

TH 500 THESIS –
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN PARTNERED FORCES
IN SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

TH 500 THÈSE –
LE CHANGEMENT INSTITUTIONNEL AVEC LES FORCES PARTENAIRES
DANS LES MISSIONS D'ASSISTANCE DE SÉCURITÉ

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of the Royal Military College of Canada
by

Jan Kool, CD
Major (The RCR)

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The research involving human subjects that is reported in this thesis was conducted with the approval of the Royal Military College of Canada General Research Ethics Board.

For Mom and Dad

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ABSTRACT

This study identifies how security force assistance (SFA) missions can best support enduring institutional change within their partnered force's professional development system. It proposes a model for SFA engagement that demonstrates how different activities achieve immediate or enduring (i.e., institutional) effect on the partnered force. SFA is an increasingly important mission for Western military forces, with nearly 70% of Canadian deployed personnel participating in SFA as a primary or secondary task in 2019. However, recent failures of partnered forces, including the Afghan National Army against the Taliban, the Iraqi military against Daesh, and a long history of coups and human rights abuses call into question the effectiveness of Western SFA. This thesis uses the case study method, conducting a comparative analysis between contemporary or recent Canadian SFA missions in Lebanon, Jordan, and Ukraine. It leverages historical institutionalism to gain insight on institutional change within the case studies. The research finds that while the SFA environment is complex and uncontrollable, activities aimed at organizational and institutional reform are correlated with enduring change which is slow to actualize but accumulates over time. Conversely, SFA activities aimed at tactical and technical training achieve immediate effect that dissipates over time due to attrition and skill fade. It concludes with a call for planners and practitioners to understand the effect they are looking to achieve and apply the correct activities to achieve that effect.

RÉSUMÉ

L'étude démontre que les missions d'assistance de forces de sécurité (AFS) peuvent supportées des changements institutionnels durables à travers les systèmes de développements professionnels des forces alliées partenaires. Il propose un modèle d'engagement de l'AFS qui démontre comment différentes activités produisent un effet immédiat ou durable (c'est-à-dire institutionnel) sur la force en partenariat. L'AFS est une mission de plus en plus importante pour les forces militaires occidentales, avec près de 70 % du personnel canadien déployé participant à l'AFS en tant que tâche principale ou secondaire en 2019. Les récents échecs des forces partenaires, notamment l'armée nationale afghane contre les talibans, l'armée irakienne contre les forces Daesh, et une série de coups d'État et de violations des droits de l'homme remettent en question l'efficacité des forces occidentales qui support des AFS. Cette thèse utilise la méthode de l'étude de cas, menant une analyse comparative entre les missions canadiennes contemporaines ou récentes de la AFS au Liban, en Jordanie et en Ukraine. La thèse s'appuie sur l'institutionnalisme historique pour mieux comprendre le changement institutionnel dans les études de cas. Les recherches démontrent que malgré l'état complexe et incontrôlable d'un AFS, les activités visant à la réforme organisationnelle et institutionnelle sont corrélées avec des changements durables mais ceux-ci sont lents à se concrétiser et s'accumulent au fil du temps. À l'inverse, les activités AFS visant l'entraînement tactique et technique produisent un effet immédiat qui se dissipe avec le temps en raison de l'attrition et le déclin des compétences graduelles. La thèse se termine par un appel aux planificateurs et aux opérateurs pour qu'ils comprennent l'effet qu'ils cherchent à obtenir et d'incorporer des activités adéquates pour obtenir cet effet.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABCA	America, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies Program	IT&E	Individual Training and Education
		JAF	Jordanian Armed Forces
ADDIE	Analysis, Design, Develop, Implement, Evaluate	JFO	Joint Forces Operation (Ukraine)
AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine	JMTG-U	Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine (US)
ATIP	Access to Information and Privacy	JTAC	Joint Terminal Air Control
CAD	Canadian Dollar	JTF-I	Joint Task Force – IMPACT
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces	JTF-U	Joint Task Force – Ukraine
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear	LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
CFA	Combat First Aid	MENA	Middle East and North Africa
CFITES	Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System	MTCP	Military Training and Cooperation Program (Canada)
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation	MTT	Mobile Training Team
CJAT	Commander’s Joint Assessment Team	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CJOC	Canadian Joint Operations Command	NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
CMR	Civil-Military Relations	NGU	National Guard of Ukraine
CT	Collective Training	PDS	Professional Development System
CTAT-J	Canadian Training Assistance Team - Jordan	PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
CTAT-L	Canadian Training Assistance Team - Lebanon	QRF	Quick Reaction Force
DEEP	Defence Education Enhancement Program (NATO)	REB	Research Ethics Board
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)	RMC	Royal Military College of Canada
DMTC	Director of Military Training Cooperation (Canada)	RSC	Regional Security Complex
DP	Development Period	SAT	Systems Approach to Training
DRAB	Defence Reform Advisory Board	SBGS	State Border Guard Service (of Ukraine)
ETR	End-Tour Report	SF	Special Forces
FET	Female Engagement Team (FET)	SFA	Security Force Assistance
FID	Foreign Internal Defence	SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade (US)
GAC	Global Affairs Canada	SFU	Security Forces of Ukraine
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	TAV	Tactical Assistance Visit
HI	Historical Institutionalism	TDO	Training Development Officer
HQ	Headquarters	TF	Task Force
IHL	International Humanitarian Law	USD	United States Dollar
IMET	International Military Education and Training (US)	RFAF	Russian Federation Armed Forces
		RRB	Rapid Reaction Brigade (National Guard of Ukraine)
		RSC	Regional Security Complex
		WMTT	Winter Mobile Training Team

PART 1:
ESTABLISHING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Introduction.

The provision of Security Force Assistance (SFA) is currently the single biggest effort of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) outside of Canada, with 70% of deployed personnel engaged in SFA activities in 2020 either as a primary or secondary focus of their mission.¹ By improving partnered states' militaries and other security forces, SFA aims to strengthen weak states, contribute to regional security, and improve conditions for the population by promoting respect for human rights, the laws of war, and democratic control of military force. SFA is also meant to achieve foreign policy objectives without investing too much money, person power, or materiel, making it an attractive option for Canada and other Western states weary after a decade of costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is another tool in the national power toolbox, sized somewhere between a ball peen and a sledgehammer. As the head of the US Security Force Assistance Command Brigadier-General Scott Jackson explains, “[SFA is] how you achieve your national objectives without going to war [...] it keeps you out of a binary world of doing nothing or doing way too much.”² With such strong moral and operational imperatives, it is small wonder that Western nations have invested so much into SFA, with the US alone spending \$16 billion on the effort in 2016.³ When SFA is successful, as it appears it may have been in Ukraine from 2015 to 2022, based on Ukraine's performance in the first six months of its war with Russia, our national interests and our values are promoted at a bargain price.

¹ Canadian Department of National Defense, *CJOC Primer: Capacity Building* (Ottawa: Canadian Joint Operations Command, 2020), 3. In addition to the three current missions used as case studies in this thesis, Canada has a long history of SFA engagement. A non-exhaustive list includes missions to Ghana (1961-1968), Zambia (1965), Tanzania (1965-1970) Nigeria (1963 and 1968-70), Sierra Leone (2001-2013), Afghanistan (2002-14), Niger (2013 to present), and to the NATO training mission in Iraq (2014 to present). See Christopher R. Kilford, *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to The Developing World 1945-1975* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press: 2010); Andrew Godefroy, “The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 1965-1970,” *Canadian Military History*, 11, no. 3 (2002): 31-47; Greg Donaghy, “The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952-1971,” *Canadian Military History*, 4, no. 1 (1995): 75-84; The Department of National Defence (Canada), “Operation SCULPTURE (Sierra Leone),” <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/operation-sculpture.html> (accessed March 1st, 2023); The Department of National Defence (Canada), “Operation ATTENTION (Afghanistan),” <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/operation-attention.html> (accessed March 1st, 2023); The Department of National Defence (Canada), “Operation NABERIUS (Niger),” <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-naberius.html> (accessed March 1st, 2023); The Department of National Defence (Canada), “Operation IMPACT: NATO Mission Iraq,” <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-impact.html> (accessed March 1st, 2023).

² Nick Lopez and Kyle Atwell, hosts, “The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance,” *Irregular Warfare Podcast*, 20 Nov 20, accessed 1 Feb 20, <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-practice-and-politics-of-security-force-assistance/>, 13m42s.

³ Rachel Kleinfeld, *A Savage Order: How the World's Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2018), 36.

Despite these investments, Western militaries more often lose than win at SFA.

In 2021, the Afghan National Army, carefully trained and equipped by the West over two decades, collapsed in the face of a far weaker Taliban assault, allowing the Taliban to take control over Afghanistan after a twenty-year hiatus. In 2014, a similarly supported Iraqi army melted away before Daesh in Northern Iraq, further destabilizing the Middle East, contributing to a humanitarian and refugee crisis, and forcing a bloody campaign by Iraq and the West to retake the lost territory. In 2012, a US trained Malian Army Captain named Amadou Sanogo led a coup that overthrew one of the most stable democratically elected governments in Africa.⁴ Soldiers under his command – many of whom are graduates of US and Canadian military training programs – stand accused of war crimes and human rights abuses, including the extrajudicial killings of Malian civilians.⁵ These are just a few examples in the past ten years. The list of partnered forces who prove military ineffective and the number of soldiers accused of human rights abuses, war crimes, or who have committed or attempted military coups is distressingly long.⁶ When that list is examined – as the literature review will do – three ways that armies fail emerge: the first is militaries failing on the battlefield, normally due to a lack of motivation;⁷ the second is military officers overthrowing their own governments in military coups;⁸ and the third is armies losing the support of their population or of the international community by their own criminal acts, including human rights abuses, war crimes, or corruption.

No matter how, when states fail at SFA foreign policy and security objectives are not met, democracy is weakened, and human beings suffer. At best, states have wasted their effort and money. At worst, we have built more capable criminals and more effective despots. In either case, the West's record of failure on SFA calls into question why we so often do not deliver on expectations.⁹

⁴Adam Nossiter, "Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government in Setback for Democracy in Africa," *The New York Times*, 22 March 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html> (accessed April 10, 2019).

⁵Human Rights Watch, "Mali: Security Forces 'Disappear' 20, Torture Others: Crackdown on People Linked to Countercoup, Journalists," 25 July 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/25/mali-security-forces-disappear-20-torture-others> (accessed April 10, 2019); Jeffrey York, "Training of Mali soldiers said to lack 'values, ethics and military ethos'" *The Globe and Mail*, 25 January 2013, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/training-of-mali-soldiers-said-to-lack-values-ethics-and-military-ethos/article7893675/> (accessed 9 March 9th, 2019).

⁶Jahara Matisek, "The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and "Fabergé Egg" Armies," *Defense and Security Analysis*, 34, no. 3 (2018): 267–90; John Norris, "Is America Training Too Many Foreign Armies?" *Foreign Policy*, January 28, 2013, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/28/is-america-training-too-many-foreign-armies/> (accessed March 8, 2019); Joshua E. Keating, "Trained in the U.S.A." *Foreign Policy*, 28 March 2012, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/28/trained-in-the-u-s-a/> (accessed March 8th, 2019).

⁷Matisek, "The Crisis of American Military Assistance..."

⁸Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: Oklahoma Press, 1993).

⁹Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, "Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41, no. 1–2, (2018): 92; Kleinfeld, *A Savage Order*, 36.

This is a sticky question, with multiple complex answers. The literature review reveals five persistent problematic factors, most of which affect all SFA missions in some way. They include the challenge of state fragility; societal divisions within the partnered state; poor civil military relations between the partnered state, its military, and its population; corruption within the partnered government and the military; and principal-agent incongruencies between the partnered and partnering force. The problems can be seen together as the environmental conditions of SFA missions. SFA practitioners have little influence on these conditions, yet their impacts can easily doom a SFA mission to failure.

But what about those factors that are within the control of the SFA practitioner? Logically some ways of conducting SFA are better than others. This is the realm of mission design. Which approaches work best, when, and why? Which SFA activities provide the most effect on the partnered force, and what kind of effect is the mission trying to achieve? Few scholars and practitioners are looking at these questions, but those who are identify that current SFA missions are too often focused on providing tactical level training on easily measurable things like marksmanship, tactics, first aid, and PowerPoint law of armed conflict classes, instead of harder and less measurable reforms to the professional development system as a whole.¹⁰ Tactical training is easily quantified and thus seductive for campaign designers, and it may build transient tactical capability, but it does little to strengthen a partner's institution or build institutional power.¹¹ This thesis will not disagree with that point, but will make allowances that there are certain times and places where transient tactical capability is precisely what is needed.

Aim of Research, Research Question, and Hypothesis

The aim of this research is to determine the value of different approaches to SFA engagement within a partnered force's professional development system. To do this, it proposes two unique models for SFA engagement, described in Chapter 5. It places SFA activities on a 'Spectrum of Engagement,' from tactical and technical level activities on one end to organizational activities in the middle, to institutional activities at the other end. Different activities generate either immediate or enduring outcomes, depending where on the spectrum the activities is. It is founded on the idea that with a few exceptions, the goal of SFA engagement is to generate enduring institutional change. When they are executed correctly, SFA missions are small nudges to systems under stress. The challenge is placing that nudge in the right spot in the right direction at the right time to generate a virtuous cycle and change the direction of the institution.¹² Because this research is fundamentally dealing with institutional change, it will use institutional change theory, and specifically historical institutionalism to gain

¹⁰ Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, "Is Human Rights Training Working with Foreign Militaries? No One Knows and That's OK," *War on the Rocks*, May 12th, 2020.

<https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/is-human-rights-training-working-with-foreign-militaries-no-one-knows-and-thats-o-k/> (accessed May 26th, 2020); Sergeant First Class Tyrone C. Marshall, "AFRICOM Commander Addresses Concerns, Potential Solutions in Mali" American Forces Press Service, January 25, 2013, (accessed February 20th, 2019); BGen Scott Jackson, "The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance," 22m08s.

¹¹ Department of National Defence (Canada), B-GL-323-000/FP-001 *Security Force Capacity Building (Draft)* (Kingston: Director Army Doctrine, 2021): Chapter 1, Sect 1.

¹² Correspondence with Dr. David Last, September 2021.

insight on if, how, and why institutions change. It hopes to contribute to the growing body of scholarship and policy papers aimed at improving SFA practices.¹³

This thesis will explore the different effects that the provision of tactical training and support to institutional reform efforts have on the professional development systems of partnered states. The research question is “how do tactical training and institutional engagement affect the professional development system of the partnered state?” At the very least, better understanding of institutional changes because of SFA will help to improve the balance of tactical training and broader professional development and contribute to a better general understand of how SFA activities influence the partnered force.

To that end, it is hypothesized that the professional development system of a partnered force is improved more by institutional level change efforts versus the provision of tactical training. It is further predicted that the higher and deeper these institutional reforms are made, the more the institution improves. The dependant variable is assessed to be enduring improvements to the professional development system of the partnered force, which are defined as being capable when it can produce officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers with relevant skills, attributes, and knowledge to perform assigned tasks. The independent variables are the levels of engagement along the spectrum of engagement, of which there are four: the provision of tactical training, either at the individual or collective level; support to schools and training centers, including train-the-trainer activities; support to curriculum review and training organizations, including the application of a systems approach to training; and support to professional development system reform, including the creation of military employment systems and employment specifications. These variables interact in an environment that is impossible to control, characterized by the problems associated with fragile states, societal divisions, poor civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems. These external factors cannot be adjusted for, only acknowledged.

This research uses the case study approach, conducting a qualitative comparative analysis of contemporary Canadian SFA missions to Lebanon, Jordan, and Ukraine. It is hoped that the use of three unique case studies will give this research increased external validity. Likewise, a degree of methodological triangulation was sought by relying on three methods: documentary review of official documents and academic sources; interviews with current and former SFA practitioners deployed on these three missions; and my own direct observation from my experience deployed to Ukraine in 2018.¹⁴

The research revealed that where SFA activities were weighted towards organizational and institutional level efforts, there was an enduring positive effect on the partnered force that accumulated over time, and a strong correlation with institutional change observed by SFA practitioners. Conversely, where SFA activities were weighted towards tactical and technical activities, the effects on the partnered force were more immediate, but those effects dissipated over time due to skill fade and attrition. These findings, explained in greater detail in Chapter 9

¹³ The Department of National Defense’s *CJOC Primer: Capacity Building* identifies the “absence of precise, contextual and adjusted direction and guidance for [capacity building, of SFA] operations, from strategic to tactical” as a deficiency of CAF SFA efforts.

¹⁴ Donald Polkinghorne, *Methodology for the Human Sciences* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 253-54.

and 10, have implications for SFA practitioners in the field, and more importantly to those designing missions in Ottawa, Washington, or in other allied capitals.

Scope

This research is limited to SFA engagements within partnered forces' professional development systems. This term is defined in greater detail below, but for now it is enough to say that it refers to the system of training (individual and collective), education, and experiential gateways that produces soldiers and leaders. It is focused, in short, on the human capital of the partnered force. This research does not discuss other aspects of security force assistance, or the wider arena of capacity building which include equipment and vehicle donations, support to infrastructure, and support to personnel policy such as housing and pay, to name a few. This research focuses exclusively on what are normally called 'training missions,' though that specific term will be avoided because professional development systems include aspects other than training. Finally, this research is less interested in sponsored professional military education (PME) programs like the United States' International Military Education and Training (IMET) program or Canada's Military Training Cooperation Program (MTCP), which bring officers from partnered forces to Western countries to attend command and staff training. While these programs are an important aspect of international military cooperation, and certainly influence the partnered force, they are organized and executed outside of the mandate of SFA missions, which is where this research is focused. As acknowledged in the introductory paragraph, Canada has a long history of SFA engagement during the Cold War and in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, because this research relies on access to digitized official documents and to currently serving or recently retired SFA practitioners, only recent and contemporary SFA missions are studied. It also does not focus on Special Forces (SF) Foreign Internal Defence (FID) operations. FID is a related mission focused on training small numbers of internal security forces and usually conducted by Special Forces personnel. There is a small amount of literature on FID, which will deliberately not be covered in this research as it is older, involves special rather than conventional forces, and does not pertain to the selected case studies.

Secondly, it is too difficult to measure, and therefore beyond the scope of this project, to prove that there are definitive links between positive institutional changes to a professional development system and military effectiveness and improved professionalism and ethical behaviour of the force more generally, however experience and logic suggests that this link exists nonetheless.¹⁵

Finally, as this study is limited to just the question of professional development system reform and does not evaluate the many other reasons that SFA may be ineffective (poor civil-military relations, principal-agent disparities, housing and pay issues, etc.), it cannot address the whole of the SFA problem. Improvements to professional development system of a military force is not a panacea but can be an engine of progress. It is hoped that this research can provide

¹⁵ Risa A. Brooks, and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds, *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

policy recommendations to civilian and military leadership when considering SFA engagement and planning guidance to military commanders when designing SFA campaigns.

Key Terms and Concepts.

The following key concepts are defined for use in this research:

Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA will be defined in accordance with the NATO *Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.16 – Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, which defines SFA in part as “include[ing] all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones.”¹⁶ Throughout the paper, the force providing assistance will be referred to as the ‘partnering force’, and the force receiving assistance will be called the ‘partnered force.’ The terms Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB), Capacity Building (CB), and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) are related to SFA and may be used by different organizations. Of note, the Canadian Army uses the term SFCB, while CJOC uses CB.

Modern Military Values. The term modern military values will reflect the concepts established by the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*¹⁷, specifically the respect for human rights, the democratic control of military force, and adherence to the laws of armed conflict. Other values and beliefs such as unlimited liability, teamwork, and fighting spirit are also considered modern military values. It also incorporates new ideas identified by Hachey et al, such as the role of gender, diversity, and inclusivity.¹⁸

Military Effectiveness. This research will use the definition of military effectiveness as conceived of by Brooks and Stanley – specifically the attributes of skill and to a lesser extent responsiveness in the context of the global environment and their own political culture, social structures, and institutions.¹⁹ It will also be informed by Stephen Biddle’s views on military effectiveness being related to the adoption of what he calls ‘the modern system’ of force employment, to include dispersion, cover, and combined-arms tactics as opposed to numbers or equipment.²⁰ Finally, as SFA should not be value-neutral, this definition will also view modern military values (as defined above) as an essential factor. An effective military, then, is one that fights using modern tactics, is capable and willing to undertake difficult tasks, and whose behaviour reflects a professional ethos grounded in respect for human rights, the laws of armed conflict, and democratic (or at least civilian) control of the use of force.

¹⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance*, AJP-3.16A (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office(2016): 1-1.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence (Canada), *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2003).

¹⁸ Krystal Hachey, Tamir Libel, and Waylon H. Dean, eds, *Rethinking Military Professionalism for the Changing Armed Forces* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45570-5>.

¹⁹ Brooks and Stanley, *Creating Military Power*.

²⁰ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), Chapter 3.

Professional Development System. A professional development system (PDS) is the systemic process with which a military force develops its officers and soldiers across its elements and trades ethically, socially, and intellectually at all levels of their service career. For the purposes of this research, the CAF PDS will be used as a model. The CAF PDS breaks down both officer and soldier development into ‘development periods’ (DPs) across four pillars: training, education, experience, and self-development. The requirements for development at the intersection of each DP and pillar are selected via a professional development needs analysis, and training is analysed, designed, and designed using a systems approach.²¹




Figure 1 – The CAF Professional Development System (Source: The Department of National Defence)

Institution. An institution, simply defined, is a way of organizing social behaviour, encompassing both organizational structure and rules or norms of behaviour. More formally, an institution can be described as by Grief and Laitin “as a system of humanmade, nonphysical elements—norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules—exogenous to each individual whose behavior it influences that generates behavioral regularities.”²²

²¹ Department of National Defence (Canada), *Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System (CFITES)*, A-P9-050-000/PT001 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2014).

²² Avner Grief and David Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” *American Political Science Review*, 98, no. 4, (2004): 635.

The Systems Approach to Training (SAT). The systems approach to training is a concept and set of procedures used by Western militaries to govern and manage their professional development systems.²³ It is a logical and recursive process that contributes to designing military employment structures, including element, occupation, and job specifications, qualification standards, training plans, and training material. In short, it is meant to ensure that the right people have the right knowledge, skills, and attitudes at the right point in their career. The process is explained in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2 – The Systems Approach to Training (CFITES)
Source: The Department of National Defence

²³ CFITES.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the state of the literature on SFA and to lay the intellectual and practical foundations on which this paper's analysis will rest. To this end, many of the ideas put forth by the scholars covered in this chapter will be organized into an analytical framework (Figure 4) which Chapter 5 (Analysis and Findings) will use to describe and inform its analysis on the external reasons *why* SFA missions so often fail. There are key insights on the *ways* that military forces fail which this section will organize into a model (Figure 3) that will inform the rest of the paper and its conclusions. It will describe how scholars assess current SFA efforts and discuss different conceptions of military effectiveness. It will also perform a limited doctrinal survey and discuss who is writing and talking about SFA within the English-language academic and professional community.

Until recently, SFA was something that Western militaries did, but to which researchers and professionals paid little attention. This began to change around 2010, when then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates published an article in *Foreign Affairs* describing the provision of security force assistance as “a critical part of protecting US security.”²⁴ Academics and professionals began to take note of the amount of effort that Western militaries were putting into SFA, especially training the Afghan and Iraqi armies. After 2014, when Daesh routed the larger, better equipped, and Western trained Iraqi Army to take much of Northern Iraq, a trickle of publications turned to a torrent, with dozens of articles appearing in academic and professional journals, and on new hybrid professional-academic forums such as the *Modern War Institute* and *War on the Rocks*. This deluge included podcasts, a relatively new publishing medium, of which many are sourced in this chapter. Publishers of content include both academics such as Drs. Stephen Biddle and Rena Joyce, practitioners publishing in professional journals such as Colonel Yannick Michaud and Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Leroux, and policy makers turned academics such as Dr. Mara Karlin. Practitioner-scholars like Jahara Matisek and Matthew Cancian provide a needed tactical perspective.

A Doctrinal Gap: Immediate vs Enduring Effects

In addition to academic and professional sources, military doctrine and official publications provide an important perspective, which is where this literature review will start. Post-FID conceptions of SFA began to receive the attention of doctrine writers at around the same time as academics, at the turn of the aughts. Again, this is likely because of the emphasis placed on SFA in Iraq and Afghanistan, where multiple Western countries suddenly found themselves with large training deployments. The earliest such publication was a 2010 edition of the ABCA (American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies' Program) *Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook*.²⁵ This manual was written to provide ABCA planners guidance when establishing SFCB (read SFA) missions and became important within English-speaking militaries because of the absence of any other guiding doctrine at the

²⁴ Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” *Foreign Affairs*, 89, no. 3, (May/June 2010): 2-6.

²⁵ ABCA, *Security Force Capacity Building Handbook*, ABCA Publication 369, Edition 2, July 1st, 2011.

time. Showing prescience despite lacking the oxford comma, the manual describes the goal of SFA as a partnered force that “is an accountable, self sustaining, capable and credible force able to meet the security challenges faced by the HN and looked upon as legitimate by the population.”²⁶ The next major publication came in 2013, when the US Department of Defence published its *Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13 Security Force Assistance*.²⁷ This was the first US publication governing its training and capacity building activities by conventional forces and was followed in 2017 by *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation*, which contained a decent overview of SFA in its Annex B.²⁸ In 2018, the US Army published *ATP 3-96.1 Security Force Assistance Brigade*. This publication governed one of the most fundamental changes in the US Army’s structure in decades – the creation of five regular force Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) under a separate Security Force Assistance Command.²⁹ SFABs are unique in that they are designed, trained, and structured for SFA missions, obviating the requirement to constantly transform and then rebuild combat brigades for what had become persistent and routine SFA deployments.³⁰

NATO began publishing doctrine in 2016, with *AJP-3.16A Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA)*.³¹ This document is important in that it filled a doctrinal gap for some of the 30 members of NATO, especially smaller members, who rely on NATO doctrine where and when their own does not exist.³² This document also references the 2010 *Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, which required its members to develop the ability to conduct SFA within their own militaries.³³ This was not NATO’s the first foray into SFA; in 2007, NATO created the Defence Enhancement Engagement Program (DEEP) out of its Partnership for Peace Defence Reform Initiative. The DEEP program contributes significantly to the conversation about SFA. It has three main components: curriculum development, faculty development, and assistance to military education systems reform. NATO DEEP’s generic officer and NCO professional military education curriculums, published in 2011 and 2013, respectively, are

²⁶ ABCA, i.

²⁷ Department of Defence (US), *Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13 Security Force Assistance*, (Washington: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).

²⁸ Department of Defence (US), *Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation* (Washington: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017).

²⁹ Department of the Army (US), *Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-96.1 Security Force Assistance Brigade* (Washington: Headquarters of the Department of the Army, 2018).

³⁰ Of note, a Canadian Army Journal opinion article by Major Nicolas Fysh advocated for a similar program in Canada, centered on ‘Security Force Assistance Battalions’ created from the light infantry battalions within each brigade. Though a compelling argument, it effectively removes the light infantry capability from the Canadian Army. See Nicholas Fysh, “Opinion: The Canadian Army Should Create Security Force Capacity Building Units with a Dual Role to Support Force Generation,” *The Canadian Army Journal*, 19, no.1 (2021): 88-93.

³¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Publication 3.16A – Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance*, Ed 1, Ver 1 (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2016).

³² This author did not conduct a doctrinal survey of all thirty NATO members to determine which did not have their own SFA doctrine, as that was outside of the scope of this research.

³³ AJP 3.16, 1-1.

important documents in understanding the types of professional development systems reforms possible in partnered countries.³⁴

Canada's official doctrine on SFA consists of the unpublished *B-GL-323-000 FP-001 Security Force Capacity Building*, which has been in draft since 2014.³⁵ Echoing the ABCA *SFCB Handbook* from 2011, this draft doctrine defines SFCB (read SFA) as "those activities undertaken to develop the institutional and operational capabilities of foreign security forces, in order to create appropriate, effective and legitimate security institutions and forces."³⁶ This document also makes a significant contribution in that it introduces a concept of 'institutional power', which it defines as the sum of the moral, physical, and intellectual components of a partnered force's institution.³⁷ The ABCA concept closely mirrors the NATO and Canadian concept of fighting power, which is broken down into the same elements.³⁸ There is a useful intellectual relationship between the concept of the three components to institutional or fighting power and the well-known Bloomian Knowledge-Skill-Attitude (KSA) competency model, which forms part of the system of analysis for this research described in Chapter 5, in Figure 11.

The CAF has also published two official documents on SFA relevant to this study. Both are primers from the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) designed to guide SFA practitioners on how best to conduct SFA. The first, published in 2020, is titled the *CJOC Primer: Capacity Building*, details a Capacity Building Operating Framework that divides out military-level, ministerial-level, and political-level capacity building.³⁹ Within the military-level, it identifies the provision of professional development system reform, using the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), making it the first official document found by this researcher to do this. It also comments on the relationship between enduring effects and immediate effects, which the primer refers to as 'quick-impact' activities.⁴⁰ The *CJOC Primer* uses many examples from Jordan, Lebanon, and Ukraine to illustrate its points, making it a very topical reference for this research. The second publication is a companion to the original *CJOC Primer* and expands on the concept of NCO Development as a critical aspect of institutional change within partnered forces.⁴¹ *Capacity Building: Delivery Non-Commissioned Officer Mentoring and Training* was published by the CJOC Commander's Joint Assessment Team (CJAT) in 2021 and details the importance of and the challenges to supporting NCO reform efforts during SFA.

³⁴ NATO Defence Institution and Capacity Building Directorate, *Generic Officer Professional Military Education – Reference Curriculum*, NATO DEEP, September 2011; NATO Defence Institution and Capacity Building Directorate, *Generic Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Professional Military Education – Reference Curriculum*, NATO DEEP, October 2013.

³⁵ *B-GL-323-000 FP-001 Security Force Capacity Building* (Draft). This document has not been published due to a lack of capacity within the Canadian Army Doctrine Center.

³⁶ *B-GL-323-000 FP-001 Security Force Capacity Building* (Draft), 2.

³⁷ *B-GL-323-000 FP-001 Security Force Capacity Building* (Draft), 4.

³⁸ NATO Standardization Office, *AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine* Ed E, Ver 1 (February 2017), 1-17; Department of National Defence (Canada), *B-GL-300-001 FP-001 Land Operations* (Director Army Doctrine, Kingston: 2008)

³⁹ *CJOC Primer: Capacity Building*, 7.

⁴⁰ *CJOC Primer: Capacity Building*, 10.

⁴¹ Department of National Defence (Canada), *Capacity Building: Delivery Non-Commissioned Officer Mentoring and Training*, (Canadian Joint Operations Command, Commander Joint Assessment Team, Ottawa: 2021)

All doctrine discusses the challenges of SFA missions, the characteristics of partnered forces, and the importance of understanding cultural difference, of conducting operational assessments, and many other concepts relevant to SFA practice. Aside from the CJOC primers, no doctrinal sources note the difference between immediate and enduring effects, and none have grouped SFA activities into coherent approaches with predictable impacts on institutional reform of the partnered force. There exists a doctrinal gap here, with little guidance to inform the difference between immediate and enduring effects within the partnered force, or how different approaches lead (or do not lead) to those outcomes. This research hopes to help close this gap.

What is Military Effectiveness?

If the goal of SFA is to build capable and credible military forces, then it is worth exploring some of the ideas of what contributes to military effectiveness. At its simplest, military effectiveness can be defined as a military's ability to accomplish its aims. It can be tricky to measure. Many militaries have been wrongly assessed as more effective than they were (Iraq 1991, Iraq 2003, Israel 2008, Iraq 2014, Afghanistan 2020), or less effective than they turned out to be (Israel 1948, Israel 1973, Ukraine 2022). There is a cost to mismeasuring military effectiveness in either situation. The problem is current; within a single year, the US overestimated the effectiveness of the Afghan military, and underestimated the effectiveness of the Ukrainian military, some of specific costs of which Julian Barnes lays out in the *New York Times* in March 2022.⁴² Despite its importance, academics have only recently begun studying military effectiveness, led by political scientists “applying new methodologies and approaches... [leading to] an emerging research agenda in which the conduct of war... [is] seen as a social science phenomenon in which human behaviour plays a critical role in interaction with material factors to produce real military outcomes.”⁴³ Two key sources from this literature will be discussed here.

The first is the 2007 collection of essays edited by Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, titled *Creating Military Power: Sources of Military Effectiveness*.⁴⁴ In its introductory chapter, Brooks describes military effectiveness as a key component of military power that has often been overlooked by those focused on more measurable components such as human capital, industrial output, or natural resources.⁴⁵ Brooks, referring to analysis conducted by Biddle, states that a model that takes into account human capital and resources only predicts military victory about 60% of the time, which is slightly more accurate than flipping a coin.⁴⁶ Rather, Brooks believes that military effectiveness comes from four attributes: 1) integration, which

⁴² Julian E. Barnes, “Why the US Was Wrong about Ukraine and the Afghan War,” *The New York Times*, March 24th, 2022 <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/politics/intelligence-agencies-ukraine-afghanistan.html> (accessed March 27th, 2022).

⁴³ Stephen Biddle, “Military Effectiveness,” *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.35>.

⁴⁴ Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds. *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁴⁵ Risa A. Brooks, “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness,” *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, Risa A. Brooks, and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 2.

⁴⁶ Brooks, “Introduction...,” 3.

relates to how consistently a military can marshal its resources to achieve its aims, and avoid “counterproductive actions”; 2) responsiveness, which is how quickly a state can answer national security problems; 3) skill, which relates to the ability and motivation of military personnel to conduct tasks; and 4) quality, referring to the capabilities of physical infrastructure, such as weapons and equipment.⁴⁷

Stephen Biddle, in his 2004 book *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, focuses more narrowly on Brook’s third component: military skill.⁴⁸ In it, Biddle posits that victory in modern battle depends not on ‘numerical preponderance’ or superior technology, but overwhelmingly on the skill of its militaries. Biddle states that the ‘modern system of tactics’ – the dispersion of forces and the use of ground for cover and concealment – is the only thing to counter the ‘radical lethality’ of modern weapons systems since 1914. He skillfully uses a series of case studies, data analysis, and war gaming to prove his thesis in the post First World War era. The issue, Biddle says, is that implementing the modern system of tactics requires extremely high level of skill from its soldiers. He writes: “Among the most serious drawbacks of the modern system is its tremendous complexity, and the high levels of skill it therefore demands in soldiers and officers. Not all armies can provide such skills.”⁴⁹ Short service conscripts do not have the time to learn all the necessary skills required to implement the modern system, and their longer-serving leaders are thus not trained or educated to fight that type of battle. This becomes one of the largest challenges for SFA practitioners: trying to teach short-service soldiers a system of tactics incongruent to the style of their military. This is also related to later discussions in Chapter 5 of Schiff’s concordance theory and agreement between political elites, military leaders, and citizens on the ‘style’ of military the state maintains.

NATO and Canadian military doctrine put forward a conceptual model for military power that underpins the CAF’s draft SFCB doctrine’s concept of ‘institutional power’ and correlates closely to the training-competency model used by this researcher in Chapter 5 (Figure 11).⁵⁰ This concept breaks down military power into three interrelated components: 1) the conceptual component, which includes doctrine, structures, tactics and techniques, principles of war, and philosophies of command; 2) the moral component, which includes motivation (including the will to fight), leadership, culture, ethics and ethos; and 3) the physical component, which includes numbers of soldiers, number and quality of weapons and equipment, sustainment, and readiness. According to NATO and Canadian doctrine, each of these components need to strong, or else the entire system is weak. One useful aspect about this model is that it places motivation in a position of importance. Multiple articles on Ukraine’s success in the opening months of the 2022 escalation of the Russo-Ukraine War speak to

⁴⁷ Brooks, “Introduction...,” 2.

⁴⁸ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁴⁹ Biddle, *Military Power*, 49.

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine* Ed E, Ver 1 (February 2017), 1-16-17; Department of National Defence (Canada), *CFJP 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine* (Joint Doctrine Branch, National Defence Headquarters: Ottawa), 2-3.

motivation of Ukrainian soldiers as a key factor to their victories.⁵¹ Iraq and Afghan losses in 2014 and 2021, conversely, manifested themselves in a lack of will to fight amongst their soldiers.

These three models for military power partially inform our understanding of what SFA missions are attempting to do: build *capable* military forces. What they lack is guidance on how to develop *credible* – that is, trustworthy and reliable – military forces. Brooks, Biddle, and the doctrinal model of military power are, taken on their own at least, value neutral. As later portions of this literature review will describe, losing in battle is just one way that military forces can fail. They also fail by not following the rules of war, by being corrupt or cruel to their own citizens, or by not respecting civilian control of the military (in non-military autocracies, at least). The pursuit of military effectiveness, and the building of military power in partnered states, must not therefore be value neutral. This argument will be expanded on later in this chapter, in the discussion on ways that militaries fail.

Does SFA Work?

It is difficult to say. The record of SFA engagement, though long, has had some outstanding failures just in the past decade (Iraq and Afghanistan), and maybe one outstanding success (Ukraine). There are many articles calling into question whether small SFA engagements achieve policy aims. Biddle, MacDonald, and Baker’s write their 2018 article that “for all its importance for US national security policy and its near ubiquity in international politics, SFA has a checkered record in recent experience”, going on to cite the failure of Iraq against ISIL in 2014, the Afghan Army’s difficulty containing the Taliban, Pakistan’s inability to defeat its insurgency, and the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam’s failures between 1965 and 1975.⁵² Biddle then goes on to predict that SFA in Ukraine would be a failure too; time will tell on his last prediction. Mara Karlin, the current Assistant Secretary of Defence for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Biden Administration, adds Mali to the list of failures in a 2017 article, stating “for decades, the United States has poured countless billions into foreign security forces—to the tune of nearly \$20 billion per year... [b]ut the returns have been paltry.”⁵³ She goes on to say that “The biggest problem with Washington’s efforts to build foreign militaries is its reluctance to weigh in on higher-order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel... [focusing instead] exclusively on training and equipment, thus undercutting the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.”⁵⁴ Having worked on SFA in Afghanistan and the Pentagon, she says on the *Irregular Warfare Podcast* about writing her book *Building Militaries in Fragile States* “the plan was to go and write a book saying that everything I did was really awesome, and so that was going to be pretty easy and look great, obviously. And then inconveniently I started getting into the research, and you know,

⁵¹ Barnes; Paul Wells, “Don’t underestimate the power that comes from the will to fight,” *The Line*, April 1st, 2022, <https://theline.substack.com/p/paul-wells-dont-underestimate-the>, (accessed April 1st, 2022).

⁵² Biddle et al, “Small footprint...”92.

⁵³ Mara Karlin, “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint: Minor Tools Can’t Solve Major Problems,” *Foreign Affairs*, 96, no. 6 (2017): 1111.

⁵⁴ Karlin, “Why...” 1111.

sometimes research takes you somewhere else, and it turns out I was pretty spectacularly wrong.”⁵⁵

Rachel Kleinfeld adds several more SFA failures to the list in her 2018 book *A Savage Order: How the World's Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security*: Burundi, where European-trained police and military forces were used by politicians to assassinate opponents in 2016; Mexico, where US-trained special forces went rogue and eventually formed the Zeta Cartel, one of the most violent criminal gangs in Mexico; and Honduras, where American trained officers overthrew their own government in 2009.⁵⁶ Referencing data provided by the *Security Assistance Monitor*, Patricia Sullivan records that in 2020, 133 countries received some form of security assistance from the US. Unhappily, her analysis of data from Stockholm Institute for Peace Research and the Cline Center for Advanced Social Research reveals “strong evidence that both military aid and arms transfers to post conflict governments *increase* state repression.”⁵⁷ Her belief was that access to stronger military forces made it easier political leaders to pursue a strategy of repression over one of good governance to maintain power. Though Sullivan is speaking more broadly of security assistance, which includes not just the provision of training but also direct funding and the provision of weapons and equipment to foreign militaries, the analysis remains extant for SFA.

Rachel Telcott writes in a 2021 *Foreign Affairs* article that “[t]he United States’ three largest efforts to build partner militaries—in Vietnam, Iraq, and now Afghanistan—have all failed spectacularly... There is good reason the images coming out of Kabul [in August 2021] conjure up Saigon in 1975 and Mosul in 2014.”⁵⁸ She writes that despite 20 years of effort and \$83 billion in assistance, Afghanistan represents one in a line of a failures the US and the West have had building local security forces. Telcott says this is partially because the US military is more interested in building relationships with partnered forces and does not make its assistance conditional on outcomes. It thus allows itself to be exploited by local elites who leech funds and patronage, and often subtly undercut security reform efforts that would jeopardize the elites’ place at the trough. Her points are related to sections on corruption and principal-agent dilemmas, both discussed later in this chapter under the heading ‘Why SFA Missions Fail.’

Finally, Lauren Woods and Elias Yousef, writing for the *Security Assistance Monitor* in 2021, identify key failures in the SFA record in keeping terrorism and militantism in check. They write:

If the theory had worked as intended, we should have seen, from 9/11 until the present, a reduction in terrorism in the countries where the United States has delivered security assistance, resulting from increased capacities by militaries

⁵⁵ Nick Lopez and Kyle Atwell, hosts. “The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance,” *Irregular Warfare Podcast*, November 20th, 2020, , <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-practice-and-politics-of-security-force-assistance/> (accessed February 1st, 2021).

⁵⁶ Kleinfeld, 36.

⁵⁷ Patricia Sullivan, “Does Security Assistance Work? Why It May Not Be the Answer for Fragile States,” *The Modern Warfare Institute*, November 15, 2021, <https://mwi.usma.edu/does-security-assistance-work-why-it-may-not-be-the-answer-for-fragile-states/>.

⁵⁸ Rachel Telcott, “Why America Can’t Build Allied Armies: Afghanistan Is Just the Latest Failure,” *Foreign Affairs*, August 26th, 2021. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-26/why-america-cant-build-allied-armies>.

and police forces to counter armed groups. Instead, sub-state armed groups have proliferated and metastasized globally, spreading, and in in some cases, progressing in sophistication. Conversely, many of the security services that have seen the most robust U.S. support have either failed to make inroads against militants or collapsed altogether.⁵⁹

How Do Military Forces Fail?

The literature reveals that there are three ways militaries fail. The first is to be defeated in battle. When large, Western-supported forces lose to inferior opponents – Iraq 2014 and Afghanistan 2021 as the most obvious examples – Jahara Matissek calls them ‘Fabergé egg’ armies: expensive to build but easy to break.⁶⁰ The second is for militaries to politically influence or overthrow their own governments in a military coup. Samuel Huntington dubbed this the Praetorian Problem.⁶¹ The third way militaries fail – posited by this researcher – is by engaging in criminal activities that contribute to weakening the state either by reducing citizens’ support for the government, or by garnering condemnation from the international community. This third category has been labelled ‘Criminality and Kleptocracy;’ activities include human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, and thieving from state coffers or the population. Categorizing and combining these three reasons into a single model (at Figure 3) is believed to be a unique contribution to the field. Literature from each category will now be reviewed in turn.




Figure 3 – Ways that Militaries Fail

Fabergé Egg Armies. Jahara Matissek coined the term ‘Fabergé egg’ army in 2018 to describe the failure of the Iraqi military against Daesh in 2014, and what he saw happening within the Afghan military at the time.⁶² Militaries which outnumbered their opponents many times over, possessed modern weapons and equipment, and who had benefitted from years of Western training should, on paper at least, never lose to poorly armed substate groups, especially not in a conventional way. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the will to fight amongst their soldiers was often absent, resulting in units fleeing the battlefield or deserting their posts, often leaving their expensive weapons and equipment behind to be captured. The lack of will to fight is the manifestation of many factors interacting with one another, several described below and more expanded later in this chapter.

⁵⁹ Lauren Woods and Elias Yousef, “The Expanding Scope of U.S. Security Assistance Since 9/11,” *Security Assistance Monitor* (Center for International Policy: Washington, 2021), 3-4.

⁶⁰ Matissek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance...”.

⁶¹ Huntington, 231.

⁶² Matissek, “The Crisis of American Military Assistance...”.

Matisek argued that part of the reason the US and the West had some success transforming some militaries (i.e., the Greek and Turkish militaries) in the early days of the Cold War, was that the US, committed to halting the spread of communism, engaged with large aid packages and political engagement over long periods of time. He says that recent efforts to reform partner militaries lack such focus or time committed to state-building, which puts any success with military reform on shaky political ground. He argues that the disparity between the annual budgets of the Department of State (less than \$50 billion USD in 2016) and the Department of Defence (\$600 billion USD in 2016) limits the ability of the US government to wield diplomatic power and makes the job of the US military in weak states that much harder.⁶³

Matisek revisits his thesis several more times, including in September 2021, where he laments the fall of the Afghan Army in an article titled “Requiem for the Afghan ‘Fabergé Egg’ Army: Why Did it Crack So Quickly?”⁶⁴ In this article, Matisek identifies causes related to corruption and the weak Afghan state as two primary reasons for this failure, both of which will be discussed in turn in the section “Why do SFA missions fail?” Matisek also identifies as a problem the Western approach of trying to create the Afghan military in their own image, burdening it with Western military models not suitable to Afghan society, and exquisite systems requiring large maintenance contracts and logistics, all prone to corruption. Terrence Kelly et al identified this as a problem back in 2011, write the following for a RAND Report identifying lessons learned from Afghanistan:

Western efforts in Afghanistan have produced forces that can work well at low levels where such characteristics as literacy, technological sophistication, and reliability are either not critical or can be easily overseen or bolstered by ISAF forces, but they tend to fail at the higher levels of organization where systems for planning, personnel, logistics, and other critical functions must function.⁶⁵

David Kilcullen writes something similar in his chapter “Strategic Culture” in Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray’s book *The Culture of Military Organizations*. He relates that assistance must be culturally appropriate for the partnered force. He uses the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan, where he argues that the West burdened its partners with “lavish equipment, [while] systematically strip[ing them] of their naturally acquired ways of war.”⁶⁶

All these reasons, with the impact of corruption and state fragility discussed further below, lead to the creation of armies that either do not possess the ability or the will to fight

⁶³ Matisek, “The Crisis...” Matisek, a serving US Air Force officer, is not the first person in uniform to make this argument. Former Secretary of Defence and then Commander Central Command General James Mattis said to Congress in 2014 “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” Kevin Baron, “Brass tone down the ask for foreign aid,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 6th, 2013, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/06/brass-tone-down-the-ask-for-foreign-aid/>.

⁶⁴ Jahara Matisek, “Requiem for the Afghan Fabergé Egg Army – Why did it crack so quickly?” *Modern War Institute*, October 28th, 2021, <https://mwi.usma.edu/requiem-for-the-afghan-faberge-egg-army-why-did-it-crack-so-quickly/>, (accessed November 1st 2021).

⁶⁵ Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Olikier, “Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts,” *RAND Arroyo Center*, Santa Monica (2011), xvii.

⁶⁶ Kilcullen, David, “Strategic Culture,” *The Culture of Military Organizations*, Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2020): 33-52.

effectively. It takes cultures with reputations as fierce warriors and makes them *less* effective than they would have been without support. David Kilcullen is worth quoting at length:

Imagine how different today's Afghan army for example would look if instead of taking a group that knew how to fight, had been fighting the Taliban for a decade, and had a self organizing tactical system superbly adapted to its own environment, and giving it complicated heavy weapons, vehicles that bound it to roads, and an enduring dependence on Western air support, we had left its fighting style as undisturbed as possible while inserting niche capabilities only, and improving human capital through education, healthcare, ethics and civics programs...⁶⁷

The Praetorian Problem. The second way that militaries fail – at least outside of military dictatorships – is by overthrowing their own governments. The problem is named after the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Empire, which for three centuries used assassination or threat of force to control or influence Roman politics. The problem extends to the modern era; the study of the military and the quest to keep it from wresting control of the state from the government when it pleases has spawned two academic fields: the study of civil-military relations (CMR) and the study of the professional of arms. Samuel Huntington, a founding member of both fields, defined the Praetorian Problem as “the need to curb the political power of the military establishment and to make the armed forces into a professional body committed to providing for the external security of the country.”⁶⁸ This problem is sharpest in weak states, where the military has fewer political barriers and more incentive to seize power. By their nature, these weak states are often the subjects of Western military aid, including SFA missions.

While it may seem logical that assistance from the West, where CMR are usually healthier, would improve CMR in weak states, many suspect that western military assistance does little to help and may even harm ‘coup-proofing’ efforts. Because coups are often perpetrated by staff trained military officers, much of the research in this field is not focused on deployed training missions, but on PME sponsor programs, where foreign officers are selected to attend command and staff training in Western countries. These programs, such as the US IMET or the Canadian MTCP sponsors hundreds and tens (respectively) of military officers from weak states attend service and joint staff colleges every year. These officers sometimes put their new skills to uses other than the programs intend, however. A 2012 *Foreign Policy* article lists seven officers trained in the US who had successfully overthrown their governments since 1958.⁶⁹ More have occurred since, including in Mali in 2012 and 2020, and a failed coup in Gambia in 2014.⁷⁰ The Gambia case is particularly interesting, as it appears the motives of the

⁶⁷ Kilcullen, 33-52.

⁶⁸ Huntington, 231.

⁶⁹ Keating, “Trained in the USA,”

⁷⁰ For a compiled list of recent coups, and a discussion of how PME interacts with coups, see Tiffany Ticky, “Learning from Coups: The Impact of Professional Military Education and Training on Subordination,” MPA Thesis, Royal Military College, 2020.

Western educated officer who led the coup, Colonel Lamin Sanneh, were legitimately aimed at freeing his country from a tyrannical dictator.⁷¹

While Ruby and Gibler found that US-provided PME improved civilian control of the military in weak states,⁷² Savage and Calverley found that participating in IMET doubled a country's risk of experiencing a coup.⁷³ They argue that the knowledge and credibility that these officers gain from attending Western command and staff colleges increases their capacity to stage coups. This is the opposite of the stated goals of the IMET program, which has as one of its aims exposing officers to democratic values and the importance of human rights.⁷⁴ A RAND Report on security assistance to Africa in 2018 raises similar concerns, though it questions the causal relationship between SFA and coups more than Savage and Calverley.⁷⁵ Military assistance is more often deployed in places where civilian control of the military is required, so it is logical that there would be more coups in those places. Marc-Olivier Cantin et al are similarly skeptical in a 2020 policy brief from Queen's Network for Strategic Analysis.⁷⁶ They find that the link between security assistance and coups is not clear, citing recent research from Rena Joyce that shows that US training in Africa is correlated with the reduced influence of militaries in national politics.⁷⁷

Though the focus is normally on professional military education programs such as IMET, deployed training missions have also associated with coups. As recently as September 2021, the *New York Times* reported that Guinean soldiers being trained by US Green Berets left training to mount a coup against President Alpha Condé, and instal their commander, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya as president.⁷⁸ In Mali, soldiers involved in the 2012 coup benefited from

⁷¹ Jeffrey Meiser, "The Dilemma of an African Soldier," *War on the Rocks*, January 26th, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/01/the-dilemma-of-an-african-soldier/>, (accessed July 15th, 2022).

⁷² Tomislav Ruby and Douglas Gibler, "US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad," *European Journal of International Relations*, 16, no. 3 (2010): 339–364.

⁷³ Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, "When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups," *Journal of Peace Research*, 54, no. 4 (2017): 542–557.

⁷⁴ Department of State (US) "Office of Security Assistance." US Government Website, <https://www.state.gov/about-us-office-of-security-assistance/> (accessed July 15th, 2022).

⁷⁵ Stephen Watts et al., "Building Security in Africa," *RAND National Defence Research Institute* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2018), Annex C, 71. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2447/RAND_RR2447z1.appendixes.pdf.

⁷⁶ Marc-Olivier Cantin, Ludwine Tchatat, Theodore McLauchlin & Lee J. M. Seymour, "Rethinking the Impact of US Military Training on Coups," Policy Brief, Network for Strategic Analysis (Queen's University, Kingston, 2020).

⁷⁷ Cantin et al, 3. Dr. Joyce's research is as yet unpublished and so unavailable.

⁷⁸ Delcan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Forces Were Training the Guinean Soldiers Who Took Off to Stage a Coup," *The New York Times*, September 10, 2021 <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/africa/guinea-coup-americans.html> (accessed July 15th, 2022).

in-country US-led training and equipment.⁷⁹ Interestingly, Canadian-trained soldiers attempted a counter-coup to restore the President, which ultimately failed.⁸⁰

Criminality and Kleptocracy. The third way that militaries fail is through the commission of crimes – either against their people, their enemies, or against humanity – which delegitimize themselves and the state which they serve in the eyes of their own people or to the international community. This describes the operational imperative for Western military forces to improve the behaviour of its partnered forces – criminality undercuts mission success. There is an equally important morale imperative – improving the professionalism of partnered forces means less repression of civilians (violent or financial) and fewer violations of the laws of armed conflict, which leads to better outcomes for humanity. The stakes are high: data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), shows that between 1997 and 2019 nearly a quarter of reported acts of violence against civilians in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia were perpetrated by government forces.⁸¹ While there is no data on corruption or thievery, which are less visible forms of repression, Kleinfeld describes how corrupt and brutal security forces can lead to state failure:

Why should a vicious, corrupt state have any greater claim to its people’s allegiance than criminals and insurgents? The Stanford political scientist Margaret Levi, who has spent decades investigating why citizens trust their governments, explained, ‘When citizens believe government actors promote immoral policies, have ignored their interests, or have actually betrayed them, citizens are unlikely to feel obliged to comply with the laws.’ When law enforcement is brutal or simply absent, as often occurs in marginalized areas starved of state support, space opens for criminals and insurgents to compete with the state for citizen loyalty.⁸²

Some scholars question whether SFA has a positive or a negative effect on the behaviours of partnered militaries or their governments. The argument is that a more capable military does not necessarily make a more moral military. Sullivan states that SFA can make governments more likely to use force against its own people, as it tips their calculus away from pursuing good governance as a path to maintaining power, and towards repression of dissidence and rewarding its allies.⁸³ Larsdotter suggests something similar, stating that SFA can increase

⁷⁹ Karlin, 1113.

⁸⁰ David Pugliese, “Canadian special forces to continue with U.S.-led training of African troops despite links to coups,” *The Ottawa Citizen*, September 29th, 2020, <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-special-forces-to-continue-with-u-s-led-training-of-african-troops-despite-links-to-coups> (accessed July 14th, 2022).

⁸¹ Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States – Time for a Peacebuilding Approach,” *The RUSI Journal*, 164, no. 3 (July 2019): 10-21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1643258>. ACLED data reports that of 57,982 recorded events between 1997 and 2019, 13,195 of them were attributed to state forces. See Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, ‘ACLED Data Export,’ ACLED Data, April 13th, 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data/> (accessed April 22nd, 2019).

⁸² Kleinfeld, 71.

⁸³ Patricia Sullivan, Leo J. Blanken, and Ian C. Rice, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Studies,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, 31, no. 2 (2020): 177-200. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388>.

violence of partnered forces.⁸⁴ Knowles and Matisek agree that there is a danger of SFA building up predatory armed forces.⁸⁵ They state that the common solution to this problem, the delivery of lessons on international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights laws to more soldiers do little to improve behaviour, citing examples from Mali, Cameroon, and Chad of partnered forces who had received IHL training committing IHL violations.⁸⁶ Knowles and Matisek write:

Poor IHL compliance by many recipients of SFA is a problem that needs solving. It is impossible for armies to earn the acceptance and legitimacy of the local populations that they serve if they arbitrarily detain civilians, torture prisoners, or abuse their power to serve parochial interests above those of the wider population. However, interloping SFA advisers consistently misdiagnose compliance as a problem that stems from a lack of basic IHL training. Using this logic, the more local soldiers you train, the better their behaviour on the battlefield.⁸⁷

Paterson nevertheless advocates for more IHL and HR training in SFA and FID in his monograph published for the Joint Special Operations University, stating that such training can improve partnered forces behaviour, and that not teaching these topics places US forces in moral hazard.⁸⁸ General Carter Ham, the former commander of AFRICOM, used this logic when describing US failures in Mali, stating that his trainers had spend too much time on “tactical and technical matters... We didn’t spend, probably, the requisite time focusing on values, ethics, and military ethos.”⁸⁹

Though admirable and well intentioned, Paterson and Ham’s logic fails to address that a lack of training is not seen as the root cause of poor ethical behaviour. Wolfenstein argues that since the commission of most war crimes is situational, organizational culture is a far greater determiner of behaviour than any training received.⁹⁰ The difficulty of culture change is not lost on this researcher, who is a current CAF serving member. The effort certainly must go deeper than training, and even past the articulation of new doctrine, as Johnson writes.⁹¹ The challenges of military socialization are well covered by Guimond, who in addition to providing an excellent review of the literature on the subject, casts doubt on the effect that military

⁸⁴ Kersti Larsdotter, “Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for Less,” *Parameters*, 45, no. 2 (2015): 25–34.

⁸⁵ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” 13.

⁸⁶ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” 18.

⁸⁷ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” 16.

⁸⁸ Patrick Paterson, *Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, Columbia, El Salvador, and Iraq*. JSOU Report 16-9. (MacDill Air Force Base: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016).

⁸⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Security Assistance: U.S. Agencies Should Improve Oversight of Human Rights Training for Foreign Security Forces*, by Jennifer Grover. 19-554. (Washington: US GAO, 8 Dec 2019) <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-554>

⁹⁰ Jessica Wolfenstein, “Military Culture and War Crimes,” *Routledge Handbook of Military Ethics*, ed, George Lucas (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 82.

⁹¹ Paul Johnson, “Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies,” *Parameters*, 30, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 30-39.

socialization programs have on individual values at all.⁹² This has political and strategic implications. Jones et al, writing for RAND, state that if Western militaries are not able to improve the accountability and human rights practices of their partnered forces, “US policymakers will have to weigh the short- and long-term implications of assisting an increasingly competent but still highly repressive internal security force.”⁹³

An Updated Definition of Military Effectiveness

This understanding of the Praetorian Problem and of Criminality and Kleptocracy as ways that militaries fail necessitates the need for an updated definition of military effectiveness, one that includes respect for the rule of law, human rights, international humanitarian law, and (in democracies at least) respect for democratic control of military force. Only a military that has the will and means to fight and win on the battlefield, is subordinate to the democratic leadership of the state, and maintains its credibility with the people and the international community can be viewed as effective. For SFA practitioners, this makes the challenge more difficult, because direct training is not likely to solve the Praetorian or Criminality problems. Those require shifts in organizational culture more than they require PowerPoint lesson plans.

Why do SFA Missions Fail?

The literature reveals that there are five external factors – those outside the control of the SFA practitioner – that explain why SFA missions fail. These factors are all at the political and national strategic levels and can be thought of the conditions which together make up the SFA environment. While engagement at the military level may influence these conditions, they are usually intractable, wicked problems with no easy solution. As Matissek, Mattis, and others have argued, they require significant engagement with other instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic, and informational – in close collaboration with military efforts to hope to improve them. These conditions are usually inter-




Figure 4 – SFA Environmental Conditions

⁹² Serge Guimond, “Encounter and Metamorphosis: The Impact of Military Socialisation on Professional Values,” *Applied Psychology*, 44, no. 3 (1995): 251-275.

⁹³ Seth G. Jones, Seth G., Olga Olikier, Peter Chalk, C. Christine Fair, Rollie Lal, and James Dobbins, *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), xviii-xix.

related and are displayed in Figure 4. They are state fragility, societal divisions, poor CMR, corruption, and principal-agent problems. The remainder of this section will discuss the literature concerning each of these areas in turn.

State Fragility. The first and highest order external factor affecting SFA is the problem of weak states, which are defined as states with low social cohesion and weak institutions. Buzan's *People, States, and Fear* informs us of the characteristics of weak states and their destabilizing impacts on regional security and the international system, which not coincidentally is often the reason SFA missions are deployed in the first place.⁹⁴ Kleinfeld expands on the relationship between weak states, warfare, and political violence in *A Savage Order: How the World's Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security*. Kleinfeld cites the work of Walter, who found that states with weak rule of law were two to ten times more likely to experience civil war,⁹⁵ and Fearon, who found that countries with weak security institutions experienced more war and political violence.⁹⁶ The intersection between state fragility, corruption, and societal divisions is clear in these examples.

A weak state is not fertile ground for a strong military institution. Knowles and Matissek have looked at this issue in depth, describing how state fragility can lead to what they call pathologies that affect the accountability, legitimacy, and capabilities of security forces.⁹⁷ They write:

There are a range of structural issues facing host-country military personnel in fragile states that make it difficult for the average soldier or police officer to survive. These pathologies include, but are not limited to: no, low or late pay; poor living conditions; lack of basic supplies; and minimal equipment. In response to these structural conditions, host-country security actors tend to adopt a multitude of behaviours including bribery, corruption, extracting 'tolls' and 'fees' from citizens, selling war materiel, setting up informal business deals in conflict zones, abuse of prisoners, judicial/ martial executions and 'liberal' (non-discriminatory) use of firepower around civilians.⁹⁸

From this list, it is easy to see how state fragility is a causal factor to the ways that militaries fail described in the previous section, and how it contributes to corruption, poor CMR, and principal-agent problems described in this section. Knowles and Matissek also state that fragile governments often desire to keep their militaries weak and unprofessional, to avoid the Praetorian Problem in the future.⁹⁹

Matissek and Reno apply these problems directly to SFA missions. They write that Western SFA is often "too focused on building an army in the absence of a viable state that has

⁹⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2007), Chapter 4.

⁹⁵ Barbara F. Walter, "Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57, no. 7 (2015): 1242-1272.

⁹⁶ James D. Fearon, "Governance and Civil War Onset," *World Development Report 2011*, Background Paper, August 31, 2010, 80.

⁹⁷ Knowles and Matissek, "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," 15.

⁹⁸ Knowles and Matissek, "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," 15.

⁹⁹ Knowles and Matissek, "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," 15.

the institutional capacity and political willpower to sustain that army.”¹⁰⁰ They argue that without a massive state building effort alongside it, most SFA efforts are doomed to fail. “If history is any guide,” they write, “the success of American SFA hinges on long-term commitments to support state institutions alongside the building up of a host-nation military.”¹⁰¹

Societal Divisions. The second external factor for SFA failure is societal division. The logic is that countries with crosscutting ethnic, linguistic, religious, or tribal identities have greater difficulty building stable professional security sectors than those without. Amy Chua used the example of the ethnic and linguistic divisions within Afghanistan in her book *Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations*.¹⁰² After 9/11, the US had decided to exclude from the new government anyone “remotely associated with the Taliban” – meaning many Pashtun tribal leaders were shut out of decision making. As the years went on the majority Pashtun population increasingly felt shut out of the minority Tajik dominated government and military.¹⁰³ Many – even soldiers – turned towards the Taliban, contributing to the Taliban’s victory in August 2021. There are strong echoes here of Iraq, where former military officers released from the Iraqi Army during de-Ba’athification turned to Daesh, contributing to their victories in 2014.¹⁰⁴

SFA can empower certain actors and further fragment the security sector, especially if the SFA is not coordinated. Using Somalia as an example, Robinson and Matisek write:

Broader trends concerning multilateral attempts to rebuild security forces in fractious states, where security assistance activities lack unity or common national interests. This has resulted in various Somali military forces with different loyalties (domestic and international), capabilities, and priorities in each Federal Member State (FMS). Uneven foreign military training programs in the context of survival politics fuels the fragmentation of various security forces.¹⁰⁵

Division within a military can have a direct impact on battlefield performance. Jason Lyall’s *Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War* argues that the higher the rate of what he dubs ‘military inequality,’ which Lyall states is a function of the levels of repression of ethnic groups, the poorer a military will perform.¹⁰⁶ Lyall believes this is for two reasons. First, oppressed groups are less motivated to fight. Second, commanders who

¹⁰⁰ Jahara Matisek and William Reno, “Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 92 (Jan 2019): 66.

¹⁰¹ Matisek and Reno, 71.

¹⁰² Amy Chua, *Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations* (Penguin Books, New York, 2019).

¹⁰³ Chua, 70.

¹⁰⁴ Liz Sly, “The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” *The Washington Post* April 4th 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/> (accessed July 15th 2022).

¹⁰⁵ Colin D. Robinson and Jahara Matisek, “Military advising and assistance in Somalia: fragmented interveners, fragmented Somali military forces” *Defence Studies*, 21, no. 2 (2021), 181.

¹⁰⁶ Jason Lyall, *Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2020), 117.

understand this will force employ their ethnic formations more simply (i.e., a frontal attack over a flanking) to limit soldiers' ability to shirk or desert.¹⁰⁷

Corruption. The third external factor in SFA failure is corruption. Most sources studied mention corruption as a barrier to security sector reform, though the definitive source in recent years is Sarah Chayes' *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security*.¹⁰⁸ While an advisor to General McCrystal in Afghanistan, Chayes created a model which described how endemic societal corruption operated in reverse of a normal societal model. In Chayes' model, wealth flowed up from the population through patronage networks, with each node taking a small cut from themselves, while favour and protection flowed downwards. The government was used as the vehicle for these transactions; indeed, for many the government existed for this purpose, and not to provide basic goods and services to its people. Chayes found that her description of the Afghan kleptocracy was applicable to many other societies in the world.

In kleptocracies, security services are often important parts of these government patronage networks, with corrupt practices occurring routinely. When forces are responsible for internal security, they become yet another arm of the government taking from the population. These 'takes' come in the form of small bribes paid to soldiers to do basic things like pass through checkpoints to get to market. The soldier is not paid enough to live – especially when the cost of living includes the soldier also having to pay bribes to access basic services – and is under pressure from their commander, who expects his portion of the bribes taken at the checkpoint. The commander is under pressure from their commander for their cut, and so on until even the President may be involved.

Corruption affects SFA in several ways. First, it degrades the security environment. Citizens are aggravated by the corruption they encounter, may shift their support away from the government, and may even take up arms against it.¹⁰⁹ This is one of the sources of support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Second, it makes the daily work of training and advising more difficult if resources are not being used as intended. Equipment may be misappropriated, infrastructure may be built to an inferior standard, or soldiers are not made available for training because their commander has them performing their extralegal duties. Speaking of these challenges, Knowles made the comment that “training your own military in the West is a matter of routine, but training a foreign army in a corrupt state may feel like building a plane while dogfighting.”¹¹⁰ Third, the government may view a reformed and professional security force as a threat to their criminal enterprise, and subtly work against its improvement.¹¹¹ This third point intersects with the discussion on principal-agent problems later in this section.

All these points interact to make systemic corruption a heavy weight on SFA efforts. Chayes writes:

¹⁰⁷ Lyall, 1.

¹⁰⁸ Sarah Chayes, *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2015).

¹⁰⁹ Chayes, 11.

¹¹⁰ Knowles, “Is Human Rights Training Working...”

¹¹¹ Biddle, “Building Security Forces...” 129.

as long as U.S. military interventions and stabilization campaigns ignore the broader framework within which soldiers and aid workers are operating – or worse, as long as those interventions are inadvertently enable host government abuses – then all the efforts by all the brave soldiers on a tactical level will add up to nothing.¹¹²

Tackling corruption is not in the power of SFA practitioners. Without a massive whole of government reform effort, or an internal political shift away from corruption, as Ukraine has attempted to do since 2014, little will improve in these states.

Poor Civil-military Relations. The fourth external factor is poor CMR. This research uses Schiff's Concordance Theory to inform its understanding of CMR.¹¹³ Schiff's theory, which is appropriate for this study because it helps explain CMR in non-democracies and fragile democracies as well as in strong democracies, is described in more detail in Chapter 3. For this section, it is sufficient to explain Concordance Theory as requiring agreement between three main groups – the political elite, the military, and the citizenry – on key questions regarding the composition, type, and role of the military in society. Where concordance does not exist, there is friction that can affect SFA efforts.

Because all three case studies are democracies of some form, Zoltan Barany's *The Soldier and the Changing State* is also relevant to this research.¹¹⁴ Barany starts with the premise that democracies require 'good' militaries, or they will inevitably overthrow their governments. He has three principle arguments. The first is that for democracy to work in fragile states, military leadership must be committed to it. The second is that building democratic armies is more difficult in some places than others; politics and socioeconomics play a role. The third is that with so many variables differing between cases, it is impossible to generate a general theory for building democratic armies.¹¹⁵ Barany's work is also relevant as his discussion of Russia's transition to (flawed) democracy has lessons and insights for Ukraine as another post-Soviet state, and because he looks at Lebanon as a case study directly.

Principal-Agent Problems. The fifth and final external factor deduced from the literature is the PA Problem. Originally articulated in economic theory, the PA Problem describes the frictions resulting from the different and often conflicting interests between two parties in a deal. A popular example comes from Levitt and Dubner's book *Freakonomics*. Levitt and Dubner use the example of the realtor representing the seller of a home. The seller (the principal) is interested in getting the best possible price for their home, while the realtor (the agent) is interested in selling the house quickly, which usually means at a lower price. The agent, who works off commission, stands to gain only fractionally more from a higher sale price

¹¹² Chayes, 104.

¹¹³ Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2008).

¹¹⁴ Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier, and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).

¹¹⁵ Barany, 11-12.

to the point where it is not worth their extra time and effort.¹¹⁶ Stephen Biddle popularized the application of the PA problem to SFA in 2018.¹¹⁷ He wrote:

Security force assistance is a classic PA problem. In SFA, the United States is the principal, the ally receiving the aid is the agent, and the principal's aim is to meet a threat to American security more cheaply than by sending a large U.S. ground force to do the job directly. As with any other PA problem, SFA is thus subject to agency loss as a consequence of interest asymmetry, information asymmetry, and moral hazard; unfortunately, the particular circumstances of SFA promote [principle] losses that are much larger than many SFA advocates expect.¹¹⁸

For instance, Western SFA providers may want to strengthen a particular security force to increase stability in the region and represent their security interests. It is in the SFA providers' (the principal) interest to get in, provide effective and efficient SFA engagement, improve the force, and get out again. The SFA receiver (the agent), however, is interested in the funding that comes with the security aid so that they may improve their economy or thieve from, or they are interested in the increased access and prestige the presence of Western troops brings, or they are interested in their own security concerns that are different from the principal's. For instance, it may be the desire for the SFA provider to create professional, ethical, and effective security forces, but these types of forces may be a threat to the criminal activities of regime they serve, and therefore be resisted.¹¹⁹

Burchard and Burgess apply PA Theory to human rights training of military forces in Africa.¹²⁰ They make the point that most authoritarian governments in Africa are preoccupied with internal security challenges. They require militaries that are strong enough to maintain sovereignty, but not so strong as to threaten the regime. Hence a significant portion of military assistance ends up going to special forces and presidential guard units.¹²¹ This normally goes against Western interests, which are broader than protecting the person of the president.

PA Problems intersect with other external factors and the internal dealings of SFA practitioners with their partnered forces at every level of engagement: individual, organizational, and institutional. Without having the power to change the interests of the partnered force, it is a difficult problem for SFA practitioners to solve at their level.

Where has SFA Succeeded?

There are times and places where SFA has been successful, and it is useful to go back and look at these instances to see why. Many of the scholars mentioned above hold up a single example of success, though unfortunately they see this success through the lens of their own

¹¹⁶ Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, *Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything* (William Morrow: New York, 2005), 12.

¹¹⁷ Biddle, "Building Security Forces."

¹¹⁸ Biddle, "Building Security Forces," 128.

¹¹⁹ Biddle, "Building Security Forces," 129.

¹²⁰ Stephanie Burchard and Stephen Burgess. "U.S. Training of African Forces and Military Assistance, 1997–2017: Security versus Human Rights in Principal–Agent Relations" *African Security*, 11, no. 4 (2018):339–369 <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2018.1560969>.

¹²¹ Burchard and Burgess, 347.

analysis so other external factors are often not discussed. This limits the ability to pursue a unified model for SFA success or failure.

In her doctoral thesis, Karlin argues that the root cause of SFA failure is an unwillingness or inability of Western nations to “become deeply involved in the partner state military’s sensitive affairs [including] influencing personnel and organization.”¹²² She writes that an emphasis on “training and equipment” but not “key political issues... wastes time, effort, and resources... It represents a critical policy failure”¹²³ She holds up Greece as an example of success. The US military was “deeply involved in [Greece’s] military affairs,” including in the selection and removal of its top generals, influencing its doctrine, and its organization.¹²⁴ Karlin wrote this back in 2012, so it is unknown how she would have viewed the case of Afghanistan, where it could be argued Western states were deeply involved. Recalling Matisek and Kilcullen’s warnings about not creating financially or culturally unsustainable “mini-US armies” in partnered states is a good exercise for any Westerners with the kind of access and power that Karlin prescribes.

Biddle holds up South Korea as an example of SFA success. Not surprisingly, he argues that this success was due to a high degree of interest alignment - in this case defending against North Korea and the spread of communism.¹²⁵ This minimized the number and severity of PA problems.

Cancian reports SFA efforts with the Peshmerga in Northern Iraq as successful. He conducted interviews and surveys of 2,301 Peshmerga in 2017 to determine if the Peshmerga believed that Western military training, which some of them had received, was useful in their fight against Daesh. He found unequivocally that “Western training increased [the Peshmerga’s] confidence and decreased the likelihood they would hide or run away when under fire from the Islamic State group.”¹²⁶ Cancian reports that Peshmerga were surprised at the effectiveness of coalition-taught tactics against Daesh positions, and highly valued Western training. Cancian does not comment on why the Peshmerga were so willing to accept Western training; an analysis of external factors using Figure 4 would be interesting future research. These successes with the Peshmerga are all reported at the tactical level and are immediate; though it would be useful to examine that training program to see if any enduring institutional effects occurred, the Peshmerga’s place in Iraqi society as a semi-sanctioned state military force would likely confound that research.

Finally, there are the comments made on the *Irregular Warfare Podcast* by Brigadier General Scott Jackson, commanding general of the US Security Force Assistance Command,

¹²² Karlin, *Training and Equipping*... 319.

¹²³ Karlin, *Training and Equipping*... 319.

¹²⁴ Karlin, *Training and Equipping*... 320.

¹²⁵ Shawna Sinnott and Kyle Atwell, hosts, “Does Building Partner Military Capacity Work?” *Irregular Warfare Podcast*, June 19th, 2020, <https://mwi.usma.edu/building-partner-military-capacity-work/>, (accessed January 30th, 2020), 34m49s.

¹²⁶ Matthew Cancian, “Well-Trained Partners are More Willing to Fight,” *Association of The United States Army*, May 7th, 2019. <https://www.USA.org/articles/well-trained-partners-are-more-likely-fight> (accessed April 21st, 2021).

under which the US SFABs serve.¹²⁷ General Jackson's views are relevant because of his position at the very top of the US Army's SFA organization. Speaking of the multiple SFA engagements soldiers under his command were undertaking around the world at the time, General Jackson makes it clear that he understands the difference between immediate and enduring effects, stating that "you can improve the tactical edge all day long, but until you wrap it all up with some institutional reform and capacity development, it is all short term."¹²⁸ He speaks to how engagement specifically in the training system of their partnered forces, engaging in training system reform, is their most successful approach.¹²⁹ This is a relevant comment, as this research examines exactly this point.

SFA Approaches at the Operational and Tactical Levels. There is a significant amount of SFA research at the strategic and political level, much of which is described above. There is a research gap, however, in the literature at the operational and tactical levels of SFA, specifically what approaches taken by SFA practitioners work, and which ones have not. What does exist is found, appropriately, in professional journals, podcasts, and online communities.

The documentary filmmaker Ken Burns said, "when you can't measure the things that are important, you make the things you can measure important."¹³⁰ He was referring to the practice of the US military in Vietnam using enemy body counts as a measure of effectiveness, without understanding that killing Vietcong or North Vietnamese soldiers had little impact on winning the war. This desire for easily quantifiable metrics rather than harder to measure outcomes in SFA is identified by some SFA scholars. These metrics include money spent, equipment bought or donated, and numbers of troops trained, without ever asking how effective or sustainable any of those engagements were. Knowles and Matisek, writing to practitioners in *War on the Rocks*, identify that because often practitioners are either pressured or internally motivated to show 'results' to their superiors, "most evaluation criteria employed in military assistance missions usually reflect a bias towards short-term, tactical activity, such as hours spent providing PowerPoint slides on human rights."¹³¹ They suggest that impacts mission success, because "tactical capacity alone will not build effective, accountable, and locally legitimate armed forces in fragile states."¹³²

Cancian agrees. Speaking with Stephen Biddle on the *Irregular Warfare Podcast*, Cancian describing his findings studying the training mission with the *Peshmerga* forces in northern Iraq, spoke of the incentives that practitioners have to report success:

there is a certain element in a lot of these contexts where at the small unit level, what we do is effective, but there's also a problem where the people who are conducting the training on the western military side also have strong incentives to report that our training is working, and you don't have other people going in and checking their homework, and so you just get these reports from the trainer

¹²⁷ Nick Lopez and Kyle Atwell, hosts, "The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance," *Irregular Warfare Podcast*, November 20th, 2020, <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-practice-and-politics-of-security-force-assistance/> (accessed February 1st, 2021).

¹²⁸ Lopez and Atwell, "The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance," 22m08s.

¹²⁹ Lopez and Atwell, "The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance," 16m08s

¹³⁰ Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, "Episode 4: Doubt," *The Vietnam War*, PBS, September 20th, 2017.

¹³¹ Knowles, "Is Human Rights Training Working..."

¹³² Knowles, "Is Human Rights Training Working..."

who says, ‘I did a great job’. You don’t go and verify that with any sort of objective analysis, and that the only thing you have to go off of is somebody whose incentives are strongly aligned with reporting that they had a good job.¹³³

This focus on quantifiable metrics can steer operational design and mission activities towards shorter, less effective training engagements. It looks more impressive to have trained several thousand soldiers in first aid or marksmanship than it does to have helped design or develop a leadership program. Unlike the external factors described in the previous section, this short-term focus is a practitioner-imposed barrier to mission success.

Two Canadian articles submitted to the CAF professional journal, *The Canadian Military Journal*, identify what two practitioners independently agree to be an effective approach to enduring institutional change: reforming and professionalizing the partnered forces’ individual training and education system. Both articles are especially useful as are both written about cases this research is studying: Lebanon and Ukraine.

In 2019, Leroux wrote of his experience as a Task Force Commander on Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine, stating that “enhancing the structures behind the training” was where his Task Force made the most impact.¹³⁴ Leroux explains how they used of training development officers (TDOs) and Canadian trainers to sell and then advise the SFU on the Systems Approach to Training (SAT), describing the success they had in many instances in teaching the SFU how to analyse, develop, and implement training and education programs.¹³⁵ As an example, Leroux writes of efforts with the National Guard of Ukraine, an organization that is focused on further in the case studies in Chapter 8:

A positive example [...] is the NGU Basic training writing board held during October and November of 2018, to which 15 NCOs from across Ukraine were assigned, and they took complete ownership of the process. We supported this writing board with one Canadian TDO, one NCO and one translator, along with a Canadian major supervising part-time. The writing board produced qualification standards and training plans completely adapted to the needs of the NGU. The easy method would have been to duplicate our own CAF documents, but that would not have been adapted to the true needs of the NGU, nor would it have done anything to build their internal capacity and expertise to conduct such writing boards themselves in the future.¹³⁶

Haslett, a TDO deployed to Lebanon in 2020, wrote of similar success he had with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), working with the LAF logistics school:

Our partners see the value in creating their own training system, and this is where the TDOs and the Canadian SAT model are becoming instrumental. The Ukrainian and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are two prime examples of partner forces that

¹³³ Sinnott and Atwell, “Does Building Partner Military Capacity Work?” 18m53s.

¹³⁴ Pierre Leroux, “Security Force Capability Building 2.0 - Enhancing the Structure behind the Training,” *The Canadian Military Journal*, 19, no. 3 (2019): 7.

¹³⁵ Leroux, 8-9.

¹³⁶ Leroux, 11.

have begun to shift their request for Canadian support from a train-the-trainer model to a train-the-training-system model.¹³⁷

Haslet advocates for additional emphasis placed on training system reform in current and future SFA missions.¹³⁸ These two articles may be an interesting trend in Canadian professional military discourse: of the three articles written on SFA, SFCB, or CB in the past five years, the purpose of two of them is to advocate training system reform.¹³⁹ This type of SFA approach features in Chapter 5.

A Final Word on the Literature.

The literature reveals an informal model of how and why militaries fail: the three ways (how) that militaries fail are praetorianism, criminality, and lack of ability or will to fight (Fabergé Egg Armies); and the five main external reasons why they fail are because they take place in environments of fragile states, societal divisions, poor CMR, corruption, and PA problems. Scholars view success and failure of SFA through their own research lenses, often not discussing the reasoning put forth by fellow scholars, making it difficult to apply the informal model above as a general theory without significantly more research. The literature reveals that there is disagreement amongst scholars about how effective SFA can be, especially when it comes to changing the morale behaviour of partnered forces. There is strong agreement that military assistance needs to be paired with other instruments of national power to achieve long lasting effects.

At the tactical and operational level, too many practitioners focus on easy, measurable training, instead of harder to measure capability development. There is an interesting movement in Canadian professional circles that advocate for the leveraging of training system reform in the Canadian model to achieve long lasting institutional reform. Finally, there is a research and a doctrinal gap of SFA approaches at the tactical and operational level. No source – academic, doctrinal, or professional – compared the effectiveness of specific SFA activities and approaches, or their impact on short-term or enduring effect on the partnered forces' institutions.

This thesis will not reconcile or bring together the various ideas put forth by scholars to test a general model for SFA success or failure at the political and strategic level, though it would be interesting work for future research. Rather, this thesis hopes to contribute to closing the knowledge gap at the operational and tactical level, specifically examining the effectiveness of various SFA approaches with the hopes of informing practitioner practice, influencing operational design, and helping close the doctrinal gap.

¹³⁷ Michael Haslet, "Building Partner Capacity in the Training Domain: An Opportunity," *The Canadian Military Journal* 19, no.1 (2021), 97.


¹³⁸ Haslet, 99.

¹³⁹ The third article, by Colonel Yannick Michaud, speaks to the value that SFA missions provide to the CAF. See Yannick Michaud, "By, With, and Through: The Value of Capacity Building in the Canadian Armed Forces," *The Canadian Military Journal*, 20, no. 3 (2020): 28-37.

CHAPTER 3: THEORY

Introduction: A Short Discussion of Levels of Analysis

Military institutions do not exist in vacuums. They are products of state, the system the state exists in, and of the individuals within them. To fully understand and study the military institution, therefore, the system the institution exists in must be understood. This paper identifies four levels of analysis relevant to the study of the military institution: the state in the context of the state system, (international relations); the military institution in the context of the state (civil-military relations); the military institution itself; and the individuals within the context of institution. As the referent object of study here is the military institution, that level will receive the most attention. Historical institutionalism (HI) theory will be applied. It has been chosen because it explains change better than its cousins within neo-institutionalism. Mahoney and Thelen's expanded interpretation of HI is particularly relevant, as they go beyond



the concept of sudden change brought on by critical junctures to explain gradual change in the absence of exogenous shocks. As Mahoney and Thelen place the individual at the center of their analysis, they cover off the individual level of analysis as well.

The Copenhagen School and Concordance Theory will be used to explain and inform understanding of the international and domestic contexts of institutional change. SFA missions are by their nature inter-state interactions, and therefore exist partially within the realm

Figure 5 – Levels of Analysis

of international relations. Barry Buzan's state/power model will be leveraged to frame the state in the international system. As all three case studies take place in states with regional security problems, which the SFA missions are Buzan and Wæver's work on regional security complexes (RSCs) is also useful. The military institution within the domestic context has a label in political science: civil military relations. Of the existing civil-military relations theories, Concordance Theory is most appropriate for this study because of its ability to explain functioning civil-military relations in non-Western countries, which other theories fail to explain.

Institutions

An institution can be simply defined as a way of organizing social behaviour, encompassing both organizational structure and rules or norms of behaviour. More formally,

Grief and Laitin described an institution “as a system of humanmade, nonphysical elements— norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules—exogenous to each individual whose behavior it influences that generates behavioral regularities.”¹⁴⁰ As most security forces are characterized by their hierarchical structures and strict discipline, they fit the definition of an institution better than most other human organizations. Studying efforts to improve security forces through SFA engagement is therefore the study of institutional change. This research uses institutional analysis, and specifically the theory of historical institutionalism, to gain insight on how partnered forces achieve – or do not achieve – desired change.

This following section will be dedicated to describing theories of institutional analysis, particularly historical institutionalism (HI). It traces HI from its break with early concepts of institutional analysis, which saw institutions as stable and self-enforcing, to more recent conceptions which make more room for externally and internally generated change. This discussion will inform a deeper understanding of what an institution is, the reasons change is difficult, and to better understand the opportunities for change when they present themselves. It will pay particular attention to Mahoney and Thelen’s 2004 paper “A Theory of Gradual Change”, which provides an important theoretical model which will be applied to the case studies in Chapter 7-9 of this research.¹⁴¹

Historical Institutionalism

Early institutional analysis was descriptive, focused on defining the social phenomena of institutions, and seeing them as mostly static and unchanging. Later, new institutionalism (or neo-institutionalism) focused on comparative analysis between institutions grappling with similar problems.¹⁴² In a military context, this would be the equivalent of seeing how two militaries – say the Russian and American – dealt with demographic changes, or the impositions of new technology, or the end of the Cold War. Research concerned itself with describing the characteristics of each institution, and then using those characteristics to explain the similarities or differences in responses to events or trends. While useful, this comparative analysis did not answer the question of how either of those two militaries were evolving or may continue to evolve.

By the mid-1990s, three sub-fields within neo-institutional analysis had emerged. Sociological institutionalism (SI) leans on constructivism, viewing institutions as ‘organizing myths’ with institutions shaping the actions of individuals within this construct. It explains continuity better than change, however, so is of little use for this research.¹⁴³ Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) describes organizations as interest-based, with self-interested actors

¹⁴⁰ Grief and Laitin, 635.

¹⁴¹ James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds, *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

¹⁴² James Conran and Kathleen Thelen, “Institutional Change,” *Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, eds Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falletti, and Adam Sheingate, (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2016), 51.

¹⁴³ Henry Farrell, “The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories: Rational Choice, Historical Institutionalism, and Sociological Institutionalism,” *Knowledge and Institutions*, eds Johannes Glückler, Roy Suddaby, Regina Lenz (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Open, 2004), 35.

making rational decisions, the range of which is limited by the institution itself.¹⁴⁴ It leans on game theory, but is likewise does not explain institutional change on its own in a satisfying manner, as individual interests are most often served by conforming to the institution, not breaking from it.¹⁴⁵

The third sub-field, historical institutionalism (HI), is best suited to examining the problem of institutional change as it blends the rational and cultural approaches from RCI and SI to provide better explanations for how and why institutions change over time.¹⁴⁶ It is defined by Fioretos et al as “a research tradition that examines how temporal processes and events influence the origin and transformation of institutions that govern political and economic relations.”¹⁴⁷ In its early form, historical institutionalism used the concepts of path dependence and critical junctures to explain institutional change. A common concept in economics and political science, path dependence at its core states that past events both determine and constrain future possibilities. Applied to HI, path dependence portrays institutions lumbering along historical pathways, with its members having little or no agency to change its course.¹⁴⁸ Occasionally, a (usually external) event will shock the system, allowing for a brief period of sudden change. This shock and the subsequent brief period of change is described in HI as a critical juncture, which Capocci and Kelemen define as a “relatively short period[...] of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.”¹⁴⁹

Applied to military institutions, path dependence helps explains why some systems evolve as imperfectly as they do. Examples abound – for Canadian readers, the inefficient structure of the Canadian Army of four ‘divisions’ – only three of which contain fighting formations – as an evolution of the Land Force Area Commands, which in turn is a legacy of Armed Forces Unification and before that the previous militia system, may be a familiar example to many readers. Dismantling this system seems very logical, until the myriad of first, second, and third order effects of such a change are accounted for. When they are, the policy inertia suddenly appears logical. A critical juncture might be a war, or a severe political crisis. The First and Second World Wars serve as examples of the first, while the Somalia Inquiry (amongst other very public failures of military professionalism in the 1990s) is an example of the second.¹⁵⁰ All three of these critical junctures resulted in massive institution change within the Canadian military, with more than one sacred cow slaughtered.

¹⁴⁴ Orfeo Fioretos, Tullia G. Falletti, and Adam Sheingate, “Historical Institutionalism in Political Science,” *Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, eds Orfeo Fioretos, Tullia G. Falletti, and Adam Sheingate, (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2016), 6.

¹⁴⁵ Conran and Thelen, 52.

¹⁴⁶ Fioretos et al, 6.

¹⁴⁷ Fioretos et al, 5.

¹⁴⁸ Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” *World Politics*, 59 (2007): 341-69.

¹⁴⁹ Capoccia and Kelemen, 348.

¹⁵⁰ Bernt Horn and Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015); Peter Kasurak, *A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).

Theories of Gradual Change

A reliance on path dependence and critical junctures on their own to explain institutional change is unsatisfying. One can observe that institutions change gradually over time, and members of the institution have at least some agency over those changes.¹⁵¹ Looking to broaden the conversation on institution change, Avner Grief and David Laitin, working within the RCI tradition, published their theory of endogenous change in 2004. They proposed that the behaviour of individuals working within self-enforcing institutions can marginally alter the institutional equilibria, changing the parameters of the institution through this new behaviour.¹⁵² Thelen and Mahoney, informed by and building on the work of Grief and Laitin, proposed their theory of gradual change in 2010. This theory broadened historical institutionalism to explain gradual change brought on by endogenous developments, which may unfold slowly but have large impacts in aggregate over time.¹⁵³ Like Grief and Laitin, Mahoney and Thelen reject that institutions are inherently stable, or that changes occur solely because of exogenous shocks. The completeness of historical institutionalism, as interpreted by Mahoney and Thelen, which explains change and resistance to change within a system of internal and external injects over time and within a historical context, make it appropriate for this study.

The primacy of personal agency is critical to Mahoney and Thelen's gradual change model. Like Grief and Laitin's focus on game theory, the gradual change model states that actors within an institution act within their own interests and can either be compliant or non-compliant to the rules of the institution. Actors can thus either reinforce or erode the existing order. Who causes change and what type of change is caused are also important, as are the characteristics of both the political context in which the institution exists, as well as the characteristics of the institution itself. Together, these factors interact in Mahoney and Thelen's model, which is reproduced at Figure 6.¹⁵⁴

This model follows Streeck and Thelen's earlier work describing four types of institutional change: displacement, where existing rules are replaced by new ones; layering, where new rules are introduced on top of old ones; drift, where rules stay the same but their impact changes; and conversion, where existing rules are enacted differently.¹⁵⁵ There are likewise four types of change actors, determined by whether those actors seek to preserve the institution, and whether they follow the rules of the institution. Insurrectionaries seek to eliminate the institution, and do not feel obliged to follow its rules. Symbionts are those who benefit from the institution and seek to preserve it. They will follow, interpret differently, or break the rules depending on how they benefit and if they can get away with it. Subversives seek to change the institution but will follow its rules to do so. They often disguise themselves, performing well to gain influence and change the institution from within. Finally, opportunists

¹⁵¹ Mahoney and Thelen give the example of the evolution of British House of Lords, which has evolved since the 13th century from an "undemocratic bastion of traditional interests to champion of individual rights. Mahoney and Thelen, 1-2.

¹⁵² Grief and Laitin, 649.

¹⁵³ Mahoney and Thelen, 1.

¹⁵⁴ Mahoney and Thelen, 15.

¹⁵⁵ Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, ed Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1-39.

seek neither to replace or support the institution, but rather to exploit any possibility for personal gain, by following the institutions rules or not.¹⁵⁶ Of the four types of change actors, it is useful to keep in mind that where they achieve change, insurrectionaries and subversives mean to do so, while symbionts and opportunists do so accidentally.




Figure 6 – Framework for Explaining Modes of Institutional Change
 Source: Mahoney and Thelen, *Explaining Institutional Change*

Linking the type of dominant change agent to the type of institutional change, Mahoney and Thelen state that each type of change agent is likely to pursue a different type of change: insurrectionaries pursue displacement; symbionts contribute to drift; subversives are associated with layering, though they can also contribute to drift and conversion; and opportunists can contribute to conversion.¹⁵⁷

The characteristics of the political context is determined by whether change can be easily vetoed, either by power veto players, or by multiple veto points. It asks if the bosses of would-be change actor can stop the actor’s efforts. If they do, veto power is considered high. The characteristics of the institution is determined by the level of discretion the change actor

¹⁵⁶ Mahoney and Thelen, 22-27.

¹⁵⁷ Mahoney and Thelen, 22-27.

has with interpreting or enforcing rules. Importantly, how the characteristics of the political context and the institution interact determines the type of change that is most likely to be successful. Figure 7 reproduces Mahoney and Thelen's matrix.¹⁵⁸

A match between the dominant type of change agent and the type of change made more possible by the characteristics of the political context and the institution made change more likely. For instance, where weak veto

possibilities meet low levels of discretion (setting the conditions for displacement) and insurrectionaries are present and common or powerful within the institution, the stars align, and institutional change is more likely. It makes sense then that a mismatch between the type of institution change and the dominant change agent makes change less likely. Where change remains elusive, this may provide an explanation.

A Brief Description of Supporting Theories

The Copenhagen School. To place the case studies in context within regional and international security studies, and to inform the political context of Mahoney and Thelen's model, this paper will pick the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. First, it will use Buzan's concepts and definitions of weak and strong *states* versus weak and strong *powers*, as laid out in Chapters 2 and 3 of *People, States, and Fear*.¹⁵⁹ Specifically, we will measure state strength as a function of a state's socio-political cohesion and the resilience of its institutions using data from the Fragile States Index (FSI).¹⁶⁰ The FSI uses twelve metrics across social, economic, political, and societal cohesion indicators, making it useful for this research. There is no equivalent database for measuring state power, so a qualitative assessment will be made by the researcher based on the case studies' military and economic capabilities.¹⁶¹ Second, because each of the existing security concerns leading to an SFA deployment are regional in nature – the Syrian civil war for Jordan and Lebanon, and Russian exceptionalism for Ukraine – we will use Buzan

		Characteristics of the Targeted Institution	
		Low Level of Discretion in Interpretation / Enforcement	High Level of Discretion in Interpretation / Enforcement
Characteristics of the Political Context	Strong Veto Possibilities	Layering	Drift
	Weak Veto Possibilities	Displacement	Conversion

Figure 7 – Contextual and Institutional Sources of Institution Change
Source: Mahoney and Thelen, *Explaining Institutional Change*

¹⁵⁸ Mahoney and Thelen, 19.

¹⁵⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 65-124.

¹⁶⁰ The Fund for Peace, *The Fragile States Index*, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

¹⁶¹ Buzan, 93.

and Wæver's Regional Security Complex Theory to understand the regional context of our case studies.

Concordance Theory. Civil-military relations – the link between the state and institutional levels of analysis, and one of the five identified external factors for the failure of SFA missions within the literature review – will be viewed through the lens of Roberta Schiff's Concordance Theory. Concordance Theory is appropriate here because of its focus on culture and its acceptance of non-Western structures of civil-military relations.¹⁶² Specifically, concordance theory rejects the requirement for separation between civil and military elites, or for civilian control of military force, and instead posits that civil military relations can function effectively when four conditions are agreed upon by the political leadership, the military leadership, and the citizenry at large. These conditions are listed as: 1) social composition of the officer corps; 2) political decision-making process; 3) recruitment method; and 4) military style. When there is concordance between the trinity of politics, military, and citizenry on these issues, functioning civil military relations are more likely, and coups less likely.¹⁶³ Using this theory, the western system of civil military relations – characterized by civilian control and the desirable or undesirable separation between military and civilian worlds observed by Huntington and Janowitz, respectively – is but one functioning model of civil-military relations.

Bringing It All Together

The Copenhagen School and Concordance Theory will be incorporated within expanded version of Thelen and Mahoney's gradual change model, applied specifically to SFA missions. This model can be found at Figure 8. Specifically, these two theories will inform the analysis of the political context of institutional change, which determines the strength of the veto in the institution. The Copenhagen School will describe and explain the international context for the state, to determine how much influence other states have on the internal affairs of the partnered force. A weak state and a weak power logically is more susceptible to foreign influence, especially if it exists in an RSC with impacts on regional stability or is within the interest of a larger power. Concordance theory will be used to inform the domestic influence on the political context. Strong CMR logically would strengthen the veto, while weak CMR may weaken the veto. How the international and domestic contexts interact will produce an

¹⁶² Peter Feaver identifies another useful model of CMR that focuses on principal-agent problems, and is also applicable to non-Western states, though it still supposes civilian control of military force. Aside from this last point, Schiff's model is chosen for how well it integrates into the model of gradual change proposed in Figure 8, and to avoid confusion with the related conversation of principal-agent problems within SFA as proposed by Biddle. See Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

¹⁶³ Schiff, 12-13.




Figure 8 – Institutional Change Theory Adapted to SFA

assessment of the overall strength of the veto. Since domestic considerations usually trump international considerations in politics, it is logical to predict that the domestic forces are stronger than international forces when determining the characteristics of the political context. The model graphically represents this by increasing the size of the domestic context compared to the international context.

Like the characteristics of the political context, the characteristics of the institution are understood as the interaction between international and domestic influences. In this case, the international influence is the SFA engagement itself: the trainers, advisors, and program managers from assisting nations seeking to improve the capacity and capabilities of the partnered force. The quality of this engagement is really the crux of this research, though it forms but one part of the larger equation. The domestic influence will be interpreted as the command culture of the institution. Since the purpose of this part of the model is to determine the level of discretion actors have within the institution, it makes sense that the organizational culture of the institution is an important factor. This research will assess whether the partnered forces' command cultures subscribe to a decentralized mission command philosophy, as in most Western states, or a traditional centralized command philosophy. Mission command militaries prioritize and demand high levels of initiative and discretion in carrying out instructions. Centralized command militaries, by contrast, normally stifle initiative and allow for lower levels of discretion within the chain of command. How the international influence (the SFA engagement) and the domestic influence (the command culture of the partnered force) interact help determine the level of discretion within the partnered force. As culture changes slowly, it is logical to predict that the domestic influence is stronger than the international influence. The domestic influence on the characteristics of institution appears larger in Figure 8 to represent this prediction.

Applying the Theoretical Model.

This research will apply the tools of HI to the three case studies to gain insight as to why change may or may not have occurred in each case. To begin, each case study's recent history will be examined for exogenous shocks and critical junctures in accordance with Capoccia's work on the subject – the Maidan revolution, the subsequent Russian invasion of Crimea and support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine, and the state driven military reforms that followed come immediately to mind in Ukraine's case. Should a critical juncture be detected, it will be used to help explain where and why institutional change occurred in the partnered force.

The expanded version of Thelen and Mahoney's model at Figure 8 will then be applied to each case, whether a critical juncture is detected or not. In cases where there is a critical juncture, Thelen and Mahoney's model is still useful to contextualize even rapid change and can help explain whether change is expected to continue gradually. The inputs for the model will come from the application of the Copenhagen School, Concordance Theory, an analysis of SFA engagement, and the identification of the command philosophy of the partnered force. The model will predict the dominant change agent within the political and institutional context, and the type of change most likely to occur. This will be checked against the data to see if the predicted change agents and types of change were observed. If the predicted change agent and type of change were observed, confidence in the model improves. If they were not observed, it might help explain why change is slow or is not occurring. In either case, this lens will deepen the understanding of institutional change within SFA missions.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Introduction

The following chapter describes this thesis' research design, including the methodology and methods used, strengths and weaknesses and ethical considerations for my chosen methodology and methods.

Research Hypothesis and Selection of Variables

To recall, the research question is: "how does tactical training and institutional engagement affect the professional development of the partnered state?" Based on initial research and the researcher's direct observation as a practitioner, it was suspected that SFA engagement at the institutional level of the partnered forces' training system had greater value and supported institutional change more than tactical or technical level engagement, such as the direct provision of marksmanship training. This seems an obvious truth: institutional engagement leads to greater institutional change than tactical engagement. Yet many SFA missions focus exclusively on tactical and technical level engagements, as the literature review and an examination of my case studies found.

Originally, the hypothesis was that the professional development system of a partnered force is improved more by institutional level change efforts than the tactical or technical level efforts. As Chapter 10 describes, this hypothesis was found wanting almost immediately, describing part but not the whole picture to be uncovered. Preliminary research established a hierarchy of SFA training activities, organized into four levels, arrayed on a spectrum of tactical/technical, organizational, and institutional engagements. This model is illustrated at Figure 10 and described in Chapter 5. This model refined the original hypothesis to include the concepts of immediate and enduring effects as outcomes of engagement. Specifically, it was posited that tactical level training had immediate effect that dissipated over time, while higher level engagement had little immediate effect, but could have enduring effects that accumulated over time. This model leaves space for and does not ignore the value of tactical level engagement when immediate effect is desired. Therefore, the revised hypothesis is that organizational and institutional level efforts within a partnered forces' professional development system are more likely to support enduring institutional change than tactical level efforts.

The dependent variable was assessed to be improvements to the professional development system of the partnered force, which is defined as being capable when it can produce officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers with relevant skills, attributes, and knowledge to perform assigned tasks as members of teams. The independent variables are the four SFA levels of approach in Figure 10. They include the provision of tactical training, support to schools and training centers, support to curriculum review and training organizations, and support to professional development system reform. The external factors – which describe the environment in which the SFA mission takes place and are beyond the control of SFA practitioners – are state fragility, societal divisions, poor civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems. These external factors were identified during the literature review and are reflected in Figure 4. They have an unpreventable and unmeasurable impact on the research cases. The best the research can do is describe and acknowledge their impacts on the cases as well as possible.

Research Methodology: The Case Study

Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon... in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context may not be clearly evident.”¹⁶⁴ This research seeks to understand and explain contemporary change within complex adaptive systems. This makes the case study, which allows for an in-depth examination of multiple factors and variables, using a wide variety of evidence, the most suitable methodology.¹⁶⁵

It was decided to conduct a cross case analysis involving three cases, making this a small n case study. The three cases selected were the Canadian SFA missions in Lebanon (CTAT-L), in Jordan (CTAT-J), and in Ukraine (UNIFIER). The research was limited to three cases to respect the size and scope of an MA research thesis, while ensuring there was time and resources to treat the selected case studies in sufficient depth. A single case study (Ukraine) was considered; however, this would have limited the external validity of the research. Two other cases considered for inclusion were Canadian participation in NATO Mission Iraq (Op IMPACT), and the Canadian provision of training in Niger (Op NABERIUS). These were rejected to expedite the research into the selected cases, and to avoid other problems. The researcher originally began researching NATO Mission Iraq, and conducted several preliminary interviews and examined several documents. There was some friction with this case, however, both because the research would be complicated by interviewing non-Canadian (i.e., NATO) sources and the difficulty of accessing NATO documents, and because of an ongoing investigation into alleged Iraqi war crimes identified to Canadian trainers in Iraq.¹⁶⁶ As the researcher was the company commander for several of these soldiers on redeployment – soldiers who would otherwise be ideal sources – it would be inappropriate to interview them, especially with an investigation ongoing. Op NABERIUS was deselected as a case study because of access to sources. Several NABERIUS deployments were conducted by the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, who of necessity classify their documents more robustly than conventional forces. The conventional forces that have deployed on NABERIUS were generated from the 2nd Canadian Division, which conducts its daily business in French. Though the researcher speaks, reads, and writes French passably, some nuance would have been lost. In hindsight, Op NABERIUS would have been an appropriate case study that would have added value to this research, despite the language challenge. The one preliminary interview of an officer who deployed on NABERIUS informed the researcher’s understanding of SFA considerably.

UNIFIER, CTAT-J, and CTAT-L were chosen primarily because of the access the researcher had to practitioners, documents, and because of his own direct observations in Ukraine. They also share an important similarity for this research: the security force practitioners who deploy on these three missions are all generated from the same pool of personnel, though as is described in Chapter 9, UNIFIER was often privileged with the more

¹⁶⁴ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research and Applications*, Sixth Edition (Sage Publishing: Los Angeles, 2018), 15.

¹⁶⁵ Yin, 12.

¹⁶⁶ Murray Brewster, “Canadian trainers being questioned by military police about witnessing possible Iraqi war crimes,” *CBC News*, June 6th, 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iraq-security-training-atrocity-eyre-1.6054419> (accessed June 7th, 2021).

experienced personnel from this pool. UNIFIER is different from the two CTATs in that it had eight times the number of personnel deployed and was operating for longer (at the time of writing the mission was paused due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022). The partnered forces are also different in size, mission, history, and the interplay of external factors illustrated in Figure 4. While this makes comparisons between the CTATs and UNIFIER more difficult, it does increase the external validity of those comparisons that can be made.

This research is qualitative in nature. This has the advantage of maintaining flexibility and context within the research. There are no datasets easily available, nor were there resources to gather them. This limited any attempt to pursue quantitative analysis or a blended qualitative comparative analysis. This is a potential weakness within the methodology, as a purely qualitative analysis does not leverage all the benefits of “methodological triangulation” as described by Polkinghorne, namely that contrasting methods can mitigate each others’ weaknesses.¹⁶⁷

Data was reviewed and interpreted using thematic analysis. Themes pertinent to the research were highlighted in the note taking process. Notes were then organized according to those themes. As knowledge of each case study could only ever be incomplete, the researcher used abductive reasoning based on partial observations to draw insights and conclusions from the research notes.¹⁶⁸ In places, grounded theory was used, particularly in the creation of the SFA models in Figure 10 and Figure 12. These models emerged during data collection, building on previous analysis to create a framework to make sense of and inform later interviews and documentary research. Not all conditions of rigorous ground theory were fulfilled, as the process was applied informally and unknowingly. The thought process was identified as grounded theory only after the fact and was identified as such by the thesis supervisor.

Methods

Three different methods were used to gather data: documentary research, interviews, and direct observation. By using three methods, it was hoped to have achieved at least some triangulation within the research methodology.

Documentary Research. First and most importantly, the research relied on documentary evidence during data collection. Since official government documents were required, the researcher began by submitting an Access to Information (ATI) request through the CJOC Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) coordinator in February 2021. As part of the request, the researcher requested end-tour reports, after-action reviews, and ‘101 briefs’ relevant to the case studies. Most documents were received in June 2021. Some of them were partially redacted, though as the researcher had access to these documents through other means via the CJOC information management system (CJOC SharePoint), they could confirm that the information redacted was not relevant to the research topic. No redacted information was used. Other sources for documents were those given to me freely by interview participants. Documents received and reviewed were all unclassified and were secured and transmitted appropriately. At no time were National Defence Security Orders and Directives (NDSODs)

¹⁶⁷ Polkinghorne, 253-54.

¹⁶⁸ H. Russel Bernard, Gerry W. Ryan, and Amber Y. Wutich, *Analyzing Qualitative Data: Systemic Approaches*, Second Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2016).

violated by the researcher or the interviewees. A summary of the type, number, and length of these documents can be found in Table 1. Notably, there were fewer documents for UNIFIER, though they were significantly longer. CTAT documents were more numerous, though shorter in length. This is because UNIFIER published a single end tour report covering all tour activities at the end of each six-month rotation, while the CTATs published end tour reports at the end of training iteration covering only that single training iteration. There was between about five times more relevant material on UNIFIER than there was for the CTATs.

Official documents provided a wealth of insight into the research topic. Because these documents are not released to the partnered force, they contain in many cases unvarnished observations and analysis by senior staff and commanders. The sections of end-tour reports written by Task Force Commanders or CTAT Commanders themselves proved especially useful, as those sections capably synthesized the activities conducted by the rotation, the Task Force Commander’s analysis of the success of those activities, and recommendations for future rotations and even mission design suggestions back to CJOC.

Table 1 – Summary of Official Documents Studied

	Lebanon	Jordan	Ukraine
Type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End-serial summaries from majority of MTT serials. • Several handover documents, including after action reviews and training proposals. • CTAT-L 101 presentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End-serial summaries from majority of MTT serials. • Several handover documents • CTAT-J 101 presentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End tour reports (ETRs) from R0 and R5-R11 (R1-R4 were not available) • Handover documents • UNIFIER 101 presentation
Number of documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 18 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 ETRs • Various other documents, including planning documents, situation reports, and presentations directed at both Ukrainian and NATO audiences
Typical Length	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2-10 pages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2-8 pages 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85-125 pages (ETRs) • 1-15 pages for other

Comparing mission ‘101 Briefs’ over time was useful to track the evolution of each mission over time. These presentations are normally maintained by the CTAT or TF HQs to brief visitors or partners on the history, purpose, and activities of its respective mission. They are adapted as needed to the specific presentation required. Examining different iterations of these briefs allowed me to track different activities over time, and in UNIFIER’s case, was a useful way to trace the mission geographic expansion from two locations to sixteen, with forty unique engagements.

Other documents included news articles, practitioner articles, and academic sources which were used for context, particularly when it came to establishing the historical framework necessary to apply historical institutionalism as a theoretical model, and when assessing the external factors (Figure 4) as they applied to the case studies. The *New York Times* was used whenever possible as the newspaper of record, both because of its resources and prestige, and because the researcher was already a subscriber. All academic and news articles are cited in footnotes or listed in the bibliography.

Interviews. Next in importance were interviews with SFA practitioners with operational experience with the case studies. The researcher selected interviewees initially through their personal relationships and relied on those initial general interviews to identify subsequent persons with specific knowledge of the research interests. This is commonly known as the convenience sample, followed by the snowball technique. At no time did the researcher struggle to find interview subjects; to the contrary, they had to limit the number of interviews that they conducted to keep the research within the bounds of an MA thesis. Because there were many options for willing interview participants, the researcher was able to select for a cross-section of rank levels and experience; for instance, at least one non-commissioned officer was included per case study.

The purpose of these interviews was not to record personal perceptions or experiences, but to collection information about actions and organizational relationships, including observations of the partnered force. The primary purpose of the interview was to identify additional primary documentation, including unpublished literature and personal notes, to be used with permission and in accordance with all information security regulations.


The active interview method was used, as described by Holstein and Gubrium.¹⁶⁹ The researcher had a series of questions (see Annex C) they wanted answered, and steered the conversation towards those topics, while maintaining a free exchange of ideas. In numerous instances this paid dividends, as interviewees brought up information of interest they may not have in a traditional interview format. Interviews were conducted mostly over the phone, except three that were conducted in person. The researcher leveraged an online subscription-based recording and transcription service called Otter.ai, which proved to be about 80% accurate in its transcription. Interviewees were all asked for consent prior to being recorded (Annex A), and all interviewees signed a letter of information and consent (see Annex B), which they were sent prior to the interview commencing. All interview recordings and transcripts were stored digitally in a secure location. When writing up findings, data was anonymized to protect the identity of the interviewees, in accordance with the tenets of *k* anonymity.¹⁷⁰

A total of twenty interviews were conducted. The longest interview was one hour and fourteen minutes. The shortest was twenty-five minutes. The total amount of interview transcription was sixteen hours, nineteen minutes, and forty seconds. The average interview

¹⁶⁹ James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, *The Active Interview* (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, 1995).

¹⁷⁰ Latanya Sweeney, "k-Anonymity: A model for protecting privacy," *International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems*, 10, no. 5 (2002): 557-570; Sweeney, L., "Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization and suppression," *International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems*, 10, no. 5 (2002): 571-588.

length was forty-nine minutes. One person was interviewed twice, three months apart, to gain additional data on a specific aspect of a mission. Two interviewees had deployed on the same mission twice, though none had deployed on more than one case study mission. The lowest rank was sergeant, and the highest rank was colonel. The least amount of experience in uniform (Captain) was between four and five years; several interviewees had more than thirty years of experience. One person had retired from the CAF by the time they were interviewed. Three interviewees were members of the Army Reserve. A breakdown of interviewees by rank and mission is displayed at Figure 9.



By recruiting interviewees with experience from the tactical to the operation level, including several task force commanders and a CTAT commander, insight was gained across a wide spectrum of SFA activities. Two people from JTF-I headquarters were interviewed, providing the higher headquarters perspective for the CTATs. Interviewing NCOs was especially valuable, as they provide a perspective that is not always captured in official documents, which are predominantly drafted by officers. It also provided granular detail on specific SFA activities, which could be used to compare and verify statements made in official documents or by officers interviewed. Interviews were not conducted with enlisted personnel below the rank of Sergeant. Privates and Corporals were not as engaged in direct SFA activities

as NCOs are on these missions, conducting mostly supporting duties such as driving and security. The value of their perspective would have been limited, just by the nature of their limited exposure to the delivery of SFA activities.

Direct Observation. Finally, the researcher's own direct observation relating to Operation UNIFIER was used sparingly and reflectively. It helped shape the search for documents and designing the active interviews but was treated critically. As the researcher was a practitioner conducting action research, the dangers of bias and blind spots were real and acknowledged.¹⁷¹ A direct observation was not considered 'factual' unless it had also been observed by an interviewee, recorded in an official document, or written about in a professional journal. Nevertheless, the context and background information that attained through direct observation, on UNIFIER and Ukraine specifically but also on SFA missions generally made a valuable contribution to the thesis.

Research Process and Hypothesis Development.

Initially, the researcher wished to measure the adoption and understanding of a Canadian-supported, NGU-drafted NCO ethos in NCO candidates at the NGU NCO academy. The travel restrictions of COVID-19, the difficulty finding funding, a deployment to Latvia, and a growing understanding of the tenuousness of measuring changes in personal beliefs, especially over such a short period of time as a single NCO training course, led the researcher to look more generally at how SFA missions affect partnered institutions. Institutional change is easier to identify than cultural change, making it more feasible for MA research.

Because the research was now looking at institutional change, historical institutionalism was used as a theoretical lens. This necessitated a thorough study of that subject, as it was not one with which the researcher was previously familiar. This led to the writing of Chapter 3 and influenced all the analysis contained within Part II of this thesis.

Two trends become clear during the literature review. The first trend was that the literature spoke of armies failing in three ways: they fail on the battlefield, they overthrow their own governments, or they commit crimes either on the battlefield or during their routine security duties. The literature was stove piped, with scholars and professionals writing about each of these failures individually; no where to the researcher's knowledge has anyone thought of these failures as an interacting system. As partnered forces can fail in any one of these three ways, it was important that these ways were acknowledged. This led to the creation of the model at Figure 3. Where the thesis fell short was incorporating this model into the remainder of the research. There is no universal model of SFA engagement that the researcher could conceive of that uses this insight explicitly. Nevertheless, the researcher was satisfied that it 1) provided context for the research; and 2) was a worthwhile contribution to the body of knowledge, however, and left it in the literature review.

The second trend in the literature was scholars identifying why SFA missions failed. The partnered force failures described in the preceding paragraph were blamed on state fragility, societal divisions, poor civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems. This

¹⁷¹ Anne Campbell and Susan Groundwater-Smith, eds, *An Ethical Approach to Practitioner Research: Dealing with Issues and Dilemmas in Action Research*, (London: Routledge, 2007).

led to the creation of the model at Figure 4 and contextualized the analysis throughout Part II of the thesis. These ways were labelled 'environmental conditions' by the researcher. These conditions are seen to be outside the control of the SFA practitioner, difficult to measure, and usually more of a deciding factor of SFA success or failure than the approach taken by practitioners.

The development of the research question and hypothesis in their current form was a recursive process. The researcher began by leveraging the reading they had completed for version one of the thesis, additional academic and professional readings specific to SFA approaches, preliminary discussions with fellow practitioners, and their own reflections over multiple COVID isolation periods to develop an early form of the model at Figure 10. They used this model to help develop the research question and hypothesis and began data collection concurrent to staying on top of emerging professional and academic writing on the topic of SFA. This writing was published at an increasing rate, especially after the fall of Kabul in August 2021.

The documentary and interview data collection took several months and was mostly completed between November 2021 and March 2022. Figure 10 was continuously updated and improved as additional sources and reflection led to more insights. This included modifying the model to include the concepts of enduring and immediate effects, which was placed in tension with each other in the model. It was at this time that the hypothesis was modified to include immediate and enduring effect.

During the data analysis process, the notes taken from various sources were organized according to the mission and activity and placed on Figure 10. These were then assessed against what the documentary or interview evidence reported as outcomes of those activities to the model. It was found that where there was evidence, the outcomes reported aligned with the assessment of immediate versus enduring effect, which increased confidence in the model. This analysis is displayed as Figure 13.

This process also exposed the limitations of Figure 10, however. The model did not distinguish between simple skills and knowledge, and specialized knowledge, skills, or attitudes. It also did not distinguish between the size of the audience; usually a wide audience is superior to a narrow audience, because more people receive the skill, knowledge, or attitude being taught. This led to the creation of Figure 11 (The Training Competency Model) – which is based on Bloom's Taxonomy – and Figure 12 (The SFA Engagement Matrix) which explicitly dealt with the complexity of the subject being taught and the size of the audience, and predicted outcomes based on the complexity and size of the audience. Though it was attempted, efforts to combine Figure 12 with Figure 10 and create a unified model failed. When activities were placed onto the SFA Engagement Matrix, a correlation was found between what the documentary and interview evidence identified as outcomes and what the SFA Engagement Levels model predicted (see Figure 14). Again, this increased the confidence in the SFA Engagement Matrix as a workable model, to be used to reinforce Figure 10.

Methodology and Methods Strengths and Weaknesses

This research suffered from several weaknesses, mostly related to the limited scope of data collection. To begin, due to COVID, ethics, and operational constraints, research participants were limited to CAF personnel, and not the partnered forces. By not engaging with the partnered force, this research missed an important perspective on the value of different SFA approaches. Looking at only Canadian sources risks entering an echo chamber, where documents and interview transcripts, which in some cases originate with the person, mistake, or amplify successes or failures, corrupting the analysis. This weakness was partially mitigated by the fact that most documents and interviewees proved remarkably frank about what they thought worked and did not work: little came across as self-congratulatory. Ideally future researchers with more resources could look at this problem from the perspective of the partnered force.

Next, there are difficulties in measuring success, due to the subjective nature of personal accounts, the inherent difficulties in measuring anything in complex adaptive systems, and the short timeline being studied – six years for UNIFIER and slightly less than four years for CTAT Lebanon and CTAT Jordan. Balancing open-ended interviews with documentary sources and using the interviews to seek additional primary source documents illustrating institutional change will increase confidence in the findings.

As an insider conducting practitioner-research, the researcher's bias is a threat to the validity of this research. The researcher was directly involved in one of the activities studied in this research (NGU NCO development) and received a Chief of the Defence Staff Commendation for my work. The researcher's expertise in the CAF training system, including two years employed as the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School Standards Officer, influenced not only their professional decision to apply the SAT while deployed to Ukraine, but also the decision to include that activity as a topic of study. There can be a bias to view one's own contributions favourably, which in this case could skew the findings. This bias was adjusted for by verifying all direct observations with supporting evidence from either professional journals, interview, or documentary source.

There is also the issue of power dynamics during the interview process. The researcher occupies a place in the military hierarchy, and those interviewed were either subordinate, superior, or a peer to the researcher. In all three cases, it is likely that this reality affected the outcomes of the interviews in subtle ways.

Finally, because of the number and influence of what were labeled 'environmental conditions' within the SFA environment – state fragility, societal divisions, civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems – comparisons between cases are imperfect at best. The context and environment of UNIFIER is different from CTAT-J and CTAT-L. Even the two CTATs, for all their similarities in approach and geography, exist in completely different political contexts. An approach that worked well in Ukraine may be unfit for purpose in Lebanon or Jordan, and vice versa. An approach in Lebanon may be unsuitable for Jordan. It is impossible to adjust for or even just measure the impact of these external factors on the research subject. The best that could be achieved was to describe and acknowledge them.

There are, on the other hand, several strengths to this research. As an insider conducting practitioner research, the researcher has unique access to quality data. Because of their seventeen years experience in uniform, the researcher speaks the technical language of the military, they understand how to access relevant information, have access to subject matter experts and practitioners with recent operational experience, and have the CAF's permission and support. This access to data is not typical for most research projects.

The researcher also possesses the tools to analyse the collected data. Because of their operational experience in Ukraine as a senior officer advising a partnered force, the researcher has a deep and nuanced understanding of the subject matter from a practical perspective. The researcher understands Ukraine better than most, having lived "amongst the people" on the economy in Kyiv for over six months, having travelled the country extensively in the execution of my duties, and having access to information from both the military chain of command and from the Canadian Embassy, where they frequently worked under the Defence Attaché. The researcher is also a technical expert on the delivery of military training, holding several advanced training qualifications, with four years experience delivering and supervising basic training at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School, where they served as the Standards Officer for two years.

Ethics and Approvals

Because this research involved interviewing humans, an Ethics Review request was submitted through the RMC Research Ethics Board (REB) on 20 April 2021. Confirmation from the REB was received on 30 April 2021 that since human participants were not themselves the subject of research, REB review or approval was not required. The RMC REB Chair did suggest several improvements to both the Letter of Information and Consent (Annex A) and the Active Interview Plan (Annex C), all of which were adopted.

As previously mentioned, the researcher contacted the Canadian Joint Operations Command (J5 Capacity Building) and received permission and support for this research from that headquarters, including assistance accessing mission documents through the ATIP process. In return for this support, the researcher was asked to produce an executive summary on the results of the research for the CJOC J5 Capacity Building and other interested stakeholders. Finally, a letter was submitted to the CAF's Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPPRA) informing that office of the parameters of the research. They indicated that this research did not require technical or ethical approval from its Social Science Review Board, for the same reasons as the RMC REB.

**PART 2:
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS**

CHAPTER 5 – TWO CONCEPTUAL MODELS FOR SFA TRAINING MISSIONS

Introduction

This chapter introduces two conceptual models designed during this research to help describe SFA activities and their impact on the partnered force. These two models are contained at Figure 10 and Figure 12 and are described below.

A Conceptual Model: Levels of Engagement in SFA Missions

Analysis of Canadian SFA activities in Ukraine, Jordan, and Lebanon reveals a conceptual model for describing and partially predicting the outcomes of SFA engagements. This model, displayed as Figure 10 below, emerged slowly during data collection, and continued to evolve during the analysis process. It posits that the types of training assistance provided by the CAF within the three case studies all easily group into four distinct categories, which the model labels as levels of engagement. The levels are arranged hierarchically on a spectrum of engagement, which spans from the tactical or technical realm at the lower end, through the organizational realm, to the institutional realm at the top end. This spectrum is an adaptation of the three levels of war – tactical, operational, and strategic – applied to institutions.

Level one is best described as the provision of tactical training. These are the types of activities that most associate with overseas training missions. It includes the direct delivery of basic skills and knowledge. This can be individual skills like marksmanship, first aid, CBRN, or mission planning, or collective skills such as planning and executing military exercises and providing exercise umpires (observer-controllers). These activities are the easiest to plan and execute, and the easiest to measure.

Level two begins to focus on partnered forces' organizations, including schools and training centers. Practitioners are no longer only providing direct training to soldiers; rather they are helping build the partnered forces' capabilities to train themselves. The most common activity in level two related to supporting individual training is referred to as 'train-the-trainer,' but other activities include assisting schools to develop resource management skills, including allocation of training spaces and the creation of schedules. Within collective or group training, activities can include developing exercise design skills, helping train indigenous exercise umpires, and with resource management such as training areas deconfliction.

Level three is focused on the organizational level of the partnered force. It includes activities such as the development or review of course curriculum (referred to as 'training plans' and related 'qualification standards' in the CAF, as 'programs of instruction' in the US, and simply as 'curriculum' by NATO DEEP), and the development of training policies. It focuses not on the delivery of training, but on enhancing the structures and systems supporting the delivery of training. To put it another way, it focuses on what to train, not just how to train it. Within NATO countries, level three means the application of Systems Approach to Training (SAT), which as described in Chapter 1 applies a rigorous level of analysis to a professional development system. This system is often lacking in non-Western militaries and was non-existent in all three case studies prior to CAF engagement.




Figure 10 – SFA Engagement Levels within Professional Development Systems

Level Four is focused on the higher organizational and institutional levels of the partnered force. It includes activities such as the design and implementation of military employment structures, which includes the professional development system for the partnered force. It is determined at this level what kind of soldiers, NCOs, and officers the partnered force needs, and develops a system of education, training, and experiential gateways to build them. It is about inculcating a culture of professional development and creating an indigenous training development capability based on the SAT within the partnered force. To answer the question of what sort of soldier the partnered force needs, this category may also include the articulation of a military ethos, which are the *stated* values and beliefs of an institution, which differ from demonstrated values and belief until the organizational culture of the partnered force adapts to the desired model.

The left hand of the model – the part which dictates the four levels of approach and the spectrum of engagement – is descriptive, and most SFA activities in the training realm can be placed easily within one of those four levels.¹⁷² Some trends reveal themselves quickly. For instance, the majority of current SFA engagements described within the literature review and those studied within the three case studies of this research can be classified within levels one and two. Level three activities are rare, and level four activities rarer still. In fact, this research identified only two instances of level 4 activities, both occurring in the UNIFIER case. Another clear observation is that the lower on the scale the approach, the easier the results are to measure; numbers of soldiers taught marksmanship or first aid briefs easier than progress on the implementation of a new training plan. Harder still is measuring the difference between demonstrated and stated values of a military ethos.

The right side of the model – the part displaying the interplay between immediate and enduring change – is predictive. It is, in fact, a visual representation of the first part of the hypothesis of this study. It suggests that the higher the level of approach to SFA the less

¹⁷² This model can also be related to the Canadian Army's operational assessment framework, which uses measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to assess if desired outcomes are being achieved. Levels one and two relate to measures of performance (MOP), which asks 'are things being done right?' Levels three and four relate to the more important measures of effectiveness (MOE), which asks 'are the right things being done?'. See Department of National Defence (Canada), *B-GL-300-001 FP-001 Land Operations* (Kingston: Canadian Army Doctrine Center, 2008), 5-35. Measuring performance and effectiveness in military operations, including non-combat operations such as SFA, is important to ensuring that resources are being allocated correctly, and that activities are supporting desired outcomes. This research argues that desired outcomes in SFA engagement should be a more effective military force, which as defined in the introduction is one that fights with modern tactics, is capable and willing to undertake difficult tasks, and whose behaviour reflects a professional ethos grounded in respect for human rights, the laws of armed conflict, and democratic control of the use of force. Establishing appropriate measures of performance and effectiveness takes effort (and arguable is an aspect of operational art), as does the act of measuring them. Things that truly matter are often qualitative and defy easy measurement, for instance. Though it does not use the professional language of MOP/MOE beyond this footnote, measuring effectiveness remains a theme of this research. For a fulsome discussion of how MOP and MOEs relate to SFA, see James LeGresley, "Decomposing Complexity: Measures of Effectiveness in Security Force Assistance," Canadian Forces College, Joint Command and Staff Program 46, Service Paper (2020), <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/22/305/LeGresley.pdf>.

immediate but more enduring the effect on the institution will be. In other words, activities grouped under level four is more likely to achieve institutional change than those grouped under level one. The converse is also displayed: tactical and technical activities may achieve immediate results, but these will have small impact on enduring institutional change. The diagram also proposes that the benefit of immediate effects dissipate over time, as skills and knowledge gained are lost to retirement, postings, or skill fade. Conversely, enduring effects begin small but accumulate over time, as the institution and the people within it adjust to new ideas and practices. An example is a sergeant who graduates from a revised leadership course eager to apply mission command but finds little space to exercise their new skills and knowledge until most of their unit, and importantly their officers, have also received training in the new command philosophy. Momentum starts slowly – and is susceptible to reversal if pressure is not maintained – but in ten years, all junior leaders will be trained only in the new command philosophy. In twenty, most senior leaders will know nothing else.

A Second Conceptual Model: The SFA Engagement Matrix (Depth and Width)

The conceptual model at Figure 10 has its limitations, however. Specifically, it does not easily interact with two of the remaining key factors to SFA engagements: engagement depth, and the size of the engagement audience. Therefore, a complementary model is required. This model, the SFA Engagement Matrix, can be found at Figure 12. It delineates between two engagement depths (shallow and deep), and two engagement audiences (narrow and wide) to predict and describe SFA outcomes.

This concept and the diagrams below are related the second part of this study’s hypothesis, which is that the deeper and wider SFA engagements are made, the stronger the institutional change effect will be.

Engagement depth is founded on the well-known Knowledge-Skill-Attitude (KSA) competency model, which is in turn based off Bloom’s classifications of the affective, cognitive, and psychomotor domains.¹⁷³ A version of this competency model as it relates to institutional change within SFA missions can be found at Figure 11. Note that attitudes have been further broken down as values, attitudes, and




Figure 11 – Training Competency Model (KSA)

¹⁷³ Benjamin S. Bloom, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals, 1st ed.* (New York: Longman Group, 1956); Department of National Defence (Canada), *DAOD 5031-2 Individual Training and Education System Strategic Framework* <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5031/5031-2-individual-training-and-education-system-strategic-framework.html> (accessed April 14th, 2022).

beliefs, which is a common interpretation of Bloom's affective domain; this is useful because it visually demonstrates the difficulty in affecting values with new knowledge or new skills. As institutions are more about attitudes and specialized knowledge than about skill, then it is reasonable that engagements focused on attitudes and specialized knowledge are more likely to affect institutional change than those focused on skills or simple knowledge. In the SFA Engagement Matrix, the former is labelled 'deep engagement' and the latter 'shallow engagement.'

Figure 11 can be linked to two important related concepts. First, there is a relationship between the KSA framework and NATO's 'three components of fighting power,' which are defined as the physical (skills), intellectual (knowledge), and moral (attitudes) components.¹⁷⁴ A second linkage is to Schein's work on organizational culture, particularly to their work on artefacts, values, and beliefs, which relates strongly to 'attitudes' within the KSA framework, so much that they nearly overlap.¹⁷⁵ It is logical that a shift in attitudes within an institution would correspond to a change in organizational culture. This is not the focus of this research but is fertile ground for additional study.

Engagement audience size is simpler yet still critical to understanding how SFA engagements affect the partnered force. Simply put, the size of your engagement audience matters. Activities directed towards a smaller audience, though easier to execute, have less of a chance of influencing the larger organization, as the catalysts for change are fewer. Conversely, activities directed at a wider audience have greater chance of influencing the larger organization; lessons are more likely to spread if more people have learnt them. This is not an exact calculation, because of course the type of audience also matters: targeting a narrow group of leaders and decision makers can lead to decisions that change organizations.

Four categories emerge on the Engagement Matrix, detailed below. Predictably, shallow engagements targeted at narrow audiences provide quick wins of limited overall value, where deep engagements targeted at wider audiences are hard to do but have an increased chance of 'organizational diffusion,' which this paper will define as the likelihood of knowledge, skills, and attitudes spreading to the larger force beyond the initial SFA engagement. Knowledge and attitudes that spread widely across the organization contributes to institutional change.

The SFA Engagement Matrix interacts imperfectly with the model of SFA Engagement Levels. Levels one and two of Figure 10 generally but not always relate to quadrant one and three of Figure 12. Levels three and four of Figure 10 are more likely to relate to quadrants two and four of Figure 12. It proved too difficult to incorporate the size of the audience (width) or the complexity of the subject matter (depth) into Figure 10; others are encouraged to try. Taken together, these models inform an understanding of SFA activities; it matters who you engage with, the depth of your engagement, and what activities with which you engage.

¹⁷⁴ *AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine*, 16-17.

¹⁷⁵ Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Third Edition (Jossey-Boss: San Francisco, 2004).

		Engagement Type	
		<u>Shallow</u> (focus on skills and simple knowledge)	<u>Deep</u> (primary focuses on attitudes and/or specialized knowledge)
Engagement Audience	Narrow Audience (small audience, low chance of institutional diffusion)	<p>Quadrant 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build skills or knowledge within a limited audience • Outcomes are immediate but can be transitory • Very low chance of institutional diffusion • Examples include training winter skills for border guards or urban operations for specific units 	<p>Quadrant 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build specialized knowledge or shape attitudes, beliefs, and values of a small audience • Outcomes are delayed but can be enduring • Lower chance on institutional diffusion, unless targeted at key decision makers • Examples include SOF partnerships, JTAC training, TDO training, or sponsoring spots in western staff colleges (e.g. US IMET or Canadian MTCP programs)
	Wide Audience (large audience, increased chance of institutional diffusion)	<p>Quadrant 3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build skills or knowledge in a wider audience • Outcomes are immediate but can be transitory • Higher chance of institutional diffusion • Examples include CBRN instructor training, or skill/knowledge focussed basic training programs 	<p>Quadrant 4</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build knowledge or shape attitudes, beliefs, and values of a wider audience • Outcomes are delayed but can be enduring • High chance of organizational diffusion of attitudes or specialized knowledge • Examples include development of values-based professional development programs, articulation of ethos, etc.

Figure 12 – The SFA Engagement Matrix

CHAPTER 6: THE CASE OF SFA IN LEBANON

Background.

Canada deployed CTAT-L in 2018 to assist Lebanon's security sector with its long-standing border and internal security problems that resulted from the Syrian civil war. To understand the context of this border challenge, and the context of CTAT-L and the Lebanese military within the Lebanese state and society, some political history is required. This history is enormously complex; there are eighteen distinct sects within Lebanese society, crossing religious, national, and ethnic lines, each with its own leaders, interests, and history.¹⁷⁶ The challenge is doing this history and complexity justice without getting buried in it.

This review will therefore start at the end of the Lebanese civil war, which was fought from 1975 to 1990. This complicated war was waged between the Christian Maronites and their (shifting) allies on one side, and Muslims – Palestinian and other Arab militias, further divided between Shi'a and Sunni sects, who sometimes fought each other – on the other with foreign interventions at various points by Israel, Syria, Iran, and the United Nations. Fawwas Traboulsi's *A History of Modern Lebanon*, provides an excellent review of the events and trends of this conflict, which this thesis will not recount.¹⁷⁷

The Ta'if Agreement was signed in 1989, ending the war and forcing a new power sharing deal on the Maronite president, the Sunni prime minister, and the Shi'a speaker of parliament.¹⁷⁸ The security sector was likewise rebalanced, with the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) officer corps and units adjusting their compositions to being more representative of society.¹⁷⁹ Though both political and military reforms came at the expense of Christian Maronite power, they led to a level of popular legitimacy for the LAF, which Oren Barak credits as a significant factor in the relatively stable politics of Lebanon since 1990.¹⁸⁰ The Lebanese state enjoys less prestige amongst its citizenry, suffering from what Tamirace Fakhoury calls "three core dilemmas... [its] proneness to deadlock, its dependence on the external environment as an avenue for partisanship and sectarian leverage, and weak responsiveness to the demands below."¹⁸¹ As a result, the LAF emerges as one of the only nation-building institutions in the country.

The Syrian occupation of Lebanon from 1990 to 2005 played an important role in Lebanese security and politics. This occupation, a result of a security agreement between Lebanon and Syria at the time, gave the Syrian military wielded significant influence over the

¹⁷⁶ Fawwas Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 2nd Edition (Pluto Press: London, 2007).

¹⁷⁷ Traboulsi, 193-252.

¹⁷⁸ Oren Barak, "Lebanon: A Military in Politics in a Divided Society," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics*, Oxford University Press, (accessed April 25th, 2022) <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1832>, 8.

¹⁷⁹ Barak, "Lebanon...," 8.

¹⁸⁰ Oren Barak, "Representation and Stability in Postwar Lebanon," *Representation*, 48, no. 3, (2012): 321-333, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2012.706993>.

¹⁸¹ Tamirace Fakhoury, "Power-Sharing After the Arab Spring? Insights from Lebanon's Political Transition," *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, 25, no. 1 (2019): 11.

LAF, including the training and selection of its officers.¹⁸² The 2005 Cedar Revolution, which resulted in Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, freed the LAF from Syrian military control. It also coincided with an increase of military assistance from the United States, which was refocused further following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in the hopes that a stronger LAF would decrease the power of Hezbollah.¹⁸³ Apart from France, which maintained its interests with modest engagements in Lebanon as part of the Francophonie, the period following the Cedar Revolution was the beginning of true Western security assistance to the LAF.

The 2011 Arab Spring added more problems to Lebanon's already lengthy list. Though Lebanon avoided the mass protests that crippled much of Middle East and North Africa, the resulting Syrian civil war created compounding security and humanitarian crises. Lebanon took in 1.5 million refugees from this war, and now has the highest proportion of refugees to citizens in the world. In addition to the humanitarian and economic burden this war caused, several Shi'a political factions – notably Hezbollah – are supporters of the Assad Alawite regime and have stoked sectarianism in Lebanese politics.¹⁸⁴ The four-hundred-kilometer Syrian-Lebanese border is porous and serves as an entry and exit route for foreign fighters and weapons to Syria, including Daesh. The LAF has fought several engagements against Daesh and other militias operating on the Lebanese side of the Syrian-Lebanese border.¹⁸⁵

To add to its woes, Lebanon has been in severe economic crisis since 2019. The lira has lost 90% of its value and 80% of its population now lives below the poverty line. Hundreds of thousands of middle-class Lebanese have fled the country as economic emigrants. This crisis has been directly tied back to corruption within the Lebanese elites within all sects, united at last by their pursuit of wealth. The situation has been described as a Ponzi scheme, where “the central bank paid Lebanese commercial banks [in which Lebanese political elites are major stakeholders] exorbitant interest rates for dollar deposits, and those banks in turn offered their own generous returns to lure more depositors... Lebanese elites made a killing and left millions of their impoverished countrymen holding the bag.”¹⁸⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic has not helped the situation, nor did the massive fertilizer explosion in the port of Beirut in August of 2020, which caused billions of dollars in damage, shut down Lebanon's major port, and stoked citizenry anger and frustration over their government.

¹⁸² Nayla Moussa, “Loyalties and Group Formation in the Lebanese Officer Corps,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 3rd, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/03/loyalties-and-group-formation-in-lebanese-officer-corps-pub-62560>.

¹⁸³ Casey L. Addis, “US Security Assistance to Lebanon,” Congressional Research Service, January 19th, 2011. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R40485.pdf>.

¹⁸⁴ Fakhoury, 17.

¹⁸⁵ Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces, Hezbollah, and the Race to Defeat ISIS,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 31st, 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanese-armed-forces-hezbollah-and-race-defeat-isis>.

¹⁸⁶ Sam Heller, “The Ponzi Scheme that Broke Lebanon,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 18th 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs-com.cafvl.idm.oclc.org/articles/lebanon/2022-04-18/ponzi-scheme-broke-lebanon> (accessed April 20th, 2022).

Lebanon and the LAF in Context

International. This section will apply the lens of the Copenhagen School to gain insight on the international context for Lebanon, and to inform later discussions on the strength of the veto within the institutional change model at Figure 8. Lebanon is a weak state and a weak power within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional security complex (RSC). Its weakness comes from many sources: it is economically underdeveloped with a financially corrupt elite and an impoverished population; its political system, though remarkable for its survival since 1990, is deficient in key ways described by Fakhoury; and most of its institutions – save the LAF – are not seen as legitimate by its population. The Fragile States Index ranks Lebanon near the bottom of its list for state stability; it holds the 152nd spot out of 179 countries in 2022, between Uganda and Pakistan.¹⁸⁷ Indicators related to factionalized elites, group grievances, the economy, state legitimacy, refugees and internally displaced persons, and external intervention are all identified as drags on Lebanon’s stability. Lebanon is the least stable and the weakest state amongst the three case studies used in this research.

Lebanon is a weak power on account of its small and shrinking GDP (80 billion USD in 2020), its lack of political clout, and its small, underfunded military. The LAF, with its 80 000 personnel, its hand-me-down equipment, and a 3.6 billion USD (2019) defence budget, is one of the weakest in the region.¹⁸⁸ Lebanon’s sovereignty is consistently violated by its neighbours and substate groups, who treat its borders as a guide rather than a rule. It has persistent difficulties on both the Syrian and Israeli border with ISIS, Al Qaeda, Israel, and Palestinian militias, and has not maintained a monopoly on violence, unable (or unwilling) to prevent the powerful militant wing of Hezbollah from operating and even fighting a war against Israel in 2006.¹⁸⁹ Iran influences Lebanon through its financial and military support to Hezbollah and morale support to Lebanon’s plurality Shi’a population more generally.

Domestic. This section will discuss the domestic context for the security forces of Lebanon, which like the international context, will inform discussions on the strength of the veto within the institutional change model at Figure 8. Though small and weak, the Lebanese military is vitally important to the Lebanese state and society. It is one of the few functioning and legitimate institutions within the country, and has played a stabilizing role over most of its history, particularly during the political crises of 1958 and 2005.¹⁹⁰ It has remained politically neutral for much of its history, except notably for a period during the Lebanese Civil War which severely hurt its reputation amongst non-Christians.¹⁹¹ Though former military commanders often become political leaders, the LAF’s history suggests a conscious effort to remain

¹⁸⁷ *Fragile States Index – Global Data*, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/> (accessed August 1, 2022). In this data, Lebanon is ranked as the 27th least stable country. This ranking has been inverted in the text to make it easier to understand in the context of this discussion. Lebanon scored a total of 91.3 points on the index, out of a possible 120. A lower score is favourable; Canada for instance scored 20.1 points.

¹⁸⁸ CIA World Factbook – Lebanon, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/lebanon/> (accessed Apr 26th, 2022); Barak, “Lebanon...,” 2.

¹⁸⁹ Karine Meunier, “The LAF-Hezbollah Duopoly: A Stake for Lebanese Safety and Regional Security,” *Confluentes Mediterranees*, 2, no. 97 (2016): 176-179.

¹⁹⁰ Barak, “Lebanon, A Military...” 9.

¹⁹¹ Barak, “Lebanon, A Military...” 6.

legitimate in the eyes of the people, welcoming reforms and proportional representation of ethnic and religious groups in the country.¹⁹² LAF weakness is an important feature of civil-military relations in Lebanon, and Barak's comments on the subject are illuminating. He says the military has traditionally been kept weak first as a coup-proofing strategy to avoid unwanted military interference in political affairs, and second to avoid participation in regional conflicts; if you do not have a powerful army, it is less likely neighbours will ask you to fight alongside them. Finally, the careful ethnic and religious balance within the LAF makes it a sensitive ecosystem. Any attempts at enlarging the LAF through conscription would upset this balance.¹⁹³ This weakening strategy means, however, that the LAF is not always capable of performing its security duties, most recently along the Syrian border.

Concordance theory provides insight on why civil military relations in Lebanon function the way they do. There is agreement within Lebanon between the military, the political leadership, and society on all four questions proposed by Schiff. The composition of the officer corps – which since 1990 has been set at 51% Muslim – is deliberately engineered, with no one keen to upset that balance. Political decision making is firmly in the hands of politicians, with military leaders enjoying a reputation of political neutrality. Recruitment is voluntary; conscription is not desired by any party, lest it upset the delicate ethnic and religious equilibrium. Finally, the style of the Lebanese military – small, weak, with an officer-driven command structure – is acceptable to all parties. While persistent security problems may lead some to desire a reformed and more capable military, it is likely that economic and political concerns will keep it small, because the status quo for the LAF is desirable amongst political and military leadership. This has implications for institutional reform efforts, which will be discussed in the section on external factors below.

CTAT-L Described.

One of the focuses of Canada's Middle East Strategy is mitigating the destabilizing effect of Daesh on the region by enhancing security and stability within Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.¹⁹⁴ Specific to security and stability within Lebanon, GAC's stated aims are "strengthening border security and building the capacity of the Lebanese security forces." Of the four sub-aims, three of them are related to security of the Syrian border, primarily looking at Daesh as the main security concern. The fourth sub-aim is a generic statement to prevent and counter terrorism and extremism.¹⁹⁵ GAC states that Canada has spent 427 million CAD since 2016 towards its larger security, economic, and development strategy within Lebanon. Specific amounts for security initiatives are not provided.¹⁹⁶ The LAF is dependent on foreign assistance to operate. The United States is by far the largest donor, providing 218 million USD to the LAF in FY 2019 alone (about 10% of its total defence budget) and donating eighty percent of

¹⁹² Barak, "Lebanon, A Military..." 9.

¹⁹³ Barak, "Lebanon, A Military..." 3.

¹⁹⁴ Government of Canada, "Canada's Middle East Engagement Strategy" Global Affairs Canada. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/mena-moan/strategy-strategie.aspx?lang=eng (accessed Apr 26th, 2022).

¹⁹⁵ Government of Canada, "Canada's Strategy for Lebanon," Global Affairs Canada. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/mena-moan/lebanon-liban.aspx?lang=eng (accessed Apr 26th, 2022).

¹⁹⁶ Government of Canada, "Canadas Strategy for Lebanon..."

Lebanese military equipment. The next largest contributor is the EU, which contributes significantly less than the US.¹⁹⁷

It is difficult to find sources on what Lebanon's goals are in pursuing security cooperation with Canada and other Western nations. Logically, however, some interests can be inferred. With the economic crisis ongoing, the economic assistance that comes tied to security assistance is likely Lebanon's primary interest. The economic situation in Lebanon threatens political and domestic stability and is likely seen as more urgent than border or regional security, with Lebanon likely places further down its list of critical interests. This is misaligned with Canada and the West, which sees domestic stability within Lebanon as a condition for regional stability, which it values highest.

The Canadian Training and Assistance Team – Lebanon (CTAT-L) is the CAF commitment to Canada's strategy in Lebanon. Like CTAT-J, CTAT-L is a bilateral mission subordinate to Operation IMPACT, which is based in Kuwait and oversees all CAF operations in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, except for Op JADE, which is the CAF support to the UN monitoring mission in the Golan Heights.¹⁹⁸ CTAT's mission statement is:

BUILD partner capacity through projects and training delivery in order to
ENABLE the LAF, ENHANCE regional stability and SUPPORT GAC's Middle
East Engagement Strategy.¹⁹⁹

CTAT-L is a modest engagement at thirteen permanently deployed personnel, making it just over half the size of its counterpart in Jordan, though it is actually larger than CTAT-J when all of its MTTs are in theatre. CTAT-L employs a 'hub-and-spoke' model, with episodic mobile training teams sized three to fifteen personnel deploying from Canada to improve LAF capabilities in three identified areas: combat first aid, operations in cold weather, and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). Aside from its headquarters and security element, the only persistent engagement with the LAF is a small team advising the LAF logistics brigade. CTAT-L divides its staff effort between planning and executing training, and managing projects, which include things like purchasing tool kits for border outposts, purchasing wet weather clothing, logistics warehouse improvements, and the refurbishment of the logistics school.²⁰⁰ There is no direct information on how or why these activities were chosen, or how they contribute more than others may have to GAC's strategic objectives. This is discussed more in Chapter 10.

The SFA Environment in Lebanon.

This section will discuss the factors beyond the control of CTAT-L that affected its ability to perform its mission. As discussed in the methods chapter, an acknowledgement of these factors is required for a holistic understanding of the environment in which SFA takes

¹⁹⁷ Hijab Shah and Melissa Dalton, "Playing Politics: International Security Sector Assistance and the Lebanese Military's Changing Role," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 2020) https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Shah_Dalton_-_Lebanon_Security_Assistance.pdf.

¹⁹⁸ Government of Canada, "Current Operations and Joint Military Exercises List," Department of National Defence, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html>. (accessed Apr 26th, 2022).

¹⁹⁹ Government of Canada, "Capacity Building 101" Operation IMPACT, January 30th, 2021.

²⁰⁰ "Capacity Building 101"

place; it is too ambitious to imagine one could qualitatively adjust for them, so this research will settle for understanding them. These external factors, identified during the literature review (Figure 4), exist within the political and strategic space, whereas CTAT-L operates in the operational and tactical space, meaning CTAT-L has little influence on them. Moreover, positive conditions in each of these external factors are to a point necessary but not sufficient for the success of SFA missions; failure in any could result in mission failure, not matter the health of the other five factors, or the approach taken by the SFA mission at the operational level. These factors are discussed in descending order of levels of analysis, beginning at the state level and progressing down to the military institution.

State Fragility. Buzan's model classifies Lebanon as a weak state. Its socio-political cohesion is extremely low, and its institutions are held together through tenuous power-sharing agreements. The state leans on the LAF for its legitimacy, likely making the state wary of any attempts to reform it in a meaningful way, potentially influencing the political context within Mahoney and Thelen's gradual change model. Despite this, economic crisis aside, the LAF's own wellspring of legitimacy and its refusal to be a powerbroker in Lebanese politics insulates it from what Knowles and Matisek call the 'pathologies' of militaries within of weak states – lack of legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness.²⁰¹ Where the LAF is most effected is by the extremely damaged Lebanese economy, which has forced it to adopt extreme cost-cutting measures, which has an impact on training and daily operations.²⁰²

Societal Divisions. Lebanon is one of the most divided societies in the world. These divisions affect most aspects of Lebanese life, especially its politics.²⁰³ Despite this, the carefully curated diversity of the LAF, designed though power sharing agreements going back through 1990 to the creation of the Lebanese state, appears to sidestep this issue.²⁰⁴ In fact, Barak suggests that the LAF can provide a model, "that in divided societies in the aftermath of conflict, stability can be attained by enhancing the representativeness of the security sector."²⁰⁵ There are no reported concerns in any documents, interviews, or recent academic articles that cite internal societal divisions as an obstacle within the LAF.

Civil-Military Relations. CMR in the LAF are characterized by its weak state, its unpopular politicians, and its popular military. Despite its commitment to post-war societal reconstruction since 1991, political leaders in Lebanon do not want to risk the military becoming too powerful or more influential than it already is. The status quo – a relatively weak albeit popular military – is desired by the political class. This is apparently acceptable to society and to senior LAF leaders, perhaps because of political ambitions following retirement, or because of extracurricular enrichment activities explained more below in the paragraph on corruption. In any case, there appears to be concordance among the political elite, military

²⁰¹ Knowles and Matisek, "Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States," 15.

²⁰² All officers and NCMs with experience on CTAT-L spoke to this problem. For example, in order to cut feeding and other operating costs, in some units in the LAF, soldiers worked only part-time. This also had the effect of allowing many soldiers to take second jobs, which helped them support their family.

²⁰³ Heller, "The Ponzi Scheme that Broke Lebanon..."

²⁰⁴ Are John Knudson and Tine Gade, "The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): A United Army for a Divided Country," *Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon: Conflict, Cohesion, and Confessionalism in a Divided Country*, (Palgrave MacMillan: London, 2017) 1-22.

²⁰⁵ Barak, "Representation and Stability in Lebanon," 321.

leadership, and society about the role and function of the LAF.²⁰⁶ This has implications on the political context of institutional change, which will be discussed at the end of this section.

Corruption. Corruption is endemic in Lebanese politics with financial manipulation of the Lebanese currency for individual gain a major cause of the current economic crisis.²⁰⁷ Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows a low and decreasing score over the past ten years. In 2021, Lebanon was ranked 154th of 188 countries, with a score of 24 points, which indicates severe and persistent corruption.²⁰⁸ Notably, this is a worse score than both Ukraine (32) and Jordan (49), suggesting that corruption has more of an impact in Lebanon than in the other two case studies. Corruption in the LAF is not reported in any CTAT-L documentation or interviews, though media reports suggest that senior LAF leaders have been accused of corruption in the recent past, including the head of the LAF from 2008-2017.²⁰⁹ It is likely that corruption has been a weight on LAF reform efforts, though impacts to specific CTAT-L initiatives are difficult to measure.

Principal-Agent Problems. The interests of Canada and Lebanon regarding security cooperation were each discussed earlier in this chapter. From these discussions, it is clear that there is some interest mis-alignment at the strategic level, with Lebanon likely valuing the economic benefits of security cooperation over the regional security benefits that Canada is seeking to achieve. At the operational and tactical level, this interest misalignment is clear. Practitioner interviews and documents reveal several principal-agent problems with SFA engagement to Lebanon, alongside common instances of goal misalignment. One practitioner said of the LAF: "When you talk to the LAF, they don't care about institutional changes. So, there's a disconnect between our ambition and their ambition..."²¹⁰ The goals of LAF senior leadership differed from the goals of Canadian trainers, though often junior LAF leaders were aligned. PA problems were identified in the logistics enhancement project and the combat first aid project, with instances described in the section below.

Taken together, the aggregate of the conditions in Lebanon suggests an environment that is toxic to SFA success. Lebanon's crashing economy,²¹¹ corruption, and principal-agent problems are especially hazardous, with clear examples of these conditions preventing, retarding, or reversing success in SFA activities. According to the model proposed by this research, even the best approach taken by SFA practitioners is unlikely to succeed.

²⁰⁶ Barak, "Lebanon: A Military in Politics in a Divided Society..."

²⁰⁷ Heller, "The Ponzi Scheme that Broke Lebanon..."

²⁰⁸ Transparency International, "2021 Corruption Perceptions Index: Lebanon," <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/lbn>, (accessed January 5th, 2023).

²⁰⁹ Timour Azhari, "Lebanon ex-army boss, intelligence heads charged with corruption," *Al Jazeera*, December 2nd, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/2/lebanon-ex-army-boss-intelligence-heads-charged-with-corruption>, (accessed May 3rd, 2022). Note that in the Lebanese Armed Forces, the head of the Army leads the LAF, with the Air Force and Naval Chiefs subordinate to them.

²¹⁰ A senior officer with CTAT-L.

²¹¹ Lebanon's crashing economy can be seen as both a cause and symptom of state fragility.

An Analysis of CTAT-L SFA Activities.

The following section examines the major lines of effort or activities pursued by CTAT-L between 2019 and 2022.

Combat First Aid MTT (CFA MTT). The CFA MTT was tasked to bridge a capability gap the LAF identifies with combat lifesaving in their operational units. There have been three CFA MTTs deployed to Lebanon since May 2019, two of them five months in length, and one three months in length. Each MTT was made up eight NCOs (OR 4-6) and each ran multiple serials of five-day CFA courses. The focus of these MTTs was two-fold: first, running serials of CFA; and second, running serials of CFA instructor. Over the course of three years, a total of 1043 students have been qualified the LAF version of CFA, and seventy-eight candidates have been ‘qualified’ as CFA instructors. Success was claimed on paper (“a good return on its security investment to the Canadian tax dollar”), however the same documents identified multiple significant issues with the program, including a chronic issue with the LAF sending the right personnel to take the training – as one example, doctors and nurses were sent to complete basic CFA; as another example, 60% of the candidates who attended CFA instructor training lacked basic CFA skills prior to arriving. There are also persistent issues with material, with not enough individual first aid kits available to conduct the courses, let alone to provide each graduate with one. An interview subject said that regarding the CFA MTT, “I don’t think we’re hitting the mark.”²¹²

All documents and interviewees identified the need to build a self-sufficient CFA instruction capability within the LAF, with one document stating “the sustainability of this program cannot reside in continual repetitions of primarily Canadian Armed Forces led CFA.... Future iterations must consider how the LAF can become self-sustainable to fill this operational gap.”²¹³ The MTT thus developed a plan to turn this capability over to the LAF, including a new curriculum to be piloted and improved over the course of the scheduled 2022 CFA MTT, with the planned MTT in 2023 supporting LAF-led training rather than running it themselves. The executive summaries are light on details as to what capability development analysis has been put into these next steps.

Using the model at Figure 10, the CFA MTT’s activities can be clearly placed within levels one and two: they are striving to do things right, with little emphasis on doing the right things. Most effort is focused on provision of training, with some on the generation of instructors, though without the system around those instructors to make them effective. The planned effort to generate a LAF-led CFA capability is trending towards Approach 3, and may achieve limited organizational level change, particularly if it is used as a vehicle to familiarize the LAF training command with the SAT. Using the model at Figure 12, the CFA MTT’s activities have been shallow and narrow. They have built simple skills within a small number of LAF soldiers (1.3% of the total force, not accounting for attrition, which certainly occurred over the three years the program has ran)²¹⁴, and generated a small number of instructors, most of

²¹² An officer with CTAT-L.

²¹³ CTAT-L end-tour summary for CFA MTT 1, 2019.

²¹⁴ Zeina Karam and Bassem Mroue, “Lebanon’s crisis threatens one of its few unifiers, the army,” AP News, June 16th 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-europe-army-business-5354ef5a5345acc08fe0b146202f8282>.

whom are not employed in that role following the training. The skills they have taught are useful in the short term, though without a wider capability development effort, including more equipment, doctrine, and a continuation training program, these skills may not be applicable in existing conditions and/or dissipate over time. Practitioner interviews indicate some immediate effect is generated, though little enduring effect. Institutional change effect is therefore assessed as low.

Winter Mobile Training Team (WMTT). The WMTT is labelled CAF's 'signature line of effort' in Lebanon. It was developed in response to the LAF's requirement to strengthen its border with Syria, which necessitated for the first time a permanent presence in high altitude, cold weather environments. The WMTT works primarily with the Land Border Regiments, who operate from watch towers and garrisons, two regiments of which can see up to 10m of snow and be cut off for weeks.²¹⁵ The purpose of the WMTT is to teach cold weather operating skills, which initially but no longer includes snowmobile driving and maintenance and basic mountaineering. At the time of writing, there have been four completed WMTT deployments to Lebanon, though data on the fourth was not yet available. Each MTT involves between 13-15 junior officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel deploying to Lebanon for fourteen weeks between December and March of each year. The first MTT (Dec 18 to Mar 19) was assessed as too classroom-based and hampered by inexperience of some CAF members. The second MTT (Dec 19 to Mar 20) trained a total of 651 graduates divided across four courses: cold weather operations, snowmobile training, snowmobile maintenance, and basic mountaineering. The third MTT (Dec 20 to Mar 21), which had an objective to train LAF trainers as well, graduated 278 LAF soldiers, including twenty-four cold weather instructors and twelve mountaineering instructors.²¹⁶

The second MTT outcome document was the first to explicitly identify the development of a Lebanese-led cold weather capability, suggesting that future serials should "consider increased focus on building the instructor cadre... to enable a transition to LAF-led training... supported by the formalization of our training package with the LAF Training Directorate."²¹⁷ The third MTT actioned this suggestion, stating its goal was to "mentor an instructor cadre to enable a self-sufficient training system." This MTT identified that there was no standardized winter operations training plan in the LAF and suggested that CAF TDO support be given to the LAF Training Directorate to develop qualification standards and training plans for this capability. The third MTT was also the end of basic mountaineering training, which was assessed as not needed, and snowmobile operating and maintenance, which the LAF was assessed as capable to instruct independently. All outcome documents speak to the success of this line of effort, notwithstanding the frictions of the first MTT rotation. This is incongruent with the assessment of a senior leader on the mission, who expressed their dissatisfaction with the line of effort, questioning the quality of the training.

Using the model at Figure 10, the activities conducted to date within this line of effort fall primarily within Level one, with recent train-the-trainer activities falling within Level two.

²¹⁵ The Land Border Regiments also receive persistent mentorship from the UK, which contracts the private security firm Risk Advisory Group to do this. CTAT-L and the UK advisors have some interaction, but few pertinent to this study.

²¹⁶ This MTT was severely affected by COVID-19 restrictions.

²¹⁷ CTAT-L end-tour summary for WMTT 2, 2020.

As with the CFA MTT, discussions about TDO supported training analysis, design, and development of a LAF-led winter operations capability would fall within Approach 3. Using the model at Figure 12, the WMTT's activities are assessed as narrow and shallow, though there is a caveat to the analysis of depth: because the required capability for winter operations is small – almost exclusively within the Land Border Regiments – the training of more than a thousand soldiers could be considered wide within that context. Nevertheless, the skills taught remain simple, and the audience limited. There is immediate effect generated (LAF graduates are demonstrably better able to operate in cold weather conditions), with a path available to more enduring effect through engagement at the LAF Training Directorate. Until the WMTT can conduct activities within Approach 3 and achieve deeper engagement, even to a narrow audience, institutional change effect will remain low.

CIMIC MTT. In 2015, the LAF identified a desire to establish Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability, with the long-term goal of creating a regional CIMIC center of excellence. The NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence stepped in at the time to help develop a five-day Basic CIMIC Operator course, assist with the LAF's CIMIC doctrinal framework, and create an operator handbook. The CAF became involved in 2019, with the deployment of the first three-person CIMIC MTT, which for four months worked with the LAF to develop and deliver a two-week Intermediate CIMIC Operator course. A second MTT deployed in 2020, tasked to develop and deliver an Advanced CIMIC Operator course, and mentor the LAF as they led the delivery of the Intermediate Course. A third, shorter MTT was deployed in 2021 to work with the LAF CIMIC instructional cadre and mentor the LAF's delivery of serials of the basic and intermediate CIMIC courses. This MTT reported training fifteen LAF instructors and overseeing the training of twenty LAF candidates on the CIMIC basic and intermediate courses.

Though the MTTs and interviewees report issues with LAF instructional capability, the CIMIC project gains widespread approval from all sources, with even the most pessimistic interviewee stating the CIMIC engagement “seems to have gone over relatively well.” It also the only line of effort that put the LAF in a primary role from the beginning, and the one where the LAF was the most ambitious, with their goal of creating a regional center of excellence for CIMIC. An interviewee specified that this meant there were few principal-agent problems with this line of effort, as the LAF's desired output was not only clear from the beginning, but also aligned with Canada's. CIMIC may also be an outlier in that central to its capability is an understanding of the importance of cooperation and relationship building. This MTT was also resourced early in the process with both a TDO and a senior officer (major, OF-3) as a subject matter expert.

Using the Conceptual Model for SFA Missions at Figure 10, the CIMIC line of effort has spanned Approaches 1, 2 and 3, with the application of the SAT and support to the LAF CIMIC center of excellence with curriculum development representing a more highly evolved engagement than either the WMTT or CFA MTT. Using the SFA Engagement Matrix at Figure 12, the CIMIC line of effort represents a narrow and deep engagement, with specialized knowledge being passed onto a small audience within the LAF CIMIC community. There is likely an enduring effect achieved, albeit within a small capability. There is a low chance of institutional diffusion across the LAF, though this can be increased if the CIMIC programme's profile continues to rise within the LAF and across the region.

Logistics Enhancement Team. The logistics project is the only persistent training and mentorship line of effort within CTAT-L. It was created in response to a LAF request for assistance with their operational level logistics capability. The project began in 2019 as the Logistics Enhancement Team, which was a robust team of eight CAF mentors lead by an OF-4 (Lieutenant-Colonel) and included CTAT-L's full-time TDO. This project initially operated with a wider mandate, but force generation and issues with perceived LAF disinterest in logistics doctrine reform led to a downsizing of the project to a narrower focus on training development only, centered on the LAF Logistics Brigade's technical school. Since late 2020, the project has been known as the Technical School Training Development (TSTD); the team was also reduced from eight to six personnel, and its lead was downranked from OF-4 to OF-3.

Documents and interviews reveal LAF logistics was very receptive to training development initiatives. A needs analysis led to a basic warehouse course, developed with TDO support using the SAT. LAF members participated in this process throughout, with several junior LAF officers becoming proficient in what they dubbed 'LAFITES,' a modification of the Canadian CFITES (Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System). A curriculum development course was taught to key LAF officers and NCOs to allow the Log Bde to better analyse, design, and develop its own training. An employment structure for LAF technical trades was also developed. The main challenges to success were the low priority placed on training development by the higher HQ, with one document stating that "progress stalled due to current lack of LAF commitment to the program, lack of involvement with the Ministry of Defence HQ, and lack of LAF personnel resources."²¹⁸ Progress further stalled because of COVID-19 and the economic crisis; as of writing, all training has ceased, all training development projects have lost momentum, and LAF new-found expertise within the brigade is in danger of dissipating. The CAF commitment to the program is waning, with a project to improve physical infrastructure the only thing making progress. A recommendation was made in summer 2021 for logistics project to be reduced in size and placed in 'caretaker status' until conditions improve.

With one exception, all interviewees within CTAT-L and its parent headquarters at Joint Task Force – IMPACT identified the CTAT-L logistics program as the project in Jordan and Lebanon which was having the most impact and most success, despite its challenges. The one differing opinion felt that the program was too ambitious, did not look at capability development in a holistic way, and could not succeed without higher LAF buy-in. Recent COVID and economic challenges make it difficult to judge if the project would have met its objectives under normal circumstances. Of all the projects in Lebanon and Jordan, it certainly had the clearest focus on institutional change levers.

Applying the Conceptual Model for SFA Training Missions at Figure 10, the logistics project spans Approaches 2, 3 and 4. Its efforts towards a military employment system, the creation of job specifications, and the socialization of the SAT to the LAF are all indicative of Approach 4. Applying the SFA Engagement Matrix at Figure 12, this effort is deep and narrow. Specialized knowledge, skills, and perhaps even values have been transmitted to a narrow audience within the LAF, specifically those responsible for training within the logistics brigade. Institutional change effect, which may have seemed assured, has been severely limited by the

²¹⁸ A senior officer with CTAT-L.

challenge of buy-in (PA problem) amongst the higher LAF echelons, and the difficult conditions caused by COVID-19 and the economic crisis.

Institutional Change Theory Applied to the LAF.

Institutional change theory can help us understand the LAF better as an institution, and thus help us understand why and how – or why and how not – Canadian SFA engagement works in Lebanon. Using the model of historical institutionalism (HI) informed by the constructivist Copenhagen School and Concordance theory described in chapter 3, this section will attempt to do just that.

Traditional HI would see the LAF as path dependent and have us look for critical junctures to identify and explain periods of change. The history of the LAF reveals several critical junctures within its security sector, the most recent being the restructuring and reportioning of ethnic and religious groups within the LAF as part of the 1990 Ta'if Agreement after the Lebanese Civil War. Since then, however, there have been no easily identifiable critical junctures in the security sector, despite Lebanon's challenges with the Syrian Civil War, the rise of Daesh, and the recent economic and political turmoil in the country. Any change occurring now will be more gradual, making Thelen and Mahoney's model relevant. This model as it applies to SFA is found at Figure 8.

The political context of the LAF can be viewed as a function of international and domestic influences. Internationally, the existence of Lebanon within the MENA Regional Security Complex (RSC), specifically its proximity to Syria and Israel and the resulting international attention that draws, as well as its position as a weak state and a weak power, would suggest weak veto power. Western funds and support keep the LAF afloat, which should give the US, the EU, and Canada influence over decision making in the LAF. This is balanced by the domestic context, however. There is strong concordance amongst the military leadership, political elites, and Lebanese society about the structure, type, and role of the LAF. The status quo is desirable, leading to resistance of Western influence and a strengthening of the veto power. Without the West delivering ultimatums to Lebanon and the LAF – something that it hesitates to do in SFA, instead prioritizing maintaining relationships²¹⁹ – the domestic pressures win out, and the veto remains strong.

The institutional context relates to how much discretion actors have when interpreting and enforcing existing rules. This too, is affected within SFA missions by international and domestic influences. International influence in the context of Lebanon comes directly from SFA practitioners advising their LAF counterparts. These practitioners operate in the Western philosophy of mission command, which allows high level of discretion in decision making. Members of the LAF, on the other hand, are indoctrinated into a centralized command structure, which allows for little amounts of discretion. An example of how this directly impacts reform efforts is given by an interviewee, who related:

²¹⁹ Telcott, "Why America Can't Build Allied Armies..." In her Foreign Affairs article, Telcott writes "the U.S. military prioritizes building relationships with foreign militaries over applying any sort of conditionality to its security assistance, and civilian officials in Washington defer to its approach."

In Canada, a TP [training plan] or QS [qualification standard] is signed by a Colonel. In the LAF it's signed by their Chief of Defence Staff. Everything goes up to the Chief of their defense staff for approval. So that makes it very slow and cumbersome. It doesn't empower people to make change and develop capabilities the way we would like it.²²⁰

As the LAF's centralized command structure is an important aspect of its military style – for which concordance exists – there are few incentives for LAF members to buck the trend, though some junior members do try, such as those within the technical school pushing the SAT.

The characteristics of the political context (strong veto), combined with the characteristics of institution (low discretion) suggest that layering, or the introduction of new rules on top of old ones, is the form of institutional change most likely to succeed. The most effective change agent to achieve layering is the subversive, they who follow the rules and perform well to gain power and influence to change the system from the inside. The number and effectiveness of subversives within the LAF is hard to determine, as they by their nature look like everyone else. Given the moderate reach of CTAT-L into the LAF, it is unlikely CAF members interacted with any subversives of real influence anyway. The only easily identifiable change agents reported by CAF members are the few early adopters of the SAT within the logistics brigade. Those young change agents, minor insurrectionaries looking to displace the old rules with the ones proposed by the Logistics Enhancement Team, stood little chance of success in the centralized command structure of the LAF.

²²⁰ An officer with CTAT-L.

CHAPTER 7: THE CASE OF SFA IN JORDAN

Background.

Canada deployed CTAT-J in 2018 to assist Jordan in strengthening its border with Syria in the aftermath of the disastrous Syrian Civil War, and more generally to build the capacity of the Jordanian Armed Forces. Like Lebanon, this war has stretched Syria's resources and destabilized its politics.²²¹ Jordan has taken in 1.2 million Syrian refugees, creating economic and humanitarian problems in addition to its security challenges on its Syrian border. Supporting Jordan is seen to be in Canada's national interest. Though a small country of just over ten million people, its neighbours put it key strategic location; it is bordered by Israel, the West Bank, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, giving Jordan a front row seat to several major geopolitical events in the past few decades. At least since it signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994, Jordan has been seen as a bastion of stability and a reliable ally in an otherwise unstable and unfriendly region.²²² It supported allied action in Afghanistan and Iraq and was directly involved in the fight against ISIS.

The history of the Jordanian Armed Forces is tied to the history of the Jordanian state. Jordan gained its full independence in 1946, having existed as a British mandate from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. At the time, the British placed the Hashemite family, descendants of the prophet Mohammed and ousted rulers of much of Arabia, in charge of Transjordan and Iraq.²²³ King Abdullah I was installed as King of Transjordan; his younger brother Faisal, popularized by T.E. Lawrence, became King of Iraq. Almost immediately the Arab Legion – the precursor to the Jordanian Armed Forces – found itself fighting in the 1948 Arab Israeli War. The Arab Legion proved to be one of the only capable Arab military forces in the war, retaining the West Bank and East Jerusalem where other forces lost territory.²²⁴ Because of this war, a flood of Palestinians resettled in Jordan, their huge numbers upsetting the careful balance of tribal politics. They remain there to this day, where they continue to influence modern politics.²²⁵

In the 1950s pan-Arabism became an influential force in the Middle East, notably amongst Palestinians. In 1957, pan-Arab nationalists within the Jordanian Army attempted a coup, but failed partially due to a strong monarchist streak amongst the Bedouin 'East Bank' tribesmen who made up a large part of the rank and file.²²⁶ The next year, Faisal's descendants in Iraq were overthrown and brutally killed by more pan-Arab nationalists.²²⁷ The 1957 coup

²²¹ Wa'ed Alshoubaki and Michael Harris, "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis," *Journal of International Studies*, 11, no. 2 (2018): 154-179.

²²² Dana El Kurd, "The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally," *Parameters*, 44, no. 3 (2014): 47-55.

²²³ Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan: The Military and Politics in the Hashemite Kingdom," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias: Politics*, October 27th, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1945>, 2.

²²⁴ Ryan, 2. The military was renamed the Jordanian Arab Army in 1956.

²²⁵ Ryan, 2.

²²⁶ Ryan, 3.

²²⁷ Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence," *Armed Forces and Society*, 4, no. 1 (1977).

attempt and the successful coup in Iraq in 1958 resulted in the Hashemites moving to minimize the influence of non-allies in the military.²²⁸ To this day, only about 10% of the JAF's officer corps is Palestinian-Jordanian, despite making up over two-thirds of the national population.²²⁹

With its allies, Jordan fought and lost the 1967 war against Israel, retreating from the West Bank to its current borders. More Palestinian refugees fled to Jordan, this time including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which staged attacks from and invited Israeli retaliation on Jordanian territory, destabilizing Jordanian politics and weakening Jordanian sovereignty.²³⁰ The PLO, according to Barari, “established a state within a state”, infringing on Jordan's sovereignty and antagonizing the Jordanian Army.²³¹ Eventually, this led to open conflict between the Jordanian military and the PLO in 1970-1971, called ‘Black September’. This escalated when Syria intervened on the side of the PLO, but the Jordanians were able to defeat the Syrians and force them back across the border. This war caused internal strife, as many pan-Arabists saw “the Hashemite actions as treachery in Arab nationalist politics.”²³²

This marked the beginning of a period of pragmatism in Jordanian foreign policy. Fearing additional loss of territory, Jordan mostly stayed out of the 1973 war, contributing only a token force to the Golan Heights alongside Syrian forces. In 1988, Jordan renounced its claim to the West Bank, and in 1994, it signed a peace treaty with Israel.²³³ This led to NATO declaring Jordan a “major non-NATO ally” and opened the door to significant amounts of military and economic assistance, especially from the United States. In return, Jordan supported US and NATO actions in Afghanistan, helped train Iraqi and Afghan security forces, and participated in the campaign against Daesh.²³⁴

The 2011 Arab Spring did not hit Jordan as hard as some of its neighbours.²³⁵ Tobin identifies the emerging and anti-revolutionary urban middle class as factor.²³⁶ Yitzhak identifies a lack of consensus on the goals of the protest amongst the various protesting groups, which included Salafists, liberals, the Muslim Brotherhood, and tribal leaders, and the de-antagonizing effect of Jordan allowing peaceful demonstrations.²³⁷ This was also partially because there was less discontent amongst its population than in some of its neighbours, and the Royal Family having “shown much acumen in managing domestic conflict, offering concessions at the right

²²⁸ El Kurd, 48.

²²⁹ El Kurd, 48.

²³⁰ Hasan Barari, “Four Decades after Black September: A Jordanian Perspective,” *Civil Wars*, 10, no. 3 (2008): 233.

²³¹ Barari, 233.

²³² Ryan, 4-5.

²³³ Ryan, 4-6.

²³⁴ Ryan, 9.

²³⁵ Lawrence Whitehead, “On the ‘Arab Spring’: Democratization and Related Political Seasons,” *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*, ed Larbi Sadiki (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 60; Stephen Farrel, “Demonstrations Whisper of an Arab Spring in Jordan,” *The New York Times*, February 9th, 2012. <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/world/middleeast/jordan-protests-whisper-of-an-arab-spring.html> (accessed May 10th, 2021).

²³⁶ Sarah Tobin, “Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and the Anti-Revolution,” *Middle East Policy*, 19, no. 1 (2012): 96-109.

²³⁷ Ronan Yitzhak, “Between Reform and Islam: The Arab Spring in Jordan 2011-2014,” *Democracy and Security*, 14, no. 1 (2018): 24-44.

time to dissipate tension and direct discontent to[wards] the government rather than to the ruling family.”²³⁸ The largest effect of the Arab Spring on Jordan was the Syrian Civil War, which like the 1948 and 1967 wars have threatened the political and economic stability of the country with a flood of refugees.²³⁹ As of 2021, Jordan is second only to Lebanon in the largest number of refugees per capita in the world.²⁴⁰

The most recent political crisis in Jordan occurred in April 2021, when the younger brother of King Abdullah II, Prince Hamzah, was temporarily placed under house arrest under accusations of fomenting dissent against his brother.²⁴¹ This caused some alarm within Jordan, its neighbour Israel, and its major foreign backers, as Hamzah enjoys significant support amongst the JAF and the rural Bedouin, who remain distrustful of the Palestinian population.²⁴² Of note, King Abdullah’s wife, Queen Rania, is Jordanian-Palestinian. This crisis deescalated at least temporarily when Prince Hamzah publicly re-pledged his allegiance to the King in Summer 2021.²⁴³

Jordan and the JAF in Context

International. This section will apply the lens of the Copenhagen School to gain insight on the international context for Jordan, and to inform later discussions on the strength of the veto within the institutional change model at Figure 8. Jordan is a member of the Levant sub-complex within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) RSC.²⁴⁴ It is a relatively weak state, ranking 112th of 178 countries for state stability according to the Fragile States Index 2022 rankings. For comparison, it is ranked slightly less stable than India (110th) and slightly more stable than Turkey (117th). It ranked better than Lebanon (152nd), but worse than Ukraine (88th).²⁴⁵ Jordan’s state weakness should not be overstated; it proved more resilient than many of its neighbours during the Arab Spring and looks to have weathered its most recent crisis. We can therefore qualify Jordan as a moderately weak state, with all the pathologies of weak states present, but to a lesser degree than in other places. The influx of Syrian refugees, economic pressures due to the COVID-19 recession, disagreement with Israeli policies and actions in the

²³⁸ Whitehead, 60.

²³⁹ Alshoubaki and Harris.

²⁴⁰ Department of National Defence (Canada), “CTAT-J 101 Brief,” Presentation, Joint Task Force Impact, December 3rd, 2021.

²⁴¹ Rana F. Sweis, Isabel Kershner, and Nicolas Kulish, “Jordan Arrests High-Profile Figures, and Ex-Crown Prince cries Foul,” *The New York Times*, April 3rd, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/world/middleeast/jordan-security-arrests.html>, (accessed March 29th, 2022).

²⁴² Ryan, 13.

²⁴³ Jane Arraf, “Two Jordanians Sentenced to Prison in Plot Against Monarchy,” *The New York Times*, July 12th, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/12/world/middleeast/jordan-bassem-awadallah-sentence.html>, (accessed March 29th, 2022).

²⁴⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 189.

²⁴⁵ *Fragile States Index – Global Data*, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/>, Accessed August 1, 2022. In this data, Jordan is ranked as the 67th least stable country. This ranking is inverted in the text to make it easier to understand in the context of this discussion. On the Index itself, Jordan scored 76.6 points out of a possible 120. Recall that a lower score is favourable; Canada scored 20.1 points, for instance.

region, and dissatisfaction with the pace of promised political reforms are all identified by CTAT-J official documents as destabilizing factors within Jordan.²⁴⁶

Continuing with Buzan's model, Jordan is a moderately weak power, with a gross domestic product (GDP) over a little over 44 billion USD²⁴⁷ and a moderate sized and funded military with 110 700 active service members and an annual budget of 2.1 billion USD, or 4.5% of its GDP.²⁴⁸ This military is relatively professional, with recent operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq , and on its own border with Syria against ISIS. Many of its officers attend Western military colleges.²⁴⁹ It operates a mix of modern and legacy Western military equipment, including modern Marder infantry fighting vehicles, rocket artillery (HIMARs), AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, and F-16 fighter jets. It has, according to documents and interviews, no professional NCO corps, and its junior officers spend much of their time performing the duties normally entrusted to NCOs in a Western military. Its professional development system is not currently designed to produce NCOs.²⁵⁰

Jordan is reliant on foreign assistance for economic development, humanitarian aid, and security assistance, with its biggest bilateral donors informally dubbed the 'Amman Six': the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, and Canada.²⁵¹ Canada contributed \$2 billion in total assistance to Jordan from 2016-2019.²⁵²

Domestic. This section will discuss the domestic context for the security forces of Jordan, which like the international context, will inform discussions on the strength of the veto within the institutional change model at Figure 8. Since the coup attempt in 1957, when many Palestinian nationalists and pan-Arabists were forced out of the ranks, the military has been a bastion of the tribesmen and Bedouin known as the 'East Bankers.'²⁵³ The cessation of conscription in 1992 solidified this trend, with most volunteer recruits coming from traditional tribes.²⁵⁴ This is especially true of the JAF's leadership, which has strong tribal loyalties to the Royal Family.²⁵⁵ For most of its history since 1957, the military has stayed out of politics, until an important moment in 2010, when a powerful veterans' organization, including many former leaders of the JAF, circulating a petition calling for resolution of the Palestinian problem within Jordan, and for increased parliamentary powers.²⁵⁶ This moment was, according to Assaf David, the "culmination of a gradual process in recent years, whereby senior army veterans interfere in

²⁴⁶ Department of National Defence (Canada), "CTAT-J 101 Brief", 03 Dec 21.

²⁴⁷ Jordan. Data: The World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan> (accessed March 29, 2022).

²⁴⁸ "CTAT-J 101 Brief"; Jordan, CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/jordan/#military-and-security> (accessed March 29, 2022).

²⁴⁹ Ryan, 6.

²⁵⁰ Multiple military members with CTAT-J.

²⁵¹ CTAT-J 101 Brief; Global Affairs Canada, "Canada-Jordan Relations," <https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/jordan-jordanie/relations.aspx?lang=eng> (accessed April 9th, 2022).

²⁵² CTAT-J 101 Brief.

²⁵³ El Kurd, "The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally," 48.

²⁵⁴ Ryan, 7.

²⁵⁵ Whitehead, 60.

²⁵⁶ El Kurd, "The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally," 53.

politics.²⁵⁷ Most recently, the military's quiet support for Prince Hamzah may represent further politicization of the military.

The JAF is a popular institution in Jordan, with polling routinely ranking the populations' confidence in their military higher than in their government. It is also an important source of pride and identity for the Royal Family. King Hussein, Jordan's longest monarch from 1952 to 1999, reported 'doted' on his armed forces, seeing them as symbols of the Jordanian identity.²⁵⁸ His son, King Abdullah, spent thirty-five years in the JAF, was a helicopter pilot and the former commander of the JAF's special operations forces, and continued to participate in military parachute training as a jumpmaster even as King.²⁵⁹ The military has been kept relatively well funded and equipped in spite of Jordan's economic weakness and reliance on foreign support. Notably, Jordan announced the reintroduction of conscription for a one-year term of service for 25–29-year-old men and women in September 2020.²⁶⁰ The Jordanian government said this decision was meant to curb high unemployment and act as a nation-building exercise, and only applied to those without employment and not in school, and did not apply to only sons, or to heads of families. Support for renewed conscription is not universal amongst Jordanian lawmakers or within civil society.

Concordance theory provides insight on civil military relations in Jordan. There is not perfect alignment amongst all parties on at least one of Schiff's four questions. The composition of the officer corps is not a problem, as the government (in this case the powerful monarch), the military, and society seem satisfied with an East Bank majority in the rank. 'Seem' is written as a hedge, because there is a lack of information in the sources on how Palestinian-Jordanians feel about the East Bank dominated military. Recruitment remains voluntary for the professional army, though the reinstatement of limited conscription in 2020 may prove to be a friction point between society and government over time. The style of military – a professional military classified by El Kurd as a unique mix of rule-governed and patrimonial²⁶¹ – is accepted by all parties, evidenced by the pride that society, the monarch, and the military themselves have in their military capabilities. Greater friction may exist in concordance on political decision making. The 2010 petition revealed a gap between the military and the monarch which many did not know existed, particularly with the request for increased parliamentary powers at the expense of the monarchy. The implications this lack of concordance has on institutional reform efforts will be discussed below.

²⁵⁷ Assaf David, "The Revolt of Jordan's Military Veterans," *Foreign Policy*, June 16th 2010, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/16/the-revolt-of-jordans-military-veterans/>, (accessed July 29th 2022).

²⁵⁸ Ryan, 6-7.

²⁵⁹ Ryan, 8.

²⁶⁰ "Jordan orders army conscription for 25–29-year-olds to help tackle unemployment," *The Arab News*, September 9th, 2020, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1732116/middle-east>, (accessed July 29th, 2022).

²⁶¹ Dana El Kurd, "Civil-Military Relations and Monarchial Survival: A Comparative Analysis of Morocco and Jordan," MA Thesis, University of Texas at Austin, March 2014, 16.

CTAT-J Described.

One of Global Affairs Canada (GAC)'s six main strategic objectives in Jordan "is strengthening border security and building the capacity of Jordanian security forces."²⁶² In support of this objective, since 2016 the CAF has deployed a Canadian Training and Assistance Team (CTAT) to Jordan to advise and assist the JAF in key areas. This CTAT deploys under the auspices of the larger Operation IMPACT, which is described as "part of Canada's whole-of-government approach to the Middle East. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mission to build the military capabilities of Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, and set the conditions for their long-term success."²⁶³ CTAT-J's essential task, according to its own documents, is to "BUILD partner capacity through projects and training delivery in order to ENABLE the JAF, ENHANCE regional stability and SUPPORT GAC's Middle East Engagement Strategy."²⁶⁴ Chapter 10 of this thesis contains a brief discussion of how this strategic direction is interpreted at the operational level, and applied at the tactical level.

As with Lebanon, it is difficult to find sources on what Jordan's goals are in pursuing security cooperation with Canada and other Western nations. Logically, however, some goals can be inferred. Regime stability likely occupies that top spot on the list, as is the case with most autocratic states, no matter how benevolent. Next, it is likely concerned with its border and regional security – a goal it shares with its Western partners. Jordan is also interested in the economic development that comes with security cooperation. Finally, because so much of the Monarch's identity is tied to the JAF, there is also likely a prestige component, where Western military partnership increases the visibility of the JAF both to Jordanian citizens and to regional allies and competitors.

CTAT-J is slightly larger than CTAT-L, with twenty-five permanently deployed personnel. These personnel conduct headquarters functions, logistics training and mentorship within the JAF rapid reaction brigade and provide training and advising to a female quick reaction platoon. Like CTAT-L, CTAT-J also employs a 'hub-and-spoke' model, with mobile training teams deploying from Canada to deliver episodic training to key JAF audiences, including the Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) school and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) school. Both capabilities see one or two deployments of two to three CAF specialists (JTAC and CBRN experts) to each mission per year.²⁶⁵ When the periodic training teams are in country, CTAT-J grows to about thirty personnel. The activities of each of these elements will be described in more detail below.

CTAT-J spends about half its staff effort and most of its budget on construction projects and the provision of equipment. These projects include a border road and tower project, base facilities including accommodations, classrooms, and computer labs, and CSS capability

²⁶² Global Affairs Canada, "Canada's Strategy for Jordan," <https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international-relations-relations-internationales/mena-moan/jordan-jordanie.aspx?lang=eng>. (accessed April 10th, 2022)

²⁶³ Department of National Defence. "Operation IMPACT," <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-impact.html> (accessed March 29th, 2022).

²⁶⁴ CTAT-J 101 Brief.

²⁶⁵ CTAT-J 101 Brief.

improvements such as shelving and cages for supply warehouses. These activities are not within the scope of this research. The total budget for security assistance in Jordan between 2016 and 2019 was \$196 million; of this, the majority went to what are known as ‘vote 10’ projects such as the border road initiative and equipment donations.²⁶⁶

Several NATO countries provide training and other security assistance to Jordan, notably the Amman Six. The most relevant is a minor effort by US CENTCOM, reports delivering two-week NCO instructor courses which had graduated 140 NCOs as of 2016. NATO DEEP reports partnering with the JAF in ‘priority areas,’ which revealingly are listed as cyber defence, counter-IED, civil preparedness, and information protection.²⁶⁷ Additionally, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all hosted Jordanian officers for PME courses; the US alone has trained over six thousand members of the JAF through their IMET program.²⁶⁸

The SFA Environment in Jordan.

This section discusses the factors beyond the control of CTAT-J that limited its ability to perform its mission. These environmental conditions were identified during the literature review and are expressed in Figure 4. These factors will be discussed in descending order of analysis, beginning at the state level, and ending at the military institution.

State Fragility. A previous paragraph identified Jordan as a moderately weak state, using the Copenhagen School’s model and data from the Fragile States Index. Logically, this makes Jordan and its military susceptible to what Knowles and Matisek identified as the ‘pathologies’ of weak states which limit the accountability, legitimacy, and capabilities of security forces. Weak states often provide fertile ground for corruption and crime amongst its security forces. This effect is mitigated in the JAF, however, because the JAF enjoys the support and stable resourcing from the Jordanian government. There is some reported corruption within the JAF, which will be discussed below. Given that Jordan is only a moderately weak state, and that the JAF is insulated from the worst effects by stable support and funding, state fragility has a minimal impact on the success of SFA in Jordan.

Societal Divisions. Jordan is a tribal culture, with tribal loyalties influencing who occupies top positions within the military.²⁶⁹ There is a significant Palestinian population –

²⁶⁶ CTAT-J 101 Brief.

²⁶⁷ Alan Belser (Sgt), "Jordanian NCOs partner with US instructors," US Central Command, December 20th, 2016, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1034959/jordanian-ncos-partner-with-us-instructors/>; "Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative," NATO DEEP, June 9th, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm?selectedLocale=en.

²⁶⁸ Department of State (US), "Security Cooperation with Jordan," May 21st, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-jordan/> (accessed August 1st, 2022); Department of National Defence, "MTCP Activities," *Directorate of Military Training Cooperation – 2018-2019 Annual Report*. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/military-training-cooperation-program/directorate-military-training-cooperation/mtcp-activities.html> (accessed August 10th, 2022).

²⁶⁹ Whitehead, 60.

some estimates are up to two-thirds of the entire population – within Jordan.²⁷⁰ Relations between Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians can be strained, and even violent, evidenced by the 1970-1971 conflict with the PLO. Palestinian representation within the Jordanian military is small, however, largely because Palestinians do not choose to join the volunteer force; El Kurd cites a study that places the proportion of Palestinians in the officer corps at only 10%.²⁷¹ The Palestinian-Jordanian population is an important, though challenging, political and economic ally with the King, advocating for economic and social reforms resisted by the traditional tribal elites who support the military. These two sources of power in Jordan are in tension. For instance, some retired military elites supported Prince Hamzah because of his military record and more importantly his full Jordanian heritage; he is seen as more legitimate than King Abdullah's son, Crown Prince Hussein, who is half-Palestinian.²⁷² This has certainly caused tension between the Royal Family and at least parts of the military, with an unmeasurable impact on SFA efforts. There is no indication from within official documents, or from interview transcripts, that this was identified as an obstacle to CTAT-J's activities.

Civil-Military Relations. CMR in Jordan is characterized by the popularity of the military by both the monarch, who has significant executive power in the Jordanian political system, and by the population. There are strong links between the monarchy and the military, both through traditional tribal affiliation and by the number of Royal Family members with experience in uniform, including the King's own thirty-five years of service. Despite this, as discussed above, concordance is lacking in recruitment method following the reinstatement of the draft in 2020, and more importantly in political decision making. The JAF has become increasingly political since 2010, advocating for increased parliamentary powers and a change in policy towards the Palestinian question. There may also be support in the military for the claim of former Crown Prince Hamzah, though King Abdullah likely retains the loyalty of those with whom he served. Given that the political and military elites are so entwined in Jordan, it is reasonable that deep institutional reforms – particularly those regarding merit-based promotions to senior leadership positions and civilian or democratic control of military force – would be extremely challenging to enact. Those types of reforms are far outside the mandate of CTAT-J, so there is no way to measure this. It is likely at the tactical and technical level, CMR has little impact on the success of SFA activities.

Corruption. Corruption is reported as an endemic low-level problem within Jordan within Op IMPACT documents, though never in the context of directly affecting SFA initiatives. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows an average and steady score in the past ten years. In 2021, Jordan was ranked 58th of 188 countries, with a score of 49 points, which indicates moderate and persistent corruption.²⁷³ Notably, this is a better score than either Ukraine (32) or Lebanon (24) in 2021, suggesting that corruption has less of an impact on SFA in Jordan than the other two case studies. There is third party analysis of corruption within the JAF with measurable effects, including the misappropriation of weapons

²⁷⁰ El Kurd, "The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally," 49.

²⁷¹ El Kurd, "The Jordanian Military: A Key Regional Ally," 49, citing Government of the United States, "Jordan Personnel: Composition, Recruitment, and Training," Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Country Studies Series, 1989.

²⁷² Ryan, 13.

²⁷³ Transparency International, "2021 Corruption Perceptions Index: Jordan," <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/jor> (accessed January 5th, 2022).

and ammunition intended for moderate Syrian fighters by Jordanian officers for sale on the black market.²⁷⁴ That same analysis states, however, that “these incidents do not suggest a fundamental problem between Washington and its best Arab ally.”²⁷⁵ Corruption exists, but is not significant enough to be directly observed by SFA practitioners, or be cause for alarm in Washington. It therefore likely has a minimal impact on SFA success in the country.

P-A Problems. The goals of Canada and Jordan with regards to security cooperation were each discussed earlier in this chapter. From those discussions, it is clear that there is some interest mis-alignment at the strategic level, though both parties seek increased regional stability.²⁷⁶ At the operational and tactical level, these interest misalignments come into focus. Most interviews and documents identified unaligned goals as a substantial friction point between the CAF and the JAF. One practitioner assisting a JAF training course reported:

I believe that [the JAF’s] primary motivation for this course had very little to do with actual content. It had a whole lot to do with the relationship building with the Canadians, with the CAF...with GAC, with maintaining and building those relationships further, with the end state of being larger, more, more expensive, more well-rounded courses. So that that was I think that was their aim points.... We’re not trying to achieve the same goals.²⁷⁷

In another instance, a task force commander reported that there were significantly different ideas of how to improve logistics within the rapid reaction brigade, leading to at least a year of diverging effort between the JAF and CTAT-J on the file. The severity of these P-A problems in Jordan are assessed as moderate to severe, and likely had a substantial impact on CTAT-J’s ability to accomplish its goals. The one exception is the JTAC project, where no P-A problems were specifically identified. An explanation of this is the small sample size, the fact that English proficiency is a requirement for candidates to attend JTAC training, and the highly technical nature of JTAC operations creates a global community amongst practitioners like special operations forces. JTAC is also a valuable yet discrete capability, with a clear formula in place to generate qualified personnel; it requires a small number of extremely capable and heavily invested-in soldiers, not substantial reforms to a mass training system.

Taken together, the aggregate of the conditions in Jordan suggests an environment that is unfavourable to SFA success. Though SFA practitioners did not identify many hazards in the SFA environment arising from state fragility, societal divisions, civil-military relations, or corruption, they did identify principal-agent problems. These P-A problems on their own, however, were serious enough to limit the success of SFA efforts.

²⁷⁴ David Schenker, “Cracks Start to Show in Jordan,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 13th, 2016, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/cracks-start-show-jordan>, (accessed July 29th, 2022).

²⁷⁵ Schenker.

²⁷⁶ These misalignments are specifically with the economic and prestige benefits that Jordan seeks. Jordan also places regime stability as a goal on its own, while Canada sees regime stability as a condition of regional security.

²⁷⁷ A senior officer involved in SFA in Jordan at Joint Task Force Impact Headquarters.

An Analysis of CTAT-J SFA Activities.

The following section analyses CTAT-J's training activities, including the JTAC MTT, the CBRN MTT, the logistics program (the CSS MTT), and the female engagement program. A comparative analysis of these activities with the activities from other case studies can be found in Chapter Nine.

JTAC MTT. The JTAC line of effort is aimed at the creation of a Jordanian led and sustained JTAC capability. To accomplish this, CTAT-J was assisting with the creation of a JAF JTAC school with NATO and US JTAC accreditations. There have been four JTAC MTTs deployed to Jordan since 2017, each lasting several months. The first MTT completed a needs analysis and courseware development, with the next three serials first running, and then assisting the JAF to run their own JTAC qualification courses within the fledgling JTAC school. The end-tour reports report steady improvement in JAF capabilities in terms of number and quality of JTACs trained, number of JTAC instructors trained, and the JTAC school's ability to plan and execute JTAC training, though the goal of NATO and US accreditation remains some distance away. A five-year capability development plan was drafted by serial four to bring the JAF JTAC school closer to that goal. This plan included continued Canadian support to the JAF JTAC school, as well as bringing select Jordanian JTACs to Canada to train as JTAC instructor trainers, which is assessed as critical to creating an enduring JTAC capability in Jordan.

Using the SFA Levels of Engagement model at Figure 10, the JTAC MTT's activities fall within levels one and two. They are both training JTACs and helping to develop a JTAC school by training JTAC instructors and move towards NATO and US accreditation. Since they were executing an internationally recognized course with rigorous international standards, in this specific case there was no need to complete curriculum development, so level three activities were not appropriate.

Using the Engagement Matrix at Figure 12, CTAT-J effect on the JAF has been narrow and deep. It is narrow because the audience is small, numbering no more than a few dozen JAF personnel in the past five years. It is deep engagement in the sense that a specialized and complicated capability has been generated. Since that capability is primarily knowledge-rather than values-based and is so discrete, and because the audience was so small, its chances of institutional diffusion to other parts of the JAF is low. Notably, the JTAC MTT was identified by several interviewees as being the most successful effort within CTAT-J, with significant immediate effect. Continued investment over five more years may create an enduring capability, though a very discrete one.

CBRN MTT. The aim of CTAT-L's CBRN program is to improve Jordan's ability to conduct CBRN operations by improving quality of CBRN instruction at the Jordanian Engineering Academy. There has been a total of six CBRN MTT deployments since 2018. The first four MTTs established a basic CBRN course and built a Jordanian instructor cadre to teach it. At the completion of the fourth MTT, it was thought that the JAF could run the course self-sufficient, but this proved optimistic; though they could deliver lessons and training, the JAF CBRN cell was not capable of completing necessary course administration such as scheduling, booking facilities and supplies, and other support functions. When this was identified, two additional MTT serials were executed, and by serial six, it was assessed that the JAF had the

course well in hand. This was validated when serial six deployed late due to COVID, and the JAF ran IST and the first several weeks of the CBRN course successfully without oversight.

Using the SFA Levels of Engagement model established at Figure 10, the CBRN MTT's activities primarily fall within level two, support to schools and training centers. The model predicts that level two activities have mostly immediate effect, with some enduring effect that accumulates over time. This is borne out by the observations of the CBRN MTT, which was confident by the end of serial six that the CBRN cell within the JAF engineering academy could successfully teach CBRN defence, they were uncertain if the capability would endure when Canadian-trained instructors were posted or left the military. There was little support or interest from the JAF engineering academy in *how* the CBRN MTT was building the CBRN program, which makes the program vulnerable to unintended consequences of actions taken by the chain of command (i.e., an infrastructure decision, or transfer of a key personality).

Using the SFA Engagement Matrix at Figure 12, the CBRN MTT's activities can be classified as shallow but wide. It is shallow because CBRN defence is a basic skill that does not require particularly specialized knowledge, skills, or attitudes. It is wide because the aim of the program was to diffuse these basic skills across the JAF through JAF-led delivery of CBRN courses. This SFA engagement was limited in scope – an SFA practitioner reported that their interactions were limited to the CBRN cell, and that the instructional or organizational practices of the larger engineering academy were unaffected.

The CBRN MTT reported some success, with the CBRN cell within the JAF military engineering academy improving its ability to run basic and advanced CBRN course after six MTT serials. It is likely that at least temporarily JAF CBRN defence capability has improved, though neither the training organizations nor institutions have been affected. Without reforms within the larger engineering academy, a change in policy, resourcing, or staffing within the academy could torpedo any gains. Therefore, we can classify these effects as immediate, fragile, and with uncertain endurance.

CSS MTT. The CSS MTT represents the largest investment of personnel and time made by CTAT-J in Jordan, with eight full-time officers and senior NCOs assigned to the project. It was initiated in 2017 and is currently on its tenth rotation. This goal of the CSS MTT is to improve logistics support within the rapid reaction brigade, and though there have been stops and starts, end-tour documents and interviews of CTAT-J HQ personnel report some improvement to partnered force CSS personnel and organizations. This effort has involved direct mentorship of key personnel, the teaching of classes and concepts, the creation and distribution of a CSS handbook in Arabic describing western logistic doctrinal concepts and procedures and attempting to influence the organizational structures of the three infantry battalions within the brigade to properly resource CSS organizations. In particular, the creation and delivery of logistics officer and NCO courses to JAF logistics personnel in 2021 is identified as being a particularly effective initiative. It is a suggested initiative for future rotations to run train-the-trainer packages so the JAF can begin to take the lead on these courses. It is also a future goal to formalize these courses through a Canadian TDO for submission to the JAF.

Using the Levels of Engagement model at Figure 10, most CSS activities can be classified as level 1 activities, with some recent level two activities and aspirations towards

level 3 activities, specifically with the desired implementation of JAF-led logistics courses. Completed activities are reported by documents and interviews to have immediate but little enduring effect, which aligns with the predictions of the model. The development of the logistics officer and NCO courses, which are level two/three activities are reported to have more enduring effect, which again aligns with the model at Figure 10.

Using the SFA Engagement Matrix at Figure 12, the CSS MTT's activities have been deep and narrow. They are deep because the subject matter of the MTT, combat logistics, is a complicated subject, requiring specialized knowledge and organization. It is narrow because the CSS MTT's efforts have been limited to the logistics systems within the companies and battalions of the rapid reaction brigade, which is a small audience. This keeps the prospects of institutional diffusion low. Should the logistic officer and logistics NCO course gain more momentum and be expanded outside the rapid reaction brigade, this would increase the width of the audience and increase the chance and rate of institutional diffusion.

Female Engagement Team (FET). The FET has deployed six rotations to JAF as of writing. Practitioners have reported verbally and in writing that there are significant challenges with this project, stemming from a lack of engagement and investment from the JAF, its treatment of the QRF platoon as a spectacle to fulfill the narrative of gender integration, and its significant recruitment and retention issues. Limited success has been achieved in getting the platoon leadership to take ownership of its own training, rather than passively accept Canadian training.

Using the model at Figure 10, the FET's activities fall primarily within level one – Provision of Tactical Training. It is focused almost exclusively on tactical training, and therefore likely can only generate immediate effect. Using the model at Figure 12, the FET's engagement is shallow and narrow. It is shallow because it is focused on basic tactics and narrow because of the size of its audience. Though this SFA engagement has forestalled the further erosion of the capabilities of the female QRF platoon, it is unlikely to have any influence on other aspects of the JAF.

Institutional Change Theory Applied to the JAF and CTAT-J.

From the analysis above, it is apparent that the JAF is a stubborn institution; though discrete elements of the JAF are influenced positively by CTAT-J, wider systemic or institutional level change has not occurred. The lens of historical institutionalism is useful to help understand why.

Traditional HI theory views the JAF as a path dependent institution and would have us look for critical junctures to identify and explain periods of change. El Kurd helpfully identifies two of these in her article "The Jordanian Military, A Key Regional Ally." She classifies the 1957 coup attempt as the first critical juncture, which allowed the King to reform the JAF and significantly reduce the power of Palestinian-Jordanians in the ranks.²⁷⁸ She identifies the second critical juncture as the 1970-1971 conflict with the PLO, known as 'Black September'. This had the effect of limiting Palestinian influence over the military even further.²⁷⁹ The 1994

²⁷⁸ El Kurd, 48.

²⁷⁹ El Kurd, 49.

peace agreement with Israel is likely a third critical juncture, as this peace agreement allowed for a realignment of defence priorities by removing the Israel Defence Force as a security threat and opened the gates for Western military assistance. Since then, however, Jordan's security sector has experienced no easily identifiable critical junctures, despite its challenges with the Syrian Civil War, the ongoing war with Daesh, and political infighting within the Jordanian Royal Family. Perhaps remarkably given the events within MENA RCS, Jordan has remained relatively stable – or at least acceptably unstable to maintain system equilibrium within Jordanian society. The military has thus avoided the need for externally imposed reform. Western financial and humanitarian aid in this case serves to reinforce this stability (indeed, this is a stated aim of these programs). The type of foreign military assistance provided by CTAT-J is designed to improve discrete aspects of the Jordanian military, not to reform it in a meaningful way. The light sprinkle of training programmes CTAT-J conduct with the JAF are not mutually supporting, and do not focus on levers of institutional change like officer education or the professionalization of the NCO corps. Given that the senior leaders of the JAF have a personal stake in institutional stability, this may be by design.

The lack of an easily identifiable critical juncture in recent years may explain the JAF's institutional inertia in the past several decades. Thelen and Mahoney's theory on gradual institutional change can help us understand if and how changes may be occurring more slowly. To achieve this, we will apply Thelen and Mahoney's theory adapted to SFA, which can be found at Figure 8.

The political context of the JAF can be viewed as a function of international and domestic contexts. Internationally, Jordan sits within the Levant sub-RCS within the larger MENA RCS. Its security interests include the entirety of the Levant, though it has used force in Afghanistan, to show its support for its Western allies more than to fill any immediate security interest. It is a key Western ally in the region, especially to the 'Amman Six,' and has been dubbed the United States' "best Arab ally."²⁸⁰ It is also a moderately weak state and a weak power. This weakness, combined with being in the sphere of interest of the Amman Six and most importantly the United States, would suggest that Jordan has weak veto power. The domestic context strengthens this political veto, however. Here, we are informed by concordance theory. In Jordan, there is discord within the some JAF on political decision-making, and within society on recruiting methods, but there is also significant support from the monarch for the military, given King Abdullah II's personal experience as a senior military officer and the traditional affinity the Hashemites have had for their armies since Jordan was founded. These factors interact behind closed doors, making it difficult to determine the exact amount of power the monarch holds over the military, but it is likely significant. This is supported by the fact that at least temporarily the forces that support Prince Hamzah are in abeyance. This makes the domestic political veto over the institution stronger. King Abdullah's personal power he holds as a respected senior statesperson with his allies counteracts some of the international pressures, establishing moderately strong veto power overall.

The institutional context of the JAF relates to how much discretion actors have when interpreting and enforcing existing rules. Like the political context, the institutional context is affected by international and domestic influences. International influence is exercised by SFA practitioners in the country. This influence is modest. Canadian SFA in Jordan is limited to the

²⁸⁰ Schenker.

twenty-five to thirty junior members of the CTAT focused on tactical and technical level engagements. Allied training in Jordan is likewise limited, at least compared to efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Ukraine. A larger effort goes into bringing Jordanian officers to the West for professional military education. The influence that comes with King Abdullah II having been educated at UK's Sandhurst and through the US IMET program at the beginning and mid-way through his military career is unmeasurable, and not the focus of this thesis.

Domestically, the institutional context is influenced by the command culture of the JAF. This style is described by multiple documents and interviewee as heavily centralized, with a culture of risk aversion which punishes failure severely and rewards mediocrity the same or more than success. This can be contrasted to a merit-based system based on mission command, which rewards innovation and change, which is the ideal of the Western military system. In effect, this low level of international influence focused on technical and tactical matters (Western PME programs aside) and high levels of centralized decision-making combine to create an environment where discretion is low.

This identifies the JAF as an institution where the veto power is high and discretion is low. According to Thelen and Mahoney's model, this would suggest that layering – the attachment of new rules to old ones – would be the predominant type and most effective form of institutional change. The most effective change agent to achieve layering is the subversive, who follows the rules (thus surviving and even thriving in the system), but secretly seek to change the institution from the inside. There are indeed some limited examples of layering observed by the CTAT-J within the JAF, specifically within the JTAC program, where a Western capability is being laid on top of the existing military system, and within the CSS MTT, where some there are some changes to how combat sustainment is done within the rapid reaction brigade. These instances are limited in size and scope and represent islands of success rather than a trend.

Subversives are likely the hardest change agents to detect, and CTAT-J's interactions with the JAF did not reveal any obvious examples within the JAF's ranks. Even if they had, the nature of the CTAT-J's mission, with a focus on the tactical and technical levels of engagement, mean that the influence of any identified subversive would be low. The JAF system, like most militaries with centralized command cultures, tends to produce risk adverse officers. The system of rewards and punishments within the JAF reinforce this. This system is more likely to produce symbionts or opportunists, not subversives. Conversion and drift are the two types of institutional change associated with these types of change agents, both of which seek to work within and exploit existing rules, rather than seek change. By this logic, it may be that the lack of institutional change within the JAF is because the system produces the wrong type of change agent to achieve change.

CHAPTER 8 – THE CASE OF SFA IN UKRAINE

Background.

Canada deployed Operation UNIFIER to Ukraine in 2015 to provide security force assistance to the Ukrainian military. Canada and Ukraine shared two related but sometimes conflicting goals: 1) help improve Ukraine's ability to defend its territory in the Donbas against Russian supported separatists; and 2) assist Ukraine in its goal to become NATO interoperable, preparing it for its eventual bid to join NATO.²⁸¹ These two goals were both aimed at deterring Russia by raising the cost of military action to Russia in Ukraine. This deterrence failed in February 2022, though Ukrainian success in repelling the Russian invasion (at least at time of writing) shocked Russia and exceeded the expectations of Ukraine's allies.

Ukraine's recent history begins at the end of the Cold War, when Ukraine overwhelmingly voted for its independence from Russia, becoming an independent state for the first time since 1919. Economic issues started soon after, with Ukraine's GDP falling between 35-40% in the first two years of independence. Mass unemployment and poverty led to disillusionment with Western free markets and democracy, and nostalgia by some for life under the Soviet Union.²⁸² Ukraine's slow transition to a market economy allowed predatory oligarchs to snatch up enormous wealth at the expense of Ukrainian society. Economic and political corruption was rampant.²⁸³ Ukrainian politics were a pendulum, swinging between liberal democratic, Western-oriented policies and authoritarian Russian-oriented policies, depending on the government.²⁸⁴ In 2014, massive pro-Western Euromaidan protests broke this pattern after the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich backtracked on his promise to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. After months of protest in Maidan Square, Yanukovich fled the country and a pro-Western provisional government took control; days later, Russia took advantage of the political chaos and invaded Crimea with barely a shot. Shortly after that, pro-Russian secessionist movements began in the east and south of the country. Caught off-guard, lacking leadership and direction, and hollowed out from years of mismanagement, the AFU initially lost ground in some embarrassing defeats.²⁸⁵ Supported by volunteer militias and by combat forces of the better managed and trained National Guard of Ukraine (NGU), the AFU eventually found its footing. By summer 2014, most separatist movements had been put down, except in the most eastern parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the Don River Basin area (Donbas), where self-proclaimed "peoples' republics" were established. Ukraine slowly gained ground against these so-called 'republics' until the Russian military intervened with

²⁸¹ This goal quickly became increasingly unrealistic for political reasons that are outside the scope of this research.

²⁸² Richard B. Spence, "Democratization, Militarism, and Paramilitarism in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc*, Ed by Constantine Danopoulos et al. (Taylor and Francis Group: Abington, 2019), 138.

²⁸³ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Ukraine: Democratizing Civil-Military Relations in the Midst of Conflict," *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics*, Oxford University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1921>, 5.

²⁸⁴ Ulrich, 3.

²⁸⁵ Simon Ostrovsky, "Ukrainian Military Give Up Their Weapons: Russian Roulette," *Vice News* S1 E28, April 20th, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNig07RtWxA&t=450s> (accessed Apr 25th, 2022).

conventional forces on August 24th, 2014, changing the dynamic once again.²⁸⁶ By the signing of the Minsk II ceasefire in February 2015, the conflict had stabilized along a ‘line of contact’ in the Donbas. Ceasefire violations occurred regularly.

Over the next eight years, the Ukrainian government struggled to modernize all its institutions. It waged an often-anemic campaign against corruption,²⁸⁷ and attempted to build more ties to the West by continuing its bid to join the EU.²⁸⁸ Aggressive defence reforms were ordered by the government. On top of expanding its armed forces and paramilitary forces – its gendarmerie National Guard and border guards – from under 200 000 to over 300 000 personnel in three years and increasing its defence budget from 1% to 3% of its GDP, Ukraine also took steps to civilianize its Ministry of Defence, and ordered the Armed Forces to be subordinate to it.²⁸⁹ In the 2016 Ukraine released the Strategic Defence Bulletin, which committed to transforming the military’s doctrine and training system, creating a professional NCO Corps, and to the lofty goal of making its forces NATO interoperable by 2020.²⁹⁰ This document was updated and renewed in 2021, with an aimpoint of 2030.²⁹¹

The Ukrainian military had a long road to follow. In 2014, it was still a conscript, mass-based army, its training system was a shambles, its equipment old and ill-maintained, its personnel policies were defunct or non-existent, it possessed few strategic documents of any quality, and above all its doctrine and organizational culture was still largely Soviet. Multiple countries – including Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, and Poland – deployed strategic advisors and security force assistance missions to Ukraine to assist its reform efforts.²⁹² The enormity of the task, and obstinance from some senior Ukrainian military leaders

²⁸⁶ Michael Kofman et al, “Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine,” (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2017), 44; Andrew Kramer and Michael Gordan, “Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front,” *The New York Times*, August 27th, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html>, (accessed May 10th 2022).

²⁸⁷ Mikheil Saakashvili, “Why Ukraine Is Losing the War on Corruption,” *The New York Times*, November 16th, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/opinion/why-ukraine-is-losing-the-war-on-corruption.html> (accessed May 10th 2022).

²⁸⁸ Dan Bilefsky, “Why Ukraine’s road to European Union membership will likely be long and winding,” *The New York Times*, March 1st, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/world/europe/ukraine-european-union-membership.html>. (accessed May 10th, 2022).

²⁸⁹ Ulrich, 10.

²⁹⁰ Government of Ukraine, “Key Findings of The First Stage of Reform of Ukrainian National Security and Defence” National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, 2016, https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2016/en_print-1.pdf.

²⁹¹ Government of Ukraine, “Head of State Approves Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine,” Office of the President of Ukraine, September 17th, 2021, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-zatverdiv-strategichnij-oboronnij-byulet-en-70713>.

²⁹² As of 2018, the US and Canada had the largest presence in Ukraine, each with approximately 250 permanent or periodic trainers and advisors deployed to Ukraine, and each with a budget of ~20 million USD/year (this does not account for the 100-200 million USD the US provided in equipment donations or military sales). The UK had at any time twenty permanent and up to one hundred periodic trainers, with an annual budget of 10 million USD per year. Lithuania had the next largest mission, with ~40 trainers and a 3 million USD/year budget. Finally, Poland invested twenty-five trainers and 1-2 million USD.

frustrated many of these advisors and trainers. Still, when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine confounded expectations by not only defending Kyiv, but inflicting crippling casualties on supposedly ‘elite’ Russian units and forcing the Russians to withdraw from the North and significantly limit their war aims.²⁹³ At the time of writing, Ukraine continues to hold the line in the Donbas, and prospects for Russian control over Ukraine are low.

The structure of the security forces of Ukraine (SFU) requires some explaining for those unfamiliar with Eastern European security establishments. There are several agencies within Ukraine that have responsibilities for national security. Largest amongst these is the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is further subdivided into the Land Forces, the Navy, the Air Force, the Air Assault Forces (DsHV), and the Special Operations Force. The AFU is responsible for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, it numbered 250 000 active members before the 2022 expansion, and has been nominally subordinate to the Minister of Defence since 2018.²⁹⁴ The next largest grouping are those forces subordinate to the Minister of the Interior: the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU), the State Border Guard Service (SBGS), and the National Police of Ukraine (NPU). The NGU numbers 48 000 personnel, and primarily has internal security responsibilities akin to a Western European *gendarmerie*, but also has a mandate to generate combat forces for the defence of Ukraine. Since 2014 the NGU has had formations equipped with tanks, artillery, and infantry fighting vehicles. When performing defence functions, its units are subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. There exists an unhealthy rivalry between the AFU and the NGU, influenced by the NGU’s superior performance in 2014, and legacy issues with the NGU’s participation as a security force at the Maidan.²⁹⁵ The SBGS (42 000 personnel) and the NPU (130 000 personnel) are responsible for border control and policing, respectively, though both services have units equipped and trained for combat. Finally, Ukraine’s national intelligence service and successor to the Soviet KGB, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), maintains its own elite *spetznaz* force. For the purposes of this study, SFA provided to the AFU and the NGU are relevant.

Ukraine and the SFU in Context

International. This section will apply the lens of the Copenhagen School to gain insight on the international context for Ukraine, and to inform later discussions on the strength of the veto within the institutional change model at Figure 8. At least prior to the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine presented as a moderately weak state within the European regional security complex. It ranks in the middle of the Fragile States Index, as the 88th most stable state of 178 states. For comparison, it is slightly more stable than Belarus and slightly less stable than Tunisia, which are ranked 89th and 87th, respectively.²⁹⁶ It is also the most stable state of the

NATO invested a further 10 million USD per year, and about twenty advisors. Figures are taken from Canadian Embassy to Ukraine documents.

²⁹³ Eliot A. Cohen, “Why Can’t the West Admit That Ukraine Is Winning?” *The Atlantic*, March 21st, 2022. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/ukraine-is-winning-war-russia/627121/>. (accessed March 22nd, 2022).

²⁹⁴ Ulrich, 10.

²⁹⁵ Researcher’s direct observation.

²⁹⁶ *Fragile States Index – Global Data*, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/global-data/> (accessed August 1, 2022). In this data, Ukraine is ranked as the 92nd least stable country. The ranking has been inverted to

three case studies used in this research: Jordan ranked 112th and Lebanon 152nd. Two indicators of direct interest to this research, state legitimacy and security apparatus, were assessed as lightly dragging factors on Ukraine's stability, though Ukraine's worst score comes from the indicators relating to external intervention and factionalized elites. Corruption in Ukraine remains a problem despite best efforts, and negatively drives perception of the government in the country.

Ukraine also presented as a weak power, at least relative to Russia; despite its large and increasingly competent military, Russia dwarfed its defence spending and force size by a factor of 10-1 and 5-1, respectively.²⁹⁷ Its weak GDP made it a weak economic power, though its position as a leading exporter of corn, wheat, and sunflower oil give it some influence there. Where the Ukrainian economy did perform, much of the wealth was captured by its oligarchy. These statements are in the past tense, because under the stress test of the 2022 invasion, the power of Ukraine's civil society, its social cohesion, and the performance of its security forces has exceeded expectations and stymied predictions. Ukraine has proven to be a stronger power than many predicted, though its economy is expected to contract significantly this year because of the Russian invasion, calling into question its ability to maintain its strength into the future.²⁹⁸

Ukraine's position in the European RSC puts it within the sphere of the national interest of several powerful European nations, as well as Canada and the United States. Its location between the West and Russia, its large land mass suitable as a buffer, as well as its historical position within the Russian and the Kyivan-Rus Empires, make it within Russia's vital interest.²⁹⁹ The Polish-American diplomat and political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski once famously observed that "without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire." History shows that Russia very much wants to be an empire.

Domestic. This section will discuss the domestic context for the security forces of Ukraine, which like the international context, will inform discussions on the strength of the veto within the institutional change model at Figure 8. The Armed Forces and National Guard of Ukraine are important features of the Ukrainian state and are held in high regard by Ukrainian society. The AFU enjoyed particularly positive public perception during the Maidan protests, first because it was never used for crowd control, and second because of the number of veterans who helped organize the defence of Maidan Square. Its reputation was tarnished by its failure to defend Crimea and its initial failures in the Donbas, but recovered as its combat effectiveness increased.³⁰⁰ The NGU – the immediate successor to the Interior Troops – suffered some

make it easier to understand in the context of this discussion. Ukraine scored 68.6 of a possible 120 points on the index itself (a lower number is favourable; as a reminder, Canada scored 20.1 points).

²⁹⁷ Angela Dewan, "Ukraine and Russia's Militaries are David and Goliath. Here's How They Compare," *CNN*, February 25th 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/russia-ukraine-military-comparison-intl/index.html> (accessed May 9th, 2022).

²⁹⁸ The Ukrainian economy had mixed success since Maidan but is now set to contract by as much as 46% in 2022. The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Ukraine's economy set to register a 46.5% recession this year," March 30th, 2022, <https://www.eiu.com/n/ukraines-economy-set-to-register-a-46-5-recession-this-year/>.

²⁹⁹ Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine* (Basic Books: New York, 2015); Gerard Toal, *Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Context over Ukraine and the Caucasus* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017).

³⁰⁰ Ulrich, 10.

reputational damage due to its role in crowd control operations at the Maidan, though Ukrainian society seems happy to assign most of the blame for the brutality meted out to protestors on the now defunct Berkut presidential riot police.³⁰¹ It is held in very positive regard for its role in backstopping the defence of Ukraine in 2014, however. A critical element in understanding Ukrainian society's relationship with its security forces was the widespread participation in volunteer militias in 2014-2015.³⁰² These militias existed outside state control, and though they were encouraged by and most often cooperated with the state, their very existence suggests a breakdown of the Weberian definition of the state. Several of these militias – notably the far-right Azov Regiment – were folded into the SFU in 2015. Public support for these militias runs parallel to their support of the SFU, with many regarding the volunteers as heroes.

Civil-military relations within Ukraine are characterized by the democratization of the Ukrainian state, with Marybeth Ulrich commenting that “underdeveloped democratic civil–military relations have been a main reason for Ukraine’s lack of military capabilities.”³⁰³ Essential components of functioning civil-military relations in democratic states, including civilian oversight and a capable civilian Ministry of Defence, are underdeveloped though improving with the 2018 adoption of the National Security Law, and President Zelensky’s appointment of the first civilian to the role of Minister of Defence in 2019.³⁰⁴ Corruption remains a problem, with both senior military leaders and politicians implicated in corruption scandals.³⁰⁵

Concordance theory provides some insight on why civil-military relations in Ukraine function the way they do. Though there is agreement on the composition of the officer corps and political decision making, there is not universal agreement on recruitment methods or military style. Though society and the political decision-makers want to transition the SFU to an all-volunteer, professional military based on the tenants of manoeuvre, some senior military leaders are more comfortable with a mass-based military relying on conscription. Collected data clearly show that a powerful cadre of senior military leaders are hesitant to accept reforms that change their paradigm too quickly or too much. The generals may be right; society and political leaders do not necessarily understand the costs associated with transitioning to a Western style army based on manoeuvre. A Canadian senior military leader interviewed for this research estimates that NATO spends between 12-16 times more per soldier than Ukraine does, and that for Ukraine to have a Western style military, it would need to either shrink the size of its military substantially or increase its defence budget exponentially. Finally, senior military leaders chafe under civilian oversight, with the AFU still resisting the fact that they were

³⁰¹ It is commonly accepted that most of the sniper fire that killed forty-eight protestors on February 20th, 2014, were fired from Berkut positions, however there is copious video evidence of individuals wearing the uniform of the Interior Troops using excessive force elsewhere during the Maidan. See Mattathias Schwartz, “Who Killed the Kiev [sic] Protesters? A 3-D Model Holds the Clues,” *The New York Times Magazine*, May 30th, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/magazine/ukraine-protest-video.html> (accessed May 15th, 2022); Evgeny Afineevsky, *Winter on Fire: Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom*, Netflix Documentary, October 9th, 2015.

³⁰² Ilmari Kähkö, “A nation-in-the-making, in arms: control of force, strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions,” *Defence Studies*, 18, no. 2 (2018): 147-166.

³⁰³ Ulrich, 7.

³⁰⁴ Ulrich, 10.

³⁰⁵ Ulrich, 9.

subordinate to the Ministry of Defence as recently as 2019.³⁰⁶ In July 2021, President Zelensky dismissed the head of the armed forces along with several other senior generals, citing tensions between the AFU and the Ministry of Defence as the reason.³⁰⁷ A much younger reform-minded general was promoted to command the AFU; he has since become a national hero for his leadership during the February 2022 invasion.³⁰⁸ Notwithstanding this recent change in leadership, the lack of concordance between the General Staff, the political class, and society affects the health and functioning of Ukraine's civil-military relations. This carries implications for institutional reforms, which will be discussed in a later section.

UNIFIER Described

Canada's interests in Ukraine, according to a January 27th statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, is "to safeguard[...] common interests with Ukraine such as gender equality, democracy, and the rules-based international order."³⁰⁹ Canada is also committed to supporting "Ukraine's goals for greater Euro-Atlantic integration", and its ability to deliver "security, prosperity, and freedom for all its citizens."³¹⁰ This is in line with Canada's goal of expanding the boundaries of democratic Europe, and reducing the influence of autocratic regimes like Russia, particularly after Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Ukraine's interests in its security partnership with Canada and other Western partners are more obvious than Jordan or Lebanon and are clearly stated with Ukrainian policy. Ukraine sees Russia as an existential threat and wishes to join NATO to reap the security assurances that membership provides.³¹¹ All other Ukrainian political interests are distantly removed from this goal of security from Russia. Militarily, this requires that Ukraine reform itself to align with NATO standards.

³⁰⁶ Department of National Defence (Canada), "Commander's Joint Assessment Team (CJAT) Assessment Report – Ukraine (OP UNIFIER)," Canadian Joint Operations Command, June 21st, 2019, 10.

³⁰⁷ "Ukrainian president fires head of the armed forces, citing disputes," *Reuters*, July 27th, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-fires-head-armed-forces-citing-disputes-2021-07-27/>. (accessed May 11th, 2022); Mark Raczkiwycz, "Citing need for systemic 'transformation,' Zelenskyy conducts major shakeup of Ukraine's security service," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, July 30th 2021, <https://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/citing-need-for-systemic-transformation-zelenskyy-conducts-major-shakeup-of-ukraines-security-service/> (accessed May 11th, 2022).

³⁰⁸ David M. Herszenhorn and Paul McLeary, "Ukraine's 'iron general' is a hero, but he's no star," *Politico*, April 8th, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/08/ukraines-iron-general-zaluzhnyy-00023901> (accessed May 12th, 2022).

³⁰⁹ Global Affairs Canada, "Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 30th anniversary of Canada-Ukraine diplomatic relations," January 27th, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/01/statement-of-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-30th-anniversary-of-canada-ukraine-diplomatic-relations.html>.

³¹⁰ Global Affairs Canada, "Canada's engagement in Ukraine," Accessed May 11th 2022, <https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/ukraine/relations.aspx?lang=eng>.

³¹¹ In 2017, the Ukrainian parliament (the *Rada*) passed legislation declaring NATO membership as a national policy objective. The Ukrainian Constitution was even amended in 2019 to reflect this objective. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Relations with Ukraine," October 28th, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm (accessed January 5th, 2023).

In total, Canada spent close to 1 billion CAD between 2014 and 2021 in development, humanitarian, and security assistance, including 65 million CAD per year in security sector reform efforts.³¹² Canada's military support to Ukraine comes in many forms, with the two most visible being its twenty-eight year engagement through the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP), which periodically deploys small training teams to Ukraine to teach exported courses, or brings Ukrainian officers to Canada to attend Canadian military courses, and Operation UNIFIER. Other efforts include support to Ukrainian policy development through DND's Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy (ADM Pol), support to the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv and NATO Trust Funds, and support to an RCMP-led police training mission, amongst others.

The United States also had several training assistance efforts underway, most notably the Joint Multi-National Training Group – Ukraine (JMTG-U), a 240 person US National Guard-led collective training mission deployed to Western Ukraine. Ukraine also receives periodic assistance from the California National Guard through their State Partnership Program, as well as a series of small strategic advisor programs. US military efforts are observed to be disconnected from one another, which limited their effectiveness. US direct financial support to the Ukrainian security sector was up to 300 million USD a year.³¹³ The United Kingdom deployed the next largest training mission (Op ORBITAL), with thirty-five permanent headquarters staff coordinating mobile training team deployments from the UK to run short-term courses in Ukraine. This mission rarely exceeded one hundred personnel in country at one time and spent about 10 million USD per year. Lithuania deployed between 20 and 40 personnel to Ukraine on advisory and training tasks, spending about 3 million USD per year. Each of these missions are bilateral agreements but are voluntarily coordinated through a body known as the Military Joint Commission (MJC), which is co-chaired by a senior Ukrainian General Officer.³¹⁴ Finally, NATO plays a role in Ukraine defence reforms through senior level advising, its NATO Trust Funds, and through the NATO Defence Education Enhancement Program (DEEP), among other initiatives.³¹⁵

³¹² Global Affairs Canada, "Canada's engagement in Ukraine...;" Department of National Defence (Canada), "Building Partner Capacity in Ukraine: A Defence Team Effort," Strategic Joint Staff Presentation Briefing, dated October 2019. These numbers do not include the expanding purse of direct military assistance announced since the Russian invasion in February 2022, which as of May 2022 is over 600 million CAD budgeted or delivered. See Department of National Defence (Canada), "Canada announces artillery and other additional military aid for Ukraine," News Release, April 22nd 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/04/canada-announces-artillery-and-other-additional-military-aid-for-ukraine.html>.

³¹³ Department of National Defence, "Reform Update - Ukraine Security & Defence Reform: Vulnerabilities and Uncertainty, Need for Steadfast Engagement & Support," CDA Ukraine Presentation Brief, dated May 2018.

³¹⁴ There is no equivalent organization in either the LAF or the JAF, which may be a factor in the effectiveness of military aid programs in Lebanon and Jordan.

³¹⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Relations with Ukraine," https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm (accessed May 11th 2022); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Professional Military Education (PME) Development under the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP)" NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, June 15th 2020; Pierre Jolicœur and Frédéric Labarre, "Shaping and Measuring Military Culture Development: A

Because of the size, visibility, and agility of Canada's commitment to Ukraine, Canada wields a significant amount of influence in Ukraine. A well-sourced interviewee commented that UNIFIER gave the Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine far better access and influence in Kyiv than all but the United States, on subjects as far ranging as legal reform to trade. This makes Canada a major player in Kyiv, placing Canada-Ukraine relations in a unique spot within Canadian foreign policy. In fact, before the February 2022 invasion, Canada was second only to the United States in military assistance, and frequently had more military trainers deployed to Ukraine at any given time.³¹⁶

The structure and tasks of Op UNIFIER have evolved significantly since its initial deployment. In 2015, UNIFIER was restricted to two training bases, and was focused almost exclusively on designing and providing 55-day training packages to rotating AFU companies of about 120 personnel. By the time the mission paused in January 2022, UNIFIER had spread to nearly forty permanent locations in fifteen cities or training bases, and was providing support to brigade or battalion rotational training in three locations, had advisors embedded within three officer academies, four NCO academies, numerous other training facilities as well as in several Ukrainian headquarters.³¹⁷ The mission structure has changed several times as well, with the most recent change seeing the task force grouped functionally into organizations focused on collective training, individual training, and professional military education. Soldiers rotated every six months, and as of January 2022 thirteen task forces had deployed over the mission's seven years in existence. The mission grew incrementally over its lifetime, from about 190 personnel in 2015 to 224 in 2021, which represents a 17% increase over six years. The UNIFIER mission statement changed slightly from rotation to rotation as the mission became less focused on short term training effects to institution-building, with the latest mission statement reading "Joint Task Force – Ukraine will support SFU reforms professionalization and capacity building IOT assist UKRs path to NATO interoperability and readiness for the JFO."³¹⁸

Operation UNIFIER is on a different scale compared to CTAT-Lebanon or CTAT-Jordan. In terms of size, UNIFIER deployed over two hundred full-time trainers, advisors, and headquarters staff, compared to the 14 to 40 personnel deployed full or part-time to either Jordan or Lebanon. UNIFIER is commanded by an OF-4 (Lieutenant-Colonel), who enjoyed significantly more freedom of action and a direct report back to Ottawa; CTAT-L and CTAT-J are both commanded by OF-3s (Majors) reporting back to an OF-5 (Colonel) in JTF-I headquarters in Kuwait. UNIFIER is also in its seventh year, making it more mature than CTAT-L or CTAT-J, which are four years old. Finally, Ukraine's security challenge is different than Jordan or Lebanon's. Ukraine is committed to a whole-sale structural reform of its military to align itself with NATO, while in direct conflict with Russia. There is no such clear mandate for widespread reform in Lebanon or Jordan.

Case Study of The Defence Education Enhancement Program," *Canadian Journal of Foreign Policy*, 22, no. 2 (2016): 135-46.

³¹⁶ "Reform Update..."

³¹⁷ Department of National Defence (Canada), "JTF-U Op UNIFIER 101" Presentation Briefing, January 2022.

³¹⁸ JTF-U Op UNIFIER 101.

The SFA Environment in Ukraine

This section will discuss the factors beyond the control of Op UNIFIER that affected its ability to perform its mission. These environmental conditions were identified during the literature review as reasons why SFA efforts fail and are expressed in Figure 4. Like the discussion on Jordan and Lebanon, these factors will be discussed in descending order of levels of analysis, beginning at the state level and progressing down to the level of the military institution.

State Fragility. Despite its mediocre score on the Fragile States Index, Ukraine has proved a more robust state than expected. What Ukraine lacks with its poor governance, its corruption, and its oligarchic economic system, it makes up for with the strength of its civil society, the patriotism of its citizens, and the desire of most Ukrainians to live in a free and prosperous society oriented towards Europe. The government is weak, but the nation is strong. Unfortunately, the strength of the nation does not absolve the security sector from the ills of the state. Though the SFU may be legitimate and has proven effective, at least one of Knowles' and Matisek's 'pathologies' of militaries within weak states exists in Ukraine: lack of accountability. This will be discussed further in the paragraph on corruption, along with the effect this has on SFA efforts.

Societal Divisions. Ukrainian society has undergone a profound shift since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, when a large minority of the population – particularly in the south and east of the country – identified as pro-Russian and anti-European.³¹⁹ Following this invasion and the conflict in the Donbas, public perception began shifting positively towards the west and an independent Ukrainian national identity. A recent poll shows that following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, 80% of Ukrainians favoured joining the EU, compared to 2% favouring the Russian Customs Union. Furthermore, a clear majority (59%) would vote in a referendum to join NATO, compared to 14% who would vote against it. This majority even held up in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine.³²⁰ Societal divisions are therefore not assessed as a factor for SFA effectiveness in Ukraine. Indeed, if Russia accomplished anything with its military actions since 2014, it succeeded in unifying Ukraine against it.

Civil-Military Relations. Before the 2022 war, civil-military relations in Ukraine were characterized by its politically active population, its popular security forces, its weak government, and its unpopular politicians.³²¹ As discussed above, concordance was lacking in the style and recruitment method of the military amongst politicians, military leadership, and society. This has implications on the political context of institutional change, which will be

³¹⁹ "Ukraine's Sharp Divisions," *BBC News*, April 23rd, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26387353> (accessed May 11th, 2022).

³²⁰ Center for Insights in Survey Research, "Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine: March 30 to April 2, 2022" International Republican Institute, <https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-of-residents-of-ukraine/>.

³²¹ Public opinion on President Zelensky has swung widely since his election, from 75% approval in 2019 to 25% approval in 2021, to 94% following Russia's invasion. Public perception of the *Rada* (Ukraine's parliament) is consistently lower. Daniel Twining, "What Ukrainians Think About the War With Russia," *The Wall Street Journal* May 6th, 2022, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-ukrainians-think-about-the-war-russia-putin-invasion-zelensky-victory-results-approval-rating-11651868038> (accessed May 11th, 2022).

discussed at the end of this section. It also helps explain certain principal-agent problems, with senior military leaders using their veto power on SFA initiatives they do not agree with, even if their politicians and people do.

Corruption. Corruption is a serious problem in Ukraine. There is even a museum dedicated to the subject, located at the lavish summer home and grounds of former President Yanukovich. Society's anger over corruption was one of the reasons for the Maidan protests and was the reason the political neophyte and entertainer Volodymyr Zelensky was elected as an outsider candidate in the 2019 Presidential election.³²² Despite some progress, corruption remains a daily issue for Ukrainians. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows a below average but slowly improving score in the past ten years. In 2021, Ukraine was ranked 122nd of 188 countries, with a score of 32 points, which indicates severe and persistent corruption.³²³ This score places it between Lebanon (24) and Jordan (49). Erik Herron's book on the subject stated that "Ukrainians have entered into a Faustian bargain by accepting entrenched corruption to ensure that institutions perform their basic functions."³²⁴ Marybeth Ulrich writes that "endemic corruption throughout post-Soviet institutions has been a formidable obstacle to their democratization."³²⁵ Corruption is a real problem in the security sector especially, particularly in military procurement, where efforts against corruption by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) are actively foiled by officials and parliamentarians.³²⁶ Op UNIFIER has even had some of its security partners indicted for corruption, notably the head of the NGU from 2015-2019.³²⁷ In another example, UNIFIER senior commanders were frustrated with a senior Ukrainian general who spent more time working his side businesses than on improving his own base facilities. It is certain that corruption has negatively affected SFA efforts, though quantifying that affect is beyond the scope of this research.

Principal-Agent Problems. The strategic interests of Canada and Ukraine as they pertain to security cooperation are discussed earlier in this Chapter. As a contrast to Jordan and Lebanon, there is significant interest alignment between Ukraine and Canada at the strategic level. At the operational and tactical level, however, there are frictions. Documents and interviews of practitioners and senior leaders reveal an interesting dynamic regarding principal-agent problems: political leaders, society, and junior leaders within the SFU are eager to transition to a Western-style military; it is Ukrainian generals who are motivated to resist change. These motivations range from a general conservatism and desire to maintain the system

³²² Ulrich, 9.

³²³ Transparency International, "2021 Corruption Perceptions Index: Ukraine," <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/ukr> (accessed January 5th, 2023).

³²⁴ Erik S. Herron, *Normalizing Corruption: Failures of Accountability in Ukraine* (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 2020), 2.

³²⁵ Ulrich, 7.

³²⁶ Andrew Higgins, "In Ukraine, Corruption is Now Undermining the Military," *The New York Times*, February 19th, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/world/europe/ukraine-corruption-military.html>. (accessed May 12th, 2022)

³²⁷ General Allerov was at least superficially a willing partner with UNIFIER, notwithstanding his alleged corruption. Interestingly, Allerov was only removed and charged after he had a falling out with his immediate superior, the Minister of the Interior. See "Ex-Commander of Ukraine's National Guard detained over possible involvement in flat scam," *Unian*, May 14th, 2019, <https://www.unian.info/politics/10548915-ex-commander-of-ukraine-s-national-guard-detained-over-possible-involvement-in-flat-scam.html>.

in which they were brought up, to trying to safeguard their own opportunities for corruption and power, to concerns about the cost and difficulties of training and equipping a NATO style military. No matter the motivation, in a centralized command system such as the one the SFU presently retains, a general officer has enormous power and influence. An end-tour report from 2020 stated the following:

SFU leadership are not perceived to be actively promoting and encouraging reform. In our opinion, it relates to the attachment and ties that senior leadership have to the old system [of] which many generals were a part [...]. We have observed a lack of support for change, fear of failure, avoidance of responsibility and emphasis on ‘show and presentation over substance and quality’³²⁸

Interviewees and documents comment that until senior Ukrainian leaders either get with the program or retire, success of reform efforts will continue to be limited. Principal-Agent problems thus have a real and documented effect on UNIFIER’s SFA activities. This is less of a problem with the NGU, whose senior leadership is widely reported to be a more willing partner than the AFU senior leadership.

Taken together, the aggregate of the conditions in Ukraine suggests an environment that was somewhat unfavourable to SFA activities in 2015 but had improved by 2022. Specifically, SFA practitioners identified some hazards in the SFA environment arising from civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems. Each of these hazardous conditions was partially mitigated, however, by the undeniable cultural change occurring in Ukraine as the younger generation supplants the older generation in positions of leadership within the military, politics, and society. This change steadily improved the conditions for SFA activities, allowing for a better chance of success.

An Analysis of UNIFIER SFA Activities

The UNIFIER mission and structure has evolved significantly over the past six and a half years. Between September 2015 and February 2022, the number of unique SFA engagements had increased from two to forty, with many of these engagements involving a range of different SFA activities. Sub-units within UNIFIER have been renamed and reorganized several times, making the clean analysis of lines of effort possible in CTAT-L and CTAT-J difficult. It is possible, however, to group UNIFIER’s activities into two functional areas to make analysis easier. The two functional areas are collective training (CT), which is the training of *groups* of soldiers to complete tasks as a team, and individual training and education (IT&E), which is the preparation of *individual* soldiers with the tools they need – the knowledge, skills, and attitudes depicted in – to perform as a member of a team.

Collective Training (CT). CT activities formed the core of UNIFIER’s initial activities in 2015 at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center outside of Lviv, in Western Ukraine.³²⁹ Canada’s first 190 trainers developed and executed a fifty-five-day training package

³²⁸ Department of National Defence (Canada), “End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 9” Canadian Joint Operations Command, September 2020, 42.

³²⁹ A much smaller training program for AFU engineers was executed in a second location, but the rotational training at the IPSC was the main effort for the first UNIFIER rotations.

designed to prepare an AFU combined arms company for operations in the Donbas. Later, when the mission expanded and the US deployed its 240 person JMTG-U to take responsibility for CT at IPSC, Canada placed a training company under the command of the JMTG-U and with the harvested positions began looking for other opportunities to conduct SFA. As activities at the IPSC expanded to focus on battalion and later brigade level training, JMTG-U and its Canadian company began focusing on supporting the Ukrainian IPSC staff to plan and deliver the CT packages themselves, and on teaching more complex subjects such as NATO planning procedures to battalion and brigade staffs. UNIFIER also expanded its CT training support out from the IPSC, taking the lead in supporting the AFU at a second and less developed rotational training center at Shyroki Lan, near the town of Mykolaiv. UNIFIER also began supporting first company and then battalion rotational training for the NGU at their training base in Stare (pronounced Star-eh).

Nearly 20 000 Ukrainians participated in CT either ran directly by or supported by Canadian trainers. Measuring the effect of six and a half years of CT support provides conflicting results. On one hand, successive documents point to the diminishing returns of CT activities because of partnered force attrition rates, especially in conscript armies. A 2015 document complained that:

The [AFU] have a contract model that results in up to 80% of [CT] trainees expected to be out of the military within a year of receiving the training. In this environment, it is unlikely that focusing on firsthand delivery of training will result in a measurable enduring increase in the capacity of the [AFU].³³⁰

Early rotations were frustrated when they found themselves training SFU personnel who had just returned from the Donbas and were scheduled to leave the military immediately after training. The SFU gradually improved their programming of rotational training, and as it transitioned away from conscripts to an increasing number of contract soldiers, this metric improved as well. Later rotations expressed less frustration over attrition, though it remained a (albeit smaller) problem. Eighty percent of AFU soldiers chose not to renew their contracts, meaning most were spending only three years in uniform.³³¹ While this limited the professionalization efforts of the SFU, it did provide Ukraine with a large pool of trained veterans, many of whom returned to uniform in February 2022.

There are also clear examples of success. In August 2021, the NGU 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade participated in Canadian supported CT in Stare; on February 24th, this same formation attacked and retook the Hostomel Airport from a Russian airborne brigade, spoiling Russia's plan to land additional forces and seize Ukraine's strategic center. This battle may prove decisive in the history of the war. An NGU lieutenant (OF-2) credits the training they received from UNIFIER as critical to their success.³³² There is other anecdotal evidence from Canadian

³³⁰ Department of National Defence (Canada), "End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 0, APPENDIX 2 – SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING LESSONS LEARNED", January 8th, 2016, M2-1,

³³¹ Ulrich, 15.

³³² Daniel Michaels, "The Secret of Ukraine's Military Success: Years of NATO Training," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 13th, 2022, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-military-success-years-of-nato-training-11649861339>.

trainers of the units they trained participating in the successful defence of Mykolaiv, which blocked the Russian advance to Odessa. The provision of CT support may be like advertising, where the adage goes “half of all advertising is wasted... the trouble is we can’t know which half.”³³³

Using the model at Figure 10, the CT line of effort can be placed in level one and two, with an increased focus on level two as the mission matured. The direct training activities in 2015 and 2016 may have had immediate effect on forces rotating into the Donbas, though this effect was limited by structural and attrition issues within the AFU. Little institutional or enduring effect was achieved through these Level one activities. Level two activities, such as the development of training center cadres, including operations and planning functions and observer controllers, as well as advising on the organization and structure of CT centers, have improved Ukraine’s ability to deliver collective training in the short and medium terms. These activities have generated immediate and some enduring effect. Using the model at Figure 12, CT activities are assessed as shallow and wide. They build simple and intermediate skills and knowledge across a wide audience. The exception being the provision of NATO staff training to battalion and brigade staffs and the daily mentoring and support to Ukrainian training staff, which is deeper knowledge delivered to a smaller audience. The chance of institutional diffusion is high with a wider audience, though one should not overstate this effect: training 20 000 soldiers over 6.5 years is an impressive feat, though it represents only 6.7% of the combined strength of the AFU and NGU, not adjusted for attrition. Overall institutional change effect is thus assessed as low to moderate.

Individual Training and Education (IT&E). UNIFIER began to expand into support to IT&E in 2017, with it being declared the main effort by the sixth rotation in Fall 2018.³³⁴ IT&E can be further broken down into 1) Individual Training (IT), which encompasses training courses designed to impart discrete skills and knowledge, such as sniper or combat medicine training; and 2) Professional Military Education (PME), which encompasses training courses designed to impart knowledge and inculcate attitudes, such as officer and NCO leadership courses.³³⁵ Most recent UNIFIER rotations created two separate functional groupings for IT and PME, however as PME and IT share many of the same themes, specifically the inculcating of the systems approach to training, they will be analysed together as IT&E. UNIFIER’s efforts in IT&E support began at the Military Police Academy in Lviv, with a two-person embedded mentor team: a Canadian OF-3 (Major) acting as deputy commander of the Academy, and a Canadian TDO in support. This remained the only IT&E effort until late 2017, when UNIFIER began to pull away from its CT activities and see the opportunity to influence the SFU

³³³ This adage is ascribed to John Wannamaker or Lord Leverhulme.

³³⁴ Department of National Defence (Canada), “End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 6” Canadian Joint Operations Command, April 1st, 2019.

³³⁵ Professor Ron Haycock describes the difference between training and education. Training, writes Haycock, provides “a predictable response to a predictable situation,” whereas education provides “a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation – critical thinking in the face of the unknown.” Ronald Haycock, *Clio, and Mars in Canada: The Need for Military Education*, Presentation to the Canadian Club, November 11th, 1999, Kingston Ontario. Quoted from Bernd Horn, “Warrior/Scholar: A Critical Union in the Contemporary Operating Environment,” *Educating the Leader and Leading the Educated: The Defence Learning, Education, and Training Handbook*, (Canadian Defence Academy Press: Kingston, 2012).

individual training system. In later 2017, UNIFIER placed embedded teams in several Officer and NCO academies across Ukraine. In 2018, advisors to the AFU Engineering Academy and the NGU recognized that a core problem of SFU training system was a lack of rigour in the analysis, design, and development of training courses. These advisors realized the potential of the embedded TDO at the Military Police Academy and leveraged that resource to begin teaching and demonstrating the value of the systems approach to training to the AFU Engineering School and the NGU NCO Academy.

Within nine months, UNIFIER had refocused its efforts on IT&E reform, and had assisted the AFU with the analysis, design, and development of thirty-nine IT&E courses. Specific attention was placed on NCO leadership courses, with AFU and NGU section commander and platoon second-in-command curriculums redesigned and developed using NATO methods.³³⁶ An NGU enlisted General Specification was also created, including job specifications, an expanded values-based military ethos, and the framework for a professional development system for enlisted leaders with training, education, and experiential gateways to achieve the next rank.³³⁷ This document was created by a panel of NGU senior NCOs with UNIFIER support, and was adopted by the NGU Commander in Fall 2018. The NGU public affairs office regularly published content on this effort, including the post below:

Significant work has also been accomplished in the reformation of the NGU's training system. The development of intensive and modern Basic Training and Basic Leadership courses using a combination of Ukrainian experience and Canadian expertise represents a significant step toward the implementation of a systematic approach to NCO training and recognition of the importance of the sergeant's corps within a military formation.³³⁸

This professional development system was in its third year as of the Russian invasion, with three courses (basic training, basic leadership course, and intermediate course) running with some Canadian oversight. These courses graduated between 400-900 squad sergeants and 150-200 platoon sergeants per year; there was no reliable data on how many NGU recruits had completed the new basic training course, but it is likely in the thousands. Graduate sergeants of the squad leader and platoon second-in-command courses are trained in Western tactics derived from NGU adopted US field manuals and are taught to operate in a mission command leadership environment. A Canadian advisor supporting the 4th RRB (the formation that retook the Hostemel airport in February 2022) collective training in August 2021 reported that the difference in quality between an Academy trained NCO and those who had not completed the training was "extremely evident."

Problems with the program exist, however. Whereas the General Specification declared that every single NGU sergeant was to undergo training at the Academy as a prerequisite for squad command, that is not the case, with "only a handful" of the sergeants in the 2nd Battalion

³³⁶ End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 6.

³³⁷ Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine, "The National Guard of Ukraine Non-Commissioned Member General Specification," Translation (Draft), July 2018.

³³⁸ National Guard of Ukraine, "The comprehensive partnership between the National Guard of Ukraine and the Canadian Joint Task Force in Ukraine (Operation UNIFIER)," Facebook Post, June 20th, 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/NGUmainpage/posts/2386328328055730>.

of 4th RRB having attended the Academy. This is assessed as a case of lack of capacity at the NCO Academy – it is currently structured to graduate up to nine hundred squad sergeants per year but needs up to twice that – and patronage by local chains of command on which of their subordinates were selected to attend the prestigious course.

The NGU NCO Academy example was chosen because of the availability of data on that program, and because it is suitable as an example for other lines of effort. It represents a fraction of the work that UNIFIER put into IT&E reform efforts; UNIFIER was present in three other AFU NCO academies, three officer academies, as well as several other training bases.³³⁹ In these locations UNIFIER assisted with the analysis, design, development, and implementation of basic and leadership courses, as well as specialty courses for sniper, reconnaissance, combat medicine, engineering, and armoured capabilities. The AFU NCO courses had a wider reach than the NGU course by graduating more sergeants, though it is likely that given their own capacity issues and the relative size of the AFU that NGU saturation levels were higher. The NGU NCO program is also reported by interviewees and by documents as one of the more successful programs to which UNIFIER has provided SFA. This is because reported to be because the NGU was a more willing and adaptive partner than the AFU, with therefore fewer principal-agent problems.

The officer academies proved more difficult to influence than that NCO academies. Many reasons were suggested for this, including that more attention was initially paid by UNIFIER and its allies to NCO professionalization. A critical path analysis informed this decision, as it was assessed that officer modernization would fail without a capable NCO corps to take on the tasks traditionally completed by officers in the Soviet military structure, including basic instruction and small unit leadership.³⁴⁰ It was also observed that officer academies' curriculums were far more entrenched than their NCO counterparts because of general recalcitrance amongst senior academy leadership, but also because of a bureaucratic feature of the Ukrainian education system. This feature placed all academic curriculums – including those of officer service academies but importantly not those of NCO academies – under the control of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education. This interaction with a separate ministry made reforms more difficult, as did the requirement to legislate through the Ukrainian parliament what Westerners would consider internal department of ministry policy. Interestingly, several interviewees and documents observed that many NCOs who had gone through the new training system became disgruntled when they returned to their units and were not employed by their officers in the way they had been trained.³⁴¹ In a backhand way, this can be viewed as a measure

³³⁹ NATO DEEP was also involved in officer and NCO academy reform and was viewed as an effective lever and partner linking UNIFIER's tactical efforts to DEEP's operational access. UNIFIER embedded advisors likewise provided NATO DEEP persistent monitoring and mentoring of reform efforts, which it was lacking before. For an example of NATO DEEP's efforts in NCO reform, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Building a corps of professional Non-commissioned Officers in Ukraine," NATO DEEP, April 18th, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_129998.htm.

³⁴⁰ It was still common by 2018 to encounter a Ukrainian Colonel supervising a gate guard at a Ukrainian base, or one teaching weapons classes "to a standard comparable to a CAN Senior NCO; that is to say, he will run his weapons class to a very high standard." Government of Canada, "Appendix 2 to Annex M– Security Force Capacity Building Lessons Learned," Operation UNIFIER Rotation 0 End Tour Report, Canadian Joint Operations Command, January 8th, 2016.

³⁴¹ The end tour reports for rotations 9, 10, and 11 all comment on this, as do several interview transcripts.

of effectiveness for the NCO professionalization program, as well as impetus to get on with the officer corps modernization program. This effort took a big leap forward in 2020, when the AFU adopted a new western-style officer professional development model, as well as new values-based leadership doctrine.³⁴²

Aside from improving the quality of IT&E, a large focus of UNIFIER from 2018 was ensuring that SFU could manage a Western-style professional development system on their own. Central to this was teaching the SFU the value of the SAT and understanding the need for a culture of rational analysis in their training system. One end tour report stated “The overarching goal [...] was to continue the evolution of the mission toward enduring effects that will enable a more professional and self-sustaining Security Forces of Ukraine (SFU) by focusing on *building the structures behind the training* (emphasis in original)”³⁴³ This saw an increase in the number of training development officers (TDOs), which were described by various task force commanders as ‘essential’, ‘high demand’ and their ‘most valuable players’, from one in 2018 to four in 2021. TDOs were some of the busiest assets in the task force, moving from location to location assisting UNIFIER and SFU officials with the conduct of professional development needs analyses, qualification standards and training plan writing boards, and the establishment of standards cells within training centers and academies. UNIFIER planned and executed a modified TDO course for the NGU, which qualified eight NGU training specialists to do some of the functions of a Canadian TDO.³⁴⁴ This capability development program was not executed perfectly; though the training and support to developing Ukrainian training development doctrine was provided, the NGU did not make meaningful organizational or policy changes around this capability. As a result, in one instance an important writing board was cancelled when an NGU training specialist was not made available by their separate chain of command to lead it. The AFU also began using training specialists, though they did not adopt the SAT as a concept as completely as the NGU. The AFU did embrace an initiative in 2021 to create an NCO Center of Excellence within their National Defence University to perform a standards and training plan management function for all NCO leadership courses within the AFU. This was reported in interviews and in the rotation eleven end tour report as an important step forward on the path to a professional NCO corps within the AFU.³⁴⁵

In total, UNIFIER estimates that some 13 800 SFU members had attended individual training courses supported by UNIFIER, though this number is difficult to measure, as many SFU courses now run independent of Canadian support. Support to the Military Police Academy in Lviv, for instance, was completely withdrawn in 2021 as that organization was assessed to be “on an irreversible, self-sustaining path to NATO interoperability”³⁴⁶

³⁴² General Staff of Ukraine, “Doctrine of Military Leadership Development in the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” December 2020 (translated copy).

³⁴³ End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 6, 1.

³⁴⁴ National Guard of Ukraine, “Training course for officers in curriculum development (TDO) has started,” NGU Press Center, February 17th, 2021, <https://ngu.gov.ua/ua/news/startuvav-kurs-pidgotovky-oficeriv-z-rozrobky-navchalnyh-program-tdo>. (accessed April 2nd, 2021).

³⁴⁵ Department of National Defence (Canada), “End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 11,” Canadian Joint Operations Command, September 2021.

³⁴⁶ End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 9, 30.

Using the model at Figure 10, most IT&E activities can be placed in levels two and three. Support to the NGU General Specification, work to generate an indigenous SAT capability, and support to the generation of the AFU Officer professional development system in level four. Notable activities in level three are the generation of curriculums and supporting training documents and policies, as well as the creation of standards organizations. Level two activities include basic support to SFU instructional capability and support to training center and academy operations groups. There are also a few activities in level one, especially between 2018 and 2020, though these are limited to the instruction of more difficult concepts such as NATO staff, planning, and leadership techniques. The immediate effect of these efforts is low, though the enduring effect could be significant should momentum be maintained. This is not a certainty, especially following the Russian invasion in February 2022. Using the SFA Engagement Matrix in Figure 12, activities can be placed within all four quadrants, though predominantly in Quadrants 2, 3, and 4. Specific Quadrant 4 activities – those which are deep and wide, include NCO development efforts, as well as the nascent effort in officer development. These activities have the highest change of building knowledge and shaping attitudes, beliefs, and values of the SFU. Though the short-term effect of these activities is not great, their impact will accumulate over time as more SFU service members attend IT&E courses, and the SFU’s ability to generate and maintain these courses matures. Institutional change potential is assessed as high, but fragile due to the interruption caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Institutional Change Theory Applied to the SFU and UNIFIER

Traditional HI theory would view the AFU and the NGU as path dependent organizations and have us look for critical junctures to identify and explain periods of change. The SFU changed little between 1991 and 2014, aside from a massive downsizing. In fact, practitioners often remarked that the Ukrainian military was more Soviet than the Russian military, which had begun its transformation efforts after its 2008 War in Georgia.³⁴⁷ For Ukraine, the 2014 Maidan Revolution and the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and conflict in the Donbas represents a critical juncture. These events not only brought down a government, but also completely changed Ukraine’s relationship with its security forces. Ukrainians realized that their underfunded, stagnant Soviet style military could not guarantee their security in the face of Russian aggression. Alongside a significant expansion, the Ukrainian government ordered a reform effort to bring Ukrainian security forces in line with NATO procedures, articulated in the 2016 Strategic Defence Bulletin. The United States, Canada, Britain, Lithuania, and NATO all began or increased their defence cooperation, deploying strategic advisors and military trainers to assist with Ukraine’s transformation efforts. The period between 2014 and 2022 will be viewed as a time of rapid change for the SFU. It is likely that the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine will also be looked at as a critical juncture, though the shape and form of the SFU following this war is unknown.

Even though a critical juncture exists in the Ukrainian case, it is still worth applying Thelen and Mahoney’s model for two reasons: 1) the difference between gradual and rapid change is a matter of scale. Eight years is a short period in the historical record but represents almost a third of a career officer’s service; and 2) Mahoney and Thelen’s model is still

³⁴⁷ Gregory P. Lannon, “Russia’s New Look Army Reforms and Russian Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 24 (2011): 26-52.

informative to how all institutional changes occur, not just gradual ones. This model can be found at Figure 8.

The political context of the SFU can be viewed as a function of international and domestic contexts. Internationally, Ukraine sits within the European RSC on the border with Europe's primary antagonist, making it within the security interests of several Euro-Atlantic powers. At least before 2022, it was perceived position as a weak state and a weak power. This weakness, combined with being within the sphere of interest of several larger, more powerful states – including the world's superpower – suggest that Ukraine would have weak veto power. The domestic context can be informed by concordance theory. In Ukraine discord on military style and recruitment methods exists between Western-aligned junior military leaders, political leaders, and society on one side, and a powerful but shrinking cadre of senior commanders on the other. In the still-rigid hierarchal structure of the SFU, this cadre of senior officers still hold significant veto power, though international and domestic pressure is steadily eroding that power. Political leadership proved itself willing in July 2021 to intervene to remove recalcitrant general officers from senior command positions. This move was likely welcomed and may have even been initiated by western advisors. Therefore, we can assess that the veto in Ukraine is strong but is weakening rapidly.

The institutional context of the SFU relates to how much discretion actors have when interpreting and enforcing existing rules. Like the political context, the institutional context is affected by international and domestic influences. International influence is exercised by SFA practitioners partnered directly with their SFU counterparts. These practitioners operate under and demonstrate the philosophy of mission command, which demands high levels of discretion in their decision making. Ukraine is struggling to shed its Soviet legacy of low-discretion, centralized command philosophy to adopt mission command, particularly within more senior generations of its officer corps. A 2021 end-tour report recorded the following:

One of the biggest barriers we have identified is the culture of punishment. When mistakes are made, investigations center not on finding ways to ensure we don't repeat the same mistakes and improving the system, but on who is responsible and should be punished. This results in a lack of trust, lack of delegation of authority and the stifling of initiative at every level.³⁴⁸

There is some evidence from the ongoing conflict that decentralized decision making and mission command has been adopted at the tactical level of the SFU,³⁴⁹ though documents and interview transcripts indicate that at more senior levels there remains low levels of discretion. Levels of discretion are likely trending higher under leadership of the reform-minded AFU commander in chief, General Zaluzhnyy.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ End Tour Report – Operation UNIFIER Rotation 11, 32.

³⁴⁹ Elliot Ackerman, "Ukraine's Three-to-One Advantage," *The Atlantic*, March 24th, 2022, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/american-volunteer-foreign-fighters-ukraine-russia-war/627604/> (accessed May 12th, 2022); "Andriy Zagorodnyuk explains why Russia's army is failing in Ukraine," *The Economist*, April 13th, 2022, <https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/andriy-zagorodnyuk-explains-why-russias-army-is-failing-in-ukraine/21808813> (accessed May 12th, 2022).

³⁵⁰ Herszenhorn and McLeary.

The characteristics of the political context (strong veto trending weaker), combined with the characteristics of the institution (low discretion but trending higher) suggest that layering, or the introduction of new rules on top of old ones, is the form of institutional change that is most likely to succeed in the SFU. The most effective change agent is the subversive, they who follow the rules and perform well to gain power and influence to change the institution from the inside. We do indeed see layering and subversives in the AFU – General Zaluzhnyy may be an example of a subversive who has made it to the very top, and several NGU colonels commented on and directly observed are also examples. Layering is present in officer academies, where new NATO curriculum is taught on top of or alongside old Soviet doctrine. Within the NGU, we also see displacement of the enlisted and NCO professional development model to existing policies, suggesting that insurrectionists are also present – direct observation of this program identifies a key NGU colonel behind this project as an insurrectionist. The NGU, being more receptive to change in general, has higher levels of institutional discretion, which would encourage drift or conversion, neither of which are specifically observed. This speaks to either a problem with the model, or more likely that the constant interplay of trending levels of discretion and strengths of veto create ‘micro-terrain’ in certain instances where different and unexpected kinds of action is more possible.

CHAPTER 9: CROSS CASE ANALYSIS

Evaluating Institutional Change

Of the three case studies, institutional change within the partnered force was reported most strongly in Ukraine (Op UNIFIER), weaker in CTAT-L, and most weakly in Jordan (CTAT-J). This is a qualitative assessment, based on the optimism contained within and the language used by interviewees and official documents. UNIFIER sources were optimistic that the UNIFIER mission was positively impacting the institutions of the SFU; this agreement increased over time from 2015 to 2021 and is correlated to the mission's expansion from the provision of tactical training at IPSC Yavoriv to the organizational and institutional levels of the SFU, beginning in 2017. Sources from Lebanon were less optimistic and, in some cases, pessimistic about the institutional – or even tactical – impact CTAT-L was having on the LAF. The two exceptions here were the logistics enhancement program, which has all but died since the 2021 financial crisis in Lebanon, and the CIMIC project, which too narrowly focused to be contagious. Finally, CTAT-J documents and practitioners reported the least optimism and the most pessimism about the institutional change effect of their activities; exceptions include support to the JTAC program and the CSS MTTs, both of which are too narrow and tactically focused to generate institutional change.

If UNIFIER was more successful in its reform mandate than CTAT-L and CTAT-J, the question becomes why. Part of the answer is certainly scale – the UNIFIER mission was larger and has lasted longer than either CTAT-L or CTAT-J, meaning there have been more opportunities for mission evolution as activities that 'stick' are reinforced and those that fail are dropped.³⁵¹ UNIFIER, as an important and desirable mission, received better resources than CTAT-L and CTAT-J. UNIFIER was generated from the regular force units. Commanders of these units would prepare for their missions well ahead of time and choose their teams carefully, often deploying with their best personnel in critical positions. CTAT-L and CTAT-J rotations, on the other hand, were assembled less deliberately, with far more augmentees and part-time reservists in key roles. Though most of these augmentees and reservists performed admirably, they did not enjoy the same unity of command, familiarity with their teammates, or resourcing as their counterparts deploying on UNIFIER.

Another part of the answer lies in the variable dynamics of the environmental conditions displayed in Figure 4 and discussed in each case study. Each case study is a complex adaptive system, with state fragility, societal divisions, civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems, making direct comparisons between case studies impossible. Nevertheless, an aggregate analysis of these factors suggest that Ukraine had fewer – or at least different – problems in these areas than Jordan or Lebanon, meaning there were fewer inhibitors to change and thus more fertile soil for SFA reform efforts. Table 2 summarizes the discussions from each of the case studies.

³⁵¹ For context on scale, UNIFIER typically deployed between 190 and 220 personnel full-time, occasionally supplemented by a small number of part-time deployments. CTAT-L had a ceiling of thirty-nine personnel, not all of whom would be in theatre at one time. CTAT-J had twenty-five full time and about five part-time soldiers. This made UNIFIER about five times larger than the CTATs in terms of deployed personnel.


Table 2 – Summary of Environmental Conditions in Case Studies

	UNIFIER	LEBANON	JORDAN
State Fragility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimal to moderate impact. - Fragile State Index (2022): 68.6; ranked 92nd least stable of 179 countries. Experienced drop in stability in 2014, but has improved since. - State has proven remarkably resilient following Russian invasion. - State was assessed moderately weak, but proved remarkably resilient following Russian invasion. - Lack of accountability allows for corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Significant impact. - Fragile State Index (2022): 91 points; ranked 27th least stable of 179 countries. Slightly more stable than 10 years ago, but data doesn't include full effects of recent economic crisis. - Yes. LAF is sometimes referred to as the "last standing institution" - Refugees are paid more than soldiers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimal impact. State is moderately weak, but JAF is insulated with steady support and funding. - Fragile State Index (2022): 76.6; ranked 67th least stable of 179 countries. Slightly less stable than 10 years ago, but trending positive in past 5 years. - Weak but resilient state, weak power.
Societal Division	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimal impact - Country has been pulled between pro-Russian and pro-European forces since Independence, however since 2014, country has been increasingly and is now almost totally pro-European. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimal impact. Though one of the most highly fractious states in the world, security sector is insulated by highly effective representation agreements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unknown impact, likely moderate. - Fractures between traditional rural tribes (i.e., the Bedouin) and more urban Palestinian population. Hashemites rely on both to maintain power. - Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood both have a presence in country.
Poor Civil-Military Relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improving slowly as country westernizes. Concordance issues with style and recruitment methods. between senior military leaders and politicians (manoeuvre vs mass). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concordance is present between political elite, society, and military leadership, though SFA is limited in effectiveness by desire of Lebanese parties towards the status quo. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimal impact at the level of engagement of CTAT-J (tactical/technical), likely larger impacts at higher levels. - Concordance issues with political decision making, and some discord on recruitment style.
Corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low impact at tactical/technical level of engagement, though logically more severe at higher levels of engagement. - Endemic at societal level, with several observable cases reported in research. - Assessed as 'formidable obstacle' to democratization of government institutions - Transparency International ranks Ukraine as the 122nd most corrupt of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 32. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Significant corruption reported at political and strategic level by press and academics. - None observed/reported by practitioners. - Impacts difficult to measure, but likely has significant effect on SFA. - Transparency International ranks Lebanon as the 154th most corrupt of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 24. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low impact. Though endemic in Jordanian society and in JAF, not observed by SFA practitioners, and not identified as major problem by US observers. - Transparency International Score of 49, and is the 58th most corrupt of 180 countries on the index. - Transparency International ranks Lebanon as the 58th most corrupt of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 49.
Principal-Agent Problems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic interest alignment. - Moderate impact at operational and tactical levels. Improving as mid-level commanders are promoted. - Serious and documented negative effect on SFA efforts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic interest misalignment. - Significant impact. - Present amongst senior military leaders, who have little interest in institutional change. - Reported in Log Enhancement and Cbt FA MTTs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strategic interest misalignment. - Moderate to significant impact - Reported in FET, CBRN, and CSSMT. - No for JTAC MTT.

This thesis suggests that part of the reason for UNIFIER’s success in achieving institutional change compared to CTAT-L and CTAT-J lies in approach. In aggregate, UNIFIER’s activities were focused more on the organizational and institutional levels than CTAT-L or CTAT-J. Using the model at Figure 10, most of UNIFIER’s activities can be classified within Approaches 2 and 3, whereas CTAT-L and CTAT-J’s activities were centered around Approaches 1 and 2. Figure 13 (next page) assesses the estimated weight of effort – which in this case is a function of the duration, number and rank or expertise of the SFA practitioners committed to an activity – of each case study. As is clear from the diagram, UNIFIER’s weight of effort was far more conducive to producing enduring effect than the two CTATs. For ease of reading, this information is also displayed in Table 3.

Table 3 – Levels of Engagement and Case Studies

	UNIFIER	LEBANON	JORDAN
Level 1 Direct provision of training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of 55 day coy and later battalion training package at CTC Yavoriv from 2015-2016. - MTT support in NATO Staff Procedures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Basic Winter Warfare project. - CIMIC operator course. - Cbt FA course. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - JTAC course. - CBRN course. - Female Engagement Team (FET). - CSS MTT.
Level 2 Support to schools, training centers, instructors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of 55 day battalion training package at CTC Yavoriv from 2016-2018. - Support to AFU Shiroki Lan CTC. - Support to NGU Stare IIMTC. - Support to AFU NCO Academies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Basic Winter Warfare project. - CIMIC operator course. - Cbt FA course. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - JTAC course. - CBRN course. - CSS MTT.
Level 3 Support to curriculum review, organizational structures, and policy development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NGU NCM DP 1-3 QS/TP WBs 2018-current. - AFU NCM DP 1-3 QS/TP WBs 2017-current. - Support to NGU recce/sniper program. - Support to AFU NCO Center of Excellence (Standards Cell, Kyiv) 2021-2022. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Log Enhancement Project / Technical School Training Development / Logistics Improvement Teams (name changes). - CIMIC Project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nil.
Level 4 Professional development systems reform (MES structures, general specifications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NGU NCM General Specification Writing Board project (2018). - SAT Implementation (TDO development project). - AFU Officer PDS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nil. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nil.



Note: Weight of effort is relative and to scale.

Figure 13 – SFA Engagement Levels (with case study data)

Using the model at Figure 12, UNIFIERS activities were also usually deeper and wider than CTAT-L or CTAT-Js. CTAT-J achieved depth but not width with their CSS and JTAC MTTs, and width but not depth with the CBRN MTT. CTAT-L achieved depth but not width with its LAF logistics and CIMIC MTT efforts. UNIFIER’s activities achieved width in support to collective training (over 19 000 pers directly trained by CAF personnel, with more trained indirectly),³⁵² and depth with its support to combat specialist training (specifically snipers and reconnaissance soldiers, medics, and engineers), its support to SAT training specialists, and support to the instructors and staff supporting collective and in support to PME instruction. Critically, UNIFIER achieved depth and width with its NCO corps development efforts and was attempting to replicate that success in officer corps development when the mission was paused in February 2022. Case study data is overlaid onto the SFA Engagement Matrix at Figure 14.

		Engagement Type	
		<u>Shallow</u> (focus on skills and simple knowledge)	<u>Deep</u> (primary focuses on attitudes and/or specialized knowledge)
Engagement Audience	Narrow Audience (small audience, low chance of institutional diffusion)	Quadrant 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CTAT-L: Winter MTT, CFA MTT • CTAT-J: FET • UNIFIER: Initial support to 55 day training program at IPSC Yavoriv 	Quadrant 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTAT-L: LAF Logistics, CIMIC MTT - CTAT-J: CSS MTT, JTAC MTT - UNIFIER: Training Development Officer cadre training, specialist combat support and service support capability (i.e. sniper, engineering, medical, etc.), support to CT cadres, support to PME instruction
	Wide Audience (large audience, increased chance of institutional diffusion)	Quadrant 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CTAT-L: Nil • CTAT-J: CBRN MTT • UNIFIER: Support to Collective Training centers (IPSC Yavoriv, Shiroki Lan) 	Quadrant 4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CTAT-L: Nil • CTAT-J: Nil • UNIFIER: NCO corps development, Officer corps development

Figure 14 – The SFA Engagement Matrix (with case study data)

This research does not discount the value of the provision of tactical training (Level 1 or Quadrant 1), particularly when urgent improvements to the combat effectiveness of the partnered force is the aim of the SFA intervention. The value of tactical training is transient, however. Even without the obvious problem of skill fade, there was strong evidence in all three case studies that the effects of level 1 and 2 SFA interventions dissipate over time, with the largest factors being training the wrong personnel, and the lose of SFA investment effort due to natural attrition. In Jordan, this was especially noted in the FET training team, where females who left the military at the end their service periods took months and years of training effort

³⁵² Op UNIFIER 101 Brief.

with them for no return. In Lebanon, there was a consistent problem of the wrong candidates being selected for training, including doctors and nurses being sent to first aid training courses. There is little data in Lebanon on attrition, but it is likely that a large minority of LAF members leave the military within a year of receiving training. There is more data for Ukraine, where after action document from 2015 reported the following:

The [SFU] have a contract model that results in up to 80% of [...] trainees expected to be out of the military within a year of receiving the training. In this environment, it is unlikely that focusing on firsthand delivery of training will result in a measurable enduring increase in the capacity of the [SFU].³⁵³

Though this metric improved over time, it did not resolve. In 2021, Marybeth Ulrich wrote that 80% of three-year contracts were not renewed by Ukrainian servicemembers, due to the SFU's "unreformed military bureaucracy and poor leadership."³⁵⁴ Train-the-trainer activities are not immune to this problem. Preliminary research for this thesis uncovered a telling example from Op NABERIUS (Niger). An interviewee reported that significant effort on their rotation went into identifying and training five Nigerien instructors, three of whom died in a non-training related car accident within months of receiving Canadian training.

Evaluating Success – The Use of Empirical Evidence

The 2022 war in Ukraine, and Ukraine's unexpected military success against Russia in its opening months, provides some empirical evidence that there has been institutional change within the SFU. As two datapoints, the SFU's response in 2022 was significantly more effective than its response to initial Russian aggression in 2014, where it suffered from command paralysis, ineffective training, bad tactics and sustainment, and poor leadership. Multiple professional and media sources attribute Ukrainian success at least partially to Western SFA since 2014, including analysis from the US Army Combined Arms Center, which describes the Ukrainian ground forces as "waging operational level warfare at a relatively high level" and attributes this as a good "return[...] on training investment" by US forces.³⁵⁵ Eliot Cohen wrote in *The Atlantic* that the "Ukrainian military has proved not only well motivated but tactically skilled" and attributed much of its success to the "extensive training by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada."³⁵⁶ Daniel Michaels of the *Wall Street Journal* wrote an article titled "The Secret of Ukraine's Military Success: Years of NATO Training," which opened with the line, "When Ukrainian National Guard Lt Andriy Kulish ambushed Russian forces, he thanks the Canadian army."³⁵⁷ Writing of the development of the Ukrainian NCO Corps, Tom Blackwell of the *National Post* writes "giving small-unit commanders the autonomy to make decisions on the fly was a cultural transformation for Ukrainian soldiers, but seems to be paying off in

³⁵³ RO ETR, APPENDIX 2 – SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING LESSONS LEARNED, dated 8 Jan 16, M2-1,

³⁵⁴ Ulrich, 15.

³⁵⁵ Department of the Army (US), "Ukraine-Russia Case Study – Observations, Insights, Lessons (Oil), March 7th, 2022," United States Combined Arms Center, The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).

³⁵⁶ Cohen, "Ukraine is Winning."

³⁵⁷ Michaels, "The Secret of Ukraine's Military Success..."

spades.”³⁵⁸ Sahar Lawryniuk wrote in *The Walrus*, “One part of Canada’s military legacy in Ukraine has become clear: the fact that the country has been able to resist for so long is a testament to the training it received.”³⁵⁹ Michael Kofman, a leading Russian military expert, says that, “the training [missions] had a real impact... there were a lot of improvements across the board...” though he also admits that, “there are also significant deficits, or issues, or challenges that the Ukrainian military had yet to advance.”³⁶⁰ Most articles mention the adoption of mission command and the strength of the Ukrainian NCO corps as key to Ukraine’s effectiveness; the adoption of both of these things indicate significant institutional change since 2014. Further analysis, removed from the emotion of the moment, may minimize the role of SFA in this transformation, but is unlikely to remove it completely.

Fortunately, there exists no similar opportunity to inform our understanding of CTAT-J or CTAT-L’s efforts in Jordan or Lebanon. Given the data collected to date, it is highly unlikely either the JAF or the LAF would show as much improvement as Ukraine.

Institutional Change Theory Applied to Case Studies

The answer to why UNIFIER was successful in supporting institutional change while CTAT-J and CTAT-L were not can be informed by using historical institutionalism. There are many similarities between the three case studies that would seem coincidental if one forgot that most military institutions – even adversarial ones – are often more like each other than they are to their own societies. There are two general ‘styles’ of military institutions: the manoeuvre and precision-fire based, mission-command led militaries favoured by much of the West; and the mass and attrition, centralized command led militaries favoured (or defaulted to) by the rest of the world.³⁶¹ All three case studies have military institutions that belong to the second group, though Ukraine is unique in that it wanted to become and made progress towards becoming a Western style military. This commonality of military style is critical to understanding why there are so many similarities between the three case studies when applying the model at Figure 8, summarized below in Table 4.

³⁵⁸ Tom Blackwell, “How training by Canada helped give Ukrainian army a chance against Russia,” *The National Post*, April 15th 2022, <https://nationalpost.com/news/world/how-training-by-canada-gave-ukrainian-army-fighting-chance-against-russia> (accessed June 19th, 2022).

³⁵⁹ Sahar Lawryniuk, “What Impact Did Canada’s Military Have on Ukrainian Resistance,” *The Walrus*, April 28th, 2022, <https://thewalrus.ca/canada-training-ukraine/>, (accessed June 19th, 2022).

³⁶⁰ Laura Jones and Kyle Atwell, “Political Warfare and the Road to Invasion: Irregular Warfare in Ukraine since 2014,” *The Irregular Warfare Podcast*, June 30th, 2022, 10m34s.

³⁶¹ This is, of course, a simplified viewpoint, but still a useful one, as it accurately describes important aspects of the organizational cultures of the two main groups. Mass-based armies at times use manoeuvre, and so-called manoeuvrist armies use attrition. Both use positional warfare. Soviet Deep Operations in the Second World War is the best example of operational level manoeuvre in history, and they were executed by mass-based armies.

Table 4 – Case Studies and Institutional Change Theory

	Path Dependent	Recent Critical Juncture in Security Sector resulting from Exogenous Shock	Thelen and Mahoney’s Theory Gradual Change Components				Comments
			Characteristics of Political Context (Veto)	Characteristics of Institution (Discretion)	Most Effective Dominant Change-Agent	Type of Institutional Change	
UKRAINE	Yes.	Yes, 2014 Maidan Revolution and subsequent Russian invasion; likely another one following 2022 invasion.	Strong but weakening veto.	Low discretion. (centralized command) Trending higher as mission command is adopted.	Subversives.	Layering.	Significant institutional change observed in multiple areas. Some subversives observed through direct observation from researcher in 2018. Insurrectionists also observed and described during research. Layering most common, though some displacement observed (i.e. NGU NCO development).
LEBANON	Yes.	No (last one was 1990 Ta’if agreement).	Strong veto. In spite of weak power status, the veto is reinforced by (mostly) concordance in CMA.	Low discretion (centralized command overbalances SFA efforts).	Subversives.	Layering.	Very little institutional change observed. No subversives described during research. Some young insurrectionists identified in log enhancement, but their influence is limited. Some layering in CIMIC and Log Enhancement.
JORDAN	Yes.	No (last one was 1994 Peace Agreement with Israel).	Strong veto. In spite of weak power status, the veto is reinforced by (mostly) concordance in CMA.	Low discretion (centralized command overbalances SFA efforts).	Subversives.	Layering.	Very little institutional change observed. Some layering is observed (i.e. CSS MTT, JTAC training). More JAF officers likely to be symbionts or opportunists in command climate of JAF, thus limiting institutional change.

All three institutions should be viewed as path dependent, with entrenched problems with historical roots and few easy fixes. Senior leaders in all organizations enjoyed strong vetoes, based primarily on the hierarchical nature of military institutions, and domestic factors unique to each country that offset international pressures to modify their institutions. This is strongly true in Lebanon and Jordan, and less true in Ukraine, where the weight of international and domestic pressure to reform and align to Euro-Atlantic standards eroded senior leaders' veto powers, especially after the election of the populist disruptor President Zelensky. As a function of their centralized command structures, all three institutions had low level of follower discretion, though again this was becoming less true in Ukraine, as mission command gained traction. In strong-veto, low-discretion institutions, subversives become the most effective change agent, and layering the most likely form of institutional change. Layering was observed to be true to a limited degree in all three case studies, though there was not enough data to clearly identify the existence of subversives in all three case studies or describe the role they played. There were insurrectionists observed in Ukraine and Lebanon, though only in Ukraine was displacement observed (i.e., NGU NCO development), indicating that insurrectionists had been successful.

There are two explanations within the HI theory as applied in this research for Ukraine's positive outcome compared to Lebanon and Jordan. The first is the size, scope, and effectiveness of internationally provided SFA assistance in Ukraine, which influenced the characteristics of the institution, began shifting the command culture of the SFU and incrementally increased the amount of discretion of Ukrainian service members. In short, SFA engagement in Ukraine did not fail – either because it was done right, or because the conditions laid out in Figure 4 were favourable. Most likely, it was both.

The second explanation is that Ukraine's security sector is in a critical juncture resulting from the exogenous shocks of the 2014 Maidan Revolution and the Russian invasion of Crimea and the Donbas. It is these shocks that increased the domestic and international pressure on the SFU to reform, weakened the veto of leaderships and lead to an increase in discretion of followers. It was not gradual change for Ukraine, but rather more rapid change that earlier historical institutionalists were comfortable explaining. In a short eight years, Ukraine increased the size and capabilities of its military to the point where it was able to fight to a standstill in 2022 the same Russian military that had caught it unprepared in 2014.

Lebanon and Jordan on the other hand, have experienced no obvious critical junctures within their security sectors, despite both experiencing the shocks of the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS, Jordan's recent political turmoil within the Royal Family, and Lebanon's economic collapse and teetering government. The LAF likely experienced one back in the early 1990s at the end of the Civil War and the implementation of the Ta-if Agreement and its adjusted representative mandate, but the LAF has been relatively stable since. The Arab Spring did not hit Lebanon or Jordan like it did Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, or Libya, and recent political troubles in Jordan or economic problems in Lebanon have not manifested into anything society shattering yet, if they ever do. If the LAF and the JAF are changing, they are doing so gradually. There was insufficient data present to determine if gradual institutional change is occurring within the LAF or JAF; the data that does exist suggests that the LAF and JAF are actively resisting change, or at least in the small parts of these institutions that the data illuminates.

CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Key Findings

To recall, military success in SFA is contributing to building an effective military, which are defined as one that fights with modern tactics, is capable and willing to undertake difficult tasks, and has a professional ethos grounded in respect for human rights, the laws of armed conflict, and democratic (or at least civilian) control of the use of force. SFA missions seek to reduce the pathologies of bad militaries and improve behaviour in each of the ways that militaries fail, identified in Figure 3. As militaries are institutions, what is really being measured here is institutional change.

This research found that significant institutional change was observed in Ukraine, but that little institutional change occurred in Jordan or Lebanon. To put it another way, SFA engagement in Ukraine contributed to its military becoming less fragile, less criminal, and less praetorian. No similar improvements at the same depth or scale occurred in Lebanon or Jordan. Though this finding supports the original hypothesis, it is not the revelation it seems to be on the surface. First, institutional change was not pursued or resourced in Jordan or Lebanon, so it is unfair to qualify CTAT-J or CTAT-L as having failed at something they were not directed to do. Whether they should have been directed is another question, addressed below. Second, the influence of SFA environmental conditions makes comparisons difficult. Referring to Figure 4, the SFA environment was more favourable for UNIFIER than it was for CTAT-L and CTAT-J, with less state fragility and fewer principal-agent problems in particular. Despite these limitations, there is substantial value in this research, and that its findings are relevant to how SFA missions are designed and executed.

The research question was: “how do tactical training and institutional engagement affect the professional development system of the partnered state?” The original hypothesis was that the professional development system of a partnered force is improved more by institutional level change efforts versus the provision of tactical training. It was further predicted that the higher and deeper these institutional reforms are made, the more the institution would improve. While the hypothesis was supported by the findings, the research process revealed two shortcomings. First, the provision of tactical training versus support to institutional level reform is a false dichotomy. These activities exist on a spectrum, with important activities existing between them. This spectrum of engagement forms the backbone of the SFA Engagement Levels model at Figure 10, which in turn was the foundation for much of the data analysis.

Second, not every SFA mission is tasked to produce an institutional level effect. Perhaps the most valuable contribution this research made was articulation of the difference between immediate and enduring effect. This concept was built upon successive UNIFIER Task Force Commanders’ comments in writing and in interview about how they viewed the problem of supporting a force that was simultaneously trying to modernize its institutions while fighting an active campaign in the Donbas. The interaction of immediate and enduring effect with different levels of engagement on the spectrum of engagement is explained by Figure 10. This graphic is both descriptive, in that it explains the outcomes of various activities, and prescriptive, in that it informs planners which activities they should pursue to meet desired outcomes.

These shortcomings lead to a revision of the research design and hypothesis shortly after research commenced and led to the final version of Figure 10, which may be the most important contribution of this thesis to the field. The revised hypothesis was that organizational and institutional level engagement within a partnered forces' professional development system is more likely to support enduring institutional change than tactical level efforts. This hypothesis leaves space for the value of tactical level activities aimed at producing immediate effects. Analysis of case study data showed a strong correlation between the level of engagement and the type of effect, increasing confidence in the model at Figure 10.

The best possible example of this is occurring at the time of writing. As of August 2022, several allied nations are restarting their training missions to Ukraine or starting them for the first time. This includes Canada, which has deployed 225 trainers to the United Kingdom to assist with the UK's effort to train 10 000 Ukrainian soldiers over the next several months.³⁶² Notably, the training to be provided is basic training, and represents all 'level one' and 'quadrant one' engagements according to Figure 10 and Figure 12. This is because the urgency of Russia's invasion of Ukraine demands an immediate effect, not a slower enduring one. Efforts at institutional reform take time to mature – time that a partnered force may not have. Even with sufficient time, success is far from certain, as two decades of SFA in Afghanistan show us.

Where enduring effects are desired, however, it is vitally important to understand that a pure focus on tactical activities will not do the job. You can't get there from here, as the saying goes. Analysis of activities in Lebanon and Jordan, where little or no institutional change is assessed to have occurred, supports this. It is also understood by at least some in Ottawa. In 2019, the CJOC Commander's Joint Assessment Team conducted an audit of the UNIFIER mission, and wrote this in their report:

Tactical training efforts [...] provide little enduring institutional effect and are unlikely to increase long-term operational success... in part due to the AFU's lack of a force-wide training system within which to standardize its doctrine through to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). As a result, ad hoc adoption of TTPs by disparate units is unlikely to remain over time and would have to be relearned prior to that unit's next rotation in the JFO, let alone passing on any successful TTPs to an incoming rotation of troops.³⁶³

By rotation nine, UNIFIER had directly articulated the difference between its activities aimed at immediate effect – which it called “tactical proficiency” and enduring effect, which it labelled “institutional professionalization.” Later rotations would relabel this as the two sometimes-competing, sometimes-supporting objectives of “NATO interoperability” and “survivability in the JFO.” To be clear, UNIFIER's focus on organizational and institutional level activities between 2018 and 2021 was effective and enabled it to have institutional level effects on the SFU.

³⁶² Murray Brewster, “Canada to join British-led mission to train Ukrainian recruits,” *CBC News*, August 4th, 2022, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/operation-unifier-canada-ukraine-training-1.6540588> (accessed August 4th, 2022).

³⁶³ CJAT Assessment Report, 17.

A problem for SFA practitioners is that the operational and strategic level headquarters too often fail to provide clear direction on the desired outcome of the SFA engagement. Earlier in this chapter, it was written that practitioners in CTAT-L and CTAT-J had not failed their mandate to achieve institutional level reform, because it is not clear that they had one. This point opens a much larger conversation: what are the strategic goals of the mission, and what should practitioners do to achieve them? To apply military theory, this is the imperative of linking tactical activities to strategic direction. Since the 1930s, this has been the realm of the operational level of war, which was conceived by Soviet military thinkers to do just that. If the strategic or political direction from GAC is the wholesale reform of a partner's security forces, then practitioners focused on the delivery of tactical training are not going to achieve this goal. Table 5 (below) records the strategic direction given by GAC, as well as how this direction was interpreted and articulated at the operational level, which in the case of UNIFIER spans the relationship between CJOC and the JTF-U Commander, and for CTAT-J and CTAT-L spans the relationship between CJOC and the JTF-I Commander. Finally, it identifies how the tactical level – the level of the SFA practitioner – applied the operational interpretation in theatre through SFA activities.

This analysis shows that the strategic level direction for the CTATs is not clear. Strengthening border security is a limited goal that implies immediate effect, though arguably for that effect to be sustainable, there must be some enduring effect as well. “Building the capacity of the Lebanese/Jordanian security forces” is far more ambiguous. Building capacity to do what? What sort of capacity? This strategic ambiguity bleeds downward through the operational level, with the mission statements simply repeating that they will “build partner capacity.” Again, to do what? Absent further guidance or direction, the tactical application is all closer to the bottom of the SFA engagement matrix, except where and when practitioners themselves reached higher (i.e., the CTAT-L Logistics Enhancement project).³⁶⁴ UNIFIER suffers far less from this ambiguity, with a golden thread of purpose tracing down through the strategic direction (greater Euro-Atlantic integration) through the operation interpretation (support SFU reforms, professionalization, and capacity building), to its tactical application, which includes activities across all Engagement Levels and within all four Engagement Quadrants.

It is apparent that GAC's strategic direction for Ukraine is both more specific and scoped larger than that for Lebanon and Jordan. It is also apparent that JTF-U interpreted this direction towards more specific operational-level goals of SFU reforms and professionalization, whereas JTF-I interpreted strategic direction more simply as capacity building. This interpretation at the operational level influences how and what activities are pursued and what approaches taken at the tactical level. It affects how the mission is designed, and how resources are allocated. Discounting any additional verbal or classified direction and taking what is GAC has openly published, GAC's strategic direction for Lebanon and Jordan could be interpreted to seek more institutional change within the LAF and the JAF; that did not happen, and either deliberately, accidentally, or because of one or more of the external factors listed in Figure 4, SFA engagement was kept at the tactical and technical levels.

³⁶⁴ Several CTAT-L and CTAT-J members expressed their desires and hopes for their missions to expand beyond a tactical and technical focus, with one commander stating that they believed integrating directly into the LAF training directorate was the one thing they should be doing that they were not.

Table 5 – Case Study Strategic Direction, Operational Interpretation, and Tactical Application

	Joint Task Force - IMPACT		Joint Task Force - Ukraine
	CTAT-L (Lebanon)	CTAT-J (Jordan)	UNIFIER (Ukraine)
Strategic Direction (GAC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “strengthening border security and building the capacity of Lebanese security forces.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “strengthening border security and building the capacity of Jordanian security forces.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “to safeguard[...] common interests with Ukraine such as gender equality, democracy, and the rules-based international order” “greater Euro-Atlantic integration” “security, prosperity, and freedom for all [Ukrainian] citizens.”
Operational Interpretation (Taken from mission statements)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint Task Force IMPACT will ENHANCE regional stability by building the capacity of regional Partner Forces and integrating with allied coalitions in order to enable the Canadian Armed Forces enduring influence and access in the Middle East. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “Joint Task Force Ukraine will support SFU reforms, professionalization, and capacity building IOT assist UKRs path to NATO interoperability and readiness for the JFO” (Roto 12).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “(CTAT-L will) BUILD partner capacity through projects and training delivery in order to ENABLE the LAF, ENHANCE regional stability and SUPPORT GAC’s Middle East Engagement Strategy.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “(CTAT-J will) BUILD partner capacity through projects and training delivery in order to ENABLE the JAF, ENHANCE regional stability and SUPPORT GAC’s Middle East Engagement Strategy.” 	
Tactical Application (task force engagements)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level One and Two activities (Figure 5.1). Quadrant One and Two activities (Figure 5.3) . Focus on transfer tactical and technical skills and knowledge. Winter warfare, combat first aid, and CIMIC training. Logistics enhancement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level One and Two activities (Figure 5.1). Quadrant One and Two activities (Figure 5.3). Focus on transfer of tactical and technical skills and knowledge. Combat logistics, CBRN and JTAC training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Levels one to four. Quadrants two to four. Focus initially on transfer of tactical and technical skills and knowledge, and then later as much as possible on organizational and institutional levels. Support to NCO professionalization, support to collective training organizations, support to IT courses, NATO staff courses.

Key Observations.

This section contains a series of key observations made during the literature review, data collection, or analysis phases of research.

The first observation is that even with a perfect approach, SFA missions can still fail for reasons outside their control. SFA problems rhyme across missions, and the ones identified as environmental conditions in Figure 4 – state fragility, societal divisions, poor civil-military relations, corruption, and principal-agent problems – can swamp even the best, most intelligent effort. It does not mean that SFA missions have no effect in an unfavourable environment, but it does mean that effect is going to be limited. The literature on SFA focusses on these problems for a reason, and that reason was borne out in this research.

The second observation is that institutional change theory proved to be a valuable lens on SFA missions. Thelen and Mahoney’s model of gradual change was useful, even if there were few instances of observed gradual change. By its nature, gradual change is hard to observe when it is occurring, and much easier to identify in hindsight. Older interpretations of HI, with its focus on exogenous shocks and critical junctures, explained institutional change where it was strongly observed in Ukraine, and where it was weakly observed in Lebanon and Jordan.

Next, all missions suffered by not applying a capability development framework from the starting point of each SFA engagement. There are several out there, including the US and NATO’s preferred DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities) and the UK’s TEPID OIL (Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Doctrine and concepts, Organization, Information, and Logistics), or Canada’s PRICIE-G (Personnel, Research and development, Infrastructure and organization, Concepts, doctrine, and collective training, Infrastructure, Equipment and material, and Generation of Forces). No matter the model one chooses, lacking one risks missing key components of an enduring capability. Training alone does not build a capability, not without the doctrine, policy, personnel, equipment, and infrastructure around it. Speaking on this topic, one senior officer from CTAT-L stated “we have an unrealistic expectation of what our training missions can do...”³⁶⁵ The effort to build a TDO capability within the SFU provides an excellent example of this. Though the delivery of training was effective, and eight Ukrainians were trained to some level of proficiency in training development, the NGU did not have the policies or organizations in place to support their new capability. As a result, their TDOs were misemployed and not available at critical times, specifically for writing board in Fall 2021. Though this research is not specifically about capability development, nor was it concerned with capability development frameworks, enough interviewees identified this weakness to warrant a comment in this section.

The next observation is that SFA missions get a boost to their effectiveness when they are vertically integrated. To put it another way, SFA works best when engagement occurs simultaneously at every level on the Spectrum of Engagement. It was found that level one activities reinforced level four activities and vice versa. As an example, consider the Canadian training provided to the NGU Rapid Reaction Brigade in Stare in summer 2021: NCOs trained in a Canadian supported NCO Academy (a level 3-4 activity) improved the quality of collective training (a level 1-2 activity). Credibility of both programs improved as a result. This was mentioned by several task force commanders, who indicated that it was valuable to have

³⁶⁵ A senior officer from CTAT-L.

Canadians involved in delivery of tactical training, as it provided feedback up the chain of command on how reform initiatives were being applied at the tactical and technical level. Brigadier General Jackson, Commander of the US Security Force Advisory Command, reported the same thing:

you now had a network of advisors from the top... to the bottom and so when you've identified tactical level problems that had strategic level issues... be it logistics or command and control or force generation, you saw the effects at the bottom, you identified the problem, then you flagged it and you reported it... up the advisor chain [...] and this enables solutions at the institutional level... it's all about solving problems throughout the depth of the particular environment by having nodes and sensors at every single level.³⁶⁶

This approach also mitigates the risk of only having immediate or only achieving enduring effect (at the expense of immediate effect). An integrated approach provides a cocktail of immediate and enduring effects that reinforce one another.

Canada had particular success in Ukraine achieving this vertical integration with their single Task Force model, linked firmly with the Defence Attaché and Canada's DRAB advisor, Ms. Jill Sinclair. Excellent unity of command and unity of effort was achieved. While the US had nodes at similar levels of the Ukrainian system, they were generated from and answered to several Commands and agencies³⁶⁷, and were not nearly as coordinated as Canadian nodes were, despite the presence of the Office of Defence Cooperation in the US Embassy. Two senior US Army officers remarked to this researcher that they were envious of the agility and responsiveness of the Canadian effort in Ukraine.

SFA engagement also must start somewhere. Often that place is at the tactical or technical level, for two simple reasons. First, this level of engagement is normally the most palatable to the partnered force, who may feel a sense of urgency over immediate security concerns, who may feel the need to build trust with their partnering force, and who may not understand what options exist for higher level engagement. Likewise, initial engagement at the tactical and technical level allows the assistance provider to build trust with the partnered force, and as importantly allows it to identify areas within the partnered force's system that could benefit from higher level engagement. Once those areas are identified, the partnering force should look to move up to the partnered force's organizational and institutional levels as soon as possible, while maintaining a foot in the tactical and technical level to continue achieving immediate effects, maintaining credibility, and providing observation on reform efforts from the 'shop floor.' This describes how Op UNIFIER expanded from two locations providing direct training between 2015 and 2017, to nearly forty locations by early 2022, with many focused on organizational and institutional reform efforts. This could provide a blueprint for missions such as CTAT-L and CTAT-J, who began their missions more dispersed than UNIFIER but with a similar focus on the tactical and technical level. The CTATs are now in their fourth year of

³⁶⁶ Nick Lopez, "The Practice and Politics of Security Force Assistance..." 33m25s and 34m30s

³⁶⁷ These included US Defence Education Advisory Group (DEAG), the US Office of Defence Cooperation (ODC), the US Defence Attaché, the California National Guard as part of the State Sponsorship Program, and the Joint Multi-National Training Group – Ukraine, and others. Most of these organizations reported to different higher headquarters and had little contact with each other.

operation and have made some limited inroads into the organizational levels of their respective partnered forces; UNIFIER was in its third year when it made its big expansion out of Yavoriv and up the spectrum of engagement. This expansion was driven by the vision of successive Task Force Commanders and made possible only because of the understanding of the operating environment built over time, and the trust they had built with their Ukrainian partners.

The second-to-last observation has to do with NCO professional development. Arguably the biggest distinction between a Western style, mission-command oriented military and other centralized command militaries is the existence of a professional NCO corps in the West. This NCO corps enables mission command by leading the smallest tactical units on the battlefield, by providing tactical and technical advice to the officer corps, and by managing a whole range of duties in the day-to-day activities of a military force, from conducting inspections to delivering training. Their existence allows the officer corps to focus on commanding, planning, and administrating the force, and enables mission command. A similarity amongst many partnered forces, including the SFU in 2014, the JAF, and the LAF, is a lack of a professional NCO corps. When the aim is to transform a military into a Western style force, the development of an NCO corps is a vital early step. This requires high level engagement at the organizational levels on the part of the SFA provider, but more importantly, it requires buy-in from the partnered force. The creation of an NCO corps fundamentally changes the military style of a partnered force, which Schiff identifies as one of the four areas within Concordance Theory. The creation of an NCO corps therefore has implications on the state's civil military relations, and can be resisted by senior military leaders, leading to principal-agent problems.

The final observation is a warning against the seductiveness of false metrics. Throughout data collection, official documents and presentations, news articles, and social media posts frequently trumpeted the number of soldiers trained by SFA practitioners, as if that on its own was an accurate measure of effectiveness. Rarely did these sources discuss to what level the partnered force was trained, if that training was useful, if that soldier was enabled to use their training, if that soldier remained in uniform after receiving training, or if that training led to any sustainable capability within the partnered force. Whether a partnered soldier received a week's worth of training or six months,' the statistic went on the slideshow all the same. This is, as Jim Storr calls it, "a classic misidentification of activity with outcome."³⁶⁸ Ken Burns was already quoted in Chapter Two, but his words are worth repeating: "when you can't measure what is important, you make what you can measure important."³⁶⁹ Burns was referring to the US military in Vietnam's propensity to measure the success of their operations through body counts; measuring SFA achievement by number of soldiers trained is a similar mistake. Most interviewees identified this as a problem, yet still numbers were sent up on the weekly report, because it was simple and quantifiable, and higher headquarters demanded it.

The problem with using numbers of soldiers trained as a metric is that it encourages SFA practitioners to pursue training in level one and quadrant one, rather than on the more difficult and less briefable activities at the organizational and institutional levels. It leads to the prioritization of simple individual training and collective training over more difficult to deliver

³⁶⁸ Jim Storr, *Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century* (Howgate Publishing Limited: Hampshire, 2022), 43.

³⁶⁹ Burns, *Vietnam*, Ep 4.

leadership training or even harder professional military education. It leaves out the value of advising and mentoring, the effects of which are not easily measured. As an advisor to the NGU in 2018, this researcher reported their statistics each week as zero Ukrainians trained, yet that period began the NCO professionalization effort that paid dividends at Hostemel Airport on February 22nd, 2022. Institutional change is usually intangible and does not present well on PowerPoint.

Future Research

There are several places to take this research next. To begin, the ongoing war in Ukraine offers us an unfortunate opportunity to link the empirical record of the behaviour of the SFU and its success in battle to SFA engagement. There are early reports cited in Chapter 8 of this research, but it is too early to tell what effect SFA actually has had on the SFU. Scholars will be looking at this subject in the future, surely. Their findings will be welcomed with great interest. Related to his research is an examination of the institutional systems in place within the SFU after the war, presuming that Ukraine can win (or at least not lose) the conflict. Do these institutions reflect pre-war SFA enabled systems? Old post-Soviet Ukrainian systems? Or is this invasion the critical juncture required to adopt Western systems rapidly and completely?

Next, if they find it useful, someone with a fresh perspective should try to integrate the two primary models proposed in this research into a single unified model for SFA engagement. The Engagement Levels (Figure 10) and the SFA Engagement Matrix (Figure 12) are useful tools on their own, but better when used in concert so that they may mitigate each others' shortcomings. A single model would be easier to apply and be more useful.

Finally, this thesis began with the goal of trying to identify ways to make military forces less prone to moral failings. This was a too-ambitious target, even naïve. It would involve a detailed look at how SFA missions shape the organizational culture of partnered forces that the researcher was not in a place to make. An intellectual appetite suppressant later, and the researcher settled on measuring institutional change instead. Institutional change can be seen as a waypoint on the path to improved organizational culture, however, if the partnering force pursues a value-positive approach to its engagement. Building an NCO corps is difficult work, but if the effort is being made, why not look to build one with a compelling ethos and a strong set of ethics? The literature review revealed three ways that militaries fail: they collapse in battle (Fabergé Egg Armies); they overthrow their own governments (the Praetorian Problem); and they lose the morale authority and support of their people or the international community through criminal actions (Criminality and Kleptocracy). This concept was not woven through this research as tightly as it could have been. Aside from being a useful model on its own, it may be a launching pad for future, more in-depth research, which examines how SFA can reshape organizational culture through institutional change within partnered forces to build militaries that are more capable, more credible, and more moral.

Conclusion.

This research suggests something that seems too simple: when conditions are favourable, and the practitioner approach is sound, SFA missions have a good chance of success. Perhaps because of its simplicity, this formula has not been articulated elsewhere. This is to our detriment when understanding and discussing SFA. While some scholars have studied the environmental conditions that lead to SFA success or failure, few have looked at how practitioner approaches affected mission success. The second part of the SFA success equation is where this research sought to leave its mark.

This research has found a correlation between approaches aimed at the organizational and institutional levels of a partnered force's professional development system and enduring institutional change within that system. These efforts are slow to actualize but accumulate over time. Conversely, SFA activities aimed at tactical and technical training achieve immediate effect that dissipates over time due to attrition or skill fade. This research makes no value judgement on the benefits of enduring effect over immediate effect, or vice versa. The value of enduring effects achieved in Ukraine between 2015 and 2021 outweighed the value of the immediate effects achieved. Since Russia's February 2022 invasion and Ukraine's mass mobilization to defend itself, it is easy to argue that immediate effects are more valuable than enduring ones. This research calls on SFA mission planners and practitioners at all levels to understand this distinction between immediate and enduring effect, articulate what the SFA mission is seeking to achieve, and to design and execute SFA missions accordingly.

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ANNEX A- LETTER OF INTERVIEW AND CONSENT

RMC War Studies TH 500

Major Jan Kool (Student # G6817)

05 November 2021

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LETTER
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS
OF PARTNERED MILITARY FORCES IN SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on institutional training and education reform of partnered forces in security force assistance (SFA) missions. Your current or recent deployment to Lebanon, Jordan, or Ukraine gives you a unique and valuable perspective on the conduct of SFA. The information you provide will be valuable to analyzing the effectiveness of different approaches to SFA and may lead to recommendations on how to improve the CAF and allied forces' approach to these missions. To be clear, you are not the subject of this research; you are providing information as an expert practitioner within the SFA field.

Specifically, this study is examining the institutional change effect various approaches to SFA have on the professional development systems of partnered forces. These approaches include the provision of tactical training (individual or collective), support to schools and training centers including infrastructure and train-the-trainer/faculty development, support to curriculum and policy development, and support to systems reforms such as the articulation of an ethos, the establishment of employment structures and specifications, and designing professional development frameworks.

All information you provide must be given freely and will be kept anonymous. Unless specific permission is asked, no names or other identifying traits will be published. Should at any time you wish to not answer a question or pursue a line of questioning, that will be respected and no further questions on that subject will be asked. Your interview(s) may be recorded; your verbal consent will be asked each time before recording begins.

Permission for this process has been sought and received by both Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA). Should you desire it, I can also reach out to your in-theatre chain of command and seek their approval on your behalf for you to participate. This is offered to limit professional risk to yourself, should you perceive there to be such. Should you have concerns or questions about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the chair of the Royal Military College (RMC) Research Ethics Board Chair, Dr Nicole Bérubé at Nicole.berube@rmc.ca.

This research is being conducting in pursuit of a Master of Arts in the War Studies Programme through RMC. The results will be shared both with CJOC and the Canadian Army.

Thank you, and please respond to this email indicating that you consent to be interviewed under the conditions outlined above.

Major Jan Kool
Student, Master of Arts Program in War Studies, The Royal Military College of Canada

ANNEX B- WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CONSENT

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CONSENT

I, _____ (rank and name), consent to having my responses used towards the aforementioned study, recognizing that my identity will remain confidential.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Note: an email from an official CAF email account will be treated as a written statement of consent.

ANNEX C- ACTIVE INTERVIEW PLAN

RMC War Studies TH 500

Jan Kool (Student # G6817)

29 Dec 21

ACTIVE INTERVIEW PLAN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS OF PARTNERED MILITARY FORCES IN SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

Ref: Holstein, James A, and Jaber F. Gubrium. *The Active Interview*. Sage Publications: London, 1995.

1. The following questions are meant to prompt discussion when required, and may not be asked in this order or at all if the answer is covered in a previous response.

- a. Opening remarks – consent to be recorded, reiterate that permissions have been granted by CJOC, DGMPPRA, and RMC Ethics
- b. Preliminary Question
 - (1) When did you deploy, to where, and what was your position on your recent deployment?
- c. Main Questions
 - (1) Can you describe the objectives of your mission?
 - (2) What was the nature of the security force assistance you provided? What sorts of things were you doing?
 - (3) Where did you see success? Which approaches were the most valuable?
 - (4) Where did you see failure? Which approaches were the least valuable?
 - (5) What challenges did your partnered force face?
 - (6) What impact did you have on your partnered force? Was there any lasting change?
 - (7) Were you working with the right people?
 - (8) Were there retention issues in your partnered force?
 - (9) If you could improve an aspect or aspects of your mission, what would they be?
 - (10) What do you feel optimistic about?
 - (11) What do you feel pessimistic about?
 - (12) Can you point me towards documents or reports that provide further information about the subjects we have discussed?
 - (13) Do you have anything else you wish to add?