1943, from J.H. Roberts, GOC.

and suggested his battalion COs conduct informal talks with them.¹³¹ As Burns would after him, Roberts noticed a general lack of junior leadership:

There is constant evidence that junior officers and NCO's are careless over routine matters, and I continually find men without field dressings, identity discs, empty water bottles, dirty ammunition, etc, etc. Again, if junior officers and NCO's really did their duty, I would never have to mention such matters as smartness, alertness and saluting.¹³²

Part of the problem likely stemmed from the high number of promotions after Dieppe. Roberts noted that the division's "N.C.O's often seem to be afraid that they will be accused of "throwing their weight about."¹³³ While many soldiers are understandably hesitant to take charge when promoted ahead of their friends, the high number of such promotions seems to have amplified the problem after Dieppe. Nearly a year after the raid, the new GOC of 2nd Canadian Division, Major-General Burns noted similar problems. As Roberts had done, Burns specifically addressed some of the shortfalls he found in junior leadership with memoranda on "Training of the NCO" in June 1943 and another on the training of junior officers the following month.¹³⁴ Burns was addressing what he saw as a failure to enforce basic discipline and a lazy attitude among NCOs and junior officers that Delaney called "collective nose-thumbing at the chain of command."¹³⁵ In the former memo, Burns laid out the responsibilities of NCOs to inspect their sections' turnout, equipment, and billets.¹³⁶ Furthermore, Burns reminded NCOs that they are always on duty and "must check infractions of discipline and disorder... at all times."¹³⁷ In another memo issued on 3 June 1943, Burns noted that "many men are wearing torn or dirty battle dress," and

¹³¹ WD - 2nd Canadian Division, GS, "Letter to Commanding Officers," 2 January 1943, from J.H. Roberts, GOC.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, "Training of the NCO," E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 2 June 1943.

¹³⁵ Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 77.

¹³⁶ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, "Training of the NCO," E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 2 June 1943.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

“that unit and [formation] patches on some mens’ [sic] uniforms are missing or torn.”¹³⁸ Like Roberts, Burns blamed many of these deficiencies on the NCOs. Furthermore, his comments suggest that they continued to act like lower-ranking soldiers, insisting that “NCOs should be given privileges beyond those given to [private] soldiers, and in all possible ways their distinct and higher status should be emphasized.”¹³⁹ Burns also addressed shortcomings he perceived in the division’s junior officer cadre, noting in a memo of 20 July 1943 that “there is a large turn-over in [officers], and ... many of those with units on exercises are green.”¹⁴⁰ As he had with the NCOs, Burns pointed out that officers “must be prepared to work most nights of the week studying and preparing” training.¹⁴¹ Despite his efforts to raise the standard of junior leadership in the division, Burns’ final training instruction of 28 December 1943 again stressed the need for NCOs and junior officers to learn “responsibility and initiative.”¹⁴² With so many promotions after the Dieppe raid, many NCOs suddenly held ranks they might not have earned in other circumstances. Furthermore, the division now had hundreds of newly-promoted junior leaders who needed to be trained. Between August 1942 and January 1944, the concerns raised by Roberts and Burns indicate that the Dieppe raid created a sudden and noticeable gap in the junior leadership capability of 2nd Canadian Division.

Training During the Rebuilding Period

Although the 2nd Canadian Division was reinforced quickly, it did not recover at an acceptable pace. As many histories note, training in the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades

¹³⁸ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Clothing – Other Ranks,” E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 3 June 1943.

¹³⁹ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Training of the NCO,” E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 2 June 1943.

¹⁴⁰ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Trg of Offrs,” E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 20 July 1943.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Trg Instr No. 21, Period 1 Jan - 31 Mar 44,” 28 December 1943.

reverted to individual and sub-unit level after Dieppe, where it remained for the rest of 1942.¹⁴³ The divisional war diary shows an understandably relaxed pace during the immediate aftermath of the raid. While units conducted their own training, the divisional headquarters held two small exercises per month until November when the brigade and battalion headquarters were included. No divisional training took place in December. In January 1943, the division headquarters conducted two signals exercises. Meanwhile, the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades conducted individual and sub-unit training until 19 February, when 4th Brigade held its first brigade exercise, “Punch.”¹⁴⁴ The 6th Brigade did not conduct training above the battalion level until the divisional exercise “Elm” on 22 February.¹⁴⁵ This pace was too slow for the division to perform well in its first real test, Exercise “Spartan” (4-12 March 1943). “Spartan” was a two-army, ten-division exercise conducted by General Headquarters (GHQ) Home Forces.¹⁴⁶ It did not go well for the Canadian formations involved, and led to McNaughton’s removal from command of the army. Out of three Canadian divisions that participated, the 2nd Canadian Division performed especially poorly, receiving criticism from General Sir Bernard Paget, the C-in-C Home Forces, “for inadequate coordination of infantry and artillery action and not digging-in after attack.”¹⁴⁷ These comments reflect that the 2nd Canadian Division had problems at the levels of staff (poor infantry and artillery coordination) and junior leadership (not digging in). “Spartan” was also the last straw for Major-General Roberts, who lost his command on 13 April.

¹⁴³ GreenHous et al. *Semper Paratus*, 223.; Canada, *Cent Ans d’Histoire d’un Régiment Canadien-Français*, 169.

¹⁴⁴ Taken from: WD - 2nd Canadian Division, GS, “Weekly General Reports,” August 1942; Greenhous et al., *Semper Paratus*, 223.; Goodspeed, *Battle Royal*, 406.

¹⁴⁵ WD - 2nd Canadian Division, GS, “Exercise “Elm” Pre-Exercise Instrs, dated 13 Feb 43,” August 1942.; Greenhous et al., *Semper Paratus*, 223.

¹⁴⁶ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 250.

¹⁴⁷ English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, 147.

Roberts later claimed that he had been a “scapegoat,” and that the Dieppe raid had ended his career.¹⁴⁸ However, evidence indicates he had failed to re-train his division effectively. Theoretically, the seven months between “Jubilee” and “Spartan” should have provided enough time to train the division, even if the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades had to be entirely rebuilt with “green” troops. When the 1st Canadian Division first arrived in England at the beginning of the war, McNaughton, then GOC, created an ambitious training schedule designed to get the troops trained up to divisional level by June 1940. The plan broke down as follows:

- Twelve weeks individual training from December 1939 to mid-March 1940.
- Six weeks’ collective unit training (up to battalion) mid-March to end-April
- Six weeks of brigade-level training from 28 April to 5 June
- Divisional exercises to commence on 6 June 1940¹⁴⁹

According to Stacey, the army was on track to meet this schedule until the German invasion of France and the threat of a cross-channel invasion changed the training focus.¹⁵⁰ Even with this diversion, McNaughton declared his forces “battle worthy” on 8 June 1940.¹⁵¹ **Figure 2** compares McNaughton’s timeline with the schedule the 2nd Canadian Division followed after Dieppe. Based on McNaughton’s plan for training the raw recruits of 1939-40 up to divisional level, the reinforced 2nd Canadian Division could have prepared in time for “Spartan.” Instead, the division spent significantly more time at the lowest levels of training. All told, with individual skills, battle-drill, and combined operations training, the 2nd Canadian Division conducted twenty-six weeks of training below the unit level-- before rushing “Elm” onto the

¹⁴⁸ Atkin, *Dieppe 1942*, 268.

¹⁴⁹ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 231-4.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 234.

¹⁵¹ English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*, 79.

schedule in advance of Exercise “Spartan.” Admittedly, the battalions had not rebuilt overnight. Even the FMR, which received 253 reinforcements within a day of the raid, still needed six weeks before it was fully reinforced.¹⁵² Even so, the rate of reinforcement does not explain why the division spent so much time on low-level training, with the result that it failed to prepare in time for higher-level manoeuvres during “Spartan.”

Figure 2
Comparison of Divisional Training Schedule 1939-40 with 2nd Canadian Division after Dieppe - Divided by Week

	Week: 12	18	24	26	27	28	29		
1939 - 40:	Individual	Sub-Unit / Unit	Unit / Brigade	Division					
Rebuilding:	Individual / Sub-Unit						1	2	3
	1. Exercise "Punch" - 19 February 1943 (4th Canadian Infantry Brigade only) 2. Exercise "Elm" - 22 February 1943 (2nd Canadian Division) 3. Exercise "Spartan" - 4 March 1943								

Gleaned from: LAC, RG 24, vol. 13748, reel T-7608, “Weekly General Reports,” War Diary – 2nd Canadian Division, GS, August 1942 – March 1943; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 231-4.

If Roberts was to blame for the division’s performance in Exercise “Spartan,” Burns was determined to avoid a similar embarrassment. In his memoir, *General Mud*, Burns writes that “at Dieppe, the 4th and 6th Brigades had lost so many men that they had to return to individual and platoon training... However, by the time I took over command much leeway had been made up, and these formations were ready to take their part in the programme of more advanced training.”¹⁵³ Despite this assertion, his initial focus was on decidedly less-advanced details. Burns issued a memorandum about the poor state of marksmanship within twenty-four hours of taking command of the division in May 1943. He wrote that it was “urgent to improve the standard of our weapon tr[ainin]g in this [formation]. Indifferent shooting ... as often seen on the

¹⁵² Canada, *Cent Ans d’Histoire d’un Régiment Canadien-Français*, 162.

¹⁵³ Burns, *General Mud*, 114.

ranges, will never win battles.”¹⁵⁴ Burns frequently made such corrections while putting the division through its larger paces.¹⁵⁵ He also noticed persistent problems in the tactical abilities of the division’s officers:

[Commanders] have been told many times that the [training] of their [officers] is one of their chief responsibilities; in particular the [training] of [officers] in tactics. The experience of “OUTBURST”, and other exercise with [troops], shows that results are not satisfactory.¹⁵⁶

The memorandum goes on to advise COs on the types of training required and how to conduct Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs). Burns also made sure the 2nd Canadian Division conducted tank and infantry training throughout the summer, in advance of the I Canadian Corps exercise, “Harlequin.” Fall training returned to unit-level before the divisional headquarters and two brigades participated in exercise “Prodder” (21 - 23 October). In November, the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades conducted night-drills and all three brigade headquarters took part in Exercise “Jordan,” a three-day TEWT “to study the problems in connection with a river crossing.”¹⁵⁷ During his last full month with 2nd Canadian Division, Burns put all three brigades through Exercise “Allways,” before slackening the pace in mid-December 1943. After all the formation exercises, Burns’ final divisional training instruction of 28 December 1943 assigned “first priority” to individual training and again stressed the need for junior officers to learn “aggressiveness” and “initiative.”¹⁵⁸ Despite his assertion in *General Mud*, Burns seems to have finished his command of 2nd Canadian Division still unsatisfied that the “leeway” had been made up in junior leadership.

¹⁵⁴ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Memorandum,” E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 11 May 1943.

¹⁵⁵ For an assessment of Burns’ training regimen, see Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 76-78.

¹⁵⁶ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Trg of Offrs,” E.L.M. Burns, GOC, 20 July 1943.

¹⁵⁷ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, 22 November 1943.

¹⁵⁸ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, “Trg Instr No. 21, Period 1 Jan - 31 Mar 44,” 28 December 1943.

Burns' replacement as GOC of 2nd Canadian Division, Major-General Charles Foulkes would command the formation throughout the Normandy campaign. Ambitious and impersonal, Foulkes has not been remembered kindly by historians. Jack Granatstein described him as "efficient, organized, [and] cold... a man who lived for compromise and conciliation"¹⁵⁹ He has also been described by Douglas Delaney as an "unremarkably average" divisional commander.¹⁶⁰ After conducting unit inspections throughout January and early February, Foulkes led his first divisional exercise, Exercise "Plot," on 6 and 7 March, a timeline that accorded with Burns' training instruction of 28 December. Brigade exercises resumed in earnest in late March 1944, just weeks after Foulkes had replaced all three of his brigade commanders. In April 1944, 2nd Canadian Division took part in corps exercises, staff training, and Exercise "Step," a simulated divisional breakout from a bridgehead.¹⁶¹ In the final weeks before Operation "Overlord," the division conducted more unit refresher training and a number of engineer exercises on river crossings.¹⁶² The war diaries provide no evidence that Foulkes shared the concerns of Roberts and Burns regarding the division's junior leadership.

It is no surprise that the 2nd Canadian Division was broken during the Dieppe raid, and the evidence shows that it did not recover as expected during the rebuilding period. Although "Jubilee" left two of the division's brigades gutted, 2nd Canadian Division quickly regained its war establishment, and the long rebuilding period should have provided more than enough time to properly train the reinforced formation properly. According to Delaney, the division needed someone to inspire it, and all three of its GOCs failed in this regard.¹⁶³ However, the experiences

¹⁵⁹ Jack Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddard: 1995), 177.

¹⁶⁰ Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 255.

¹⁶¹ WD - HQ 2nd Canadian Division, 1 April 1944.

¹⁶² Copp, *Fields of Fire*, 140.

¹⁶³ Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, 79.

of Roberts, Burns and Foulkes as GOCs of 2nd Canadian Division provide clues as to the state of the division during the rebuilding period. Although Roberts let training stagnate and Burns did his best to raise the level and standard of exercises, the issues remained unresolved, and Burns devolved training once again just before leaving the division. In addition to its training issues, 2nd Canadian Division's most pressing problem was in its junior leadership. As challenging as it was to take on and train so many reinforcements, the loss of over 500 NCOs and junior officers was a much harder deficit to make up. Promotions could quickly replace those lost in Dieppe, but the training of leaders requires far more time and effort than the training of riflemen. It also requires officer and NCO mentors that the battalions of 2nd Canadian Division suddenly lacked. Although historians have glossed over the rebuilding of 2nd Canadian Division after Dieppe, the war diaries, Dieppe statistics, and training schedule provide valuable clues about the true scale of the challenge. Based on junior leadership alone, it is fair to say that the 2nd Canadian Division remained a broken formation throughout the rebuilding period.

Field Censor Reports (August - December 1942)

After the Dieppe raid, the field censors issued a special report about the raid's effect on army morale, covering the period between 22 and 28 August. As with all field censor reports, this one was based on a sampling of letters, in this instance 8,500 pieces of correspondence. Despite their terrible experience on the beaches, most of the Dieppe raid participants quoted did not complain after the fact. Instead, they made little of their suffering and expressed renewed determination to see combat. One soldier of the Essex Scots wrote, "Next time we go in to fight I'm going to do my best, won't be thinking about coming back. If I have to fall I'll fall there with pride but I'm really going to show them who we are."¹⁶⁴ Such remarks were typical of the

¹⁶⁴ Field Censor Report, 22 Aug - 28 Aug 42, "Comments on the Dieppe Raid," 2.

participants' comments cited in the report. According to the field censors, "[t]hose who participated and returned do not complain of their wounds or make much of their suffering. The question the wounded ask is: 'How soon can I get out and join the unit again and have another go?'"¹⁶⁵ Another participant from the Essex Scottish regiment wrote:

I was hit in the shoulder by a piece of shrapnel... was operated on last night... will be out in a week and ready for another crack at the darn Germans... We wanted action and we got it, and we are ready for all the rest they can give us. Nearly all our friends have gone and it was with heavy hearts that the few remaining fell in for roll call this morning... The question on everyone's lips can we invade the continent? [sic]Without a doubt we can and will.¹⁶⁶

Despite the sanguine attitude of some writers, Canadian soldiers almost certainly tempered their letters. Not only would they have wanted to calm fears back home, they also knew their letters were subject to censorship. In most reports, complaints about censorship were few.¹⁶⁷ However, following the Dieppe raid, the censor noted:

Many writers... appeared to be very censorship-conscious. They referred to a knowledge of being subjected to strict censorship, which rather cramped their style and called for remarks to the effect that they could not say much. On the other hand, many writers wrote to great length and gave much detail of the raid, apparently not considering censorship at all.¹⁶⁸

Although the field censors claim that most participants accepted that the raid was worthwhile, a few veterans questioned whether the high cost was worth the little gained. One letter complains of the "hullabaloo about opening a second front," and calls the raiders a "sacrifice to the howls of the mob."¹⁶⁹ However, these opinions were very much in the minority and most expressed a

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ None of the field censor reports consulted for this study show more than 1.8 percent of writers mentioning censorship. In all cases, "acceptance" of censorship was significantly higher than the rate of "resentment."

¹⁶⁸ Field Censor Report, 22 Aug - 28 Aug 42, "Comments on the Dieppe Raid," 1.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

desire for vengeance rather than regret for the high cost of “Jubilee.”¹⁷⁰ So, while we must consider the context in which soldiers wrote, their letters provide the best qualitative measure of “Jubilee” veterans’ attitudes after the raid.

Dieppe soon faded from its place of prominence in soldiers’ correspondence. In the weekly reports immediately following the raid, “Jubilee” is listed as a major point of interest throughout the CAOS, being mentioned in a whopping 60% of all mail sampled, significantly more than any other topic.¹⁷¹ Interestingly though, after the immediate excitement died down, mention of the raid dropped away quickly as soldiers returned to their everyday concerns. Boredom seemed to be the greatest morale issue in the Canadian Army Overseas. In the field censor report for the week before “Jubilee,” soldiers mentioned boredom more than any other subject.¹⁷² After Dieppe, this number dropped considerably, and the field censor noted “[t]here are many fewer references to being bored with inactivity. The Dieppe raid has fired their imagination.”¹⁷³ By the 3 November report, based on nearly 39,000 letters, only one of the “representative” quotes still mentioned Dieppe, and the subject was no longer listed in the summary of topics.¹⁷⁴ By the end of 1942, Dieppe was rarely mentioned in soldiers’ letters, and almost always in passing and in concert with complaints about inactivity. As Stacey noted in *Six Years of War*, morale in the Canadian Army seemed to improve after the Dieppe raid, a fact that is supported by the special censor report of 22 August and those that followed the raid until the end of 1942.¹⁷⁵ The evidence of the field censor reports suggests that the same was true of 2nd Canadian Division, participants or otherwise. Considering the small percentage of Dieppe

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁷² Field Censor Report, 4 August - 19 Aug 1942, 3.

¹⁷³ Field Censor Report, 20 August - 3 September 1942, 2.

¹⁷⁴ Field Censor Report, 20 October - 3 November 1942.

¹⁷⁵ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 395.

veterans remaining in the division, even those units which had suffered most of all shared the general attitude. Although there is evidence of gaps in junior leadership and obvious difficulties retraining the division, the field censor reports suggest that soldiers' morale was not the main problem following the raid.

Desertion Lists

Like the field censor reports, 2nd Canadian Division's desertion statistics during the rebuilding period can be a bellwether of morale after Dieppe. **Appendix B** show the desertion statistics collected from the 2nd Echelon lists between January 1942 and December 1943. Although there are a few gaps in the archival records, a number of trends remain clear. On the whole, desertion rates were low throughout the period, with neither division declaring more than six in a single week. However, as shown in **Table 3**, the average weekly declared desertions in 2nd Canadian Division remained consistently higher than that of 3rd Canadian Division in both years. On average, 2nd Canadian Division declared one more desertion per week than 3rd Canadian Division, with respective weekly averages of 2.15 and 1.19. Although there were no noticeable spikes after Dieppe, weekly declared desertions in 2nd Canadian Division rose slightly from 1.93 to 2.23.¹⁷⁶ The records indicate that the 2nd Canadian Division had an ongoing problem compared to 3rd Canadian Division during the two years studied, but that its rate remained steady after the Dieppe raid.

Table 3
Average Reported Weekly Desertions in CAOS and 2nd & 3rd Canadian Divisions

¹⁷⁶ Although these averages are based on incomplete records, the pre-Dieppe average is based on twenty-six records over a period of thirty-two weeks, and the post- Dieppe average is based on sixty-nine records over seventy-two weeks.

	Pre-Dieppe	Post-Dieppe
2 Cdn Div	1.93	2.23
3 Cdn Div	0.30	1.54
CAOS	5.67	10.20


Gleaned from: LAC, RG 24 vols. 10110 & 18712, "Absentees and Deserters – Part I." Canadian Section G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon.

To understand the overall pattern of the weekly desertion statistics, the total declared desertions are shown in **Graph 1**. To reduce the number of missing records shown, the graph does not include December 1943 or the three months before April 1942. **Graph 1** shows consistently higher weekly desertion rates in 2nd Canadian Division compared to 3rd Canadian Division. Furthermore, the trend lines for both divisions show that the average rate of desertions in 3rd Canadian Division remained lower throughout the entire period. However, the trend lines in **Graph 1** show that the rate of declared desertions in 2nd Canadian Division remained relatively flat during 1942-43 while the rate in 3rd Canadian Division increased. **Graph 2** shows the same information, but includes the total declared desertions in the entire Canadian Army Overseas. Not only does it show that the increase in declared desertions for 3rd Canadian Division was consistent with a similar trend throughout the army, the graph also suggests that 2nd Canadian Division was doing well to have its desertions increase as moderately as they did. One could speculate that boredom and discontent increased steadily over the long training period, leading to higher desertions in the long run. If so, the consistently higher rate of desertions in 2nd Canadian Division could be due to the fact that it had been in England since November 1940, nine months longer than 3rd Canadian Division. The high number of reinforcements in 2nd Canadian Division may have put a damper on this effect and kept the desertion rate from increasing as steadily as it did in the rest of the army. Ultimately, the number of declared desertions in 2nd Canadian Division does not indicate a problem compared to 3rd Canadian Division. Although the Dieppe

raid may have been a factor in the desertion rate, the small increase and lack of any noticeable spikes suggest that it was not a considerable one.

Graph 1


Comparison of Weekly Desertion Rate in 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions, April 1942 - November 1943



LAC, RG 24, vols. 10110 & 18712, "Absentees and Deserters - Part I," Canadian Section G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon.

Graph 2

Comparison of Desertion Rates in 2nd & 3rd Canadian Divisions with the Total Declared Desertions in the CAOS




LAC, RG 24, vols. 10110 & 18712, "Absentees and Deserters - Part I," Canadian Section G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon.

Court Martial Statistics

Like the field censor reports and weekly desertion lists, the monthly court martial summaries also suggest that morale in 2nd Canadian Division did not suffer significantly after Dieppe. **Appendix B** shows the total courts martial listed in the monthly reports for the period May 1942 to July 1944. **Appendix B** adds the total FGCsM and GCsM for each division, and these are shown in **Graph 3**, below. In all of the records consulted, December 1942 is the only month between Dieppe and Normandy during which the consulted records show a higher number of convictions for 2nd Canadian Division compared to 3rd Canadian Division. However, its number of convictions - 125 against sixty-six individuals- was well within normal parameters, so probably unrelated to the Dieppe raid. Although the graph shows no apparent patterns or spikes after Dieppe, the average monthly conviction rate, shown in **Table 4**, rose slightly in 2nd Canadian Division, from 63.5 per month beforehand to 63.9 afterward. However, an increase in 3rd Canadian Division's monthly conviction rate from 64.5 to 93.2 suggests that the corresponding rise in 2nd Canadian Division was insignificant.

Graph 3
Total Court Martial Convictions by Month, May 1942 - July 1944



Gleaned from: LAC, RG 24, vols. 12770 & 12771, "Total Offences on Which Convicted," in "Summary of General Courts Martial," & "Summary of Field General Courts Martial," Canadian Section, G.H.Q, 2nd Echelon.

Table 4
Average Monthly Convictions by Court Martial - Before and After Dieppe Raid

	Pre-Dieppe	Post	Overall
2 Cdn Div	63.5	63.9	63.8
3 Cdn Div	64.5	93.2	88.6

Gleaned from: LAC, RG 24, vols. 12770 & 12771, "Summary of General Courts Martial," & "Summary of Field General Courts Martial," Canadian Section, G.H.Q, 2nd Echelon.

As noted in Chapter Two, units handled most of the army's disciplinary issues without a court martial. Accordingly, the court martial statistics used in this study can only be a single marker of the state of morale in 2nd Canadian Division. Although the court martial statistics indicate a steady decline in offences from March to July 1944, the records of CMHQ's Pay and Records Section show "spikes" in offenses for all three Canadian divisions just before deployment to Normandy.¹⁷⁷ Interestingly, while offences spiked, convictions by court martial decreased over the same period. Perhaps units simply chose summary trials over lengthy courts martial during the ramp-up period to Normandy. Despite their limitations as a morale indicator, the CMHQ court martial summaries suggest that convictions in 2nd Canadian Division remained steady from May 1942 until July 1944 compared to 3rd Canadian Division, and that the Dieppe raid did not have a detectable effect upon formal discipline within the formation.

Conclusion

Stacey called the long training period in England "as severe a test of morale as has been faced by any army in this generation," a statement that applies most of all to 2nd Canadian Division.¹⁷⁸ After its near-annihilation in the Dieppe raid, the division faced a rebuilding and re-training period that eclipsed any of the challenges faced by the rest of the army. The casualty

¹⁷⁷ Engen, "The Canadian Soldier," 261-2.

¹⁷⁸ Stacey, *The Canadian Army, 1939-1945*, 97.

statistics for Operation “Jubilee” tell the story of a single day. The real challenge was putting 2nd Canadian Division back together. Hundreds of Dieppe veterans remained in the broken 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades, and we can estimate “Jubilee” participants represented about 10 percent of the rebuilt division. In all likelihood, the veterans played an important role in training the reinforcements of 2nd Canadian Division. For better or worse, their utter defeat on 19 August 1942 now represented most of the combat experience in the 2nd Canadian Division.

The division recovered slowly and unsteadily. Although it was reinforced quickly, the high number of promotions required after the Dieppe raid created a new cadre of NCOs whose performance became a concern for two of the division’s GOCs. The noted problems with NCOs and junior officers may have been the result of too many promotions in a short time leaving a capability gap in the junior leadership. In addition to these troubling signs, the division failed to train effectively, as Exercise “Spartan” proved. Rather than an overarching plan to get the division back up to formation-level training, manoeuvres stagnated at individual and sub-unit level for months, long after the ranks had been filled, leaving the battalions, brigades, and the division entirely unprepared for larger exercises in the spring of 1943. Although Burns subsequently guided the division’s training to higher manoeuvres, he left after nine months with the feeling that it still needed further individual training and still uncertain that the NCOs and junior officers were performing to expectations.

Despite the troubling indications about the division’s training and preparedness, morale among the troops seems not to have suffered considerably after the raid. The field censor reports, desertion lists and court martial statistics all indicate that the morale of the bulk of soldiers in the division was unaffected by the raid. Although the rates of declared desertions and court martial convictions rose slightly after “Jubilee,” they did not experience any appreciable spikes. On the

contrary, the field censor reports noted a heightened determination to fight in the participants' letters home. As it had energized the army, the raid seems to have had a similar effect in the 2nd Canadian Division. Furthermore, although 2nd Canadian Division experienced a higher desertion rate than the 3rd Canadian Division, that rate remained steady after the raid, while the rate in 3rd Canadian Division and the army increased overall. Similarly, the court martial statistics remained steady in the 2nd Canadian Division after Dieppe while the 3rd Canadian Division experienced a sharp increase.

Using these markers, morale in the 2nd Canadian Division seems to have recovered quite well and quickly after Operation "Jubilee." As tragic as it was, the Dieppe raid was like a shot in the arm for the Canadian Army of August 1942, a reminder of why its citizen-soldiers had volunteered and a glimpse of what was to come. Considering that 90 percent of the 2nd Canadian Division of 1943 had not participated in the raid, and that most of the troops in the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades were new reinforcements, it makes sense that most of the division's troops shared a similar attitude. However, the division's training stagnated and the quality of its junior leaders was an ongoing concern for two of the division's commanders after the Dieppe raid. It remained to be seen whether these problems would persist once the division returned to combat.

Chapter Four - The 2nd Canadian Division in Normandy

“Their first real action comes as a shock to the best of troops and only good direction and leadership can bring them through with a heightened instead of a lowered morale.”

-Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, letter to formation commanders, 19 February 1944¹⁷⁹

The indicators may suggest that morale in the 2nd Canadian Division remained reasonably steady after Dieppe, but the true test of the formation’s abilities had to wait until July 1944. In Operation “Overlord,” II Canadian Corps entered the fray after three-and-a-half years of training in England. Despite early historians’ assertions that the Canadians in Normandy faced worn-out German divisions, recent scholarship has shown that Caen was the most heavily-defended sector during the campaign, and the Canadians faced some of the toughest German troops in France.¹⁸⁰

As discussed in Chapter 2, few scholars can agree on a measure of combat effectiveness. And while all would agree that morale plays an important part, morale alone cannot guarantee success in battle. Simkins’ method of measuring combat effectiveness levels the playing field and accounts for the longer time 3rd Canadian Division spent in Normandy. Similarly, the casualty statistics of the two divisions provide an important point of comparison. During Canada’s bloodiest campaign of the war, two further costs borne by the divisions--“battle exhaustion” and self-inflicted wounds-- added to the grim toll during the hard weeks of fighting. Normandy tested 2nd Canadian Division’s abilities and demanded a level of resilience that even Dieppe had not required. Ultimately, 2nd Canadian Division’s performance in Normandy fell

¹⁷⁹ Quoted in: Terry Copp, *Guy Simonds and the Art of Command*, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 21.

¹⁸⁰ See Gregory Lietke, “Canadian Offensive Operations in Normandy Revisited,” *Canadian Military Journal* 8, 2 (Summer 2000): 60-8.

short of the standard set by 3rd Canadian Division. It also suffered notable breakdowns in unit cohesion. However, the two divisions suffered nearly identical rates of “battle exhaustion” and self-inflicted wounds. Together, these facts suggest that the problems in 2nd Canadian Division resided not in its individual soldiers, but in its leadership, beginning at the junior levels-- a problem that two of the division’s GOCs had noted after Dieppe.

The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in Operation “Overlord”

With the 1st Canadian Division fighting in Italy since the previous summer, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions were the only remaining infantry divisions available for the Normandy campaign. The 3rd Canadian Division fought throughout Operation “Overlord,” but the 2nd Canadian Division did not see its first action in Normandy until mid-July 1944. In all, 2nd Canadian Division spent thirty-five days in theatre from the start of Operation “Atlantic” on 18 July to the closing of the Falaise Gap on 21 August. The timeline at **Appendix D** shows the operations undertaken by Canadians as part of “Overlord,” including the locations of each effort, the divisions involved and the higher formations they fought under.

Although the United States had been pressuring for a cross-channel invasion since December 1941, British planners remained cautious.¹⁸¹ In his diary entry for 5 June, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Alan Brooke wrote:

It is very hard to believe that in a few hours the cross Channel invasion starts! I am very uneasy about the whole operation. At the best it will fall so very very far short of the expectation of the bulk of the people, namely all those who know nothing of its difficulties. At the worst it may be well the most ghastly disaster of the whole war. I wish to God it were safely over.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Hastings, *Overlord*, 19.

¹⁸² Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, *War Diaries 1939 - 1945*, ed. Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 2001), 554.

Ultimately, the Allied invasion of Normandy did not confirm Brooke's worst fears. For the Canadians, however, the eventual victory was fraught with many "ghastly disasters" and a casualty rate reminiscent of the Western Front.¹⁸³ Although the 2nd Canadian Division would not join the fight until 18 July, the four final Canadian assaults of the campaign, Operation "Atlantic," "Spring," "Totalize" and "Tractable," were extremely bloody. Facing the most concentrated sector of German armour in the country, the learning curve of the green formation would be a steep ridge.

Combat Effectiveness

Between the two Canadian infantry divisions in Normandy, Simkins' method shows that the 3rd Canadian Division achieved greater overall success. **Table 5** lists all of the assaults (battalion or greater) in which the infantry divisions took part.

Table 5
Assaults by 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in Normandy Campaign

3rd Canadian Division Assaults - Battalion and Greater							Opposed?
Date	Op or Location	Battle Days	Successful?			Opposed?	
			No	Some	Yes		
6 June	Neptune	1		✓		Y	
7 June	Bridgehead	1		✓		Y	
8 June	Putot	1			✓	Y	
11 June	Vieux Caron	1			✓	N	
11 June	Mue Valley	1			✓	Y	
4 - 5 July	Windsor	2		✓		Y	
7 - 8 July	Charnwood	2			✓	Y	
18 - 21 July	Atlantic	4			✓	Y	
25 - 26 July	Spring	2	✓			Y	
5 August	Tilly-la-Campagne	1	✓			Y	
8 - 10 August	Totalize	3		✓		Y	
14 - 16 August	Tractable	3		✓		Y	
17 August	Damblainville	1			✓	Y	
18 August	Dives Valley	1			✓	N	

2nd Canadian Division Assaults - Battalion and Greater							Opposed?
Date	Op or Location	Battle Days	Successful?			Opposed?	
			No	Some	Yes		
18 - 21 July	Atlantic	4		✓		Y	
25 - 26 July	Spring	2	✓			Y	
29 July	Tilly-la-Campagne	1			✓	Y	
31 July	Tilly-la-Campagne	1	✓			Y	
31 July	St. Martin-de-Fontenoy	1		✓		Y	
5 August	May-sur-Orne	1	✓			Y	
7 - 10 August	Totalize	4		✓		Y	
11 - 12 August	Moulines	2		✓		Y	
16 - 18 August	Falaise Ruins	3			✓	Y	

Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 90-269.

¹⁸³ Engen, "The Canadian Soldier," 235.

Between the two divisions in Normandy, Stacey lists a total of twenty separate assaults by a battalion or greater. The 3rd Canadian Division took part in fourteen and 2nd Canadian Division participated in nine. A comparison of the two Canadian divisions' success rates is shown in **Table 6**. The 3rd Canadian Division had an overall success rate of 85.7 percent compared to 66.7 percent for the 2nd Canadian Division during the campaign. Similarly, in opposed assaults, 3rd Canadian Division had a higher overall success rate of 83.3 percent compared to 66.7 percent for 2nd Canadian Division. Canadian operations in Normandy failed outright in 21.7 percent of assaults. However, 2nd Canadian Division's rate of failure (33.3 percent) was over twice that of 3rd Canadian Division (14.3 percent).

Table 6
Comparison of 2nd & 3rd Canadian Divisions' Combat Effectiveness in Normandy


All Assaults								Total Success		All Opposed Assaults								Total Success	
	Ops	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%		Ops	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
2nd Canadian Division	9	3	33.3%	4	44.4%	2	22.2%	6	66.7%	2nd Canadian Division	9	3	33.3%	4	44.4%	2	22.2%	6	66.7%
3rd Canadian Division	14	2	14.3%	5	35.7%	7	50.0%	12	85.7%	3rd Canadian Division	12	2	16.7%	5	41.7%	5	41.7%	10	83.3%
Total	23	5	21.7%	9	39.1%	9	39.1%	18	78.3%	Total	21	5	23.8%	9	42.9%	7	33.3%	16	76.2%

The 3rd Canadian Division also achieved a higher percentage of outright victories in both categories, whether opposed or not. Although the 2nd Canadian Division was “fresh” in mid-July, it never managed to get a string of successes under its belt as the 3rd Canadian Division managed to do in the first week of “Overlord.”

In more than one instance, 2nd Canadian Division seems to have suffered from leadership problems that confirmed Roberts and Burns' concerns during the rebuilding period. Most striking was an incident with the Essex Scottish Regiment during Operation “Atlantic” (18-21 July 1944). **Map 1** shows the Canadian dispositions during the operation. In the division's first

action since Dieppe, Foulkes tasked the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade with the Essex Scottish Regiment under command to capture point 67, a feature just north of Verrières Ridge.¹⁸⁴

Map 1



Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, Map 3.

This action became a debacle. By late afternoon on 20 July, the Germans had pinned down all three battalions of the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade short of the ridge. When the Essex Scots reached their objective behind the South Saskatchewan Regiment, one of the South Sasks' few surviving officers Major L.L. Dickin requested permission to pull back behind the Essex, but the

¹⁸⁴ Copp, *Fields of Fire*, 147.

brigade commander, Brigadier H.A. Young, ordered him to hold the position.¹⁸⁵ In Dickin's absence, his company commanders had decided for themselves to withdraw. With the Essex now holding the forward position, they came under the same tank and artillery fire the South Saskatchewan Regiment had faced. The two forward Essex companies withdrew, "in some disorder."¹⁸⁶ Although they held the new forward line throughout the night, the weakened Essex position took heavy fire the following morning and retreated further, leaving a salient between the FMR and the Camerons.¹⁸⁷ Although the Essex CO, Lieutenant-Colonel B.J.S. MacDonald, lost his job as a result of the incident, the withdrawal was more likely a breakdown of junior leadership. The initial retreat occurred under company-level command. Moreover, "A" Company had lost all of its officers and was under the command of NCOs.¹⁸⁸ After the Essex retreat of 20 July, MacDonald spent the night rallying his battalion and returning stragglers to the line.¹⁸⁹ Despite these efforts, battalion elements again withdrew on the following morning, while some of those at the form-up-point refused to occupy the forward defences.¹⁹⁰ A similar incident occurred shortly after the end of "Overlord," on 28 August when the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada panicked during the Foret de la Londe battle.¹⁹¹ Although some units of 2nd Canadian Division proved extremely effective during actions in Normandy, such rare but notable breakdowns in junior leadership did not occur in 3rd Canadian Division. This suggests that junior leadership deficiencies identified by both Roberts and Burns still persisted in 2nd Canadian Division.

¹⁸⁵ Maker, "The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic," 11-12.

¹⁸⁶ Maker, "The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic," 13.

¹⁸⁷ Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 176.

¹⁸⁸ Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, "Proceedings of a Court of Enquiry Regarding Lt. Col MacDonald," 2 August, 1944, Accessed 3 December 2015, <http://canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/court-enq-notes.pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ Maker, "The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic," 13 - 14.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁹¹ Terry Copp, *Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944 - 1945* (Toronto: U of T Press, 2006), 31.

Casualties

Comparison of the casualty statistics of 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions during the Normandy campaign are much closer than expected considering the length of time each spent on operations. As General Montgomery noted, until the end of September 1944, the Canadian infantry divisions suffered more casualties than any others in the 21st Army Group. In all, the infantry battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions suffered 117 percent officer casualties and 82 percent casualties to other ranks during the three months of the campaign.¹⁹² The tables below compare the Canadian Normandy casualties by division. Using the records of 2nd Echelon Stats, **Graph 4** compares both divisions' casualties by month. Although the 3rd Canadian Division suffered nearly 3,000 casualties in June, the 2nd Canadian Division rate was higher during the two months where both divisions fought side-by-side, significantly so in August when it lost almost 1,600 more casualties than 3rd Canadian Division. In its first operation of the Normandy Campaign, Operation "Atlantic," 2nd Canadian Division lost 1,149 casualties, 254 of them fatal.¹⁹³ By comparison, the 3rd Canadian Division suffered about one third as many casualties, 386, with eighty-nine fatal.¹⁹⁴ In its second major operation, Operation "Spring" (25-26 July 1944), 2nd Canadian Division suffered through the Canadian Army's second-costliest day of the war on 25 July, when it lost 1634 casualties, 475 of them fatal.¹⁹⁵ In a short time on operations, 2nd Canadian Division's casualty count quickly approached that of 3rd Canadian Division. Despite spending five more weeks in Normandy, 3rd Canadian Division lost barely 1,000 more casualties than 2nd Canadian Division over the entire campaign -- 8,123 to 7,150,


¹⁹² Engen, "The Canadian Soldier," 390.

¹⁹³ Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 176.; *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ LAC, RG 24, vol 18826, "Stats and Explanations re Casualties of 2 Cdn Inf Div on 28/28 Jul 44 (Op Spring)," Directorate of History, 11 December 1956.

respectively. This disparity is much smaller than expected, considering how much longer the 3rd Canadian Division had been in combat.



LAC, RG 24, vol. 10517, "Casualties by Formation," Statistics – Canadian Section, GHQ, 2nd Echelon.

Battle Exhaustion

Unlike the comparisons of combat effectiveness and casualty rates, the exhaustion statistics during the period 23 July 1944 to 8 February 1945 show no appreciable difference between the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions. However, the low numbers may reflect a general unwillingness to record exhaustion cases as such. Although "shell-shock" was an acknowledged affliction of the previous war, "battle exhaustion" was a new and evolving concept that often put psychiatrists, units, and higher command at odds. In a letter to Simonds on 15 July 1944, Crerar referred to "the subject of "exhaustion neurosis" both real and artificial."¹⁹⁶ The army commander went on to describe his objection to "exhaustion neurosis:"

That general problem concerns the natural but, in the circumstances of war, reprehensible objection of a small proportion of other ranks ... to risk death or serious injury for their country! The "angles" include such things as desertion, self-inflicted wounds, attempts to be diagnosed as "exhaustion cases", VD re-infection and so on.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ LAC, MG 30, E157, Crerar Papers vol. 4, "Letter from Crerar to Simonds," Tactical HQ First Canadian Army, 15 July 1944.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

The implication is clear. Although the 3rd Canadian Division had gone through D-Day, the bridgehead and captured Caen, Crerar had little sympathy for the “pretty high proportion” of legitimate exhaustion cases, calling them “nervous breakdowns on the part of ... unstable mental characters.”¹⁹⁸ Simonds agreed and passed a similar attitude along to his divisional commanders, conflating “battle exhaustion” with malingering. He was also unimpressed with the seriousness of cases resulting from the Normandy battles:

Medical officers may be inclined to take a lenient view of so termed “battle exhaustion cases. It requires the close attention of commanders to see that malingering is not only discouraged, but made a disgraceful offence and disciplinary action taken to counter it. Battle exhaustion may be an acute problem under the most adverse fighting conditions - Winter, bad living conditions and bad feeding resulting from small parties of troops having to fend for themselves - the drabness of static warfare with its inevitable drain on morale. It is quite inexcusable under the conditions in which we have been fighting in the last weeks.¹⁹⁹

Despite the attitude of the generals, many exhaustion casualties simply needed a rest, and units were generally willing to grant it. Soldiers who went to rest stations for 24 or 48 hours could do so without stigma, and few were listed as exhaustion cases.²⁰⁰

Formally diagnosed “battle exhaustion” cases are shown in **Appendix E**. The statistics cover the period from July to December 1944 and show nearly identical rates of “battle exhaustion” in the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions. As noted, the records probably represent only a portion of the actual exhaustion cases, many of whom received a short rest before returning to their units. Overall, the exhaustion stats show 1,028 exhaustion cases in 2nd Canadian Division compared to only ten more in 3rd Canadian Division, an indication that, on the level of individual soldiers, morale in the two divisions was similar until the end of 1944.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ LAC, MG 30, E157, Crerar Papers vol. 4, “Fighting Strengths,” 29 August 1944, Letter from Simonds to Foulkes, Spry and Foster.

²⁰⁰ Copp & McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, 117.

Self-inflicted Wounds

A comparison of the rate of self-inflicted wounds in the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions also shows no appreciable difference until the end of 1944. The 2nd Echelon statistics are reproduced at **Appendix F** and cover the period from August 1944 until January 1945. Because the table reflects the month of conviction instead of the incident, it is impossible to surmise exactly how many of the SIWs occurred in Normandy. However, records from the AAG(dis) indicate most took place during the campaign.²⁰¹ In one case that occurred on 10 August 1944, during Operation “Totalize,” a soldier of the North Shore Regiment later pleaded guilty and received a two-year prison sentence with hard labour.²⁰² This represents a typical case of SIW for the Normandy campaign. According to the AAG(dis), “the average sentence [in 21st Army Group] appear[s] to be 2 years imprisonment and discharge with ignominy, and for some very strange reason the accused soldier almost invariably pleads guilty.”²⁰³ He added that, normally, “the soldier is young, 19 to 21, and in most cases has arrived in the UK from Canada in late Spring or early Summer of 1944, and is sent almost at once as a [reinforcement] to France.”²⁰⁴ The North Shore soldier fit the typical profile almost exactly. However, the court waived ignominious discharge and recommended “mercy on the ground that he is a youth of only 20 years who spent 58 days in the line without rest under the most difficult fighting, he [sic] tried to fight off his collapse but finally bombing by our own planes was too much for him.”²⁰⁵ Stacey describes the incident of 10 August in *The Victory Campaign*. The North Shore Regiment, which had already been reduced to three rifle companies by a bombing accident two days earlier, came under Canadian artillery fire on the final day of Operation “Totalize,” losing twenty-two killed

²⁰¹ LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Memorandum to File,” 11 November 1944, AAG(dis).

²⁰² LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Copy of FGCM Report,” 20 October 1944.

²⁰³ LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Memorandum to File,” 11 November 1944, AAG(dis).

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ LAC, RG 24, vol. 2203, “Copy of FGCM Report,” 20 October 1944.

and a further fifty-eight wounded.²⁰⁶ According to Copp and McAndrew, the number of self-inflicted wounds during the Normandy campaign was “insignificant.”²⁰⁷ The 2nd Echelon statistics show that there were thirty-three SIW convictions for 2nd Canadian Division and thirty-five for 3rd Canadian Division between August 1944 and January 1945. As with the “battle exhaustion” numbers, SIW statistics show that both divisions suffered from similar numbers of personal morale crises during the Normandy campaign.

Conclusion

After more than forty months overseas, Operation “Overlord” was the ultimate test for the Canadian Army and possibly the steepest learning curve it would have to climb during the war. Beginning with the 3rd Canadian Division on D-Day, the Canadians found that fighting in Normandy would be more reminiscent of the Western Front than the manoeuvre warfare of the early war. When the 2nd Canadian Division joined II Canadian Corps in Operation “Atlantic,” it arrived in time for Canada’s bloodiest phase of the entire war. Once there, the division fought in four major assaults and suffered over 7,000 casualties.

Despite steady morale during the rebuilding period, the 2nd Canadian Division’s combat effectiveness did not measure up to that of the 3rd Canadian Division during the campaign. Not only was it twice as likely to fail in the assault, it suffered significantly higher casualties in its two months of operations. That 2nd Canadian Division’s rates of “battle exhaustion” and self-inflicted wounds compare favourably to 3rd Canadian Division shows that the soldiers of both formations reacted similarly to combat. The Normandy campaign caused unprecedented Canadian casualties, both physical and neuropsychiatric, yet the soldiers of both divisions

²⁰⁶ Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*, 231.

²⁰⁷ Copp & McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion*, 135.

showed the same mettle. However, battalions of the 2nd Canadian Division retreated in disorder twice during July and August, an indication of a junior leadership problem-- a problem that became apparent after Operation "Jubilee." After years of training, boredom, and rebuilding, the 2nd Canadian Division finally joined the "main event" against Nazi Germany. Although 2nd Canadian Division suffered, its troops soldiered-on with grim determination through the worst the war could deal it. Despite its apparent resurgence of morale after the Dieppe raid, its combat effectiveness suggests that the division's troubles, beginning in junior leadership, had not fully recovered from its earlier bloodletting.

Chapter Five - Conclusion

On 25 July 1941, C.P. Stacey visited a section of the East Sussex coast where the 2nd Canadian Division had recently taken over beach defence from the 55th British Division. Remarking on the shallow defences, he nonetheless concluded that division's front "inspire[d] considerable confidence in the possibility of holding this sector successfully in the event of a frontal attack from the sea."²⁰⁸ Just over a year later, 2nd Canadian Division launched just such an attack against the German defences in Dieppe. The "Jubilee" force broke like a wave on the beach. The 2nd Canadian Division was reduced to a shell of itself with two of its brigades cut in half. The trauma of the Dieppe raid was undeniable. Occurring in the midst of a long wait for action, Dieppe came as a shock to the army and to the country. In the seventy years since, Canadian historians have looked for answers, for reasons, and for someone to blame. But in spite of successive lines of historical inquiry, the official conclusions penned by Stacey in the days after the raid have endured. It had been a worthwhile sacrifice, necessary for the victory to come.

Despite the tendency of historians to gloss over the aftermath of Dieppe, the evidence of this study shows that 2nd Canadian Division suffered long-term effects from Operation "Jubilee," and that they affected its performance in Normandy two years later. The division regained its complement of soldiers quickly after the raid, but NCOs and officers take much longer to train than riflemen. With the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades reduced to less than half their war establishment, the division scrambled to promote enough NCOs to replace those lost on the beach. Although evidence suggests that most of the Dieppe veterans received promotions afterward, they represented only a small percentage of the rebuilt 2nd Division that had lost more

²⁰⁸ C.P. Stacey, "Movement of Second Canadian Division to South Coast, CMHQ Report No. 41," 9 August 1941, DHH.

than 600 junior leaders in the raid. Within five months of the raid, Roberts noticed troubling deficiencies in basic discipline and hesitancy among NCOs to embrace their new status in the army. Months later, over a year after the Dieppe raid, Burns identified similar problems-- slovenly troops, an indicator of apathy among NCOs. He also complained that the division's junior officers possessed poor tactical abilities. Together, the evidence suggests that 2nd Canadian Division suffered from an acute junior leadership deficiency as a result of the Dieppe raid.

In addition to its junior leadership problems after Dieppe, training in the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades remained at the individual and sub-unit level for nearly six months. Although he had enough time, Roberts did not advance the division's training in time for Exercise "Spartan," which took place seven months after Dieppe. After such a long stagnation, it is no surprise that 2nd Canadian Division performed worst of all the Canadian formations in Exercise "Spartan." And despite Burns' later efforts to conduct formation-level training throughout his time as GOC, he concluded in January 1944 that the division needed still more work on basic soldiering, evidence that the training deficiencies had not been solved.

The 2nd Canadian Division fought for only half as long as 3rd Canadian Division in the Normandy campaign, but its combat effectiveness was significantly lower. Not only did it achieve nearly 20 percent fewer victories, 2nd Canadian Division was twice as likely as 3rd Canadian Division to fail in the assault. Moreover, the division suffered significantly higher casualties during July and August than 3rd Canadian Division. But, perhaps most telling of all, 2nd Canadian Division suffered at least two breakdowns in unit cohesion during July and August 1944, with elements of both the Essex Scottish Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada withdrawing in disorder under enemy contact. Although units of 2nd Canadian Division performed remarkably well on most occasions, these two incidents are

noteworthy because no similar breakdowns occurred in the 3rd Canadian Division over its longer time in Normandy. Furthermore, the incidents indicate that the earlier problems of junior leadership had persisted into the Normandy campaign.

Despite the apparent problems in leadership and combat effectiveness, markers indicate that individual soldiers' morale in the division remained steady after Dieppe. Morale is a highly subjective concept. For this reason, field censors read thousands of letters to get an idea of army morale, and it is unlikely that anyone had a better idea of Canadian Army morale during the war. Given their concerns in the wake of "Jubilee," the field censors' conclusions seem reliable-- that Canadian Army morale and that of 2nd Canadian Division actually increased immediately after the Dieppe raid. Further indicators taken from the desertion and court martial statistics also support this conclusion. Like the field censor reports, these records show long-term patterns in the morale of 2nd Canadian Division. Although the division struggled with a higher desertion rate throughout 1942 and 1943, the rate did not increase to a significant degree after the Dieppe raid, a period over which the lower desertion rate of 3rd Canadian Division, and that of the army overall, rose considerably. Similarly, the rate of court martial convictions in 2nd Canadian Division rose by only a tiny percentage in the twenty-three months following the Dieppe raid, while the rate of convictions in 3rd Canadian Division rose sharply by more than 30 percent. While no single indicator could be called "proof" of the state of morale in 2nd Canadian Division, the records point in the same direction and that is that morale in the division remained steady during its rebuilding period after "Jubilee." Similarly, the "battle exhaustion" and SIW statistics of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions in Normandy show that both divisions suffered individual breakdowns at a roughly equal rate until the end of 1944. The "battle exhaustion" and SIW statistics also strongly suggest that individual soldiers in the two divisions performed similarly in

Normandy, despite leadership problems and lower combat effectiveness in 2nd Canadian Division. The division's steady morale, combined with its lower combat effectiveness in Normandy suggests, as Ben Shalit observed, that morale cannot always predict how units will behave in combat. Troops with high morale can be poorly led and fall apart under pressure, like strong material held together with weak glue. The individual morale markers used in this study indicate that the material was strong indeed.

Among scholars, Stacey, English and Copp remain the authorities on the Canadian effort in Normandy. It is a strange trinity, with Stacey providing the accepted facts, English the reason, and Copp the refutation. Despite their ultimate judgements about the success or failure of the Canadians in Normandy, all three historians note command failures throughout the campaign. Stacey vaguely blames the brigadiers and English points squarely at the senior command and staff. Copp frequently agrees with the earlier conclusions, but he gives a more even-handed impression by focusing on tactical silver-linings. Moreover, all three point out that, despite command failings, the Canadian soldier of the Second World War was second to none. The conclusions of this study-- that the problems in 2nd Canadian Division began above the level of individual soldiers-- support the three historians' assertions that the mettle of Canadian soldiers compared favourably to any others who fought in the Second World War. Furthermore, while this present study does not examine command failures, it provides a new perspective on the 2nd Canadian Division and its performance in the Normandy campaign. Findings of persistent deficiencies in junior leadership support the conclusions of Stacey and English that higher command and staff failed to properly prepare the division for combat in Normandy.

The findings of this study also suggest areas for further research. Despite the particular focus on occasions in which units of 2nd Canadian Division were routed, such occurrences were

rare. While these incidents provide evidence of junior leadership deficiencies, the lower overall success of 2nd Canadian Division in Normandy indicate higher-level failures. For this reason, a closer look at command from the GOCs down to COs could prove fruitful for future research. Furthermore, an exhaustive look at the post-Dieppe careers of “Jubilee” survivors could also answer many of the unanswered questions of this study. Although the consolidated casualty lists indicate that about 16 percent of “Jubilee” participants remained in combat positions, it would be interesting to know *exactly* how many became NCOs, and how well they performed compared to other soldiers in later campaigns. It would also be interesting to compare their survivability in combat and their “battle exhaustion” rates with those of the rest of the army.

In the aftermath of the Dieppe raid, 2nd Canadian Division struggled to rebuild and re-train, but showed that military formations, like soldiers, can be stubborn and resilient. To suffer the country’s worst day of operations in six years of war, and for that day to occur in the middle of a quiet three-year period, without any other indoctrination to battle beforehand, could only have increased the shock of “Jubilee.” Although it struggled, the division showed resilience in Normandy. As the country’s enduring interest in the Dieppe raid illustrates, even the most futile military efforts should be understood and neither dismissed out of hand nor falsely trumpeted. Furthermore, we owe it to ourselves to understand not only the details of its defeat, but also how the soldiers, units and formations picked themselves up afterward, and the deep reserves of strength that ordinary Canadians tapped during the country’s costliest efforts of the war.

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Appendix A
Dieppe Raid Statistics

Table A-1: Embarkation, Disembarkation Strengths by Unit

Units	Number Embarked		Fatal Casualties								Non-Fatal Casualties								Total Fatal and Non-Fatal Casualties		Number Returning UK on Completion of Operation		Number Returned to UK uninjured		
			Killed in Action		Died of Wounds		Died While PW		Total Fatal Casualties		Wounded		Prisoners of War				Total Non-Fatal								
	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	
Headquarters, Miscellaneous																									
Small Units and Detachments	42	48	5	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	7	7	2	5	2	6	11	18	16	18	33	37	26	30	
Royal Regiment of Canada	26	528	8	199	0	2	2	16	10	217	2	31	8	95	6	155	16	281	26	498	2	63	0	30	
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry	31	551	7	172	1	6	2	9	10	187	5	103	7	71	9	88	21	262	31	449	6	211	0	102	
Essex Scottish Regiment	32	521	5	100	0	2	1	13	6	115	1	26	3	119	20	240	24	385	30	500	3	49	2	21	
Fusiliers Mont-Royal	32	552	7	98	0	4	1	9	8	111	2	48	8	103	11	222	21	373	29	484	5	120	3	68	
Queen's Own Cameron																									
Highlanders of Canada	32	471	5	55	1	7	0	8	6	70	9	94	3	33	6	125	18	252	24	322	18	250	8	149	
South Saskatchewan Regiment	25	498	3	75	0	3	0	3	3	81	7	159	2	22	7	58	16	239	19	320	13	340	6	178	
14 Cdn Army Tk Regt (Calgary R)	32	385	2	10	0	0	0	1	2	11	0	4	2	17	13	125	15	146	17	157	15	232	15	228	
Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG)	5	120	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	3	0	1	0	12	0	13	5	115	5	107	
Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada	4	107	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	0	6	0	2	2	59	2	67	3	70	1	43	1	37	
Calgary Highlanders	1	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	21	1	21	
RCA Units and Detachments	14	256	2	11	0	0	0	0	2	11	1	3	1	7	3	19	5	29	7	40	8	219	7	216	
RCE Detachments	7	309	1	22	0	1	1	2	2	25	3	33	1	36	0	88	4	157	6	182	4	161	1	127	
RC Sigs Detachments	6	72	0	8	0	1	0	0	0	9	2	7	0	3	1	14	3	24	3	33	5	47	3	39	
RCASC Detachments	1	37	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	3	1	0	1	9	1	10	0	33	0	27	
RCAMC Detachments	10	116	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	3	0	2	1	9	1	14	1	18	9	101	9	98	
RCOC Detachments	1	14	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	6	1	10	1	8	
Cdn Provost Corps Detachment	2	39	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	0	7	0	11	0	25	1	25	1	21	1	14	
Cdn Int Corps Detachment	2	13	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	5	0	8	2	5	2	5	
Total	305	4658	47	760	2	26	7	65	56	851	39	547	37	531	82	1224	158	2302	214	3153	132	2078	91	1505	
Total All Ranks	4963		807		28		72		907		586		568		1306		2460		3367		2210		1596		

DHH, 594.065(D3), "Stats - Dieppe Raid, 1942: Chart Showing embarkation & disembarkation strengths, nature of casualties, etc.," 5 July 1954; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 428.

Note: the grey entries have been gleaned from sources.

Table A-2: Dieppe Casualty Statistics for 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades

Infantry Battalion	Number Embarked		Fatal Casualties									Non-Fatal Casualties							Total Fatal and Non-Fatal Casualties		Number Returned to UK		
			Killed in Action		Died of Wounds		Died While PW		Total Fatal Casualties			Wounded		Prisoners of War				Total Non-Fatal					
			Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs			ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs						ORs
4 Brigade	Royal Regiment of Canada	26	528	8	199	0	2	2	16	10	217	2	31	8	95	6	155	16	281	26	498	2	63
	Royal Hamilton Light Infantry	31	551	7	172	1	6	2	9	10	187	5	103	7	71	9	88	21	262	31	449	6	211
	Essex Scottish Regiment	32	521	5	100	0	2	1	13	6	115	1	26	3	119	20	240	24	385	30	500	3	49
6 Brigade	Fusiliers Mont-Royal	32	552	7	98	0	4	1	9	8	111	2	48	8	103	11	222	21	373	29	484	5	120
	Queen's Own Cameron																						
	Highlanders of Canada	32	471	5	55	1	7	0	8	6	70	9	94	3	33	6	125	18	252	24	322	18	250
	South Saskatchewan Regiment	25	498	3	75	0	3	0	3	3	81	7	159	2	22	7	58	16	239	19	320	13	340
	Total	178	3121	35	699	2	24	6	58	43	781	26	461	31	443	59	888	116	1792	159	2573	47	1033
	Total All Ranks	3299		734		26		64		824		487		474		947		1908		2732		1080	

Adapted from: DHH, Kardex file 594.065(D3), "Stats - Dieppe Raid, 1942: Chart Showing embarkation & disembarkation strengths, nature of casualties, etc.," 5 July 1954; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 428.

Table A-3: Remaining Strength after "Jubilee" in 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades

Battalion	Standard Strength		Number Embarked		Number Returned to UK uninjured		Number Remaining		Percent of Original Strength			
	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Total	
4 Brigade	Royal Regiment of Canada	37	811	26	528	0	30	11	313	29.7%	38.6%	38.2%
	Royal Hamilton Light Infantry	37	811	31	551	0	102	6	362	16.2%	44.6%	43.4%
	Essex Scottish Regiment	37	817	32	521	2	21	7	317	18.9%	38.8%	37.9%
	4 Bde Total Infantry	111	2439	89	1600	2	153	24	992	21.6%	40.7%	39.8%
	Total All Ranks		2550		1689		155		1016			39.8%
6 Brigade	Fusiliers Mont-Royal	37	811	32	552	3	68	8	327	21.6%	40.3%	39.5%
	Queen's Own Cameron											
	Highlanders of Canada	37	817	32	471	8	149	13	495	35.1%	60.6%	59.5%
	South Saskatchewan Regiment	37	811	25	498	6	178	18	491	48.6%	60.5%	60.0%
	6 Bde Total Infantry	111	2439	89	1521	17	395	39	1313	35.1%	53.8%	53.0%
	Total All Ranks		2550		1610		412		1352			53.0%

Standard Strength taken from: LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, "Chart by 21 AG Stats showing War Establishment, Strengths and Deficits by Unit, 5 Aug - 7 Oct 44," 18 October 1944.

**Appendix B
Desertion Statistics, 1942-43**

Table B-1: Personnel Reported to 2nd Echelon as having been Declared Deserters, by Week

1942																																																													
	Jan				Feb				Mar				Apr				May				Jun				Jul				Aug				Sep				Oct				Nov				Dec																
	2	9	16	30	6	13	27	13	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	29	5	12	19	26	3	10	17	31	7	14	21	28	4	11	18	25	2	9	16	23	30	6	13	20	27	4	11	18	24	31														
Total 2 Div	0	0	2		0	0	4	1	2	5	2	3	0	0	3	0	1		0	2	6	4	2	0	3	3	3	2	4	2	3	0	1	4	4	0	1	2	2	3	1	2	5	3	2	0	3	1	1												
Total 3 Div	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	1	5	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	1									
Total CAOS	1	3	8		2	3	10	1	5	7	3	5	2	2	3	2	4		4	6	16	7	8	5	7	13	12	4	10	17	8	15	16	10	15	10	8	10	9	11	14	12	11	7	10	5	14	5	6												
1943																																																													
	Jan				Feb				Mar				Apr				May				Jun				Jul				Aug				Sep				Oct				Nov				Dec																
	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26	5	12	19	26	2	9	16	22	30	7	14	21	28	4	11	18	25	2	9	16	23	30	6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26	1	7	14	21	28									
Total 2 Div	4	0	1	2	3	2	1	3	3	3	0	4	4	3	3	3	0	1	2	2	2	1	3	2	3	0	3	1	0	3	4	3	0	5	3	1	3	5	2	3		5	0	6	0	3	2				3	2	2								
Total 3 Div	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	2	2	0	3	0	1	3	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	0	4	2	2	5	3	2	1	4	0	5	4	1	4	1	2	3	2	2													2	1	5
Total CAOS	7	8	6	14	10	11	4	9	8	16	4	14	21	12	17	9	6	5	12	15	5	9	10	11	11	6	9	10	7	9	14	12	8	17	14	13	13	17	12	8	14	2	9	7	9	7													7	6	7

LAC, RG 24, vols. 10110 & 18712, "Absentees and Deserters - Part I," Canadian Section G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon.

Note the missing records-- six in 1942 and three in 1943.

Appendix C
Court Martial Statistics

**Table C: Court Martial Statistics for 2nd & 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions,
May 1942- July 1944**

	1942								1943												1944							
	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	
FGCsM	(Total Offences on Which Convicted)																											
2 Div	93	46	57	57		115	79	125	35	97	43	94	20	48	26	38	51	124		125	26	49	65	57	32	44	17	
3 Div	44	27	42	31		31	48	45	25	43	26	77	48	58	45	27	34	107		45	5	43	53	35	35	25	13	
GCSM	(Total Offences on Which Convicted)																											
2 Div	1	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	16	1	0	1	0	3	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	9	0	1		
3 Div	0	0	0	0		1	1	1	5	5	2	2	0	9	18	5	2	4		1	2	0	3	0	0	2		
Total	(Total Offences on Which Convicted)																											
2 Div	94	46	57	57		115	79	125	35	113	44	94	21	48	29	38	52	124		125	26	49	65	66	32	45	17	
3 Div	44	27	99	88		146	127	46	30	156	70	171	69	67	74	65	86	231		170	31	92	118	101	67	27	13	

LAC, RG 24, vols. 12770 & 12771, "Summary of General Courts Martial," & "Summary of Field General Courts Martial," Canadian Section 2nd Echelon.

Note the missing data for September 1942, November 1943 and July 1944.

Appendix D Timeline of the Normandy Campaign

	June																														July																															August																					
	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22													
	Operation Overlord 6 June - 21 August 1944																																																																																		
Objective	Caen																														Orne/Verrières Ridge					The Falaise Road							Falaise Gap																																								
Canadian Operation	Neptune 6 June		Le Mesnil-Patry 11 June																	Windsor 4-5 July		Charnwood 8-9 July			Atlantic 18-21 July			Spring 25-26 July								Totalize 7-11 August		Tractable 14-16 August																																													
	Bridgehead Battle															Battles of Caen & Bourguebus Ridge															Breakout Operations																																																				
Canadian Divisions	3rd Canadian Division																														2nd Canadian Division																															4th Canadian (Armoured) Division																					
Command	British I Corps															II Canadian Corps																															First Canadian Army																																				
	British Second Army																																																																																		
	21st Army Group																																																																																		

Appendix D shows the timeline of major Canadian operations conducted during the Normandy campaign. It includes the overall objective, the Canadian divisions in theater, and the command under which they fought. For example, during Operation “Spring,” II Canadian Corps - composed of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions - fought as part of the British Second Army, 21st Army Group. All dates are taken from Stacey, *The Victory Campaign*.

Appendix E
Battle Exhaustion Statistics

Table G: Battle Exhaustion Rates for 2nd & 3rd Division, July 1944 - November 1945

2nd Div		3rd Div	
R Regt C	92	R Wpg R	114
RHLI	75	RMR	6
Essex Scot	58	Regina Rifles	85
Total 4 Bde	225	CanScots	126
		Total 7 Bde	332
Black Watch	116	QOR of C	30
R de Mais	70	R de Chaud	128
Calg Hlrs	160	N Shore R	151
Total 5 Bde	348	Total 8 Bde	311
FMR	50	HLI of C	66
Camerons	143	SD & G Hlrs	62
S Sask R	97	North NS Hlrs	75
Total 6 Bde	290	Total 9 Bde	204
Tor Scots	23	C H of O	14
8 Recce Regt	37	7 Recce Regt	27
4 Fd Regt	2	12 Fd Regt	10
5 Fd Regt	7	13 Fd Regt	9
6 Fd Regt	9	14 Fd Regt	12
2 Atk Regt	29	3 ATk Regt	17
3 LAA Regt	4	4 LAA Regt	13
Total RCA	51	19 (SP) Regt	4
		Total RCA	65
RCE	10	RCE	26
RCCS	6	RCCS	15
RCASC	14	RCASC	7
RCAMC	10	RCAMC	21
RCOC	2	RCOC	2
RCEME	4	RCEME	6
Misc	8	Misc	8
Total 2 Div	1028	Total 3 Div	1038

LAC, RG 24, vol. 18611, "Canadian Exhaustion Cases - Cumulative Total," Statistical Section, Adm HQ First Canadian Army, 18 December 1944.

Appendix F
Self-Inflicted Wounds

Table H: Convicted SIW Statistics for 2nd & 3rd Divisions, Aug 44 - Jan 45

2nd Division							
	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Total
4 Bde							
RHLI	1	2	0	0	0	0	3
Essex	1	2	2	0	0	0	5
RRC	0	2	0	1	1	0	4
							12
5 Bde							
RHC	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Calg. Hlrs	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
R. de Mais	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
							4
6 Bde							
Cameron	0	2	1	0	0	0	3
FMR	0	2	1	0	1	1	5
S Sask R	0	3	1	0	2	1	7
							15
Total Infantry							31
2 Div Tps	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
2nd Div Total							33

3rd Division							
	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Total
7 Bde							
Regina Rifles	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
CanScots	1	1	1	0	0	0	3
R Wpg R	0	0	0	2	1	0	3
							8
8 Bde							
R de Chaud	1	2	1	2	2	0	8
Nth Shore R	2	2	0	0	1	0	5
QOR of C	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
							15
9 Bde							
HLI of C	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
SD&G Highrs	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Nth NS Highrs	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
							5
Total Infantry							28
3 Div Tps	5	2	0	0	0	0	7
3rd Div Total							35

LAC RG 24, vol. 18712, "Statistical Data on SIW," Stats - Canadian Section GHQ, 2nd Echelon, July 1944-January 1945.